London to Ladysmith via Pretoria by Winston Spencer Churchill

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While these things were passing a new pontoon bridge was being
constructed at a bend of the Tugela immediately under the Vaal Krantz
ridge, and by five o'clock this was finished. Nothing else was done
during the day, but at nightfall Lyttelton's Brigade was relieved by
Hildyard's, which marched across the new pontoon (No. 4) under a
desultory shell fire from an extreme range. Lyttelton's Brigade returned
under cover of darkness to a bivouac underneath the Zwartkop guns.
Their losses in the two days' operations had been 225 officers and men.

General Hildyard, with whom was Prince Christian Victor, spent the night
in improving the defences of the hill and in building new traverses and
head cover. At midnight the Boers made a fresh effort to regain the
position, and the sudden roar of musketry awakened the sleeping army.
The attack, however, was easily repulsed. At daybreak the shelling began
again, only now the Boers had brought up several new guns, and the
bombardment was much heavier. Owing, however, to the excellent cover
which had been arranged the casualties during the day did not exceed
forty. The Cavalry and Transport, who were sheltering in the hollows
underneath Zwartkop, were also shelled, and it was thought desirable to
move them back to a safer position.

In the evening Sir Redvers Buller, who throughout these two days had
been sitting under a tree in a somewhat exposed position, and who had
bivouacked with the troops, consulted with his generals. Many plans were
suggested, but there was a general consensus of opinion that it was
impossible to advance further along this line. At eleven at night
Hildyard's Brigade was withdrawn from Vaal Krantz, evacuating the
position in good order, and carrying with them their wounded, whom till
dark it had been impossible to collect. Orders were issued for the
general retirement of the army to Springfield and Spearman's, and by ten
o'clock on the 8th this operation was in full progress.

With feelings of bitter disappointment at not having been permitted to
fight the matter out, the Infantry, only two brigades of which had been
sharply engaged, marched by various routes to their former camping
grounds, and only their perfect discipline enabled them to control their
grief and anger. The Cavalry and Artillery followed in due course, and
thus the fourth attempt to relieve Ladysmith, which had been begun with
such hopes and enthusiasm, fizzled out into failure. It must not,
however, be imagined that the enemy conducted his defence without
proportionate loss.

What I have written is a plain record of facts, and I am so deeply
conscious of their significance that I shall attempt some explanation.

The Boer covering army numbers at least 12,000 men, with perhaps a dozen
excellent guns. They hold along the line of the Tugela what is
practically a continuous position of vast strength. Their superior
mobility, and the fact that they occupy the chord, while we must move
along the arc of the circle, enables them to forefront us with nearly
their whole force wherever an attack is aimed, however it may be
disguised. Therefore there is no way of avoiding a direct assault. Now,
according to Continental experience the attacking force should outnumber
the defence by three to one. Therefore Sir Redvers Buller should have
36,000 men. Instead of this he has only 22,000. Moreover, behind the
first row of positions, which practically runs along the edge of an
unbroken line of steep flat-topped hills, there is a second row standing
back from the edge at no great distance. Any attack on this second row
the Artillery cannot support, because from the plain below they are too
far off to find the Boer guns, and from the edge they are too close to
the enemy's riflemen. The ground is too broken, in the opinion of many
generals, for night operations. Therefore the attacking Infantry of
insufficient strength must face unaided the fire of cool, entrenched
riflemen, armed with magazine weapons and using smokeless powder.

Nevertheless, so excellent is the quality of the Infantry that if the
whole force were launched in attack it is not impossible that they would
carry everything before them. But after this first victory it will be
necessary to push on and attack the Boers investing Ladysmith. The line
of communications must be kept open behind the relieving army or it will
be itself in the most terrible danger. Already the Boers' position
beyond Potgieter's laps around us on three sides. What if we should
break through, only to have the door shut behind us? At least two
brigades would have to be left to hold the line of communications. The
rest, weakened by several fierce and bloody engagements, would not be
strong enough to effect the relief.

The idea of setting all on the turn of the battle is very grateful and
pleasant to the mind of the army, which only asks for a decisive trial
of strength, but Sir Redvers Buller has to remember that his army,
besides being the Ladysmith Relief Column, is also the only force which
can be spared to protect South Natal. Is he, therefore, justified in
running the greatest risks? On the other hand, how can we let Ladysmith
and all its gallant defenders fall into the hands of the enemy? It is
agonising to contemplate such a conclusion to all the efforts and
sacrifices that have been made. I believe and trust we shall try again.
As long as there is fighting one does not reflect on this horrible
situation. I have tried to explain some of the difficulties which
confront the General. I am not now concerned with the attempts that
have been made to overcome them. A great deal is incomprehensible, but
it may be safely said that if Sir Redvers Buller cannot relieve
Ladysmith with his present force we do not know of any other officer in
the British Service who would be likely to succeed.

CHAPTER XXI

HUSSAR HILL

[Illustration: Map of the Operations of the Natal Field Army
from January 11 to February 9.]

General Buller's Headquarters: February 15, 1900.

When Sir Redvers Buller broke off the combat of Vaal Krantz, and for the
third time ordered his unbeaten troops to retreat, it was clearly
understood that another attempt to penetrate the Boer lines was to be
made without delay.

The army has moved from Spearman's and Springfield to Chieveley, General
Lyttelton, who had succeeded Sir Francis Clery, in command of the 2nd
Division and 4th Brigade, marching via Pretorius's Farm on the 9th and
10th, Sir Charles Warren covering the withdrawal of the supplies and
transport and following on the 10th and 11th. The regular Cavalry
Brigade, under Burn-Murdoch, was left with two battalions to hold the
bridge at Springfield, beyond which place the Boers, who had crossed the
Tugela in some strength at Potgieter's, were reported to be showing
considerable activity. The left flank of the marching Infantry columns
was covered by Dundonald's Brigade of Light Horse, and the operations
were performed without interruption from the enemy. On the 12th orders
were issued to reconnoitre Hussar Hill, a grassy and wooded eminence
four miles to the east of Chieveley, and the direction of the next
attack was revealed. The reader of the accounts of this war is probably
familiar with the Colenso position and understands its great strength.
The proper left of this position rests on the rocky, scrub-covered hill
of Hlangwani, which rises on the British side of the Tugela. If this
hill can be captured and artillery placed on it, and if it can be
secured from cross fire, then all the trenches of Fort Wylie and along
the river bank will be completely enfiladed, and the Colenso position
will become untenable, so that Hlangwani is the key of the Colenso
position. In order, however, to guard this key carefully the Boers have
extended their left--as at Trichardt's Drift they extended their
right--until it occupies a very lofty range of mountains four or five
miles to the east of Hlangwani, and along all this front works have been
constructed on a judicious system of defence. The long delays have given
ample time to the enemy to complete his fortifications, and the trenches
here are more like forts than field works, being provided with overhead
cover against shells and carefully made loopholes. In front of them
stretches a bare slope, on either side rise formidable hills from which
long-range guns can make a continual cross-fire. Behind this position,
again, are others of great strength.

But there are also encouraging considerations. We are to make--at least
in spite of disappointments we hope and believe we are to make--a
supreme effort to relieve Ladysmith. At the same time we are the army
for the defence of South Natal. If we had put the matter to the test at
Potgieter's and failed, our line of communications might have been cut
behind us, and the whole army, weakened by the inevitable heavy losses
of attacking these great positions, might have been captured or
dispersed. Here we have the railway behind us. We are not as we were at
Potgieter's 'formed to a flank.' We derive an accession of strength from
the fact that the troops holding Railhead are now available for the
general action.

Besides these inducements this road is the shortest way. Buller,
therefore, has elected to lose his men and risk defeat--without which
risk no victory can be won---on this line. Whether he will succeed or
not were foolish to prophesy, but it is the common belief that this line
offers as good a chance as any other and that at last the army will be
given a fair run, and permitted to begin a general engagement and fight
it out to the end. If Buller goes in and wins he will have accomplished
a wonderful feat of arms, and will gain the lasting honour and gratitude
of his country. If he is beaten he will deserve the respect and sympathy
of all true soldiers as a man who has tried to the best of his ability
to perform a task for which his resources were inadequate. I hasten to
return to the chronicle. Hussar Hill--so-called because a small post of
the 13th Hussars was surprised on it six weeks ago and lost two men
killed--is the high ground opposite Hlangwani and the mountainous ridges
called Monte Cristo and Cingolo, on which the Artillery must be posted
to prepare the attack. Hence the reconnaissance of the 12th.

At eight o'clock--we never get up early in this war--Lord Dundonald
started from the cavalry camp near Stuart's Farm with the South African
Light Horse, the Composite Regiment, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry,
the Colt Battery, one battalion of Infantry, the Royal Welsh Fusiliers,
and a battery of Field Artillery. The Irregular Horse were familiar with
the ground, and we soon occupied Hussar Hill, driving back a small Boer
patrol which was watching it, and wounding two of the enemy. A strong
picket line was thrown out all round the captured ground and a dropping
musketry fire began at long range with the Boers, who lay hidden in the
surrounding dongas. At noon Sir Redvers Buller arrived, and made a
prolonged reconnaissance of the ground with his telescope. At one
o'clock we were ordered to withdraw, and the difficult task of
extricating the advanced pickets from close contact with the enemy was
performed under a sharp fire, fortunately without the loss of a man.

After you leave Hussar Hill on the way back to Chieveley camp it is
necessary to cross a wide dip of ground. We had withdrawn several miles
in careful rearguard fashion, the guns and the battalion had gone back,
and the last two squadrons were walking across this dip towards the
ridge on the homeward side. Perhaps we had not curled in our tail quite
quick enough, or perhaps the enemy has grown more enterprising of late,
in any case just as we were reaching the ridge a single shot was fired
from Hussar Hill, and then without more ado a loud crackle of musketry
burst forth. The distance was nearly two thousand yards, but the
squadrons in close formation were a good target. Everybody walked for
about twenty yards, and then without the necessity of an order broke
into a brisk canter, opening the ranks to a dispersed formation at the
same time. It was very dry weather, and the bullets striking between the
horsemen raised large spurts of dust, so that it seemed that many men
must surely be hit. Moreover, the fire had swelled to a menacing roar. I
chanced to be riding with Colonel Byng in rear, and looking round saw
that we had good luck. For though bullets fell among the troopers quite
thickly enough, the ground two hundred yards further back was all alive
with jumping dust. The Boers were shooting short.

We reached the ridge and cover in a minute, and it was very pretty to
see these irregular soldiers stop their horses and dismount with their
carbines at once without any hesitation. Along the ridge Captain Hill's
Colt Battery was drawn up in line, and as soon as the front was clear
the four little pink guns began spluttering furiously. The whole of the
South African Light Horse dismounted and, lining the ridge, opened fire
with their rifles. Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry came into line on
our left flank, and brought two tripod Maxims into action with them.
Lord Dundonald sent back word to the battery to halt and fire over our
heads, and Major Gough's Regiment and the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, who had
almost reached cover, turned round of their own accord and hurried
eagerly in the direction of the firing, which had become very loud on
both sides.

There now ensued a strange little skirmish, which would have been a
bloody rifle duel but for the great distance which separated the
combatants and for the cleverness with which friends and foes concealed
and sheltered themselves. Not less than four hundred men on either side
were firing as fast as modern rifles will allow. Between us stretched
the smooth green dip of ground. Beyond there rose the sharper outlines
of Hussar Hill, two or three sheds, and a few trees. That was where the
Boers were. But they were quite invisible to the naked eye, and no smoke
betrayed their positions. With a telescope they could be seen--a long
row of heads above the grass. We were equally hidden. Still their
bullets--a proportion of their bullets--found us, and I earnestly trust
that some of ours found them. Indeed there was a very hot fire, in spite
of the range. Yet no one was hit. Ah, yes, there was one, a tall trooper
turned sharply on his side, and two of his comrades carried him quickly
back behind a little house, shot through the thigh. A little further
along the firing line another was being helped to the rear. The Colt
Battery drew the cream of the fire, and Mr. Garrett, one of the experts
sent out by the firm, was shot through the ankle, but he continued to
work his gun. Captain Hill walked up and down his battery exposing
himself with great delight, and showing that he was a very worthy
representative of an Irish constituency.

I happened to pass along the line on some duty or other when I noticed
my younger brother, whose keen desire to take some part in the public
quarrel had led me, in spite of misgivings, to procure him a
lieutenancy, lying on the ground, with his troop. As I approached I saw
him start in the quick, peculiar manner of a stricken man. I asked him
at once whether he was hurt, and he said something--he thought it must
be a bullet--had hit him on the gaiter and numbed his leg. He was quite
sure it had not gone in, but when we had carried him away we found--as I
expected--that he was shot through the leg. The wound was not serious,
but the doctors declared he would be a month in hospital. It was his
baptism of fire, and I have since wondered at the strange caprice which
strikes down one man in his first skirmish and protects another time
after time. But I suppose all pitchers will get broken in the end.
Outwardly I sympathised with my brother in his misfortune, which he
mourned bitterly, since it prevented him taking part in the impending
battle, but secretly I confess myself well content that this young
gentleman should be honourably out of harm's way for a month.

It was neither our business nor our pleasure to remain and continue this
long-range duel with the Boers. Our work for the day was over, and all
were anxious to get home to luncheon. Accordingly, as soon as the
battery had come into action to cover our withdrawal we commenced
withdrawing squadron by squadron and finally broke off the engagement,
for the Boers were not inclined to follow further. At about three
o'clock our loss in this interesting affair was one officer, Lieutenant
John Churchill, and seven men of the South African Light Horse wounded
and a few horses. Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry also had two
casualties, and there were two more in the Colt detachments. The Boers
were throughout invisible, but two days later when the ground was
revisited we found one dead burgher--so that at any rate they lost more
heavily than we. The Colt guns worked very well, and the effect of the
fire of a whole battery of these weapons was a marked diminution in the
enemy's musketry. They were mounted on the light carriages patented by
Lord Dundonald, and the advantage of these in enabling the guns to be
run back by hand, so as to avoid exposing the horses, was very obvious.

I shall leave the great operation which, as I write, has already begun,
to another letter, but since gaiety has its value in these troublous
times let the reader pay attention to the story of General Hart and the
third-class shot. Major-General Hart, who commands the Irish Brigade, is
a man of intrepid personal courage--indeed, to his complete contempt for
danger the heavy losses among his battalions, and particularly in the
Dublin Fusiliers, must be to some extent attributed. After Colenso there
were bitter things said on this account. But the reckless courage of the
General was so remarkable in subsequent actions that, being brave men
themselves, they forgave him everything for the sake of his daring.
During the first day at Spion Kop General Hart discovered a soldier
sitting safely behind a rock and a long way behind the firing line.

'Good afternoon, my man,' he said in his most nervous, apologetic voice;
'what are you doing here?'

'Sir,' replied the soldier, 'an officer told me to stop here, sir.'

'Oh! Why?'

'I'm a third-class shot, sir.'

'Dear me,' said the General after some reflection, 'that's an awful
pity, because you see you'll have to get quite close to the Boers to do
any good. Come along with me and I'll find you a nice place,' and a
mournful procession trailed off towards the most advanced
skirmishers.[3]

FOOTNOTES:

[3] The map at the end of Chapter XXV. illustrates this and succeeding
chapters.

CHAPTER XXII

THE ENGAGEMENT OF MONTE CRISTO

Cingolo Neck: February 19, 1900.

Not since I wrote the tale of my escape from Pretoria have I taken up my
pen with such feelings of satisfaction and contentment as I do to-night.
The period of doubt and hesitation is over. We have grasped the nettle
firmly, and as shrewdly as firmly, and have taken no hurt. It remains
only to pluck it. For heaven's sake no over-confidence or premature
elation; but there is really good hope that Sir Redvers Buller has
solved the Riddle of the Tugela--at last. At last! I expect there will
be some who will inquire--'Why not "at first"?' All I can answer is
this: There is certainly no more capable soldier of high rank in all the
army in Natal than Sir Redvers Buller. For three months he has been
trying his best to pierce the Boer lines and the barrier of mountain and
river which separates Ladysmith from food and friends; trying with an
army--magnificent in everything but numbers, and not inconsiderable even
in that respect--trying at a heavy price of blood in Africa, of anxiety
at home. Now, for the first time, it seems that he may succeed. Knowing
the General and the difficulties, I am inclined to ask, not whether he
might have succeeded sooner, but rather whether anyone else would have
succeeded at all. But to the chronicle!

Anyone who stands on Gun Hill near Chieveley can see the whole of the
Boer position about Colenso sweeping before him in a wide curve. The
mountain wall looks perfectly unbroken. The river lies everywhere buried
in its gorge, and is quite invisible. To the observer there is only a
smooth green bay of land sloping gently downward, and embraced by the
rocky, scrub-covered hills. Along this crescent of high ground runs--or
rather, by God's grace, ran the Boer line, strong in its natural
features, and entrenched from end to end. When the map is consulted,
however, it is seen that the Tugela does not flow uniformly along the
foot of the hills as might be expected, but that after passing Colenso
village, which is about the centre of the position, it plunges into the
mountainous country, and bends sharply northward; so that, though the
left of the Boer line might appear as strong as the right, there was
this difference, that the Boer right had the river on its front, the
Boer left had it in its rear.

The attack of the 15th of December had been directed against the Boer
right, because after reconnaissance Sir Redvers Buller deemed that, in
spite of the river advantage, the right was actually the weaker of the
two flanks. The attack of the 15th was repulsed with heavy loss. It
might, therefore, seem that little promise of success attended an attack
on the Boer left. The situation, however, was entirely altered by the
great reinforcements in heavy artillery which had reached the army, and
a position which formerly appeared unassailable now looked less
formidable.

Let us now consider the Boer left by itself. It ran in a chain of
sangars, trenches, and rifle pits, from Colenso village, through the
scrub by the river, over the rugged hill of Hlangwani, along a smooth
grass ridge we called 'The Green Hill,' and was extended to guard
against a turning movement on to the lofty wooded ridges of Monte Cristo
and Cingolo and the neck joining these two features. Sir Redvers
Buller's determination was to turn this widely extended position on its
extreme left, and to endeavour to crumple it from left to right. As it
were, a gigantic right arm was to reach out to the eastward, its
shoulder at Gun Hill, its elbow on Hussar Hill, its hand on Cingolo, its
fingers, the Irregular Cavalry Brigade, actually behind Cingolo.

On February 12th a reconnaissance in force of Hussar Hill was made by
Lord Dundonald. On the 14th the army moved east from Chieveley to occupy
this ground. General Hart with one brigade held Gun Hill and Railhead.
The First Cavalry Brigade watched the left flank at Springfield, but
with these exceptions the whole force marched for Hussar Hill. The
Irregular Cavalry covered the front, and the South African Light Horse,
thrown out far in advance, secured the position by half-past eight, just
in time to forestall a force of Boers which had been despatched, so soon
as the general movement of the British was evident, to resist the
capture of the hill. A short sharp skirmish followed, in which we lost a
few horses and men, and claim to have killed six Boers, and which was
terminated after half an hour by the arrival of the leading Infantry
battalion--the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. During the day the occupation was
completed, and the brigades of Generals Wynne, Coke, and Barton, then
joining Warren's Division with the Artillery, entrenched themselves
strongly and bivouacked on the hill. Meanwhile Lyttelton's Division
marched from its camp in the Blue Krantz Valley, east of Chieveley,
along the valley to a position short of the eastern spurs of Hussar
Hill. These spurs are more thickly wooded and broken than the rest of
the hill, and about four o'clock in the afternoon some hundred Boers
established themselves among the rocks and opened a sharp fire. They
were, however, expelled from their position by the Artillery and by the
fire of the advanced battalions of Lyttelton's Division operating from
the Blue Krantz Valley.

During the 15th and 16th a desultory artillery duel proceeded on both
sides with slight loss to us. The water question presented some
difficulty, as the Blue Krantz River was several miles from Hussar Hill
and the hill itself was waterless. A system of iron tanks mounted on ox
waggons was arranged, and a sufficient though small supply maintained.
The heavy artillery was also brought into action and strongly
entrenched. The formidable nature of the enemy's position and the
evident care with which he had fortified it may well have added to the
delay by giving cause for the gravest reflection.

On the afternoon of the 16th Sir Redvers Buller resolved to plunge, and
orders were issued for a general advance at dawn. Colonel Sandbach,
under whose supervision the Intelligence Department has attained a new
and a refreshing standard of efficiency, made comprehensive and, as was
afterwards proved, accurate reports of the enemy's strength and spirit,
and strongly recommended the attack on the left flank. Two hours before
dawn the army was on the move. Hart's Brigade, the 6-inch and other
great guns at Chieveley, guarded Railhead. Hlangwani Hill, and the long
line of entrenchments rimming the Green Hill, were masked and fronted by
the display of the field and siege batteries, whose strength in guns was
as follows:

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