Evidences of Christianity by William Paley

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What would be the real effect of that overpowering evidence which our
adversaries require in a revelation it is difficult foretell; at least
we must speak of it as of a dispensation which we have no experience.
Some consequences, however, would, it is probable, attend this economy,
which do not seem to befit a revelation that proceeded from God. One is,
that irresistible proof would restrain the voluntary powers too much;
would not answer the purpose of trial and probation; would call for no
exercise of candour, seriousness, humility, inquiry, no submission of
passion, interests, and prejudices, to moral evidence and to probable
truth; no habits of reflection; none of that previous desire to learn
and to obey the will of God, which forms perhaps the test of the
virtuous principle, and which induces men to attend, with care and
reverence, to every credible intimation of that will, and to resign
present advantages and present pleasures to every reasonable expectation
of propitiating his favour. "Men's moral probation may be, whether they
will take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration; and,
afterwards, whether they will act, as the case requires, upon the
evidence which they have. And this we find by experience is often our
probation in our temporal capacity." (Butler's Analogy, part ii. c. 6.)

II. These modes of communication would leave no place for the admission
of internal evidence; which ought, perhaps, to bear a considerable part
in the proof of every revelation, because it is a species of evidence
which applies itself to the knowledge, love, and practice, of virtue,
and which operates in proportion to the degree of those qualities which
it finds in the person whom it addresses. Men of good dispositions,
amongst Christians, are greatly affected by the impression which the
Scriptures themselves make upon their minds. Their conviction is much
strengthened by these impressions. And this perhaps was intended to be
one effect to be produced by the religion. It is likewise true, to
whatever cause we ascribe it (for I am not in this work at liberty to
introduce the Christian doctrine of grace or assistance, or the
Christian promise that, "if any man will do his will, he shall know of
the doctrine, whether it be of God" John vii. 17.),--it is true, I say,
that they who sincerely act, or sincerely endeavour to act, according to
what they believe, that is, according to the just result of the
probabilities, or, if you please, the possibilities in natural and
revealed religion, which they themselves perceive, and according to a
rational estimate of consequences, and, above all, according to the just
effect of those principles of gratitude and devotion which even the view
of nature generates in a well-ordered mind, seldom fail of proceeding
farther. This also may have been exactly what was designed.

Whereas, may it not be said that irresistible evidence would confound
all characters and all dispositions? would subvert rather than promote
the true purpose of the Divine counsels; which is, not to produce
obedience by a force little short of mechanical constraint, (which
obedience would be regularity, not virtue, and would hardly perhaps
differ from that which inanimate bodies pay to the laws impressed upon
their nature), but to treat moral agents agreeably to what they are;
which is done, when light and motives are of such kinds, and are
imparted in such measures, that the influence of them depends upon the
recipients themselves? "It is not meet to govern rational free agents in
via by sight and sense. It would be no trial or thanks to the most
sensual wretch to forbear sinning, if heaven and hell were open to his
sight. That spiritual vision and fruition is our state in patria."
(Baxter's Reasons, p. 357.) There may be truth in this thought, though
roughly expressed. Few things are more improbable than that we (the
human species) should be the highest order of beings in the universe:
that animated nature should ascend from the lowest reptile to us, and
all at once stop there. If there be classes above us of rational
intelligences, clearer manifestations may belong to them. This may be
one of the distinctions. And it may be one to which we ourselves
hereafter shall attain.

III. But may it not also be asked, whether the perfect display of a
future state of existence would be compatible with the activity of civil
life, and with the success of human affairs? I can easily conceive that
this impression may be overdone; that it may so seize and fill the
thoughts as to leave no place for the cares and offices of men's several
stations, no anxiety for worldly prosperity, or even for a worldly
provision, and, by consequence, no sufficient stimulus to secular
industry. Of the first Christians we read, "that all that believed were
together, and had all things common; and sold their possessions and
goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need; and continuing
daily with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread from house to
house, did eat their meat with gladness and singleness of heart" (Acts
ii. 44-46.) This was extremely natural, and just what might be expected
from miraculous evidence coming with full force upon the senses of
mankind: but I much doubt whether, if this state of mind had been
universal, or long-continued, the business of the world could have gone
on. The necessary art of social life would have been little cultivated.
The plough and the loom would have stood still. Agriculture,
manufactures, trade, and navigation, would not, I think, have
flourished, if they could have been exercised at all. Men would have
addicted themselves to contemplative and ascetic lives, instead of lives
of business and of useful industry. We observe that St. Paul found it
necessary frequently to recall his converts to the ordinary labours and
domestic duties of their condition; and to give them, in his own
example, a lesson of contented application to their worldly employments.

By the manner in which the religion is now proposed, a great portion of
the human species is enabled and of these multitudes of every generation
are induced, to seek and effectuate their salvation through the medium
of Christianity, without interruption of the prosperity or of the
regular course of human affairs.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SUPPOSED EFFECTS OF CHRISTIANITY.

That a religion which under every form in which it is taught holds forth
the final reward of virtue and punishment of vice, and proposes those
distinctions of virtue and vice which the wisest and most cultivated
part of mankind confess to be just, should not be believed, is very
possible; but that, so far as it is believed, it should not produce any
good, but rather a bad effect upon public happiness, is a proposition
which it requires very strong evidence to render credible. Yet many have
been found to contend for this paradox, and very confident appeals have
been made to history and to observation for the truth of it.

In the conclusions, however, which these writers draw from what they
call experience, two sources, I think, of mistake may be perceived.

One is, that they look for the influence of religion in the wrong place.

The other, that they charge Christianity with many consequences for
which it is not responsible.

I. The influence of religion is not to be sought for in the councils of
princes, in the debates or resolutions of popular assemblies, in the
conduct of governments towards their subjects, of states and sovereigns
towards one another; of conquerors at the head of their armies, or of
parties intriguing for power at home (topics which alone almost occupy
the attention, and fill the pages of history); but must be perceived, if
perceived at all, in the silent course of private and domestic life.
Nay, even there its influence may not be very obvious to observation. If
it check, in some degree, personal dissoluteness, if it beget general
probity in the transaction of business, if it produce soft and humane
manners in the mass of the community, and occasional exertions of
laborious or expensive benevolence in a individuals, it is all the
effect which can offer itself to external notice. The kingdom of heaven
is within us. That which the substance of the religion, its hopes and
consolation, its intermixture with the thoughts by day and by night, the
devotion of the heart, the control of appetite, the steady direction of
will to the commands of God, is necessarily invisible. Yet these depend
the virtue and the happiness of millions. This cause renders the
representations of history, with respect to religion, defect and
fallacious in a greater degree than they are upon any other subject.
Religion operates most upon those of whom history knows the least; upon
fathers and mothers their families, upon men-servants and maid-servants,
upon orderly tradesman, the quiet villager, the manufacturer at his
loom, the husbandman in his fields. Amongst such, its collectively may
be of inestimable value, yet its effects, in mean time, little upon
those who figure upon the stage of world. They may know nothing of it;
they may believe nothing of it; they may be actuated by motives more
impetuous than those which religion is able to excite. It cannot, be
thought strange that this influence should elude the grasp and touch of
public history; for what is public history but register of the successes
and disappointments, the vices, the follies, and the quarrels, of those
who engage in contentions power?

I will add, that much of this influence may be felt in times of public
distress, and little of it in times of public wealth and security.
This also increases the uncertainty of any opinions that we draw
from historical representations. The influence of Christianity is
commensurate with no effects which history states. We do not pretend
that it has any such necessary and irresistible power over the affairs
of nations as to surmount the force of other causes.

The Christian religion also acts upon public usages and institutions, by
an operation which is only secondary and indirect. Christianity is not a
code of civil law. It can only reach public institutions through private
character. Now its influence upon private character may be considerable,
yet many public usages and institutions repugnant to its principles may
remain. To get rid of these, the reigning part of the community must
act, and act together. But it may be long before the persons who compose
this body be sufficiently touched with the Christian character to join
in the suppression of practices to which they and the public have been
reconciled by causes which will reconcile the human mind to anything, by
habit and interest. Nevertheless, the effects of Christianity, even in
this view, have been important. It has mitigated the conduct of war, and
the treatment of captives. It has softened the administration of
despotic, or of nominally despotic governments. It has abolished
polygamy. It has restrained the licentiousness of divorces. It has put
an end to the exposure of children and the immolation of slaves. It has
suppressed the combats of gladiators,* and the impurities of religions
rites. It has banished, if not unnatural vices, at least the toleration
of them. It has greatly meliorated the condition of the laborious part,
that is to say, of the mass of every community, by procuring for them a
day of weekly rest. In all countries in which it is professed it has
produced numerous establishments for the relief of sickness and poverty;
and in some, a regular and general provision by law. It has triumphed
over the slavery established in the Roman empire: it is contending, and
I trust will one day prevail, against the worse slavery of the West
Indies.

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* Lipsius affirms (Sat. b. i. c. 12) that the gladiatorial shows
sometimes cost Europe twenty or thirty thousand lives in a month; and
that not only the men, but even the women of all ranks were passionately
fond of these shows. See Bishop Porteus, Sermon XIII.
_________

A Christian writer, (Bardesanes, ap. Euseb. Praep. Evang. vi. 10.) so
early as in the second century, has testified the resistance which
Christianity made to wicked and licentious practices though established
by law and by public usage:--"Neither in Parthia do the Christians,
though Parthians, use polygamy; nor in Persia, though Persians, do they
marry their own daughters; nor among the Bactri, or Galli, do they
violate the sanctity of marriage; nor wherever they are, do they suffer
themselves to be overcome by ill-constituted laws and manners."

Socrates did not destroy the idolatry of Athens, or produce the slighter
revolution in the manners of his country.

But the argument to which I recur is, that the benefit of religion,
being felt chiefly in the obscurity of private stations, necessarily
escapes the observation of history. From the first general notification
of Christianity to the present day, there have been in every age many
millions, whose names were never heard of, made better by it, not only
in their conduct, but in their disposition; and happier, not so much in
their external circumstances, as in that which is inter praecordia, in
that which alone deserves the name of happiness, the tranquillity and
consolation of their thoughts. It has been since its commencement the
author of happiness and virtue to millions and millions of the human
race. Who is there that would not wish his son to be a Christian?

Christianity also, in every country in which it is professed, hath
obtained a sensible, although not a complete influence upon the public
judgment of morals. And this is very important. For without the
occasional correction which public opinion receives, by referring to
some fixed standard of morality, no man can foretel into what
extravagances it might wander. Assassination might become as honourable
as duelling: unnatural crimes be accounted as venal as fornication is
wont to be accounted. In this way it is possible that many may be kept
in order by Christianity who are not themselves Christians. They may be
guided by the rectitude which it communicates to public opinion. Their
consciences may suggest their duty truly, and they may ascribe these
suggestions to a moral sense, or to the native capacity of the human
intellect, when in fact they are nothing more than the public opinion,
reflected from their own minds; and opinion, in a considerable degree,
modified by the lessons of Christianity. "Certain it is, and this is a
great deal to say, that the generality, even of the meanest and most
vulgar and ignorant people, have truer and worthier notions of God more
just and right apprehensions concerning his attributes and perfections,
a deeper sense of the difference of good and evil, a greater regard to
moral obligations, and to the plain and most necessary duties of life,
and a more firm and universal expectation of a future state of rewards
and punishments, than in any heathen country any considerable number of
men were found to have had." (Clarke, Ev. Nat. Rel. p. 208. ed. v.)

After all, the value of Christianity is not to be appreciated by its
temporal effects. The object of revelation is to influence human conduct
in this life; but what is gained to happiness by that influence can only
be estimated by taking in the whole of human existence. Then, as hath
already been observed, there may be also great consequences of
Christianity which do not belong to it as a revelation. The effects upon
human salvation of the mission, of the death, of the present, of the
future agency of Christ, may be universal, though the religion be not
universally known.

Secondly, I assert that Christianity is charged with many consequences
for which it is not responsible. I believe that religious motives have
had no more to do in the formation of nine tenths of the intolerant and
persecuting laws which in different countries have been established upon
the subject of religion, than they have had to do in England with the
making of the game-laws. These measures, although they have the
Christian religion for their subject, are resolvable into a principle
which Christianity certainly did not plant (and which Christianity could
not universally condemn, because it is not universally wrong), which
principle is no other than this, that they who are in possession of
power do what they can to keep it. Christianity is answerable for no
part of the mischief which has been brought upon the world by
persecution, except that which has arisen from conscientious
persecutors. Now these perhaps have never been either numerous or
powerful. Nor is it to Christianity that even their mistake can fairly
be imputed. They have been misled by an error not properly Christian or
religious, but by an error in their moral philosophy. They pursued the
particular, without adverting to the general consequence. Believing
certain articles of faith, or a certain mode of worship, to be highly
conducive, or perhaps essential, to salvation, they thought themselves
bound to bring all they could, by every means, into them, and this they
thought, without considering what would be the effect of such a
conclusion when adopted amongst mankind as a general rule of conduct.
Had there been in the New Testament, what there are in the Koran,
precepts authorising coercion in the propagation of the religion, and
the use of violence towards unbelievers, the case would have been
different. This distinction could not have been taken, nor this defence
made.

I apologise for no species nor degree of persecution, but I think that
even the fact has been exaggerated. The slave-trade destroys more in a
year than the Inquisition does in a hundred or perhaps hath done since
its foundation.

If it be objected, as I apprehend it will be, that Christianity is
chargeable with every mischief of which it has been the occasion, though
not the motive; I answer that, if the malevolent passions be there, the
world will never want occasions. The noxious element will always find a
conductor. Any point will produce an explosion. Did the applauded
intercommunity of the pagan theology preserve the peace of the Roman
world? did it prevent oppressions, proscriptions, massacres,
devastation? Was it bigotry that carried Alexander into the East, or
brought Caesar into Gaul? Are the nations of the world into which
Christianity hath not found its way, or from which it hath been
banished, free from contentions? Are their contentions less ruinous and
sanguinary? Is it owing to Christianity, or to the want of it, that the
regions of the East, the countries inter quatuor maria, peninsula of
Greece, together with a great part of the Mediterranean coast, are at
this day a desert? or that the banks of the Nile, whose constantly
renewed fertility is not to be impaired by neglect, or destroyed by the
ravages of war, serve only for the scene of a ferocious anarchy, or the
supply of unceasing hostilities? Europe itself has known no religious
wars for some centuries, yet has hardly ever been without war. Are the
calamities which at this day afflict it to be imputed to Christianity?
Hath Poland fallen by a Christian crusade? Hath the overthrow in France
of civil order and security been effected by the votaries of our
religion, or by the foes? Amongst the awful lessons which the crimes and
the miseries of that country afford to mankind this is one; that in
order to be a persecutor it is not necessary to be a bigot: that in rage
and cruelty, in mischief and destruction, fanaticism itself can be
outdone by infidelity.

Finally, if war, as it is now carried on between nations produce less
misery and ruin than formerly, we are indebted perhaps to Christianity
for the change more than to any other cause. Viewed therefore even in
its relation to this subject, it appears to have been of advantage to
the world. It hath humanised the conduct of wars; it hath ceased to
excite them.

The differences of opinion that have in all ages prevailed amongst
Christians fall very much within the alternative which has been stated.
If we possessed the disposition which Christianity labours, above all
other qualities, to inculcate, these differences would do little harm.
If that disposition be wanting, other causes, even were these absent,
would continually rise up to call forth the malevolent passions into
action. Differences of opinion, when accompanied with mutual charity,
which Christianity forbids them to violate, are for the most part
innocent, and for some purposes useful. They promote inquiry,
discussion, and knowledge. They help to keep up an attention to
religious subjects, and a concern about them, which might be apt to die
away in the calm and silence of universal agreement. I do not know that
it is in any degree true that the influence of religion is the greatest
where there are the fewest dissenters.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE CONCLUSION,

In religion, as in every other subject of human reasoning, much depends
upon the order in which we dispose our inquiries. A man who takes up a
system of divinity with a previous opinion that either every part must
be true or the whole false, approaches the discussion with great
disadvantage. No other system, which is founded upon moral evidence,
would bear to be treated in the same manner. Nevertheless, in a certain
degree, we are all introduced to our religious studies under this
prejudication. And it cannot be avoided. The weakness of the human
judgment in the early part of youth, yet its extreme susceptibility of
impression, renders it necessary to furnish it with some opinions, and
with some principles or other. Or indeed, without much express care, or
much endeavour for this purpose, the tendency of the mind of man to
assimilate itself to the habits of thinking and speaking which prevail
around him, produces the same effect. That indifferency and suspense,
that waiting and equilibrium of the judgment, which some require in
religious matters, and which some would wish to be aimed at in the
conduct of education, are impossible to be preserved. They are not given
to the condition of human life.

It is a consequence of this institution that the doctrines of religion
come to us before the proofs; and come to us with that mixture of
explications and inferences from which no public creed is, or can be,
free. And the effect which too frequently follows, from Christianity
being presented to the understanding in this form, is, that when any
articles, which appear as parts of it, contradict the apprehension of
the persons to whom it is proposed, men of rash and confident tempers
hastily and indiscriminately reject the whole. But is this to do
justice, either to themselves or to the religion? The rational way of
treating a subject of such acknowledged importance is, to attend, in the
first place, to the general and substantial truth of its principles, and
to that alone. When we once feel a foundation; when we once perceive a
ground of credibility in its history; we shall proceed with safety to
inquire into the interpretation of its records, and into the doctrines
which have been deduced from them. Nor will it either endanger our
faith, or diminish or alter our motives for obedience, if we should
discover that these conclusions are formed with very different degrees
of probability, and possess very different degrees of importance.

This conduct of the understanding, dictated by every rule of right
reasoning, will uphold personal Christianity, even in those countries in
which it is established under forms the most liable to difficulty and
objection. It will also have the further effect of guarding us against
the prejudices which are wont to arise in our minds to the disadvantage
of religion, from observing the numerous controversies which are carried
on amongst its professors; and likewise of inducing a spirit of lenity
and moderation in our judgment, as well as in our treatment of those who
stand, in such controversies, upon sides opposite to ours. What is clear
in Christianity we shall find to be sufficient, and to be infinitely
valuable; what is dubious, unnecessary to be decided, or of very
subordinate importance, and what is most obscure, will teach us to bear
with the opinions which others may have formed upon the same subject. We
shall say to those who the most widely dissent from us, what Augustine
said to the worst heretics of his age; "Illi in vos saeviant, qui
nasciunt, cum quo labore verum inveniatur, et quam difficile caveantur
errores;---qui nesciunt, cure quanta difficultate sanetur oculus
interioris hominis;--qui nesciunt, quibus suspiriis et gemitibus fiat ut
ex quantulacumque parte possit intelligi Deus.". (Aug. contra. Ep. Fund.
Cap. ii. n. 2,3.)

A judgment, moreover, which is once pretty well satisfied of the general
truth of the religion will not only thus discriminate in its doctrines,
but will possess sufficient strength to overcome the reluctance of the
imagination to admit articles of faith which are attended with
difficulty of apprehension, if such articles of faith appear to be truly
parts of the revelation. It was to be expected beforehand, that what
related to the economy and to the persons of the invisible world, which
revelation profess to do, and which, if true, it actually does, should
contain some points remote from our analogies, and from the
comprehension of a mind which hath acquired all its ideas from sense and
from experience.

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