Evidences of Christianity by William Paley

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1. The judgment of antiquity, though varying in the precise year of the
publication of the three Gospels, concurs in assigning them a date prior
to the destruction of Jerusalem. (Lardner, vol. xiii.)

2. This judgment is confirmed by a strong probability arising from the
course of human life. The destruction of Jerusalem took place in the
seventieth year after the birth of Christ. The three evangelists, one of
whom was his immediate companion, and the other two associated with his
companions, were, it is probable, not much younger than he was. They
must, consequently, have been far advanced in life when Jerusalem was
taken; and no reason has been given why they should defer writing their
histories so long.

3. (Le Clerc, Diss. III. de Quat. Evang. num. vii. p. 541.) If the
evangelists, at the time of writing the Gospels, had known of the
destruction of Jerusalem, by which catastrophe the prophecies were
plainly fulfilled, it is most probable that, in recording the
predictions, they would have dropped some word or other about the
completion; in like manner as Luke, after relating the denunciation of a
dearth by Agabus, adds, "which came to pass in the days of Claudius
Caesar;" (Acts xi. 28.) whereas the prophecies are given distinctly in
one chapter of each of the first three Gospels, and referred to in
several different passages of each, and in none of all these places does
there appear the smallest intimation that the things spoken of had come
to pass. I do admit that it would have been the part of an impostor, who
wished his readers to believe that this book was written before the
event, when in truth it was written after it, to have suppressed any
such intimation carefully. But this was not the character of the authors
of the Gospel. Cunning was no quality of theirs. Of all writers in the
world, they thought the least of providing against objections. Moreover,
there is no clause in any one of them that makes a profession of their
having written prior to the Jewish wars, which a fraudulent purpose
would have led them to pretend. They have done neither one thing nor the
other; they have neither inserted any words which might signify to the
reader that their accounts were written before the destruction of
Jerusalem, which a sophist would have done; nor have they dropped a hint
of the completion of the prophecies recorded by them, which an
undesigning writer, writing after the event, could hardly, on some or
other of the many occasions that presented themselves, have missed of
doing.

4. The admonitions* which Christ is represented to have given to his
followers to save themselves by flight are not easily accounted for on
the supposition of the prophecy being fabricated after the event. Either
the Christians, when the siege approached, did make their escape from
Jerusalem, or they did not: if they did, they must have had the prophecy
amongst them: if they did not know of any such prediction at the time of
the siege, if they did not take notice of any such warning, it was an
improbable fiction, in a writer publishing his work near to that time
(which, on any, even the lowest and most disadvantageous supposition,
was the case with the gospels now in our hands), and addressing his work
to Jews and to Jewish converts (which Matthew certainly did), to state
that the followers of Christ had received admonition of which they made
no use when the occasion arrived, and of which experience then recent
proved that those who were most concerned to know and regard them were
ignorant or negligent. Even if the prophecies came to the hands of the
evangelists through no better vehicle than tradition, it must have been
by a tradition which subsisted prior to the event. And to suppose that
without any authority whatever, without so much as even any tradition to
guide them, they had forged these passages, is to impute to them a
degree of fraud and imposture from every appearance of which their
compositions are as far removed as possible.

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* "When ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that the
desolation thereof is nigh; then let them which are in Judea flee to the
mountains; then let them which are in the midst of it depart out, and
let not them that are in the countries enter thereinto."--Luke xxi. 20,
21.
"When ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then let them which
be in Judea flee unto the mountains; let him which is on the house-top
not come down to take anything out of his house; neither let him which
is in the field return back to take his clothes."--Matt. xiv. 18.
_________

5. I think that, if the prophecies had been composed after the event,
there would have been more specification. The names or descriptions of
the enemy, the general, the emperor, would have been found in them. The
designation of the time would have been more determinate. And I am
fortified in this opinion by observing that the counterfeited prophecies
of the Sibylline oracles, of the twelve patriarchs, and, I am inclined
to believe, most others of the kind, are mere transcripts of the
history, moulded into a prophetic form.

It is objected that the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem is
mixed or connected with expressions which relate to the final judgment
of the world; and so connected as to lead an ordinary reader to expect
that these two events would not be far distant from each other. To which
I answer, that the objection does not concern our present argument. If
our Saviour actually foretold the destruction of Jerusalem, it is
sufficient; even although we should allow that the narration of the
prophecy had combined what had been said by him on kindred subjects,
without accurately preserving the order, or always noticing the
transition of the discourse.

CHAPTER II.

THE MORALITY OF THE GOSPEL.

Is stating the morality of the Gospel as an argument of its truth, I am
willing to admit two points; first, that the teaching of morality was
not the primary design of the mission; secondly, that morality, neither
in the Gospel, nor in any other book, can be a subject, properly
speaking, of discovery.

If I were to describe in a very few words the scope of Christianity as a
revelation,* I should say that it was to influence the conduct of human
life, by establishing the proof of a future state of reward and
punishment,--"to bring life and immortality to light." The direct
object, therefore, of the design is, to supply motives, and not rules;
sanctions, and not precepts. And these were what mankind stood most in
need of. The members of civilised society can, in all ordinary cases,
judge tolerably well how they ought to act: but without a future state,
or, which is the same thing, without credited evidence of that state,
they want a motive to their duty; they want at least strength of motive
sufficient to bear up against the force of passion, and the temptation
of present advantage. Their rules want authority. The most important
service that can be rendered to human life, and that consequently which
one might expect beforehand would be the great end and office of a
revelation from God, is to convey to the world authorised assurances of
the reality of a future existence. And although in doing this, or by the
ministry of the same person by whom this is done, moral precepts or
examples, or illustrations of moral precepts, may be occasionally given
and be highly valuable, yet still they do not form the original purpose
of the mission.

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* Great and inestimably beneficial effects may accrue from the mission
of Christ, and especially from his death, which do not belong to
Christianity as a revelation: that is, they might have existed, and they
might have been accomplished, though we had never, in this life, been
made acquainted with them. These effects may be very extensive; they may
be interesting even to other orders of intelligent beings. I think it is
a general opinion, and one to which I have long come, that the
beneficial effects of Christ's death extend to the whole human species.
It was the redemption of the world. "He is the propitiation for our
sins, and not for ours only, but for the whole world;" 1 John ii. 2.
Probably the future happiness, perhaps the future existence of the
species, and more gracious terms of acceptance extended to all, might
depend upon it or be procured by it. Now these effects, whatever they
be, do not belong to Christianity as a revelation; because they exist
with respect to those to whom it is not revealed.
_________

Secondly; morality, neither in the Gospel nor in any other book, can be
a subject of discovery, properly so called. By which proposition I mean
that there cannot, in morality, be anything similar to what are called
discoveries in natural philosophy, in the arts of life, and in some
sciences; as the system of the universe, the circulation of the blood,
the polarity of the magnet, the laws of gravitation, alphabetical
writing, decimal arithmetic, and some other things of the same sort;
facts, or proofs, or contrivances, before totally unknown and unthought
of. Whoever, therefore, expects in reading the New Testament to be
struck with discoveries in morals in the manner in which his mind was
affected when he first came to the knowledge of the discoveries above
mentioned: or rather in the manner in which the world was affected by
them, when they were first published; expects what, as I apprehend, the
nature of the subject renders it impossible that he should meet with.
And the foundation of my opinion is this, that the qualities of actions
depend entirely upon their effects, which effects must all along have
been the subject of human experience.

When it is once settled, no matter upon what principle, that to do good
is virtue, the rest is calculation. But since the calculation cannot be
instituted concerning each particular action, we establish intermediate
rules; by which proceeding, the business of morality is much
facilitated, for then it is concerning our rules alone that we need
inquire, whether in their tendency they be beneficial; concerning our
actions, we have only to ask whether they be agreeable to the rules. We
refer actions to rules, and rules to public happiness. Now, in the
formation of these rules, there is no place for discovery, properly so
called, but there is ample room for the exercise of wisdom, judgment,
and prudence.

As I wish to deliver argument rather than panegyric, I shall treat of
the morality of the Gospel in subjection to these observations. And
after all, I think it such a morality as, considering from whom it came,
is most extraordinary; and such as, without allowing some degree of
reality to the character and pretensions of the religion, it is
difficult to account for: or, to place the argument a little lower in
the scale, it is such a morality as completely repels the supposition of
its being the tradition of a barbarous age or of a barbarous people, of
the religion being founded in folly, or of its being the production of
craft; and it repels also, in a great degree, the supposition of its
having been the effusion of an enthusiastic mind.

The division under which the subject may be most conveniently treated is
that of the things taught, and the manner of teaching.

Under the first head, I should willingly, if the limits and nature of my
work admitted of it, transcribe into this chapter the whole of what has
been said upon the morality of the Gospel by the author of The Internal
Evidence of Christianity; because it perfectly agrees with my own
opinion, and because it is impossible to say the same things so well.
This acute observer of human nature, and, as I believe, sincere convert
to Christianity, appears to me to have made out satisfactorily the two
following positions, viz.--

I. That the Gospel omits some qualifies which have usually engaged the
praises and admiration of mankind, but which, in reality, and in their
general effects, have been Prejudicial to human happiness.

II. That the Gospel has brought forward some virtues which possess the
highest intrinsic value, but which have commonly been overlooked and
contemned.

The first of these propositions he exemplifies in the instances of
friendship, patriotism, active courage; in the sense in which these
qualities are usually understood, and in the conduct which they often
produce.

The second, in the instances of passive courage or endurance of
sufferings, patience under affronts and injuries, humility,
irresistance, placability.

The truth is, there are two opposite descriptions of character under
which mankind may generally be classed. The one possesses rigour,
firmness, resolution; is daring and active, quick in its sensibilities,
jealous of its fame, eager in its attachments, inflexible in its
purpose, violent in its resentments.

The other meek, yielding, complying, forgiving; not prompt to act, but
willing to suffer; silent and gentle under rudeness and insult, suing
for reconciliation where others would demand satisfaction, giving way to
the pushes of impudence, conceding and indulgent to the prejudices, the
wrong-headedness, the intractability of those with whom it has to deal.

The former of these characters is, and ever hath been, the favourite of
the world. It is the character of great men. There is a dignity in it
which universally commands respect.

The latter is poor-spirited, tame, and abject. Yet so it hath happened,
that with the Founder of Christianity this latter is the subject of his
commendation, his precepts, his example; and that the former is so in no
part of its composition. This, and nothing else, is the character
designed in the following remarkable passages: "Resist not evil: but
whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other
also; and if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat,
let him have thy cloak also: and whosoever shall compel thee to go a
mile, go with him twain: love your enemies, bless them that curse you,
do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use
you and persecute you." This certainly is not commonplace morality. It
is very original. It shows at least (and it is for this purpose we
produce it) that no two things can be more different than the Heroic and
the Christian characters.

Now the author to whom I refer has not only marked this difference more
strongly than any preceding writer, but has proved, in contradiction to
first impressions, to popular opinion, to the encomiums of orators and
poets, and even to the suffrages of historians and moralists, that the
latter character possesses the most of true worth, both as being most
difficult either to be acquired or sustained, and as contributing most
to the happiness and tranquillity of social life. The state of his
argument is as follows:

I. If this disposition were universal, the case is clear; the world
would be a society of friends. Whereas, if the other disposition were
universal, it would produce a scene of universal contention. The world
could not hold a generation of such men.

II. If, what is the fact, the disposition be partial; if a few be
actuated by it, amongst a multitude who are not; in whatever degree it
does prevail, in the same proportion it prevents, allays, and terminates
quarrels, the great disturbers of human happiness, and the great sources
of human misery, so far as man's happiness and misery depend upon man.
Without this disposition enmities must not only be frequent, but, once
begun, must be eternal: for, each retaliation being a fresh injury, and
consequently requiring a fresh satisfaction, no period can be assigned
to the reciprocation of affronts, and to the progress of hatred, but
that which closes the lives, or at least the intercourse, of the parties.

I would only add to these observations, that although the former of the
two characters above described may be occasionally useful; although,
perhaps, a great general, or a great statesman, may be formed by it, and
these may be instruments of important benefits to mankind, yet is this
nothing more than what is true of many qualities which are acknowledged
to be vicious. Envy is a quality of this sort: I know not a stronger
stimulus to exertion; many a scholar, many an artist, many a soldier,
has been produced by it; nevertheless, since in its general effects it
is noxious, it is properly condemned, certainly is not praised, by sober
moralists.

It was a portion of the same character as that we are defending, or
rather of his love of the same character, which our Saviour displayed in
his repeated correction of the ambition of his disciples; his frequent
admonitions that greatness with them was to consist in humility; his
censure of that love of distinction and greediness of superiority which
the chief persons amongst his countrymen were wont, on all occasions,
great and little, to betray. "They (the Scribes and Pharisees) love the
uppermost rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues, and
greetings in the markets, and to be called of men Rabbi, Rabbi. But be
not ye called Rabbi, for one is your Master, even Christ, and all ye are
brethren: and call no man your father upon the earth, for one is your
father, which is in heaven; neither be ye called master, for one is your
Master, even Christ; but he that is greatest among you shall be your
servant; and whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased, and he that
shall humble himself shall be exalted." (Matt. xxiii. 6. See also Mark
xii. 39; Luke xx. 46; xiv. 7.) I make no further remark upon these
passages (because they are, in truth, only a repetition of the doctrine,
different expressions of the principle, which we have already stated),
except that some of the passages, especially our Lord's advice to the
guests at an entertainment, (Luke iv. 7.) seem to extend the rule to
what we call manners; which was both regular in point of consistency,
and not so much beneath the dignity of our Lord's mission as may at
first sight be supposed, for bad manners are bad morals.

It is sufficiently apparent that the precepts we have tired, or rather
the disposition which these precepts inculcate, relate to personal
conduct from personal motives; to cases in which men act from impulse,
for themselves and from themselves. When it comes to be considered what
is necessary to be done for the sake of the public, and out of a regard
to the general welfare (which consideration, for the most part, ought
exclusively to govern the duties of men in public stations), it comes to
a case to which the rules do not belong. This distinction is plain; and
if it were less so the consequence would not be much felt: for it is
very seldom that in time intercourse of private life men act with public
views. The personal motives from which they do act the rule regulates.

The preference of time patient to the heroic cheer, which we have here
noticed, and which the reader will find explained at large in the work
to which we have referred him, is a peculiarity in the Christian
institution, which I propose as an argument of wisdom, very much beyond
the situation and natural character of the person who delivered it.

II. A second argument, drawn from the morality of the New Testament, is
the stress which is laid by our Saviour upon the regulation of the
thoughts; and I place this consideration next to the other because they
are connected. The other related to the malicious passions; this to the
voluptuous. Together, they comprehend the whole character.

"Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries,
fornications," &c. "These are the things which defile a man." (Matt. xv.
19.)

"Wo unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye make clean the
outside of the cup and of the platter, but within they are full of
extortion and excess.--Ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed
appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and
of all uncleanness; even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men,
but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity" (Matt. xxiii. 25, 27)

And more particularly that strong expression, (Matt. v. 28.) "Whosoever
looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her
already in his heart."

There can be no doubt with any reflecting mind but that the propensities
of our nature must be subject to regulation; but the question is, where
the check ought to be placed, upon the thought, or only upon the action?
In this question our Saviour, in the texts here quoted, has pronounced a
decisive judgment. He makes the control of thought essential. Internal
purity with him is everything. Now I contend that this is the only
discipline which can succeed; in other words, that a moral system which
prohibits actions, but leaves the thoughts at liberty, will be
ineffectual, and is therefore unwise. I know not how to go about the
proof of a point which depends upon experience, and upon a knowledge of
the human constitution, better than by citing the judgment of persons
who appear to have given great attention to the subject, and to be well
qualified to form a true opinion about it. Boerhaave, speaking of this
very declaration of our Saviour, "Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust
after her, hath already committed adultery with her in his heart," and
understanding it, as we do, to contain an injunction to lay the check
upon the thoughts, was wont to say that "our Saviour knew mankind better
than Socrates." Hailer, who has recorded this saying of Boerhaave, adds
to it the following remarks of his own:--(Letters to his Daughter.) "It
did not escape the observation of our Saviour that the rejection of
any evil thoughts was the best defence against vice: for when a
debauched person fills his imagination with impure pictures, the
licentious ideas which he recalls fail not to stimulate his desires with
a degree of violence which he cannot resist. This will be followed by
gratification, unless some external obstacle should prevent him from the
commission of a sin which he had internally resolved on." "Every moment
of time," says our author, "that is spent in meditations upon sin
increases the power of the dangerous object which has possessed our
imagination." I suppose these reflections will be generally assented to.

III. Thirdly, had a teacher of morality been asked concerning a general
principle of conduct, and for a short rule of life; and had he
instructed the person who consulted him, "constantly to refer his
actions to what he believed to be the will of his Creator, and
constantly to have in view not his own interest and gratification alone,
but the happiness and comfort of those about him," he would have been
thought, I doubt not, in any age of the world, and in any, even the most
improved state of morals, to have delivered a judicious answer; because,
by the first direction, he suggested the only motive which acts steadily
and uniformly, in sight and out of sight, in familiar occurrences and
under pressing temptations; and in the second he corrected what of all
tendencies in the human character stands most in need of correction,
selfishness, or a contempt of other men's conveniency and satisfaction.
In estimating the value of a moral rule, we are to have regard not only
to the particular duty, but the general spirit; not only to what it
directs us to do, but to the character which a compliance with its
direction is likely to form in us. So, in the present instance, the rule
here recited will never fail to make him who obeys it considerate not only
of the rights, but of the feelings of other men, bodily and mental, in
great matters and in small; of the ease, the accommodation, the
self-complacency of all with whom he has any concern, especially of all
who are in his power, or dependent upon his will.

Now what, in the most applauded philosopher of the most enlightened age
of the world, would have been deemed worthy of his wisdom, and of his
character, to say, our Saviour hath said, and upon just such an occasion
as that which we have feigned.

"Then one of them, which was a lawyer, asked him a question, tempting
him, and saying, Master, which is the great commandment in the law?
Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first
and great commandment: and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself: on these two commandments hang all the law and
the prophets." (Matt. xxii. 35-40.)

The second precept occurs in St. Matthew (xix. 16), on another occasion
similar to this; and both of them, on a third similar occasion, in Luke
(x. 27). In these two latter instances the question proposed was, "What
shall I do to inherit eternal life?"

Upon all these occasions I consider the words of our Saviour as
expressing precisely the same thing as what I have put into the mouth of
the moral philosopher. Nor do I think that it detracts much from the
merit of the answer, that these precepts are extant in the Mosaic code:
for his laying his finger, if I may so say, upon these precepts; his
drawing them out from the rest of that voluminous institution; his
stating of them, not simply amongst the number, but as the greatest and
the sum of all the others; in a word, his proposing of them to his
hearers for their rule and principle, was our Saviour's own.

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