Evidences of Christianity by William Paley

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EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY

by

WILLIAM PALEY, D.D.

A New Edition

London: Printed by W. Clowes and Sons, Stamford Street

1851

THE HONOURABLE AND RIGHT REVEREND

JAMES YORK, D.D., LORD BISHOP OF ELY

My LORD,

When, five years ago, an important station in the University of
Cambridge awaited your Lordship's disposal, you were pleased to offer it
to me. The circumstances under which this offer was made demand a public
acknowledgment. I had never seen your Lordship; I possessed no
connection which could possibly recommend me to your favour; I was known
to you only by my endeavour, in common with many others, to discharge my
duty as a tutor in the University; and by some very imperfect, but
certainly well-intended, and, as you thought, useful publications since.
In an age by no means wanting in examples of honourable patronage,
although this deserve not to be mentioned in respect of the object of
your Lordship's choice, it is inferior to none in the purity and
disinterestedness of the motives which suggested it.

How the following work may be received, I pretend not to foretell. My
first prayer concerning it is, that it may do good to any: my second
hope, that it may assist, what it hath always been my earnest wish to
promote, the religious part of an academical education. If in this
latter view it might seem, in any degree, to excuse your Lordship's
judgment of its author, I shall be gratified by the reflection that, to
a kindness flowing from public principles, I have made the best public
return in my power.

In the mean time, and in every event, I rejoice in the opportunity here
afforded me of testifying the sense I entertain of your Lordship's
conduct, and of a notice which I regard as the most flattering
distinction of my life.

I am, MY LORD,
With sentiments of gratitude and respect,
Your Lordship's faithful
And most obliged servant,

WILLIAM PALEY.

CONTENTS

Preparatory Considerations--Of the antecedent Credibility of Miracles.

PART 1.

OF THE DIRECT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY, AND WHEREIN IT IS
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EVIDENCE ALLEGED FOR OTHER MIRACLES.

Proposition stated

PROPOSITION I.

That there is satisfactory Evidence, that many professing to be original
Witnesses of the Christian Miracles passed their Lives in Labours,
Dangers, and Sufferings, voluntarily undergone in Attestation of the
Accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their Belief
of those Accounts; and that they submitted, from the same Motives, to
new Rules of Conduct.

CHAPTER I

Evidence of the Suffering of the first Propagators of Christianity, from
the Nature of the Case.

CHAPTER II

Evidence of the Sufferings of the first Propagators of Christianity,
from Profane Testimony.

CHAPTER III

Indirect Evidence of the Sufferings of the first Propagators of
Christianity, from the Scriptures and other ancient Christian Writings.

CHAPTER IV

Direct Evidence of the same.

CHAPTER V

Observations upon the preceding Evidence.

CHAPTER VI

That the Story for which the first Propagators of Christianity suffered
was miraculous.

CHAPTER VII

That it was, in the main, the Story which we have now proved by indirect
Considerations.

CHAPTER VIII

The same proved from the Authority of our Historical Scriptures.

CHAPTER IX

Of the Authenticity of the historical Scriptures, in eleven Sections

SECT. 1 Quotations of the historical Scriptures by ancient Christian
Writers.
SECT. 2 Of the peculiar Respect with which they were quoted.
SECT. 3 The Scriptures were in very early Times collected into a
distinct Volume.
SECT. 4 And distinguished by appropriate Names and Titles of Respect.
SECT. 5 Were publicly read and expounded in the religious Assemblies of
the early Christians.
SECT. 6 Commentaries, &c., were anciently written upon the Scriptures.
SECT. 7 They were received by ancient Christians of different Sects and
persuasions.
SECT. 8 The four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen Epistles
of St. Paul, the first Epistle of John, and the first of Peter,
were received without doubt by those who doubted concerning
the other Books of our present Canon.
SECT. 9 Our present Gospels were considered by the adversaries of
Christianity as containing the Accounts upon which the Religion
was founded.
SECT. 10 Formal Catalogues of authentic Scriptures were published, in
all which our present Gospels were included.
SECT. 11 The above Propositions cannot be predicated of those Books
which are commonly called Apocryphal Books of the New
Testament.

Recapitulation.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE DIRECT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY, AND WHEREIN IT IS
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EVIDENCE ALLEGED FOR OTHER MIRACLES.

PROPOSITION II.

CHAPTER I

That there is not satisfactory Evidence, that Persons pretending to be
original Witnesses of any other similar Miracles have acted in the same
Manner, in Attestation of the Accounts which they delivered, and solely
in consequence of their Belief of the Truth of those Accounts.

CHAPTER II

Consideration of some specific Instances

PART II.

OF THE AUXILIARY EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY,

CHAPTER I

Prophecy

CHAPTER II

The Morality of the Gospel

CHAPTER III

The Candour of the Writers of the New Testament

CHAPTER IV

Identity of Christ's Character

CHAPTER V

Originality of our Saviour's Character

CHAPTER VI

Conformity of the Facts occasionally mentioned or referred to in
Scripture with the State of things in these Times, as represented by
foreign and independent Accounts.

CHAPTER VII

Undesigned Coincidences.

CHAPTER VIII

Of the History of the Resurrection.

CHAPTER IX

Of the Propagation of Christianity.
SECT. 2 Reflections upon the preceding Account.
SECT. 3 Of the Religion of Mahomet.

PART III

A BRIEF CONSIDERATION OF SOME POPULAR OBJECTIONS.

CHAPTER I

The Discrepancies between the several Gospels.

CHAPTER II

Erroneous Opinions imputed to the Apostles.

CHAPTER III

The Connection of Christianity with the Jewish History.

CHAPTER IV

Rejection of Christianity.

CHAPTER V

That the Christian Miracles are not recited, or appealed to, by early
Christian Writers themselves, so fully or frequently as might have been
expected.

CHAPTER VI

Want of Universality in the Knowledge and Reception of Christianity, and
of greater Clearness in the Evidence.

CHAPTER VII

Supposed effects of Christianity.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion.

PREPARATORY CONSIDERATIONS.

I deem it unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a
revelation because I have met with no serious person who thinks that,
even under the Christian revelation, we have too much light, or any
degree of assurance which is superfluous. I desire, moreover, that in
judging of Christianity, it may be remembered that the question lies
between this religion and none: for, if the Christian religion be not
credible, no one, with whom we have to do, will support the pretensions
of any other.

Suppose, then, the world we live in to have had a Creator; suppose it to
appear, from the predominant aim and tendency of the provisions and
contrivances observable in the universe, that the Deity, when he formed
it, consulted for the happiness of his sensitive creation; suppose the
disposition which dictated this counsel to continue; suppose a part of
the creation to have received faculties from their Maker, by which they
are capable of rendering a moral obedience to his will, and of
voluntarily pursuing any end for which he has designed them; suppose the
Creator to intend for these, his rational and accountable agents, a
second state of existence, in which their situation will be by their
behaviour in the first state, by which suppose (and by no other) the
objection to the divine government in not putting a difference between
the good and the bad, and the inconsistency of this confusion with the
care and benevolence discoverable in the works of the Deity is done
away; suppose it to be of the utmost importance to the subjects of this
dispensation to know what is intended for them, that is, suppose the
knowledge of it to be highly conducive to the happiness of the species,
a purpose which so many provisions of nature are calculated to promote:
Suppose, nevertheless, almost the whole race, either by the imperfection
of their faculties, the misfortune of their situation, or by the loss of
some prior revelation, to want this knowledge, and not to be likely,
without the aid of a new revelation, to attain it; under these
circumstances, is it improbable that a revelation should be made? Is it
incredible that God should interpose for such a purpose? Suppose him to
design for mankind a future state; is it unlikely that he should
acquaint him with it?

Now in what way can a revelation be made, but by miracles? In none which
we are able to conceive. Consequently, in whatever degree it is
probable, or not very improbable, that a revelation should be
communicated to mankind at all: in the same degree is it probable, or
not very improbable, that miracles should be wrought. Therefore, when
miracles are related to have been wrought in the promulgating of a
revelation manifestly wanted, and, if true, of inestimable value, the
improbability which arises from the miraculous nature of the things
related is not greater than the original improbability that such a
revelation should be imparted by God.

I wish it, however, to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to
what extent, this argument is alleged. We do not assume the attributes
of the Deity, or the existence of a future state, in order to prove the
reality of miracles. That reality always must be proved by evidence. We
assert only, that in miracles adduced in support of revelation there is
not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. And
for the purpose of maintaining this assertion, we contend, that the
incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in attestation of
a message from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards
and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that
state, is not in itself greater than the event, call it either probable
or improbable, of the two following propositions being true: namely,
first, that a future state of existence should be destined by God for
his human creation; and, secondly, that, being so destined, he should
acquaint them with it. It is not necessary for our purpose, that these
propositions be capable of proof, or even that, by arguments drawn from
the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable; it is enough
that we are able to say concerning them, that they are not so violently
improbable, so contradictory to what we already believe of the divine
power and character, that either the propositions themselves, or facts
strictly connected with the propositions (and therefore no further
improbable than they are improbable), ought to be rejected at first
sight, and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of
evidence they be attested.

This is the prejudication we would resist. For to this length does a
modern objection to miracles go, viz., that no human testimony can in
any case render them credible. I think the reflection above stated,
that, if there be a revelation, there must be miracles, and that, under
the circumstances in which the human species are placed, a revelation is
not improbable, or not to any great degree, to be a fair answer to the
whole objection.

But since it is an objection which stands in the very threshold our
argument, and, if admitted, is a bar to every proof, and to all future
reasoning upon the subject, it may be necessary, before we proceed
further, to examine the principle upon which it professes to be founded;
which principle is concisely this, That it is contrary to experience
that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that
testimony should be false.

Now there appears a small ambiguity in the term "experience," and in the
phrases, "contrary to experience," or "contradicting experience," which
it may be necessary to remove in the first place. Strictly speaking, the
narrative of a fact is then only contrary to experience, when the fact
is related to have existed at a time and place, at which time and place
we being present did not perceive it to exist; as if it should be
asserted, that in a particular room, and at a particular hour of a
certain day, a man was raised from the dead, in which room, and at the
time specified, we, being present and looking on, perceived no such
event to have taken place. Here the assertion is contrary to experience
properly so called; and this is a contrariety which no evidence can
surmount. It matters nothing, whether the fact be of a miraculous
nature, or not. But although this be the experience, and the
contrariety, which Archbishop Tillotson alleged in the quotation with
which Mr. Hume opens his Essay, it is certainly not that experience, nor
that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And short
of this I know no intelligible signification which can be affixed to the
term "contrary to experience," but one, viz., that of not having
ourselves experienced anything similar to the thing related, or such
things not being generally experienced by others. I say "not generally"
for to state concerning the fact in question, that no such thing was
ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to
assume the subject of the controversy.

Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a
want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the
probability there is, that, if the thing were true, we should experience
things similar to it, or that such things would be generally
experienced. Suppose it then to be true that miracles were wrought on
the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could
decide its authority, is it certain that such miracles would be repeated
so often, and in so many places, as to become objects of general
experience? Is it a probability approaching to certainty? Is it a
probability of any great strength or force? Is it such as no evidence
can encounter? And yet this probability is the exact converse, and
therefore the exact measure, of the improbability which arises from the
want of experience, and which Mr. Hume represents as invincible by human
testimony.

It is not like alleging a new law of nature, or a new experiment in
natural philosophy; because, when these are related, it is expected
that, under the same circumstances, the same effect will follow
universally; and in proportion as this expectation is justly
entertained, the want of a corresponding experience negatives the
history. But to expect concerning a miracle, that it should succeed upon
a repetition, is to expect that which would make it cease to be a
miracle, which is contrary to its nature as such, and would totally
destroy the use and purpose for which it was wrought.

The force of experience as an objection to miracles is founded in the
presumption, either that the course of nature is invariable, or that, if
it be ever varied, variations will be frequent and general. Has the
necessity of this alternative been demonstrated? Permit us to call the
course of nature the agency of an intelligent Being, and is there any
good reason for judging this state of the case to be probable? Ought we
not rather to expect that such a Being, on occasions of peculiar
importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed, yet, that
such occasions should return seldom; that these interruptions
consequently should be confined to the experience of a few; that the
want of it, therefore, in many, should be matter neither of surprise nor
objection?

But, as a continuation of the argument from experience, it is said that,
when we advance accounts of miracles, we assign effects without causes,
or we attribute effects to causes inadequate to the purpose, or to
causes of the operation of which we have no experience of what causes,
we may ask, and of what effects, does the objection speak? If it be
answered that, when we ascribe the cure of the palsy to a touch, of
blindness to the anointing of the eyes with clay, or the raising of the
dead to a word, we lay ourselves open to this imputation; we reply that
we ascribe no such effects to such causes. We perceive no virtue or
energy in these things more than in other things of the same kind. They
are merely signs to connect the miracle with its end. The effect we
ascribe simply to the volition of Deity; of whose existence and power,
not to say of whose Presence and agency, we have previous and
independent proof. We have, therefore, all we seek for in the works of
rational agents--a sufficient power and an adequate motive. In a word,
once believe that there is a God, and miracles are not incredible.

Mr. Hume states the ease of miracles to be a contest of opposite
improbabilities, that is to say, a question whether it be more
improbable that the miracle should be true, or the testimony false: and
this I think a fair account of the controversy. But herein I remark a
want of argumentative justice, that, in describing the improbability of
miracles, he suppresses all those circumstances of extenuation, which
result from our knowledge of the existence, power, and disposition of
the Deity; his concern in the creation, the end answered by the miracle,
the importance of that end, and its subserviency to the plan pursued in
the work of nature. As Mr. Hume has represented the question, miracles
are alike incredible to him who is previously assured of the constant
agency of a Divine Being, and to him who believes that no such Being
exists in the universe. They are equally incredible, whether related to
have been wrought upon occasion the most deserving, and for purposes the
most beneficial, or for no assignable end whatever, or for an end
confessedly trifling or pernicious. This surely cannot be a correct
statement. In adjusting also the other side of the balance, the strength
and weight of testimony, this author has provided an answer to every
possible accumulation of historical proof by telling us that we are not
obliged to explain how the story of the evidence arose. Now I think that
we are obliged; not, perhaps, to show by positive accounts how it did,
but by a probable hypothesis how it might so happen. The existence of
the testimony is a phenomenon; the truth of the fact solves the
phenomenon. If we reject this solution, we ought to have some other to
rest in; and none, even by our adversaries, can be admired, which is not
inconsistent with the principles that regulate human affairs and human
conduct at present, or which makes men then to have been a different
kind of beings from what they are now.

But the short consideration which, independently of every other,
convinces me that there is no solid foundation in Mr. Hume's conclusion,
is the following. When a theorem is proposed to a mathematician, the
first thing he does with it is to try it upon a simple case, and if it
produce a false result, he is sure that there must be some mistake in
the demonstration. Now to proceed in this way with what may be called
Mr. Hume's theorem. If twelve men, whose probity and good sense I had
long known, should seriously and circumstantially relate to me an
account of a miracle wrought before their eyes, and in which it was
impossible that they should be deceived: if the governor of the country,
hearing a rumour of this account, should call these men into his
presence, and offer them a short proposal, either to confess the
imposture, or submit to be tied up to a gibbet; if they should refuse
with one voice to acknowledge that there existed any falsehood or
imposture in the case: if this threat were communicated to them
separately, yet with no different effect; if it was at last executed; if
I myself saw them, one after another, consenting to be racked, burnt, or
strangled, rather than live up the truth of their account;--still if Mr.
Hume's rule be my guide, I am not to believe them. Now I undertake to
say that there exists not a sceptic in the world who would not believe
them, or who would defend such incredulity.

Instances of spurious miracles supported by strong apparent testimony
undoubtedly demand examination; Mr. Hume has endeavoured to fortify his
argument by some examples of this kind. I hope in a proper place to show
that none of them reach the strength or circumstances of the Christian
evidence. In these, however, consists the weight of his objection; in
the principle itself, I am persuaded, there is none.

PART I.

OF THE DIRECT HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF CHRISTIANITY, AND WHEREIN IT IS
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE EVIDENCE ALLEGED FOR OTHER MIRACLES.

The two propositions which I shall endeavour to establish are these:

I. That there is satisfactory evidence that many professing to be
original witnesses of the Christian miracles passed their lives in
labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation
of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their
belief of those accounts; and that they also submitted, from the same
motives, to new rules of conduct.

2. That there is not satisfactory evidence that persons professing to be
original witnesses of other miracles, in their nature as certain as
these are, have ever acted in the same manner, in attestation of the
accounts which they delivered, and properly in consequence of their
belief of those accounts.

The first of these prepositions, as it forms the argument will stand at
the head of the following nine chapters.

CHAPTER I

There is satisfactory evidence that many, professing to be original
witness of the Christian miracles, passed their lives in labours,
dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in attestation of the
accounts which they delivered, and solely in consequence of their of
belief of those accounts; and that they also submitted, from the same
motives, to new rules of conduct.

To support this proposition, two points are necessary to be made out:
first, that the Founder of the institution, his associates and immediate
followers, acted the part which the proposition imputes to them:
secondly, that they did so in attestation of the miraculous history
recorded in our Scriptures, and solely in consequence of their belief of
the truth of this history.

Before we produce any particular testimony to the activity and
sufferings which compose the subject of our first assertion, it will be
proper to consider the degree of probability which the assertion derives
from the nature of the case, that is, by inferences from those parts of
the case which, in point of fact, are on all hands acknowledged.

First, then, the Christian Religion exists, and, therefore, by some
means or other, was established. Now it either owes the principle of its
establishment, i. e. its first publication, to the activity of the
Person who was the founder of the institution, and of those who were
joined with him in the undertaking, or we are driven upon the strange
supposition, that, although they might lie by, others would take it up;
although they were quiet and silent, other persons busied themselves in
the success and propagation of their story. This is perfectly
incredible. To me it appears little less than certain, that, if the
first announcing of the religion by the Founder had not been followed up
by the zeal and industry of his immediate disciples, the attempt must
have expired in its birth. Then as to the kind and degree of exertion
which was employed, and the mode of life to which these persons
submitted, we reasonably suppose it to be like that which we observe in
all others who voluntarily become missionaries of a new faith. Frequent,
earnest, and laborious preaching, constantly conversing with religious
persons upon religion, a sequestration from the common pleasures,
engagements, and varieties of life, and an addiction to one serious
object, compose the habits of such men. I do not say that this mode of
life is without enjoyment, but I say that the enjoyment springs from
sincerity. With a consciousness at the bottom of hollowness and
falsehood, the fatigue and restraint would become insupportable. I am
apt to believe that very few hypocrites engage in these undertakings;
or, however, persist in them long. Ordinarily speaking, nothing can
overcome the indolence of mankind, the love which is natural to most
tempers of cheerful society and cheerful scenes, or the desire, which is
common to all, of personal ease and freedom, but conviction.

Secondly, it is also highly probable, from the nature of the case, that
the propagation of the new religion was attended with difficulty and
danger. As addressed to the Jews, it was a system adverse, not only to
their habitual opinions but to those opinions upon which their hopes,
their partialities, their pride, their consolation, was founded. This
people, with or without reason, had worked themselves into a persuasion,
that some signal and greatly advantageous change was to be effected in
the condition of their country, by the agency of a long-promised
messenger from heaven.* The rulers of the Jews, their leading sect,
their priesthood, had been the authors of this persuasion to the common
people. So that it was not merely the conjecture of theoretical divines,
or the secret expectation of a few recluse devotees, but it was become
the popular hope and Passion, and, like all popular opinions, undoubting
and impatient of contradiction. They clung to this hope under every
misfortune of their country, and with more tenacity as their dangers and
calamities increased. To find, therefore, that expectations so
gratifying were to be worse than disappointed; that they were to end in
the diffusion of a mild unambitious religion, which, instead of
victories and triumphs, instead of exalting their nation and institution
above the rest of the world, was to advance those whom they despised to
an equality with themselves, in those very points of comparison in which
they most valued their own distinction, could be no very pleasing
discovery to a Jewish mind; nor could the messengers of such
intelligence expect to be well received or easily credited. The doctrine
was equally harsh and novel. The extending of the kingdom of God to
those who did not conform to the law of Moses was a notion that had
never before entered into the thoughts of a Jew.

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