The Philippine Islands, 1493 to 1898 by Various

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_Don Francisco Tello_
_Doctor Antonio de Morga_
The licentiate _Tellez Almazan_

Before me: _Pedro Hurtado de Esquivel_

In the city of Manila, on the thirteenth of January in the year
one thousand six hundred and one, I, Pedro Hurtado de Esquivel,
clerk of court for the king our sovereign, in his royal Audiencia and
Chancilleria of these Philipinas Islands, at the request and order of
Doctor Antonio de Morga, of the council of the king our sovereign,
and his auditor in this said royal Audiencia, had this copy drawn
from its original, which is in the book of the government of his
royal Audiencia. It is a true and faithful copy, and agrees with the
original thereof, witnesses to its copying, correction, and comparison,
being Pedro Munoz de Herrera, Joan de Arana, and Miguel de Talledo,
citizens of Manila.

In testimony thereof, I affix my seal, in witness of the truth.

_Pedro Hurtado Desquivel_, clerk of court.

[_Endorsed_: "Testimony of the resolution of the Audiencia of the
Filipinas in respect to the entrance of the Dutch corsair among
the islands."]

_Instructions given by the governor to Doctor Antonio de Morga_

The course of action to be pursued by Doctor Antonio de Morga, auditor
of the royal Audiencia of these Filipinas Islands, and captain-general
of the fleet about to go in pursuit of the English [_sic_] enemy,
is as follows.

First: Inasmuch as news has been received that the English enemy,
against whom this expedition is directed, is stationed in the harbor of
Marayuma, and inasmuch as he might take flight without awaiting attack,
should he, by any chance, hear of our fleet, it is ordered that our
fleet, with the least possible delay, shall start in pursuit of the
enemy, in order to engage and fight him, until, with our Lord's help,
he is killed or sunk.

_Item_: The engagement with the enemy must be conducted with
all diligence and care, whether in firing or in boarding his
ships--whichever may be possible, in accordance with the best and
readiest opportunity permitted by the weather. Should the enemy take
flight on sighting our fleet, he must be pursued, until the object
sought is accomplished.

_Item_: Should the enemy have left this coast when the fleet is
despatched against him, and should information be received that he
has gone to any other of these islands, then the fleet shall seek and
pursue him, until he is captured or sunk. Should the enemy have left
these islands, he shall be pursued as far as possible, in accordance
with his [Morga's] judgment, in order that the end desired may be
attained.

_Item_: Inasmuch as the master-of-camp and the captains present at a
council of war, held on the second of this current month and year,
declared that, in their opinion, if no exact information as to the
course and route taken by the enemy should be received, said fleet
should follow the coast of Ilocos toward the strait of Zincapura, where
it is thought the enemy must pass, in order to make his voyage. Yet,
notwithstanding the said council of war, the said general, in the event
of receiving no information as to the enemy's course, shall pursue what
course he considers most advisable, as he is the one in direct charge
of the matter, and as weather and occasion allow, endeavoring to attain
the end desired--namely, the pursuit and destruction of the enemy.

_Item_: Should the fleet encounter any enemies whatsoever, pirates
or others, who may be among the islands, or who shall have left
them after committing depredations among them--whether English or
Japanese, Terrenatans or Mindanaos, or from any other nation--they
must be attacked and punished, in order that some good result may be
attained in this case also, should opportunity arise.

_Item_: After the capture of the enemy, as it is hoped, God our Lord
willing, the fleet will return with as many of the enemy as are still
living, and the captured ships.

_Item_: The booty found in said ships shall be divided among those
who gain the victory, as is customary on similar occasions.

_Item_: The greatest care must be taken that the crews of the fleet
are peaceable and well disciplined, in regard to which the regulations
followed on similar occasions shall be applied.

_Item_: Good management must be exercised in regard to the supplies
and ammunition carried; and they must be consumed sparingly, especially
if the fleet leaves these islands.

_Item_: If perchance the fleet shall have engaged the enemy, or
pursued him outside these islands, it must return to the islands as
soon as possible after the desired end has been attained. Should
the weather not permit the return voyage until the coming of the
monsoon, then he [Morga] shall endeavor to preserve, provide, and
equip the fleet with all needful things, at his Majesty's expense,
in order that his voyage may be made with the greatest promptness
and security possible. Given in the city of Manila, on the tenth of
December, one thousand six hundred. [16]

_Don Francisco Tello_

By order of the governor and captain-general,

_Gaspar de Azevo_

_Instructions given by Doctor Antonio de Morga to Captain Joan
de Alcega_

The order to be pursued by Captain Joan de Alcega, admiral of this
fleet of the king our sovereign, in the course of this voyage and
expedition, is as follows.

[1.] First: Inasmuch as the end for which this fleet has been prepared
is for the search and pursuit of the English [_sic_] ships, which
have come but lately among these islands, and, as we are informed,
are near this place; and as in conformity with the instructions of the
governor and captain-general of these islands, the said enemy must
be pursued and followed with all care and diligence wherever found,
and must be engaged, and captured or sunk: therefore it is necessary
that the said almiranta [17] proceed very cautiously, and be ready
with sailors, soldiers, and artillery, in order, on their part,
to accomplish the said purpose, when opportunity offers.

[2.] Further, the said almiranta shall follow the flagship to leeward,
unless it be rendered necessary for progress, or because of the
enemy, to beat to windward. It shall have a care that the other
smaller vessels of the fleet do not fall behind or deviate from the
course--this to be without prejudice to their navigation and voyage,
and their accompanying the flagship, which is the most important thing.

[3.] _Item_: Should opportunity be offered to engage the enemy,
the almiranta shall endeavor to engage him at the same moment as
the flagship or alone, in case that flagship is to leeward, or so
situated that it cannot do the same so quickly; for the flagship will
endeavor to come to its aid in whatever happens, with all haste and
speed possible.

4. _Item_: Upon overtaking the two ships of the enemy, efforts shall
be made to grapple and board their flagship, where their force is
carried. This same effort shall be made by the flagship of this fleet;
but in case the flagship of the enemy cannot be overtaken, and their
almiranta is in such a condition that something may be done with it,
it shall be attempted.

5. _Item_: Should our fleet attack the enemy and grapple, both
ships--the almiranta and the flagship--shall endeavor to grapple on the
same side. But if that cannot be done, care shall be taken that our
artillery and arquebuses are not turned on our own ships and men. In
this the greatest possible care and precaution shall be observed.

6. _Item_: Upon grappling the enemy, efforts shall be made to make
him fast to our ship and to lower his sails, so that he may not
become separated from us. Before boarding with troops, the nettings
and deck of the enemy shall be rendered safe by clearing and raking
them, in order that there may be as little risk as possible to our men.

7. In the course of this voyage in pursuit of the enemy, not a musket
or arquebus shall be fired, nor a powder-box touched, until after
his discovery. Neither shall any artillery be fired, for an effort
must be made to find the enemy at anchor, and to see that he have no
knowledge of the fleet that is pursuing him.

8. Should the almiranta be in any urgent need that requires aid,
a shot shall be fired in the direction of the flagship, as a signal
for help. The same will be done by the flagship in case it encounters
a like necessity.

9. _Item_: Should the flagship display a flag in the shrouds, it will
be a signal-call for a council of war, or other matters of importance,
for which the admiral shall come to the flagship in whatever boat
may be most convenient.

10. _Item_: One of the two caracoas that accompany the fleet shall
keep as close to the almiranta as possible, in order to act as tender
to it and supply its necessities.

11. _Item_: The greatest possible care and caution shall be taken
in the use of the ammunition and supplies, in order that this voyage
may be prolonged.

12. _Item_: All these vessels must endeavor to keep together. But if
one of the vessels should become separated from the others, by storm
or by any other necessity, no direction for the exact route to be
followed is given, as the design or course of the enemy is unknown. It
is observed only that all the vessels are under obligation to seek for
and pursue the enemy until they shall drive him, if nothing more shall
be possible, from these islands, and leave the islands safe and free
from the said enemy. But the best thing for the ship to do that becomes
separated, as said above, will be to find out the course taken by the
enemy, and to pursue that same course until it shall rejoin the fleet.

13. _Item_: Inasmuch as the governor and captain-general of these
islands has given Captain Joan Tello y Aguirre, who is aboard the
said almiranta, command as captain of infantry of what men I may
assign him, I do hereby assign to him the infantry troops aboard said
ship for the time that said expedition shall endure and last. The
said admiral shall deliver these men to said Captain Joan Tello y
Aguirre, in order that, as their captain, he may have charge of them,
and punish and discipline them.

All the above plan must be kept and observed now and henceforth
throughout the course of this voyage. I give these instructions
to the said admiral and other persons whom they may concern, in
conformity with the command that I hold from the said governor and
captain-general of these islands. In testimony thereof, I affixed my
signature aboard the flagship, off the island of Mariveles, Wednesday,
December thirteen, one thousand six hundred. [18]

_Doctor Antonio de Morga_

_Account of the battle between Morga and Van Noordt_

The license and daring of these heretical enemies of our holy
religion and faith are so well known to all, that no one can relate
satisfactorily the misfortunes that they have brought upon us,
the destructions and deaths that they have caused among us, and the
rich booty that they have carried away--which God in His righteous
judgment permitted. As they behold themselves so favored by fortune,
their greed is increasing continually, and they are continuing to
prosecute their designs, as was the case when Francisco Draque [19]
passed the Strait of Magellan and coasted along Chile and Piru, where
he seized the vessel "San Joan" of Anzona, with a large consignment
of silver, in the year 1579. Again in the year 1587, they passed the
straits under the English general Don Tomas Canbler. [20] Within sight
of the Californias they seized and sacked the vessel "Sanctana," which
was sailing from these islands to Nueva Espana with a large cargo of
silk and gold. Having easily made this seizure, they returned home,
displaying innumerable banners, streamers, and pennons; and it is
even affirmed that their sails were of damask. Their countrymen,
upon seeing them return so rich and prosperous in so short a time,
were so enthusiastic as to launch a similar undertaking. Among those
who resolved to make a voyage to these parts was Oliver Daudtnord [21]
a native of Nostradama [Amsterdam], one of the islands of Olanda and
Xelanda [Holland and Zeeland]. Being persuaded and informed by the
boatswain who sailed on the vessel that seized the ship "Sanctana"--to
whom he gave title as captain and chief pilot--and being attracted
to privateering, he asked permission of Mauricio, count of Nasao,
and prince of Orange, [22] in whose dominions the above islands are
located, to equip four ships. He received permission, whereupon he
collected as many men and as much of supplies and artillery as he
deemed necessary. He placed forty of the total of two hundred and
sixty men aboard two of the ships, which sailed from the port of
Nostradama--while the other two sailed from the port of Rrotadama
[Rotterdam]--on the eleventh or twelfth of August, in the year
1598. They laid their course toward the straits of Magellanes; and
while skirting the coast of Brasil, the Portuguese there hoisted a
flag of peace. This being seen by the English and Irish, twelve of
them went ashore in the shallop, where the Portuguese, who numbered
perhaps ten or twelve, received them with pleasant countenances, and
invited them to dine. But while at dinner the Portuguese murdered all
the Irishmen, among them the chief pilot, upon whom the others relied
because of his familiarity with the said course and voyage. Thereupon
the enemy, furious at the manner in which they had been treated,
landed forty or fifty arquebusiers in order to avenge the injury that
they had received. The Portuguese, in anticipation of this, intrenched
themselves very strongly, so that the enemy was unable to enter their
fort, but was, on the contrary, forced to retire to his boats with a
loss of six men. They set sail and laid their course for the strait
[of Magellan], where they arrived a year and seven months from the
time when they sailed from their own country. When they arrived
there they encountered many storms and head-winds, and sickness
to such an extent that they were obliged to transfer the men still
remaining on one ship to the other three. Then they sunk this vessel,
and with the three vessels pursued their course, followed continually
by storms which never left them. They sighted a vessel, which upon
investigation turned out to be English. By it they were informed
that another squadron of four vessels had sailed from Yngalaterra
[England], and that this vessel, being unable to carry so much sail
as the others, had been left to its fate, and knew naught more of
the others. The Dutch ships continued their course and sailed ahead,
so that within a few days they lost sight of this vessel. They passed
through the strait, where they lost four or five months. After this it
happened that the general fell out with his admiral, whom he charged
with negligence of his orders. The admiral was tried, the charges
sustained, and traitorous misdeeds proved against him; therefore
he was abandoned on a desert island near the coast of Chile. [23]
Then the general appointed as admiral one of the most valiant and
experienced soldiers of his band. He reached the coast of Chile,
where he made a few captures, although of no especial importance. The
first was a fragata, [24] which was seized near the island of Sancta
Maria Domingo de Rramos in the year 1600. They were informed by this
vessel that two ships had gone to Arica for the king's silver; but
they were warned that there were war-vessels at Callao. This fragata,
they say, was carrying three consignments of gold; but our men, upon
seeing that they were lost, threw it overboard. The enemy seized the
pilot, who was a Portuguese, and took the fragata along with them,
together with two negroes who were aboard of her. The latter told
them that the pilot had had all the gold thrown overboard, whereupon
they ordered the pilot to be cast into the sea alive. They captured
at Santiago on the same coast another vessel laden with tallow and
Cordovan leather [morocco]. Considering that it was worth little to
them, they burned it, and its crew escaped by swimming, except a few
Spaniards and natives who perished in the water. The enemy seeing
that they were acquiring small profit in that neighborhood, decided
to go up along the coast of Nueva Espana, and wait at the entrance of
the Californias for the annual vessels from these islands--the very
purpose and object for which they had resolved upon their navigation,
as is evident from the aforesaid. However they abandoned that purpose,
upon being told by the negroes whom they had brought with them that
Don Luis de Velazco, viceroy of Piru, had left Lima in person for
the port of Callao to superintend the preparation of a large fleet,
as he had been informed that pirates had passed and were along the
coast. The enemy, fearful of this, and recalling the fact that,
five years previously, Arricharse de Aquines, [25] an Englishman,
was defeated and captured by our men, after the greater part of his
force was killed, decided to abandon their voyage to the Californias,
and to head for these islands, with the intention of awaiting at the
Ladrones the shipments of silver from Nueva Espana to Manila. With
the said intent, they put to sea, but after sailing for several days,
they encountered a storm, which brought them all nearly to the verge
of destruction. One very dark and stormy night they lost sight of
the almiranta, and never saw it again. Seeing himself without this
vessel, the general chose as almiranta the fly-boat which he had
remaining. This was a vessel of perhaps fifty toneladas burden, called
"La Concordia," under command of a captain called Esias Delende. Then
they resumed their course, with the same intention of capturing our
silver, but, if unable to do more, to proceed to Maluco to barter for
cloves, for which purpose they carried mirrors, knives, basins, and
other small wares. They reached the Ladrones Islands--our Lord thus
permitting--four or five days after our vessels had passed. They
were detained there for several days, where, upon seeing their
plans frustrated, they burned the fragata that they had brought
from Piru. Thereupon they set sail and made the principal channel
of these islands, eighty or ninety leguas from this city of Manila,
where they stopped--either for iron, or, as our people here said,
because of a need of provisions; or, as I believe, and as they
themselves asserted, purposely. In short, instead of going by way of
Capul, the right and necessary path for the voyage they were making,
they entered a small bay called Albay, on the Camarines coast, where
they anchored as if they were in their own harbors, and with as little
fear and mistrust, as was clearly seen later on. They were hospitably
received in this district, for our people supplied them with abundance
of rice, with which to satisfy their need. They paid well for it,
in order to relieve their necessity--they could not, had they wished,
pay for more--for the purpose of assuring the natives that they had
not come to harm them. They told the natives that they were vassals
of the king Don Phelipe, our sovereign, in whose service and by whose
permission they were coming. As is proved by those selfsame papers,
the general showed the natives some counterfeit decrees, with which
they ought to be satisfied. A messenger was sent to Manila to give
information of the vessels that had arrived there. The news reached
here on the nineteenth of October, when Captain Xiron reported that he
was in the Camarines, and that he had boarded the general's ship, which
was coming well-supplied with munitions, arms, and artillery. He gave
information also concerning the number of men who, in his opinion,
were carried by the two vessels--about ninety men, of whom some
were sick; and of his dealings with them, and that they claimed to
be vassals of the king our sovereign. As soon as news of the enemy
reached this city, Don Francisco Tello, governor of these islands,
sent soldiers as scouts along the Camarines coast, with orders to
hide all the provisions, as he was unaware of the generous supply
that the enemy had. It is quite true, as the English themselves said,
that they could have had as much as they wanted, by paying for it.

Captain Pedro de Arseo and Captain Christobal de Arseo Etaminchaca,
both of the infantry, were also ordered to go with a command of men
along the coast to form ambushes, should the enemy land. But this
was all to no purpose, for the enemy, in little more than a month,
came out of the bay and sailed away on one course or another--which
seemed quite impossible to the people here, because they were confident
that the enemy could not get out of the bay in which they lay. But it
finally turned out quite to the contrary; for, as I say, they departed
and laid their course to Capul, until they cast anchor in a harbor,
where they are said to have cleaned the ships and sent men ashore to
burn a small native village. One of the English was left behind there
among the Indians, who seized and brought him to this city. They took
his deposition, in which he told some of the things related above.

Toward the last of November, one of the negroes, named Salvador,
who had escaped by swimming one night near Capul, arrived here. He
reported that the enemy were directing their course toward Maluco,
and that meanwhile they were trying to discover if there were any
plunder among these islands. He said that the capture of the enemy
would be greatly facilitated by attacking them with a fleet; and
his advice was not bad. All this time the enemy were coming nearer,
until they anchored in the port of El Frayle, near Mariveles, where
they lay very much at ease and without any fear, watching for the
vessels coming to this city. They captured a fragata, which they
sank. They took a quantity of flour from a Japanese vessel that was
on its way here. In order to quiet the Japanese, they gave them a
sword, and a few trinkets of no particular value. They captured a
Chinese champan, by which they were informed that the Chinese vessels
would arrive within a few months, laden with silks and merchandise of
great value. This news pleased the enemy so highly that they did not
propose to leave until they should seize some of the Chinese. From
this place they wrote a letter to Don Francisco Tello, in which they
declared that the Indians there had stolen a number of fowls from
them, that his Lordship should order the Indians to make them good,
and that they were coming to pay their respects to him. It may be
seen by this how little they feared the governor.

While these things were taking place, the governor had three ships
fitted out--one from the city of Cebu, to act as flagship; another,
a galizabra, still in the shipyard--which was launched a few days
before the departure--called "San Bartolome," to act as almiranta; and
a Portuguese patache [26] which had come from Malaca--with artillery,
men, and munitions sufficient to overbalance the greater strength of
the enemy. Doctor Antonio de Morga, auditor of this royal Audiencia,
was appointed captain-general of this fleet, an appointment which
highly displeased the old captains, because in their opinion they
should have been considered. They thought it unjust that the auditors
should take part in the affair, especially because it left only
one auditor in the Audiencia. In the end, however, neither these
nor other reasons sufficed to prevent his appointment. The general
appointed as admiral Captain Joan de Alzega, a very courageous soldier,
of considerable reputation and credit, a Biscayan by birth. Many noble
and wealthy people assisted in serving his Majesty in this expedition,
in all about three hundred men, counting the paid soldiers, the seamen,
and others. They embarked very gallantly, with the resolution and
intention of attempting not only that undertaking, but another of
greater weight and difficulty.

The general was impatient for the fleet to depart, and accordingly set
sail on Tuesday, the twelfth of December. The flagship and almiranta
left, without waiting for the Portuguese vessel, or allotting it
sufficient crew or munitions, taking advantage of a tide which was
discovered at the time of their departure, which was favorable to
them. Accordingly they began their voyage. As they left the bay,
beyond the river of Canas, three leguas from the harbor, the shallop
which was carried on the stern of the almiranta went to the bottom,
and drowned two seamen who were in it. They continued their voyage,
and that night cast anchor at Mariveles, where they lay the rest of
the night. In the morning they were informed by the alferez Albarran,
who was stationed on that island as sentinel, that the enemy were
anchored at Azebu, five or six leagues from there. Upon receiving
this news, on that same day (St. Lucy's) our men began to spread the
_pavesades_, [27] and ballasted the flagship a trifle more. They were
all in the highest of spirits, and so eager were they to come to close
quarters with the enemy, that every hour's delay seemed a hundred
years to them. At midnight, or a little later, on St. Lucy's day,
the flagship weighed anchor without notifying its almiranta. The
latter, seeing the flagship make sail, followed. Without waiting
for the small Portuguese vessel, they followed the course of the
enemy, and at dawn the next day, which was the fourteenth of the
said month, they discovered them. They investigated and ascertained
beyond all doubt that it was the enemy. Their only fear was lest the
latter might escape from them. Our men thought that if but once the
enemy were grappled, they could overcome ten vessels. However, in a
little while they were made to see the difference between fighting
in imagination and actually using their hands in real earnest. In
short, as above stated, our flagship was leading the advance; and
when the enemy saw it, he ordered his almiranta to weigh anchor and
reconnoiter. The order was obeyed, and although the almiranta put out
to sea but a little distance, it recognized them as armed vessels,
which was reported to the general. The latter ordered the almiranta to
keep a sharp lookout and to run close-hauled; and, if it was apparent
that the two vessels were approaching to attack them, to return to
his assistance. But his intent was to see if he could not in any way
separate their force, because he said that, ship for ship, his force
was the abler. Since our flagship was drawing nearer and outstripping
the almiranta, it was overtaking the enemy, who put to sea with his
flagship and waited close-hauled. He fired a shot, which carried
away part of the tops and the main halyard on our flagship. Ours
returned the fire, but struck the water. When they almost touched
our ship, the enemy fired another shot, which destroyed a pump and
killed two or three Indians. Thereupon our men crowded on all sail,
and attacked with the greatest determination that was ever seen--for,
as they say, they were going with all sails set. Our ship grappled with
its opponent, so that our men could board easily. With the vessels in
this condition, shots were fired on both sides. About twelve of our
men leaped aboard the enemy's ship. The enemy retreated to the bow,
where they intrenched themselves, and made loopholes, through which
they fired their muskets--although, being fearful lest our almiranta
should come up to grapple with them, they did but little damage,
before they were compelled to strike their own colors and hoist
ours in their place. At this moment our almiranta came up with the
intention of boarding on the other side. Thereupon our men who were
aboard the enemy's ship cried out: "Victory! victory! for the king
of Espana! Pass on ahead! Do not fire and kill us, for the ship has
surrendered already." However, the admiral, Joan de Alezega, caused two
pieces to be fired and a discharge of his musketry and arquebuses upon
the enemy. It is understood that with one piece of this broadside,
he did the enemy considerable injury, as was proved. As soon as
the admiral understood that our men were advising him to pass on,
and that the enemy's almiranta was fleeing under a press of canvas,
he bore away in pursuit of it.

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