The Philippine Islands, 1493 1898: Volume XVIII, 1617 1620 by Various

V >> Various >> The Philippine Islands, 1493 1898: Volume XVIII, 1617 1620

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A group of papers dated 1610-19 shows that an encomienda of Indians
was granted to the seminary of Santa Potenciana for its support,
in consequence of the destitution suffered by its inmates.

An important document is that sent--in two memorials, of 1619 and
March, 1620, respectively--to the king by Hernando de los Rios Coronel,
long procurator-general of the Filipinas, on "reforms needed" in the
islands--of which he has been despatched by the citizens to inform
the king. Accordingly, he writes (apparently at Madrid) a detailed
statement of the "matters that demand reform." Serious losses of
life and property have been caused by the delays in despatching the
trading ships from Manila; the governors should be compelled to send
them at the favorable season. The officials on these vessels should
be appointed from among the deserving citizens of the islands,
and not be the relatives or servants of the governor or other
royal officials. The citizens have been greatly defrauded in the
assignment of lading on the galleons, and too much of this is granted
to charitable institutions. The trading ships should not be used for
any other purposes. The Manila authorities buy ammunition and other
supplies in China, which, "in order not to anger the Portuguese in
Macan," they buy from them rather than from the natives, but the
supplies thus cost three times their value; the agent who buys them
should buy wherever he can do so to the best advantage, and directly
from the Chinese. The royal ships should be built in India, and the
burden of enforced service in this work should be removed from the
Indians. Commerce from Japan to Nueva Espana should be stopped; and
Spaniards should not be allowed to man Japanese vessels. An enemy
can close Manila harbor to all vessels desiring to enter; another
route to it should therefore be devised and made available. The Moro
pirates must be prevented from harassing the islands, and the best
means for this end is to proclaim that any one who will may capture
and enslave those pirates. No royal official should be allowed to
attend the session of the Audiencia in which a case concerning him
is tried. When Filipino natives serve as soldiers, their families
should during their absence be relieved from tributes and other
impositions. The ecclesiastical affairs of the Malucas should be
under the jurisdiction of Cebu, not of Goa. The commanders of the
trading ships should not be allowed to carry on the trade that they
now do; and the officials at Acapulco should be checked in making
extortionate charges. Ignorant and inefficient men should not be
placed in the ships as sailors. The common seamen therein (who are
Filipino natives) are inhumanly treated, and many of them die from
hunger, thirst, or cold, on each voyage. Slave women are carried on
the ships, in spite of the royal prohibition; and thus arise "many acts
offensive to God," and much cause for scandal. No sailor or passenger
(unless a person of rank) should be allowed to take with him more
than one male slave. Numerous other abuses are mentioned, regarding
the traffic in slaves, the treatment of seamen, and the overloading of
ships. The Chinese at Manila are oppressed by the royal officials--who,
moreover, appropriate their own household supplies of food from the
royal storehouses at the lowest possible prices. Municipal officers
and other leading citizens should not be compelled, as now, to live on
their encomiendas. Flour, rigging, and many other supplies should be
obtained in the islands, instead of being imported from Nueva Espana;
a great saving of money would be thus effected. The oppressive acts
of the friars toward the Indians should be checked; and no more
orders should be allowed to establish themselves in the islands. The
Chinese immigrants in Luzon should be collected in one community,
and induced to cultivate the soil. No relative or dependent of any
royal official should be allowed to hold a seat in the cabildo of
Manila, or to act as inspector of the Chinese trading vessels. More
religious are needed in the missions. The Chinese residents should
be treated more justly, and relieved from burdensome exactions. The
Japanese who come to Manila should be compelled to return to their
own country. No more ships should be built by the natives, and they
should be paid the arrearages which are due them.

The other memorial by Rios Coronel (March, 1620) is additional and
supplementary to the former one. He asks that regidors of Manila
be chosen by the Audiencia, and allowed some compensation for their
services; and that the governor be not allowed to compel the cabildo
to meet in his house. He blames the friars for transferring Indians
from the encomiendas to settlements near Manila, where these natives
are kept merely for the profit of the friars, and, moreover, become
greatly demoralized. The grant of licenses to Chinamen to reside in
the islands should be more carefully regulated; and they should in
no case be allowed to sleep within the walls of Manila. The Japanese
are also an undesirable element of the population, and their coming
to the islands should be restricted. The "commons," or reserve
supplies of rice, contributed by the Indians do them no good,
for these are plundered by the Spanish officials; and the number
of these oppressors has been unduly increased. Other injuries are
inflicted upon the natives, for whose protection the writer pleads;
and these unjust acts are committed by both the officials and the
religious. Rios Coronel objects to the practice in vogue of giving the
Indians military training; and to the traffic in slaves from Malacca,
which brings to the Philippines dangerous and criminal blacks. Public
suits should be tried and decided in the Audiencia, and not sent to
Mexico. The governors should not be allowed to treat the citizens
with insolence; and should be obliged to send the trading ships to
Mexico at the right season, in order to avoid the present frequent
loss of property and lives in wrecked vessels. Another cause of these
losses is the culpable neglect and recklessness of royal officials
and governors. Various abuses in the equipment, lading, and management
of the trading vessels are pointed out, with the corrective measures
that should be taken. The fertile and healthful province of Nueva
Segovia is neglected, and its population is decreasing; this should
be remedied by the colonial authorities. Rios Coronel asks for the
appointment of a competent and reliable shore-master to aid him
in the equipment and despatch of the ships, and for more thorough
inspection of what is done by royal officials in the islands; for
the latter purpose he recommends a choice from several ecclesiastics
whom he names. The Moro pirates still ravage the islands, and the king
should permit them to be enslaved by any one who may capture them. The
head-hunting Zambales and Negrillos of Luzon continually harass the
peaceable Pampangos; and this can only be stopped by allowing the
Pampangos to enslave these foes when captured. The Filipino natives
have been almost ruined by the exactions of forced labor imposed upon
them by the Spaniards, especially in the building and navigation of
vessels. Rios Coronel says: "As I have seen personally, and as all the
inhabitants of that country know, the galleys of the Filipinas are
their destruction." Rios Coronel describes the sort of vessel which
should be used in the islands (one of which he has built at his own
cost), and asks that such be furnished for the use of the colony. The
garrison at Manila is insufficient and demoralized; and the writer
makes various recommendations for improving its status. Many persons
in the artillery service are incompetent; the writer demands a sort
of civil-service test for those appointed to such places. He also
asks for a competent artillery-founder. Better provisions should be
made for the ecclesiastical government of the islands. He asks that
silver bullion from Japan may be legalized as money in the Philippines;
and concludes with the request that the religious and the officials
there be compelled to treat the Indians more kindly. A letter by Rios
Coronel, included in this document, is deferred to _Vol_. XIX.

The Editors
August, 1904.

DOCUMENTS OF 1617-1618

Letter to Felipe III. Andres de Alcaraz; August 10, 1617.
Trade between Nueva Espana and the Far East. [Unsigned and
undated; _ca_. 1617].
Events in the Filipinas Islands, 1617-1618. [Unsigned];
June, 1618.
Description of the Philippinas Islands. [Unsigned]; 1618.
Dutch factories and posts in the Orient. [Pedro de Heredia];
[1618?].
Memorial regarding Manila hospital. [Unsigned]; 1618.
Letter to Felipe III. Alonso Fajardo de Tenza; August 10, 1618.
Letters to Fajardo. Felipe III; December 19, 1618.
Filipinas menaced by Dutch. Joan de Ribera, S.J.; December
20, 1618.

_Sources_: The first, and last four, of these documents are obtained
from MSS. in the Archivo general de Indias, Sevilla; the remainder,
from MSS. in the Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid.

_Translations_: The first and seventh are translated by James
A. Robertson; the second, third, and fourth, by Herbert E. Bolton,
Ethel Z. Rather, and Mattie A. Austin, of the University of Texas;
the remainder, by Robert W. Haight.

LETTER FROM LICENTIATE ALCARAZ TO FELIPE III

Sire:

The enclosed papers were taken from the ships that were going last
year to Nueva Espana. Those ships were despatched to make the voyage
by way of Yndia; but as the Dutch enemy was lying at the entrances of
this bay with his ten warships, it was not possible for the ships to
leave, for it would have been only to have fallen, beyond all doubt,
into his hands. In them I inform your Majesty of everything occurring
up to their date. In this I shall inform you of what is new. The coming
of this enemy caused the anxiety which was the reason--inasmuch as we
had heard for a long time that he was coming; and that he would wait
to seize the Chinese and Japanese ships, and prevent their entrance
into the city with food--that, in order to frustrate those designs, I,
with the advice of the Audiencia and the council of war, resolved to
prepare seven galleons and to equip them as thoroughly as possible, so
that they could go out to fight that enemy. When about to set this plan
afoot, obstacles began to arise, because there was not a single real
in the royal treasury, on account of the non-arrival of the ships from
Nueva Espana; and because the country was in great need, and had no
income except that collected from the licenses of the Sangleys. These
were collected with great effort and difficulty, but the sum was all
spent in a few days in the repair of these galleons. When there was
nothing more to use, the ship expected from Nueva Espana arrived. It
had put in at Japon, and brought more than eight hundred thousand
pesos for the royal treasury and for the citizens. It was regarded
as a great mercy of God that He should help this afflicted land in
such necessity and extremity, and that He should keep this ship from
falling into the hands of that enemy. After this the repairs and
preparations of this fleet proceeded with great energy, and although
innumerable obstacles continued to arise because the wood, rigging,
rice, and other things necessary had to be conveyed by long detours,
all difficulties were conquered by God's help. To Him recourse was
always had, through all the religious orders and the religious,
so that His [Divine] Majesty should be pleased to aid this [our]
cause against those rebels to His church and sacrament, and to your
Majesty, and disturbers of the common peace. These joyous causes
furnished ecclesiastical and secular motive to request me, with loud
and frequent acclamations of joy, to hasten as quickly as possible the
preparation of this fleet. Notwithstanding that it was detained, they
said that it could go out; for they were assured that, since we had
so large galleons, that enemy would not dare to await it, and that the
flagship and almiranta were alone sufficient to drive away that enemy
and prevent the damages that were expected so close at hand. They said
that the preparations that were intended to be made would be useless,
for, when they were finished, then the enemy would have already gone
to Terrenate, enriched with his booty from the Chinese ships; and
that damage would result from delay, while great expenses would have
to be met from the royal treasury. For my part, all these arguments,
since they arose from loyal desires, without taking the trouble to
show the irreparable injuries that would result from that course of
action, caused me no care. I constantly attended to the repairing
and preparation of this fleet as well as possible, including in it
whatever your Majesty possesses in these islands. The reason that
obliged me to lay great stress upon that enemy was that--since he
knew that Don Juan de Silva had gone to Sincapura with a fleet of
ten galleons, four galleys, and one patache--he, without knowing of
the governor's death, came to look for him with an equal number of
warships. These were chosen from twenty-two vessels, and equipped with
the best artillery and men of arms and war in them all; and he dared
to come within sight of our walls and very confidently was coming
with his great force. Consequently I considered it best to prepare an
armed fleet which, being such, might be able to fight with his. Not
of less consideration was the fact that we are in the view of so many
barbarous nations, who esteem and extol him who conquers. Accordingly
it was necessary to consider carefully not to place our reputation
and credit in any danger, but that we should have as superior a fleet
to his as could be collected, to go out to measure strength with the
enemy; for in this case what was once branded [1] could not be effaced.

The final reason that caused me to arm those galleons with the best
forces that could he assembled was the consideration that the enemy
should not go out victorious because your Majesty did not possess in
this land the means with which we could construct a fleet in many
years; and if we drove the enemy's fleet away and punished him as
his boldness and arrogance merited, he would have to lay aside his
desire for returning to these islands, and would leave them quiet and
peaceful, and free from the dangers that his coming threatened. With
this resolution conquering great difficulties with the help of God,
who always favored this His cause, the fleet of seven galleons,
one patache, and three galleys was prepared. In order to man them
with the rowers that were needed, the citizens, Sangley Christians,
and some Indians lent two hundred and twenty-three slaves. And as one
hundred and fifty slaves were still wanting to man them sufficiently,
and because there was so little revenue in the royal treasury, I
made efforts to have the Sangley infidels supply this deficiency,
inasmuch as they were the most interested in avoiding the damages
caused by that enemy. They excused themselves from giving persons
to serve in the galleys; but offered to give the money to pay those
hired rowers who were willing to go. For this purpose the Sangleys
themselves made a contribution of one peso apiece from all who had
any money, and gave five thousand pesos. This sum they delivered
to a regidor for the pay of any slave or freeman who was willing
to serve on this occasion, to each one of whom twenty-five pesos
would be given. With this sum one hundred and forty-seven rowers
were gathered. Some new slaves were bought with this money and the
others were paid twenty-five pesos apiece. One thousand five hundred
and forty-five pesos of the five thousand pesos happened to be left,
and this amount was spent for another matter of equal importance.

In order to equip these galleons and galleys--and that very
moderately--we needed one thousand infantrymen; but all the islands
could only furnish six hundred paid soldiers. In order to supply
this lack, three hundred and eighty men were provided from the
citizens of this city, and from captains, alferezes, and sergeants
on half-pay--the captains numbering thirty-four, the alferezes one
hundred and six, the sergeants eighty, and the common soldiers one
hundred and sixty. These men showed a willingness to take service on
this occasion for honor. But to fulfil their obligations they had not
the means with which to buy any arms, or other supplies which were
necessary to them. The report spread that, if the money were not given
to them so that they could equip themselves, they could not embark. It
was necessary to find a remedy for the loss that might result from
this condition, and the one that seemed most suitable so that they
might serve your Majesty with single-heartedness, was to assign as a
gratuity to each captain one hundred pesos, to each alferez fifty, to
each sergeant thirty-five, and to each common soldier twenty-five. But
inasmuch as the royal treasury had nothing wherefrom to supply these
gratuities, and they could not be avoided, thirty toneladas of the
freightage for Nueva Espana were distributed, and were divided among
the citizens who had capital. Each citizen was given one pieza [2]
for twenty-five pesos. In this way six thousand pesos were raised,
which, with the one thousand five hundred and forty-five pesos given
by the Sangleys, amount to seven thousand five hundred and forty-five
pesos. This money was given as a gratuity, with thirty-nine toneladas
more and six piezas; figuring this at twenty-five pesos a pieza, all
the help amounted to fifteen thousand five hundred pesos. This amount
was regulated by giving to each captain fifty pesos and two piezas
of the cargo; to each alferez, twenty-five pesos, and one pieza of
the cargo; to each sergeant, ten pesos and one pieza of the cargo,
and to each common soldier his twenty-five pesos.

To aid the seamen, who are a discontented class, there was no
money. For after having aided the paid infantry, not a single peso was
left in the royal treasury. Forty-six of the citizens lent twenty-two
thousand seven hundred pesos and the treasury of the probate court
[_caxa de bienes de defuntos_] [3] lent four thousand. A moderate
amount of aid was furnished to those men by that means. After that,
naught more was left to be done toward the suitable preparation of the
royal fleet. May God be praised, who favored this cause so greatly,
so that your Majesty might be better served. It can be thoroughly
understood that to attempt any of these three things would give
anxiety even to him who had considerable power of management; for
the departure of the fleet to fight with the enemy depended on very
careful management; while, on the contrary, it must remain in port
if all the expenses incurred in its preparation had been carelessly
planned. But it happened as we could have desired. When all necessary
arrangements had been made, the bishop of Zibu, who has charge of this
archbishopric, gave his blessing to the royal fleet. The fleet took
as patroness the immaculate conception of our Lady, who was conceived
without the stain of original sin. It left the port of Cavite in charge
of Don Juan Rronquillo del Castillo, [4] on Saturday, on the eighth
day of the month of April, one thousand six hundred and seventeen,
to find the enemy, who was stationed at Playa Honda [5] with six
vessels. There, in the past year of six hundred and sixteen, he was
defeated by Governor Don Juan de Silva. Three ships of the enemy were
thirty leguas in advance, on the look-out for Chinese vessels, while
the last of his ten ships had been sent to Terrenate. On Thursday,
the thirteenth of the said month, our fleet sighted four vessels
[of the enemy's fleet]. They were lying by very carelessly, with
two Chinese vessels that they had pillaged. Those two vessels ware
carrying about three hundred thousand pesos' worth of merchandise. One
of them the enemy had begun to rob, although only slightly. It was
impossible to attack them, for wind was lacking. Thereupon the enemy
very leisurely weighed anchor, but did not leave the Chinese ships
until the next day. Then as the two fleets were about to engage,
they left their prizes, in order not to be hindered by them. They
had already been joined by two other vessels. Our royal flagship had
got to windward. Near it, at eight in the morning, was the galleon
"San Juan Bautista" under command of Admiral Pedro de Heredia (but he
was not admiral of the fleet). The other galleons were to leeward. As
the enemy saw so good an opportunity, he maneuvered his six ships,
placing them in good order. His flagship passed within musket-shot of
one side of the royal flagship and discharged its artillery. Answering
them with another, as good and better, many volleys were fired
without missing one shot, because the pieces were fired at so short
a distance. Another ship passed, with the same good order, giving and
taking its heavy volleys. The four other ships of those which I said
were there, did the same. It was the greatest gallantry that I ever
saw; for our galleon gave all those of the enemy so many volleys that
it displayed excellently its great strength--as well as the injury
received by the enemy, since he attempted nothing more on that day. On
our side five men were killed and eight wounded. The following day,
Saturday, the fifteenth of the same month of April, the two fleets
got ready to fight, and ours got to windward. Orders were given for
each galleon to grapple with one of the enemy--flagship with flagship,
and the "San Juan Bautista" with the almiranta of the enemy; while the
galleon "San Lorenzo" and the patache were to aid whichever boat they
saw needed help; the galley flagship was to aid the royal flagship,
and the other two galleys the galleon nearest them. The enemy was
awaiting us in excellent order; and, signaling the other vessels to
attack him, our first galleon, named "Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe,"
under Captain Juan Bautista de Molina, grappled; and then the royal
flagship with that of the enemy; the galleon "San Juan Bautista" with
their almiranta; the galleon "San Miguel," commanded by Rodrigo de
Guillestigui, with the ship that fell to its lot; the galleon "San
Lorenco," under Captain Juan de Acevedo, with another ship. As for
the galleon "San Marcos," under Captain Don Juan de la Vega (one of
the best ships of the fleet), and the galleon "San Phelipe," under
Captain Sebastian de Madrid, these two did not grapple, although
common report says that they could have done so had they made an
effort. They fought a very fierce battle. The galleon "Nuestra Senora
de Guadalupe" defeated its opponent, being aided by the galley under
Captain Don Diego de Quinones; and the enemy having shown a flag of
peace, soldiers from our side entered it in token of victory. The royal
flagship, after having been grappled for more than two hours--the
battle being fought with great gallantry on each side, each firing
heavy volleys at the other, and the galley flagship aiding on its
side--was reported to be leaking badly from the effect of certain
volleys which it received at its water line. This forced it to throw
off the grappling-irons and go away; while the enemy's ship refused
to mind its helm, and, in a little more than half an hour, careened
on one side and sank, without any of its cargo being seen. Forty or
more men, among them the general, escaped in two lanchas. With great
efforts they reached one of their ships. The galleon "San Miguel,"
after having fought with great courage, set fire to its opponent,
a vessel of eight hundred toneladas, laden with cloth which they had
stolen. The fire caught the main-sail, which was so quickly burned
that the sail fell, on the yard, into the waist of the ship. The ship
continued to burn so fiercely that it could not be quenched. All the
men took to the sea, some in lanchas and others swimming, most of the
latter being drowned. This burning ship drifted to where our galleon
"Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe" was stationed. Near it was the captured
galleon, and the burning vessel coming down upon the latter, set fire
to it; and this one began to burn so furiously that the soldiers who
had entered it escaped with difficulty, while some were burned. And,
since our galley was not so near now, all, both Spaniards and Dutch,
were drowned or burned. Then the first burning ship passed on. The
galleon "San Juan Bautista" having almost captured the enemy's
almiranta, the burning vessel bore down upon them both. Throwing off
their grappling-irons with considerable difficulty, the fire forced
them to ungrapple; and at once they separated, so that the fire might
not injure them. Thereupon victory was declared, and the three hostile
ships took to flight badly crippled. Their almiranta was so damaged
that our people thought that it would surely sink. Those three vessels
were pursued by the "San Marcos," and "San Phelipe," which were more
to the windward, and by all the rest of the fleet. However, inasmuch
as the royal flagship, the "San Juan Bautista," and the "San Miguel"
and "Nuestra Senora de Guadalupe" were hardly used and leaking badly,
they turned shoreward after midnight. In the morning the "San Marcos"
and the "San Phelipe" found themselves alone, and somewhat separated,
and found no traces of the enemy. Although they should have kept
together, they did not do it, but each vessel acted by itself. The
galleon "San Marcos" went to a place where two ships of the enemy
were pillaging two other Chinese ships. When the enemy discovered it,
one of his vessels went to reconnoiter it, while the other stayed
behind with the vessels that they were pillaging. They commenced
to fight and the battle lasted more than three hours, at the end
of which the Dutch vessel withdrew and joined the other ship. Next
day--that of San Marcos--the [Dutch] ship that had not fought came;
it is understood that it was reenforced with men. Firing a quantity of
chain-shot, it did considerable damage to our rigging; and as our main
yard had fallen, our ship did not mind its helm well. Consequently,
our galleon sustained serious injury at the stern, upon which its
commander came to a very imprudent resolution--namely, to go in
toward shore and anchor in twelve brazas of water, and there fight
with the enemy. This was so carelessly executed that, upon throwing
the anchor, they could not find bottom, whereupon they grounded
the galleon in four brazas of water. The entire crew went ashore
taking some things with them. None of the enemy disembarked. As the
commander thought that the enemy could burn them with his lanchas,
he made another decision as bad as the other, and set fire to his
vessel. Thereby was lost the hull of the ship, which was especially
good. The artillery and anchors were all taken out and most of them
are ashore. The commander appears to be very blameworthy; and the
investigation to punish him according to his offense is now being
made. This devolves upon Don Geronimo de Silva, castellan and governor
of the forts of Terrenate, to whom your Majesty has granted the office
of captain-general because of the death of Governor Don Juan de Silva,
until a proprietary governor is provided. All the rest of the fleet
returned to the port of Cavite. The bad treatment received by the
galleons from the many volleys, the sailors, soldiers, and artillery
aboard them, and the dead and wounded, your Majesty can ascertain,
if so pleased, from the charts accompanying this letter.

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