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New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915 by Various

V >> Various >> New York Times Current History: The European War, Vol 2, No. 1, April, 1915




It is patent that this economic independence is influenced by the
geographical position of the fatherland and its colonies. Now, I
defended the theory (and my opponents made no attempt to confute it)
that even after a victorious war the German Empire would not have fully
attained this economic independence; that, accordingly, after the
conclusion of peace, we must exert every effort to insure this economic
independence in one way or another.

As to the course which we must follow to attain this goal, there may be
various opinions. I proposed the establishment of a union of Central
European States. The conservative press characterized that as "utterly
pretentious."...

If the course I have proposed is considered inadvisable, let another be
proposed. But on what colonies, forsooth, do those gentlemen count, that
could furnish us with cotton and ore, petroleum and tobacco, wood and
silk, and whatever else we need, in the quantity and quality we need?
What colonies that could offer us--do not forget that--markets for the
sale of our exporting industries? Even after the war we shall be
dependent upon exports to and imports from abroad.

And so there is no other way of safeguarding our economic independence
against England and Russia than by an economic alliance with the States
that are our allies in this war, or at least that do not make common
cause with our enemies. Aside from the fact, which I shall not discuss
here, that only such an alliance can insure a firm position for us on
the Atlantic Ocean, which in the next decades is bound to be the area of
competition for the world powers.

Politics are not a matter of emotion, but of calm, intelligent
deliberation. Let us leave emotional politics to our enemies. It is the
German method to envisage the goal steadily, and with it the roads that
lead to that goal. Our goal is not world domination. Whoever tries to
talk that belief into the mind of the German people may confuse some
heads that are already not very clear; but he cannot succeed in
substituting Napoleon I. for Bismarck as our master teacher.

Our goal can only be the establishing of our value in the world among
world powers, with equal rights to the same opportunities. And in order
to attain this goal we must, even after the conclusion of peace, exert
all our forces. A people that thinks it can rest on its laurels after
victory has been won runs the risk sooner or later of losing that for
which its sons shed their blood on the field of battle. With the
conclusion of peace there begins for us anew the unceasing peaceful
competition and the maintenance and strengthening of the world value
which we have won through the war. German imperialism is and will remain
the work of peace.




TWO POOR LITTLE BELGIAN FLEDGLINGS

By PIERRE LOTI.

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]


At evening, in one of our southern towns, a train full of Belgian
refugees ran into the station, and the poor martyrs, exhausted and
bewildered, got out slowly, one by one, on the unfamiliar platform,
where French people were waiting to receive them. Carrying a few
possessions caught up at random, they had got into the carriages without
even asking whither they were bound, urged by their anxiety to flee, to
flee desperately from horror and death, from unspeakable mutilation and
Sadic outrage--from things that seemed no longer possible in the world,
but which, it seems, were lying dormant in pietistic German brains, and
had suddenly belched forth upon their land and ours, like a belated
manifestation of original barbarism. They no longer possessed a village,
nor a home, nor a family; they arrived like jetsam cast up by the
waters, and the eyes of all were full of terrified anguish. Many
children, little girls whose parents had disappeared in the stress of
fire and battle; and aged women, now alone in the world, who had fled,
hardly knowing why, no longer caring for life, but moved by some obscure
instinct of self-preservation.

Two little creatures, lost in the pitiable throng, held each other
tightly by the hand, two little boys obviously brothers, the elder, who
may have been five years old, protecting the younger, of about three. No
one claimed them, no one knew them. How had they been able to
understand, finding themselves alone, that they, too, must get into this
train to escape death? Their clothes were decent, and their little
stockings were thick and warm; clearly they belonged to humble but
careful parents; they were, doubtless, the sons of one of those sublime
Belgian soldiers who had fallen heroically on the battlefield, and whose
last thought had perhaps been one of supreme tenderness for them. They
were not even crying, so overcome were they by fatigue and sleepiness;
they could scarcely stand. They could not answer when they were
questioned, but they seemed intent, above all, upon keeping a tight hold
of each other. Finally the elder, clasping the little one's hand
closely, as if fearing to lose him, seemed to awake to a sense of his
duty as protector, and, half asleep already, found strength to say, in a
suppliant tone, to the Red Cross lady bending over him: "Madame, are
they going to put us to bed soon?" For the moment this was all they were
capable of wishing, all that they hoped for from human pity--to be put
to bed.

They were put to bed at once, together, of course, still holding each
other tightly by the hand; and, nestling one against the other, they
fell at the same moment into the tranquil unconsciousness of childish
slumber.

Once, long ago, in the China Sea, during the war, two little frightened
birds, smaller even than our wrens, arrived, I know not how, on board
our ironclad, in our Admiral's cabin, and all day long, though no one
attempted to disturb them, they fluttered from side to side, perching on
cornices and plants.

At nightfall, when I had forgotten them, the Admiral sent for me. It was
to show me, now without emotion, the two little visitors who had gone to
roost in his room, perched upon a slender silken cord above his bed.
They nestled closely together, two little balls of feathers, touching
and almost merged one in the other, and slept without the slightest
fear, sure of our pity. And those little Belgians sleeping side by side
made me think of the two little birds lost in the China Sea. There was
the same confidence and the same innocent slumber--but a greater
tenderness was about to watch over them.




What the Germans Desire

Not Conquest, but a New Economical System of Europe

By Gustaf Sioesteen


The subjoined letter from Berlin, published originally in the
Swedish Goteborgs Handels-Tidnung of Oct. 26, 1914, was
immediately translated by the British Legation in
Stockholm--this is the official English translation--and sent
by the legation to Sir Edward Grey. THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT
HISTORY is informed from a trustworthy source that the article
is interpreted in London as expressing the real aims of
Germany at the end of the war, should that power be
successful. The founding of a commercial United States of
Europe by means of an economical organization with new
"buffer" States to be created between the German Empire and
Russia, and with the other smaller European States, would be,
according to this interpretation, the purpose of Germany at
the conclusion of a victorious war. The passage in the Berlin
correspondent's letter declaring that only such an enormous
central European customs union, in the opinion of leading
German statesmen, "could hold the United States of North
America at bay" in order that, after this present war, the
"world would only have to take into account two first-class
powers, viz., Germany and the United States of America," is of
peculiar interest to Americans.

BERLIN, Oct. 21.

Counting one's chickens before they are hatched is a pardonable failing
with nations carrying on war with the feeling that their all is at
stake. When sorrow is a guest of every household, when monetary losses
cause depression, and the cry arises time after time, "What will be the
outcome of all this?" then only the fairest illusions and the wildest
flights of fancy can sustain the courage of the masses.

These illusions are not only egotistical but, curiously enough,
altruistic, since mankind, even when bayoneting their fellow-creatures,
want to persuade themselves and others that this is done merely for the
benefit of their adversary. In accordance with this idea, in the opinion
of all parties, the war will be brought to an end with an increase of
power for their native country, as also a new Eden prevail throughout
the whole civilized world.

The enemies of Germany, though they have hitherto suffered an almost
unbroken series of reverses in the war, have already thoroughly thrashed
out the subject as to what the world will look like when Germany is
conquered. In German quarters the press has likewise painted the future,
but the following lines are not intended to increase the row of fancy
portraits, but merely to throw light on what is new in the demands
conceived.

My representations are founded on special information, and I deem it
best to make them now, when the most fantastic descriptions of the
all-absorbing desire of conquest on the part of Germany have circulated
in the press of the entire world.

Among other absurdities it has been declared that Germany intends to
claim a fourth of France, making this dismembered country a vassal
State, bound to the triumphal car of the conqueror by the very heaviest
chains. It is incredible, but true, that such a statement has been made
in the press by a Frenchman, formerly President of the Council.

In direct opposition to the fictitious demands of the Germans, I can
advance a proposition which may sound paradoxical, viz., that the
leading men in Germany, the Emperor and his advisers, after bringing the
war to a victorious issue, will seriously seek expedients to _avoid_
conquests, so far as this is compatible with the indispensable demands
of order and stability for Europe.

First, as regards France. The entire world, as also the Germans, are
moved to pity by her fate. Germany has never entertained any other wish
than to be at peace with her western frontier. A considerable portion of
France is now laid waste, and in a few weeks millions of soldiers will
have been poured into still wider portions of this beautiful country. On
what are the inhabitants of these French provinces to exist when the
German and French armies have requisitioned everything eatable? Germany
cannot feed the inhabitants of the French provinces occupied, nor can
the Belgians do so, I imagine, for the provisions of Germany are simply
sufficient for their own needs, England preventing any new supply on any
large scale.

This is a totally new state of things in comparison with 1870, when
Germany was still an agrarian country and had, moreover, a free supply
on all her frontiers.

Can the French Government allow a considerable portion of their own
population actually to starve, or be obliged to emigrate to other parts
of France, there to live the life of nomads at the expense of England,
while the deserted provinces are given over to desolation?

The idea prevails here that the French will compel their Government to
enter on and conclude a separate treaty of peace when the fatal
consequences of the war begin to assume this awful guise. England does
not appear to have considered that this would be the result of her
system of blockade.

The German conditions of peace as regards France will be governed by two
principal factors with respect to their chief issues.

The first is the complete unanimity of the Emperor and the Chancellor
that _no population, not speaking German, will be incorporated in the
German Empire, or obtain representation in the Diet_. Germany already
has sufficient trouble with the foreign element now present in the Diet.
Consequently there can be no question of any considerable acquisition of
territory from France, but the demands of Germany simply extend to the
_iron-ore fields of Lorraine_, which are certainly of considerable
value. For France these mining fields are of far less consideration
than for Germany, whose immense iron trade is far more in need of the
iron mines.

The second factor is that the Germans, owing to the strong public
opinion, _will never consent to Belgium regaining her liberty_. The
Chancellor of the Empire has, as long as it was possible, been opposed
to the annexation of Belgium, having preferred, even during hostilities,
to have re-established the Belgian Kingdom. It is significant that the
military authorities have prohibited the German press from discussing
the question of the future of Belgium. It is evident that there has
prevailed a wish to leave the question open in order to insure a
solution offering various possibilities. But subsequent to the discovery
of the Anglo-Belgian plot, as previously stated, all idea of reinstating
Belgium has been discarded.

The annexation of Belgium, however, makes it possible to grant France
less stringent conditions. So long as Belgium--under some form of
self-government--is under German sway there is no hope of revenge of
France, and the conviction prevails here that after this war France will
abstain from her dreams of aggrandizement and become pacific. Germany
can then make reductions in the burdens laid on her people for military
service by land.

To arrange the position of Belgium in relation to Germany will be a very
interesting problem for German policy.

It is obvious that the annexation of Belgium cannot be defended from the
point of view of the principle of nationality. The Belgians--half of
them French, half of them Flemish--undoubtedly deem themselves but one
nation. As a mitigating circumstance in favor of the annexation it is
urged--above and beyond the intrigues carried on by Belgium with the
English--that Belgium, in days of yore, for a long time formed a portion
of the German Empire, and that the inhabitants of the little country, to
a considerable degree, gain their livelihood by its being a land of
transit for German products. Nationally, the annexation is not to be
defended, but geographically, economically, and from a military point
of view it is comprehensible.

At the east front of the central powers very different conditions
prevail. _Austria has no desire to make the conquest of any territory_;
indeed, just the contrary, would probably be willing to cede a portion
of Galicia in favor of new States. _Germany has not the slightest
inclination to incorporate new portions of Slav or Lettish regions._
Both Germans and Austrians wish to establish free _buffer States_
between themselves and the great Russian Empire.

Not even the Baltic provinces, where Germans hold almost the same
position as the Swedes in Finland, form an object for the German desire
of conquest, but her wish is to make them, as also _Finland_, an
independent State. Furthermore, the Kingdom of _Poland_ and a Kingdom of
_Ukraine_ would be the outcome of decisive victories for the central
powers.

What Germany would demand of these new States, whose very existence was
the outcome of her success at arms, would simply be an _economical
organization in common with the German Empire_, an enormous central
European "Zollverein" ("Customs Union") with Germany at its heart. It is
only such a union, in the opinion of leading German statesmen, which
could hold the United States of North America at bay, and after this
present war, moreover, the world would only have to take into account
_two_ first-class powers, viz., Germany and the United States of
America.

A commencement of this new economical connection is being made by the
negotiations entered on by representatives of _Austria-Hungary_ and
_Germany_ concerning the proposed formation of a _Customs Union_. Since
this union would include 120,000,000 individuals, it must be evident
what an immense attraction it must exert on the surrounding smaller
nations. _Switzerland_ and _Holland_ can scarcely escape this
attraction, and the _Scandinavian countries_, it is said, would probably
find it to their advantage, together with a liberated _Finland_, to
form a _Northern Customs Union_, which later, on an independent basis,
could _enter in close union with the vast "Zollverein" of Central
Europe_.

This "Zollverein" would then include about 175,000,000 individuals. The
adhesion of _Italy_ to the vast union would not be inconceivable, and
then the combination of the United States of Europe, founded on a
voluntary commercial union, would be approaching its realization.

Such a commercial union, embracing various peoples, could only lead to
moderation in foreign politics, and would be the best guarantee for the
peace of the universe. A brisk interchange of commodities, a fruitful
interchange of cultural ideas would result from such a union, connecting
the polar seas with the Mediterranean, and the Netherlands with the
Steppes of Southern Russia.

All States participating in this union would gain thereby. But one
European country would be the loser, _Great Britain, the land of promise
for the middleman_; that, according to German comprehension, at present
gains a living by skimming the cream from the trade industry of other
nations by facilitating the exchange of goods, and making profits by
being the banking centre of the world.

The Germans declare that there is no reason for such a middleman's
existence in our day. The banking system is now so developed in all
civilized lands that, for example Sweden can remit direct to Australia
or the Argentine for goods obtained thence, instead of making payment
via London and there rate, by raising the exchange for sovereigns to an
unnatural height, so that, as matter of fact, England levies a tax on
all international interchange of commodities.

In opposition to this glorious vision of the days to come, which the
Germans wish to realize by their victories in war, there is the alluring
prospect of the Allies that by their victory they will deal a deathblow
to _German militarism_. While the English, with their 200,000 troops,
are good enough to promise no conquest of German territory--what says
Russia to this?--at the close of the war, in the opinion of the Britons,
there would still remain 65,000,000 Germans right in the centre of
Europe, organized as a kingdom burdened with a war indemnity to a couple
of tens of milliards in marks.

This nation, however, strengthened by 15,000,000 Germans in Austria,
would be the greatest bearers of culture in the wide world--the nation
with the best technical equipment of all others, glowing with ambition,
with military training second to none, and gifted with an immense rate
of increase as regards population. This nation would be forced to lay
down her arms, lying as it does between the overbearing gigantic realm
in the east and the warlike French to the west. The idea is
incomprehensible. The universe would behold a competition in armaments
such as it had never seen.

A victorious Germany, on the other hand, would become less and less
military, since she _would not need_ to arm herself to such an extent as
now. She is already chiefly an industrial country. Her desire is to be
wealthy, and wealth invariably smothers military instincts. Germany has
set up far greater ideals as regards social developments than other
countries, and all she asks is to be left in peace calmly to carry out
these plans in the future. _German militarism can only be conquered by
the victory being on her side, since she has no thought of military
supremacy, but simply of founding a new economical organization in
Europe._

GUSTAF SIOESTEEN.




ADDRESS TO KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM

By EMIL VERHAEREN.

Translation by Florence Simmonds.

[From King Albert's Book.]


Sire: This request to pay my respectful homage to you has given me the
first real pleasure I have been permitted to feel since the good days of
Liege. At this moment you are the one King in the world whose subjects,
without exception, unite in loving and admiring him with all the
strength of their souls. This unique fate is yours, Sire. No leader of
men on earth has had it in the same degree as you.

In spite of the immensity of the sorrow surrounding you, I think you
have a right to rejoice, and the more so as your consort, her Majesty
the Queen, shares this rare privilege with you.

Sire, your name will be great throughout the ages to come. You are in
such perfect sympathy with your people that you will always be their
symbol. Their courage, their tenacity, their stifled grief, their pride,
their future greatness, their immortality all live in you. Our hearts
are yours to their very depths. Being yourself, you are all of us. And
this you will remain.

Later on, when you return to your recaptured and glorious Belgium, you
will only have to say the word, Sire, and all disputes will lose their
bitterness and all antagonisms fade away. After being our strength and
defender, you will become our peacemaker and reconciler. With deepest
respect,

EMIL VERHAEREN.




Foreshadowing a New Phase of War

Financing the Allies and Small Nations Preparing for War

By Lloyd George, British Chancellor of the Exchequer


That there are "also other States preparing for war," and that
financial arrangements had been made for their participation
against Germany by the allied Governments of Great Britain,
France, and Russia; moreover, that Russia would be enabled
within a few months to export considerable quantities of her
grain and do her own financing--this statement preceded the
bombardment of the forts in the Dardanelles, probably to clear
the way for Russia's commerce--are the outstanding features of
the speech by Lloyd George presented below, foreshadowing a
new phase in the war. The speech was made in the House of
Commons on Feb. 15, 1915, to explain the results of the
financial conference between the allied powers to unite their
monetary resources, held in Paris during the week of Feb. 1.
It may be regarded as one of the most momentous utterances of
the war.

PARLIAMENTARY REPORT.

_The Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Mr. Lloyd George,)_ who was called
upon by the Speaker, said: I shall do my best to conform to the
announcement of the Prime Minister that the statement I have to make
about the financial conference in Paris shall be a brief one, but I am
afraid my right honorable friend assumed that we are all endowed with
the extraordinary gift of compression which he himself possesses.
[Laughter.] The arrangements that were made between the three Ministers
for recommendation to their respective Governments commit us to heavy
engagements, and it is, therefore, important I should report them in
detail to the House, and find some reason why we should undertake such
liabilities.

This is the most expensive war which has ever been waged in material, in
men, and in money. The conference in Paris was mostly concerned with
money. For the year ending Dec. 31 next the aggregate expenditure of the
Allies will not be far short of L2,000,000,000. The British Empire will
be spending considerably more than either of our two great
allies--probably up to L100,000,000 to L150,000,000 more than the
highest figure to be spent by the other two great allies. We have
created a new army; we have to maintain a huge navy. We are paying
liberal separation allowances. We have to bring troops from the ends of
the earth; we have to wage war not merely in Europe, but in Asia, in
North, East, and South Africa. I must say just a few words as to the
relative position of the three great countries which led us to make the
arrangements on financial matters which we recommend to our respective
Governments. Britain and France are two of the richest countries in the
world. In fact, they are the great bankers of the world. We could pay
for our huge expenditure on the war for five years, allowing a
substantial sum for depreciation, out of the proceeds of our investments
abroad. France could carry on the war for two or three years at least
out of the proceeds of her investments abroad, and both countries would
still have something to spare to advance to their allies. This is a most
important consideration, for at the present moment the Allies are
fighting the whole of the mobilized strength of Germany, with perhaps
less than one-third of their own strength. The problem of the war to the
Allies is to bring the remaining two-thirds of their resources and
strength into the fighting line at the earliest possible moment. This is
largely, though by no means entirely, a question of finance.

Russia is in a different position from either Britain or France. She is
a prodigiously rich country in natural resources--about the richest
country in the world in natural resources. Food, raw material--she
produces practically every commodity. She has a great and growing
population, a virile and industrious people. Her resources are
overflowing and she has labor to develop them in abundance. By a stroke
of the pen Russia has since the war began enormously increased her
resources by suppressing the sale of all alcoholic liquors. [Cheers.] It
can hardly be realized that by that means alone she has increased the
productivity of her labor by something between 30 and 50 per cent., just
as if she had added millions of laborers to the labor reserves of Russia
without even increasing the expense of maintaining them, and whatever
the devastation of the country may be Russia has more than anticipated
its wastage by that great act of national heroism and sacrifice.
[Cheers.] The great difficulty with Russia is that, although she has
great natural resources, she has not yet been able to command the
capital within her own dominions to develop those resources even during
the times of peace. In time of war she has additional difficulties. She
cannot sell her commodities for several reasons. One is that a good deal
of what she depends upon for raising capital abroad will be absorbed by
the exigencies of the war in her own country. Beyond that the yield of
her minerals will not be quite as great, because the labor will be
absorbed in her armies.

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