Continental Monthly, Vol. I., No. IV., April, 1862 by Various

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Death, we are told, found his way into Arcadia; and disappointment was
not long in coming to disturb the modern Arcadians, who had as much to
do with cotton as their predecessors with wool. The dream of universal
peace, a peace that was to endure because based on enlightened
selfishness,--that is to say on buying in cheap markets and selling in
dear ones,--was as rudely dispelled as had been all earlier dreams of
the kind. Interest, it was found, could no more make men live lovingly
together than principle could cause them to do so in by-gone times. If
there were two nations that might have been insured not to fight each
other, because interest was sufficient to prevent men from having resort
to war, those nations were Russia and England. They were in no sense
rivals, according to the definition of rivalry in the circles of
commerce. Between them there was much buying and selling, to the great
profit of both. England is an old nation, with the arts of industry
developed among her people to an extent that is elsewhere unknown. The
division of labor that prevails among her working people is so extensive
and so minute, that in that respect she defies comparison. Other
countries may have as skillful laborers as she possesses, but their
industry is of a far less various character. Russia is a new country,
and she requires what England has to dispose of; and England finds her
account in purchasing the raw materials that are so abundantly produced
in Russia. Commercially speaking, therefore, these two nations could not
fall out, could not quarrel, could not fight, if they would. In all
other respects, too, they could be counted upon to set a good example to
all other communities. They had more than once been allies, each had
done the other good services at critical tunes, and they had had the
foremost places in that grand alliance which had twice dethroned
Napoleon I. The exceptions to their general good understanding belong to
those exceptions which are supposed to be useful in proving a given
rule. When the tory rulers of England became alarmed because of the
success of Catharine II. in her second Turkish war, and proposed doing
what was done more than sixty years later,--to assist the Osmanlis,--the
opposition to their policy became so powerful that even the strong
ministry of William Pitt had to listen to its voice; which shows that
the tendency of English opinion was then favorable to Russia. The
hostility of Czar Paul to England, in his last days, is attributed to
the failure of his mind; and the immediate resumption of good relations
between the two countries after his death, establishes the fact that the
English and the Russians were not sharers in the Czar's feelings. During
the five years that followed Tilsit, Russia appeared to be the enemy of
England, and war existed for some time between the two empires; but this
was owing to the ascendency of the French, Alexander having to choose
between England and France. The nominal enemies did each other as little
injury as possible; and, in 1812, they became greater friends than ever.
Most Englishmen were probably of Lord Holland's opinion, that England's
interest dictated a Russian connection; and in the eighteenth century
England was, in some sense, the nursing mother of the new empire, though
once or twice she was inclined to do as other nurses have
done,--administer some punishment to the rude and healthy child she was
fostering, and not without reason. So harmonious had been the relations
of these two magnificent states, that an eminent Russian author, Dr.
Hamel, writing in 1846, could say: 'Nearly three hundred years have now
elapsed since England greeted Muscovy at the mouth of the Dwina. So
great have been the benefits to trade, the arts, and industry in
general, arising from the friendly relations between England and Russia,
which, in 1853, will have completed the third century of their
continuance, that one might expect to see this period closed, in both
countries, with a jubilee to commemorate so remarkable an example of
uninterrupted amicable intercourse between nations.' The year 1853 came;
but, instead of being a jubilee to the old friends of three centuries'
standing, it brought the beginning of that contest which is known as the
Russian war. That was a proper way, indeed, to notice the happy return
of the three-hundredth anniversary of the establishment of
'uninterrupted amicable intercourse' between the nations, whose soldiers
were soon slaughtering each other with as much energy as if they had
been 'natural enemies' from immemorial time. Interest had no power to
turn aside the storm of war. The English people were angry with Russia
because the iron-willed Czar had carried matters in Europe with a very
high hand, and was, in fact, virtually master of the Old World, and
suspected of being on uncommonly good terms with the masters of the New
World. Nicholas had succeeded to the place of Napoleon in their ill
graces. They liked the Cossackry of the one as little as they had liked
the cannonarchy of the other. It was a case of pure jealousy. Russia was
too powerful to suit the English idea of the fitness of things, and
therefore it was necessary that she should be chastised and humbled.
Fear of Russia there could have been none in the English mind. It has
been thought that England contended for the safety of her Eastern
dominions; but then the Czar offered her Egypt and Candia, possession of
which would not only have much strengthened her Indian empire, but have
been the means of making her more powerful at home. Nothing better could
have been offered for her acceptance, if valuable territories would have
satisfied her feelings; and much praise has been bestowed upon her
because she did not close with the Czar's proposition 'to share and
share alike' the lands of the House of Othman; but that praise is not
quite deserved, the desire not to see Russia aggrandized being a
stronger sentiment with her than was the desire to aggrandize herself.
Had the question been left for British statesmen alone to settle,--had
the British premier been as free to act for England as the Czar was for
Russia,--poor, sick Turkey would have been cut and carved most
expeditiously and artistically; she would have been partitioned as
perfectly as Poland, and Abdul Medjid would have experienced the fate of
Stanislaus Poniatowski. But English ministers hold power only on
condition of doing the will of the English nation, and that nation had
contracted an aversion to Russia that was uncontrollable, and before its
hostility its ministers had to give way, slowly and reluctantly; and the
half-measures they adopted, like the half-measures of our own government
toward the secessionists, explain the disasters of the war. The English
people were determined that there should be an end, for the time at
least, to the Russian hegemony, and threw themselves into the arms of
France with a vivacity that would have astonished any other French ruler
but Napoleon III., who had lived among them, and who knew them well. The
war was waged, and, when over, what had England gained? Nothing solid,
it must be admitted. The territory of Russia remained unimpaired, and
there is not the slightest evidence that her influence in the East was
lessened by the partial destruction of Sebastopol. The Russian navy of
the Euxine had ceased to exist; but as it consisted principally of
vessels that were not adapted to the purposes of modern warfare, the
loss of the Russians in that respect was not of a very serious
character. Russia's European leadership was suspended; but her power and
her resources, which, if properly employed, must soon reinstate her,
were not damaged. England _had_ fought for an idea, and had fought in
vain.

France had as little interest in the Russian war as England, and the
French people had no wish to fight the Czar. They would have preferred
fighting the English, in connection with the Czar,--an arrangement that
would have been more profitable to their country. But the emperor had a
quarrel with his arrogant brother at St. Petersburgh, and he availed
himself of the opportunity afforded by that brother's obstinacy to teach
him a lesson from which he did not live to profit. Nicholas had cut the
new emperor, and had caused him to be taboo'd by most of the sovereigns
of Europe; and the Frenchman determined to cut his way to consideration.
This he was enabled to do, with the aid of the English; and ever since
the war's close he has held the place which became vacant on the death
of Nicholas--that of Europe's arbiter. The French fought well, as they
always do, but their heart was not in the war. The emperor had the war
party pretty much to himself. Exactly the opposite state of things
existed in France to that which existed in England. In the former
country, the government was for war, and the people were for peace; in
the latter, the government was for peace, and the people were for war.
In each country power was in the hands of the war party, and so war was
made, in spite of the wishes of the French people and of English
statesmen. When Napoleon III. had accomplished _his_ purpose, he ordered
the English to make peace, and peace was made. In this way he satisfied
his subjects, showing them that he had no intention of making England
more powerful than she had been, or Russia weaker. He had prevented
Russia from extending her dominion, but he had also prevented England
from lessening that dominion.

The Italian war was waged in opposition to the sentiments of the French
people, which was one of the leading causes of its sudden termination,
with its object, only half accomplished, and much to the damage of the
emperor's reputation for statesmanship and courage. Whether, in a
comprehensive sense, that war was entered upon for purposes adverse to
the interests of France, may well be doubted; but it is certain that it
was an unpopular measure in that country. The French had no objection to
the humiliation of Austria; but it would be a grave error to suppose
that they have any wish to behold Italy united and powerful. The kingdom
of Italy, should it become all that is desired for it by its friends in
this country, would be to France a source of annoyance, and probably of
danger. The emperor's power was shaken by his Italian policy, and hence
it was that he played the confederature game so long, to the
astonishment of foreigners, and got possession of Savoy and Nice, to
the astonishment and anger of England; and hence it is that he is
seeking Sardinia and other portions of Italy. Thus, the Italian war was
begun against the interests of the French people, or what that people
believe to be their interests, though this is the age in which there is
to be peace, because that is not to be broken except when popular
interests require that it shall no longer be preserved.

But the most remarkable instance of the fallacy of the idea that regard
for the true interests of nations must banish hostilities from the
world, is afforded by the coarse of France and England toward this
country since the beginning of the secession war. Both those countries
have great interest not only in the preservation of peace _with_ the
United States, but in the preservation of peace _in_ the United States;
and yet they have done all that it lies in their power to do to
encourage our rebels, and have been on the verge of war with us: and war
with them, and with Spain, is exported by many Americans, who judge of
the future by the present and the past. England had a vast trade with
the American Union, buying at the South, and selling to the North, and
hence any disturbances here were sure to operate adversely to her
interests; but no sooner had it become apparent that our troubles were
to be of a serious character, than her weight was thrown on to the side
of the rebels, who never would have been able to do much but for the
encouragement they have received from abroad. The trade of France was
not so great with America as that of England; yet it was valuable, and
the French have suffered much from its suspension, perhaps we should say
its loss. The North has purchased but little from Europe for a year, and
the South has sold less to Europe in that time. There has been a trade
in food between the North and some European countries, in which grain
has been exchanged for gold, though it would have been better for both
parties could anything else than gold have been brought to America, true
commerce consisting in the interchange of commodities. For all the
sufferings that have been experienced by Englishmen and Frenchmen, they
have none but themselves and their governments to censure. That peace
has not been preserved is not our fault; and the war that has been blown
into so fierce a flame has been fed from Europe; it has been fanned by
breezes from France and England. When it was first seen that there was
danger of civil war, the governments of those countries, if they had
really had any regard for the true interests of their countries, would
have discouraged the rebels in the most public and pointed manner
imaginable, not because they cared for us, but for the simple reason
that they were bound so to act as should best promote the welfare of
their own peoples. War in America meant suffering to the artisans and
laborers of Europe, who, thus far, have suffered more from the war than
have any portion of the American people, except the residents of
Southern cities. Napoleon III. and Lord Palmerston should have said to
the agents of the Confederacy, and have taken care to publish their
words, 'We can afford you neither aid in deeds nor encouragement in
words. Our relations with both sections of the American nation are such,
that our respective countries must suffer immensely from the course
which you are about to pursue, not because you have been oppressed, or
fear oppression, but because you have been beaten in an election, and
power, for the time, has been taken from your hands. You ask us to act
hostilely against the established government of the United States, that
government having given us no cause of offense,--to become the patrons
of a revolution that has no cause, but the consequences of which may be
boundless. To revolutions we are averse; and one of our governments
exists in virtue of opposition to the party of disorder in Europe. You
ask us to do that which would lessen the means of livelihood to millions
of our people; for, granting that you should succeed, still there would
necessarily be so great a change produced by your action, and by our
intervention in American affairs, that for years America would not be
the good customer to France and England that she has been for a
generation. With the merits of your cause we can have nothing to do, our
true interests pointing to the maintenance of the strictest neutrality
in the contest between you and the federal government; and the dictates
of interest are fortified by the suggestions of principle. Your movement
is essentially disorderly in its character, and it is undertaken
avowedly in the interest of slavery; and not only are we the supporters
of the existing order of things the world over, but we are hostile to
slavery, having abolished it in all parts of our dominions. Our advice
to you is, to submit to the federal government, and to seek for the
redress of your grievances, if such you have, by means recognized in the
constitution and laws of your country. From us you can receive no aid,
and you should dismiss all expectation of it from your minds at once and
forever. We are indifferent to the form of the American government, and
its internal policy can not concern us; but the interests of our peoples
require that we should live in peace with the people of America, whether
they be of the South or of the North, slave-holders or abolitionists;
and we shall not quarrel with any portion of them for the sake of
facilitating the erection of a republic to be founded on the basis of
the divine nature of slavery, the first time that so preposterous a
pretension was ever put forward by the audacity or the impudence of
men.' Had something like this been said to the agents of the rebels, and
had the English press supported the same views, the rebellion would have
been at an end ere this, and the commercial relations of America and
Europe would have experienced no sensible interruption. English
interests, in an especial sense, demanded that the rebels should be
discouraged, and discouragement from London would have rendered
rebellion hopeless, and have promoted peace in Savannah and New Orleans.

But it was not in England's nature to pursue a course that would have
been as much in harmony with her material interests as with that high
moral character which she claims as being peculiarly her own. There
appeared to have presented itself an opportunity to effect the
destruction of the American Republic, and England could not resist the
temptation to strike us hard: and, for almost a year, she has been to
the Union a more deadly foe than we have found in the South. We do not
allude to the _Trent_ question, for in that we were clearly in the
wrong, and Mason and Slidell should have been released on the 16th of
November, and not have been detained in captivity six weeks. Secretary
Seward has placed the point so emphatically beyond all doubt, that we
must all be of one mind thereon, whether in England or America. England
might have been moderate in her action, in view of her repeated outrages
on the rights of neutrals, but no intelligent American can condemn her
position. It is to other things that we must look for evidence of her
determination to effect our extinction as a nation. She has, while
dripping with Hindoo blood, and while yet men's ears are filled with
accounts of the blowing of sepoys from the muzzles of cannon by her
military executioners, absolutely demanded of us an acknowledgment of
the Southern Confederacy's independence, on the ground that it is
inhuman to wage war for the maintenance of our national life. She has
compared our mild and forbearing government with the savage proconsulate
of Alva in the Netherlands! She has charged us with waging war against
civilization, because we have employed stone fleets to close entrances
to the harbor of Charleston, though her own history is full of instances
of their employment for similar purposes! She has encouraged her traders
and seamen to furnish the rebels with arms of all kinds, and stores of
every description! She has excluded our ships-of-war from her ports,
refusing to allow them to coal at places at which she had granted us the
privilege, in time of peace, of establishing stations for fuel! She has
given shelter and protection to the privateers of the rebels, vessels
that had violated her own laws almost within sight of her own shores,
and certainly within the narrow seas! She has acknowledged the
belligerent character of the South, which is virtually an acknowledgment
of its independence, for none but nations can lawfully wage war. She
has, through her Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that our war
with the secessionists is of the same character as the war which the
Spaniards carried on with their American colonists, and that there is no
difference between it and the attempt of the Turks to subdue the Greeks!
Monstrous perversions of history for even Earl Russell to be guilty of!
Her leading periodicals and journals, with few exceptions, have
denounced our country, our course, and our government in the bitterest
language, and to the manifest encouragement of the rebels, who see in
their language the rapid growth and prompt exhibition of a sentiment of
hostility to this country, and which must, sooner or later, end in war;
and war between England and America would be sure to lead to the success
of the Confederates, even if we should come out of it victoriously.

Thus we see that the attempt to establish peace on the basis of the true
interests of nations has not only failed, but that it has failed
signally and deplorably. The solid Doric Temple of Mammon has no more
been able to stand against the storms of war than has the Crystal Palace
of Sentiment. The fair fabric which was the type of materialism has
fallen, and it would be most unwise to seek its reconstruction. That
which was to have stood as long and as firmly as the Pyramids has fallen
before the first moss could gather upon it. Nor is the reason of this
fall far to seek, as it lies upon the surface, and ought to have been
anticipated--would have been, only that men are so ready to believe in
what they wish to believe. England, as a nation, has two interests to
consult, and which do not always accord. She has her commercial interest
and her imperial interest; and, when the two conflict, the last is sure
to become first. Her position as a nation was threatened only by the
United States and Russia. The dynastic disputes of France, which are far
from being at an end, and the generally unsettled character of French
politics, must long prevent that country from becoming the permanent
rival of England. France is great to-day, and England acts wisely in
preparing to meet her in war; but to-morrow France may become weak, and
her voice be feeble and her weight light in Europe and the world. Three
houses claim her throne, and the Republicans may start up into active
life again, as we saw they did in 1848. Neither Austria nor Prussia can
ever furnish England cause of alarm. With Russia the case is very
different, as her government is solidly established; her resources are
vast, and in the course of steady development, and her desire to
establish her supremacy in the East is a fixed idea with both rulers and
ruled. Unchecked, she would have thrown England into the background, and
supposing that she had resolved not to allow that country a share of the
spoil of Turkey. The hard character and harsh policy of Nicholas ended
in furnishing to England an opportunity to throw Russia herself into the
background for the time, and that opportunity she made use of, but not
to the extent that she had determined upon, owing to her dependence upon
France, which became the shield of Russia after having been the sword of
England. The United States were a formidable rival of England; and, but
for the breaking out of our troubles, we should have been far ahead of
her by 1870, and perhaps have stripped her of all her American
possessions. When those troubles began, she proceeded to take the same
advantage of them that she had taken of the Czar's blunder. To sever the
American nation in twain is her object, as some of her public men have
frankly avowed; and she believes that the disintegrating process, once
commenced, would not stop with the division of the country into the
Northern Union and the Southern Confederacy. She expects, should the
South succeed, to see half a dozen republics here established, and is
not without hope that not even two States would remain together; and for
this hope she has very good foundation. The American nation destroyed,
England would become as great in the West as she is in the East, and
would hold, with far greater means at her command, the same position
that was hers in the last days of George II., when the French had been
expelled from America and India. She would have no commercial rival, and
there would no longer be an American navy susceptible of gigantic
increase. She would be truly the sea's sovereign; and whoso rules the
sea has power to dictate to the land. 'Whosoever commands the sea,' says
Sir Walter Raleigh, 'commands the trade of the world; whosoever commands
the trade of the world, commands the riches of the world, and
consequently the world itself.' England never would have gone to war
with the _United States_ to prevent their growth; but, now that they
have instituted civil war, it is certain that she will do all that lies
in her power to prevent the reconstruction of the Union. The war of
words has been begun, and it is but preliminary to the war of swords.
The savage music of the British press is the overture to the opera. The
morality of England may be neither higher nor lower than that of all
other countries,--may be no worse than our own,--but there is so much
that is offensive in her modes of exhibiting her destitution of
principle, that she is more hated than all other powerful countries that
ever have existed. She not only sins as badly as other nations, but
manages to make herself as odious for her manner of sinning as for the
sins themselves. There is no crime that she is not capable of, if its
perpetration be necessary to promote her own power. When Sir William
Reid was governor of Malta, he said to Mr. Lushington, 'I would let them
(_i.e._ the heathen) set up Juggernaut in St. George's Square (in
Edinburgh), if it were conducive to England's holding Malta.' And as
this time-blue Presbyterian was ready to allow the solemnization of the
bloodiest rites of paganism in the most public place of the Christian
city of Edinburgh, if that kind of tolerance would be conducive to
England's retention of Malta,--of which she holds possession, by the
way, in consequence of one of the grossest breaches of faith mentioned
even in her history,--so do we find the Christian people, peers, and
priests of England ready to become the allies of slave-holders and the
supporters of slavery, if thereby the American Republic can be
destroyed, as they believe that its existence may become the source of
danger to the ascendency of their country.

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