Bay State Monthly, Vol. I, No. 3, March, 1884 by Various

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Edward Everett delivered the address at the dedication of the monument.
The closing passage of his oration is as follows:--

"While the College which he founded shall continue to the latest
posterity, a monument not unworthy of the most honored name, we trust
that this plain memorial also will endure; and, while it guides the
dutiful votary to the spot where his ashes are deposited, will teach to
those who survey it the supremacy of intellectual and 'moral desert, and
encourage them, too, by a like munificence, to aspire to a name as
bright as that which stands engraven on its shaft,--

'Clarum et venerabile nomen
Gentibus, et multum nostrae quod proderat urbi.'"

The citizens of New England entered most heartily into the idea of
establishing this college and contributed whatever they could; utensils
from their homes, stock from their farms, their goods, merchandise,
anything, in fine, which they had to give, so anxious were they to
educate their youth, and especially to provide for an educated ministry.
Peirce, in his History of the college, says:--

"When we read of a number of sheep bequeathed by one man, of a quantity
of cotton cloth worth nine shillings presented by another, of a pewter
flagon worth ten shillings by a third, of a fruit-dish, a sugar-spoon,
a silver-tipped jug, one great salt, and one small trencher salt,
by others; and of presents or legacies, amounting severally to five
shillings, one pound, two pounds, &c., all faithfully recorded with the
names of the donors, we are at first tempted to smile; but a little
reflection will soon change this, disposition into a feeling of respect
and even of admiration."

"How just," says President Quincy, "is the remark of this historian!
How forcible and full of noble example is the picture exhibited by
these records? The poor emigrant, struggling for subsistence, almost
houseless, in a manner defenceless, is seen selecting from the few
remnants of his former prosperity, plucked by him out of the flames
of persecution, and rescued from the perils of the Atlantic, the
valued pride of his table, or the precious delight of his domestic
hearth;--'his heart stirred and his spirit willing' to give according
to his means, toward establishing for learning a resting-place, and
for science a fixed habitation, on the borders of the wilderness!"

Mr. Sibley gives an extract from New England's First Fruits, a work
printed in London, not long after the first class was graduated. It
gives us the feelings of the emigrants about their new institution.
It says:--

"After God had carried us safe to New England, and wee had builded our
houses, provided necessaries for our liveli-hood, rear'd convenient
places for God's worship, and settled the Civil Government; One of the
next things we longed for, and looked after, was to advance LEARNING and
to perpetuate it to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate ministry
to the Churches, when our present Ministers shall lie in the dust. And
as wee were thinking and consulting how to effect this great Work, it
pleased God to stir up the heart of one Mr. HARVARD (a godly Gentleman,
and a lover of learning, there living amongst us) to give the one halfe
of his Estate (it being in all about 1700 pounds) toward the erecting of
a Colledge, and all his Library." The edifice is described as "faire and
comely within and without, having in it a spacious Hall, where they
daily meet at Commons, Lectures, Exercises, and a large Library, with
some books to it."

The rules and regulations of Harvard in early times are interesting to
us of later generations. The following are specimens:--

"When any scholar is able to read Tully, or such like classical Latin
author EXTEMPORE, and make and speak true Latin in verse and prose suo
(ut aiunt) Marte, and decline perfectly the paradigms of nouns and verbs
in the Greek tongue, then may he be admitted into the College, nor shall
any claim admission before such qualifications."

"Every one shall consider the main end of his life and studies, to know
God and Jesus Christ, which is eternal life."

"Every one shall so exercise himself in reading the Scriptures twice a
day, that they be ready to give an account of their proficiency therein,
both in theoretical observations of language and logic, and in practical
and spiritual truths, as their Tutor shall require."

"They shall honor as their parents, magistrates, elders, tutors, and
aged persons, by being silent in their presence (except they be called
on to answer)."

"None shall pragmatically intrude or inter meddle in other men's
affairs."

"No scholar shall buy, sell, or exchange any thing, to the value of
sixpence, without the allowance of his parents, guardians or tutors."

"The scholars shall never use their mother tongue, except that in public
exercise of oratory, or such like, they be called to make them in
English."

"Every scholar, that on proof is found able to read the original of the
Old and New Testament into the Latin tongue, and to resolve them
logically, withal being of honest life and conversation, and at any
public act hath the approbation of the Overseers and Master of the
College, may be invested with his first degree."

"No scholar whatever, without the fore-acquaintance and leave of the
President and his Tutor, or, in the absence of either of them, two of
the Fellows shall be present at or in any of the public civil meetings,
or concourse of people, as courts of justice, elections, fairs, or at
military exercise, in the time or hours of the College exercise, public
or private. Neither shall any scholar exercise himself in any military
band, unless of known gravity, and of approved sober and virtuous
conversation, and that with the leave of the President and his Tutor."

"No scholar shall take tobacco, unless permitted by the President, with
the consent of their parents or guardians, and on good reason first
given by a physician, and then in a sober and private mariner."

"No Freshman shall wear his hat in the College yard, unless it rains,
hails, or snows, provided he be on foot and have not both hands full."

"Freshmen are to consider all the other classes as their Seniors."

"No Freshman shall speak to a Senior with his hat on; or have it on in a
Senior's chamber, or in his own if a Senior be there."

"All Freshmen shall be obliged to go on any errand, for any of his
Seniors, Graduates or Undergraduates, at any time, except in studying
hours, or after nine o'clock in the evening."

The faculty, if they were knowing to it, could stop the performance of
an improper errand. They would have been likely to know little about
them.

Pages might be quoted of these curious and interesting rules and
customs. But these must suffice. Enough has been given to show the
immense progress which has been made from the time of the cruel Eaton to
that of the dignified, able, and judicious President Eliot, under whose
fortunate administration, the University has wonderfully increased,
materially and in every way.

The first President was Henry Dunster, a man of learning and
cultivation. He entered upon his office, August 27, 1640, and left it,
October 24, 1654. It was during his administration that most of those
unique rules were established which I have quoted. We can see in them
the evident origin or occasion of hazing the Freshmen, which would
naturally follow such rules. At the present day, be it known, the custom
has entirely ceased. The Freshmen of to-day are treated like gentlemen
by all classes. All the students are placed on their honor, in every
way, save only in some necessary particulars. Hazing has passed into
history as a barbarous custom of the past, and the deportment of the
students to-day is that of gentlemen, with very rare exceptions, such as
might be expected among so large a number. In the great Memorial Hall,
where they eat, the best of deportment is always to be seen, and
everywhere there is now a pride, in all departments of the University,
in observing the proprieties of good conduct. Indeed this has always
been the rule. The hazing has never been so extensively practised as
many have supposed; and no body of men can anywhere be found, in
Congress, legislatures, schools, academies, or colleges, whose
deportment excels in excellence that of the students of Harvard
University. This observation is demanded from the fact that many
parents, some of whom are known the writer, have decided to send sons
to other institutions, on the very ground of the influence of college
customs and habits.

* * * * *

THE DEFENCE OF NEW YORK, 1776.

By Henry B. Carrington, U.S.A., LL.D.

[The siege of Boston gave to the Continental Army that instruction in
military engineering, and that contact with a disciplined foe, which
prepared it for the immediate operations at New York and in New Jersey.
(See The Bay State Monthly, January, 1884, pages 37-44.)

The occupation and defence of New York and Brooklyn, so promptly made,
was a strategic necessity, fully warranted by existing conditions,
although temporary.]

It is not easy to reconcile the views which we take, in turn, through
the eye and object lenses of a field-glass, so that the real subject of
examination will not be distorted by too great nearness or remoteness.

If we bring back to this hour the events of one hundred years ago, it is
certain that the small armies and the smaller appliances of force then
in use will seem trifling, in contrast with those which have so recently
wearied science and have tasked invention in the work and waste of war.

If we thrust them back to their proper place behind the memory of all
living men, we only see a scattered people, poorly armed, but engaged in
hopeful conflict with Great Britain, then mistress of the seas, proudly
challenging the world to arms, and boldly vindicating her challenge.

In an effort to reproduce that period and so balance the opposing
factors that the siege of Boston and the deliverance of Washington at
Brooklyn and New York shall have fair co-relation and full bearing upon
the resulting struggle for National Independence, there must be some
exact standard for the test j and this will be found by grouping such
data as illustrate the governing laws of military art.

It has never been claimed that the siege of Boston was not the
legitimate result of British blunder and American pluck. In a previous
paper, the siege itself has been presented as that opportunity and
training-school exercise which projected its experience into the entire
war, and assured final triumph. It has not been as generally accepted,
as both philosophical and necessary, that the fortification and defence
of Brooklyn became the wise and inevitable sequence to that siege.

Let us drop a century and handle the old records.

If Great Britain had not called continental auxiliaries to her aid in
1776, her disposable force for colonial service would have been less
than half of the army of Washington.

Until the fortification of Brooklyn and New York had been well advanced,
the British ministry had not been able to assign even fifteen thousand
men for that service. General Clinton did, indeed, anchor at the New
York Narrows, just when General Charles Lee reached that city for its
defence, but did not risk a landing, and sailed for South Carolina, only
to be repulsed.

The British Crown had no alternative but to seek foreign aid. The appeal
to Catharine of Russia for twenty thousand men was met by the laconic
response, "There are other ways of settling this dispute than by resort
to arms." The Duke of Richmond prophetically declared, "The colonies
themselves, after our example, will apply to strangers for assistance."
The opposition to hiring foreign troops was so intense, that, for many
weeks, there was no practical advance in preparations for a really
effective blow at the rebels, while the rebellion itself was daily
gaining head and spirit.

The British army, just before the battle of Long Island, including
Hessians, Brunswickers, and Waldeckers, was but a little larger than
that which the American Congress, as early as October 4, 1775, had
officially assigned to the siege operations before Boston. That force
was fixed at twenty-three thousand, three hundred and seventy-two men.
General Howe landed about twenty thousand men. With the sick, the
reserves on Staten Island, all officers and supernumeraries included,
his entire force exhibited a paper strength of thirty-one thousand, six
hundred and twenty-five men. It is true that General Howe claimed, after
the battle of Long Island, that his entire force (Hessians included) was
only twenty four thousand men, and that Washington opposed the advance
of his division with twenty thousand men. The British muster rolls, as
exhibited before the British Parliament, accord with the statement
already made. The actual force of the American army at Brooklyn was not
far from nine thousand men, instead of twenty thousand, and the
effective force (New York included) was only about twenty thousand men.
As the British regiments brought but six, instead of eight, companies to
a battalion, there is evidence that Washington himself occasionally
over-estimated the British force proper; but the foreign battalions
realized their full force, and they were paid accordingly, upon their
muster rolls. Nearly three fifths of General Howe's army was made up
from continental mercenaries. These troops arrived in detachments, to
supplement the army which otherwise would have been entirely unequal to
the conquest of New York, if the city were fairly defended.

If, on the other hand, Washington had secured the force which he
demanded from Congress, namely, fifty-eight thousand men, which was,
indeed (but too tardily), authorized, he could have met General Howe
upon terms of numerical equality, backed by breast-works, and have held
New York with an equal force.

This estimate, by Washington himself, of the contingencies of the
campaign, will have the greater significance when reference is made to
the details of British preparations in England.

While Congress did, indeed, as early as June, assign thirteen thousand
additional troops for the defence of New York, the peremptory detachment
of ten battalions to Canada, in addition to previous details,
persistently foiled every preparation to meet Howe with an adequate
force. Regiments from Connecticut and from other colonies reported with
a strength of only three hundred and sixty men. While the "paper
strength" of the army was far beyond its effective force, even the
"paper strength" was but one half of the force which the
Commander-in-chief had the right to assume as at his disposal.

Other facts fall in line just here.

At no later period of the war did either commander have under his
immediate control so large a nominal force as then. During but one year
of the succeeding struggle did the entire British army, from Halifax to
the West Indies inclusive (including foreign and provincial
auxiliaries), exceed, by more than seven thousand men, the force which
occupied both sides of the New York Narrows in 1776. The British Army at
that time, without its foreign contingent, would have been as inferior
to the force which had been ordered by Congress (and should have been
available) as the depleted American army of 1781 would have been
inferior to the British without the French contingent.

The largest continental force under arms, in any one year of the war,
did not greatly exceed forty thousand men, and the largest British
force, as late as 1781, including all arrivals, numbered, all told, but
forty-two thousand and seventy-five men.

The annual British average, including provincials, ranged from
thirty-three to thirty-eight thousand men. The physical agencies which
Great Britain employed were;, therefore, far beneath the prestige of her
accredited position among the nations; and the disparity between the
contending forces was mainly in discipline and equipment, with the
advantage to Great Britain in naval strength, until that was supplanted
by that of France.

To free the question from a popular fallacy which treats oldtime
operations as insignificant, in view of large modern armies and
campaigns, it is pertinent to state, just here, that the issues of the
battle-field for all time, up to the latest hour, have not been
determined by the size of armies, or by improvements in weapons of war,
except relatively, in proportion as civilized peoples fought those of
less civilization; or where some precocity of race or invention more
quickly matured the operations of the winning side.

If the maxims of Napoleon are but a terse restatement of those of
Caesar, and the skill of Hannibal at Cannae still holds place as a model
for the concave formation of a battle-line, so have all the decisive
battles of history taken shape from the timely handling of men, in the
exercise of that sound judgment which adapts means to ends, in every
work of life. Thus it is that equally great battles, those in the
highest sense great, have become memorial, although numbers did not
impart value to the struggle; but they were the expression of that skill
and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had
been greater or less.

If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in
1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower,
make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of
Napoleon at Waterloo.

If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against
few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical
fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by
General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect "parallels," and
thereby save a "regular approach." Numbers did not change relations, but
simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.

He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial
elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into
determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate
the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a
miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate
result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great. Washington did it.
His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a
conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of
his operations at and near New York will defy criticism. To hold the
facts of the issue discussed, right under the light on that military
science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with
physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the
necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in
1776.

The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776
will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to
meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance. As
early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enlisted "for
the war." In a previous article, the policy of the Commander-in-chief
and of General Greene was noticed, and the formulated proposition, then
accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle. When the issue
ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force
before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man
who understood the exact issue. The temper of the British press, and
that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the
American Commander-in-chief. He knew that General Gage had urged that
"thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest
way to save blood and end the war." He also knew that when John Wesley
predicted that "neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would
suppress the rebellion," the British Cabinet had placed before
Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed
available for military purposes abroad. As early as May, 1776,
Washington was advised of the following facts:--

First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States,
including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal
a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.

Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective
force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall
below, forty thousand men.

The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed
operations were so closely defined and analyzed, that Washington had
full right to assume, as known, the strength of his adversary.

When, during May, 1776, the American Congress sent troops from New York
to Canada, he sharply protested, thus: "This diversion of forces will
endanger both enterprises; for Great Britain will attempt to capture New
York as well as Canada, if they have the men." He did not believe that
they would capture New York, if he could acquire and retain the force
which he demanded.

The point to be made emphatic, is this: That, from the date of the call
of Massachusetts, early in 1775, for thirty thousand men, up to the
occupation of New York, the force which he had the right to assume as at
his own disposal was equal to the contingencies of the conflict; and
that, when he did occupy New York, and begin its exterior defences at
Brooklyn, the British ministry had admitted its inability to send to
America a force sufficiently strong to capture the city. The maximum
force proposed was less than that which Congress could easily supply for
resistance. In other words, Washington would not have to fight Great
Britain, but a specific force; namely, all that Great Britain could
spare for that service; so that the issue was not between the new
Republic and England, but between the Republic and a single army, of
known elements and numbers. In fact, the opinion that France had already
made war upon England had so early gained credit, that Washington, while
still in New York, was forced to issue an order correcting the rumor,
and thus prevent undue confidence and its corresponding neglect to meet
the demands of the crisis.

Thus far, it is clear that there was nothing extravagant in the American
claim to independence; nor in the readiness of Washington to seize and
hold New York; nor in his belief that the colonial resources were equal
to the contest.

One other element is of determining value as to the necessity for his
occupation and defence of Brooklyn Heights. New York was the only base
from which Great Britain could operate against the colonies as an
organized State. By Long Island Sound and the Hudson River, her right
hand would hold New England under the guns of her warships, and by quick
occupation of Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and their tributary streams,
her left hand would cut off the South.

If the views of Lord Dartmouth had prevailed, in 1775, there would have
been no siege of Boston; but New York would have had a garrison fully
equal to its defence, while sparing troops for operations outside. But
the prompt occupation of New York, as the headquarters of revolution,
was a clear declaration to the world, and to the scattered people of the
colonies, that a new nation was asserting life, and that its soil was
free from a hostile garrison. The occupation of New York centralized, at
the social, commercial, and natural capital of the Republic, all
interests and resources, and gave to the struggle real force,
inspiration, and dignity.

Just as the men at Bunker Hill fought so long as powder and ball held
out, but could not have been led to assail, in open field, the veterans
whom they did, in fact, so effectively resist; and, as very often, a
patriotic band has bravely defended, when unequal to aggressive
action,--so the possession, defence, and even the loss, of New York, as
an incident of a campaign, were very different from an effort to wrest
the city from the grasp of a British garrison, under cover of yawning
broadsides.

History is replete with facts to show how hopefully men will seek to
regain lost positions, when an original capture would have been deemed
utterly hopeless. Poland wellnigh regained a smothered nationality
through an inspiration, which never could have been evoked, in a plan to
seize from the Russian domain a grand estate, upon which to establish an
original Poland.

To have held but to have lost New York, would simply show the defects of
the defence, and the margin wanting in ability to retain, while no less
suggesting how, in turn, it might be regained, at the right time, by
adequate means and methods. The occupation and defence of Brooklyn
Heights was the chief element of value in this direction. It not only
combined the general protection of the city and post, in connection with
the works upon Governor's Island, but to have neglected either would
have admitted an inability to retain either.

British troops at Brooklyn would command New York. American troops at
Brooklyn presented the young nation in the attitude of guarding the
outer doorway of its freshly-asserted independence. It put the British
to the defensive, and compelled them to risk the landing of a large
army, after a protracted ocean voyage, before they could gain a footing
and measure strength with the colonists. It does not lessen our estimate
of the skill of Washington to know that Congress failed to supply
adequate forces; but he made wise estimates, and had reason to expect a
prompt response to his requisitions.

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