American Eloquence, Volume IV. (of 4) by Various

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During all these four years of war Congress has been making laws for the
government of those very States, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania has
voted for them, and voted to raise armies to enforce them. Why was this
done if they were a separate nation? Why, if they were not part of the
United States? Those laws were made for them as States. Members have
voted for laws imposing upon them direct taxes, which are apportioned,
according to the Constitution, only "among the several States" according
to their population. In a variety of ways--to some of which the
gentleman' who preceded me has referred--this Congress has, by its
action, assumed and asserted that they were still States in the Union,
though in rebellion, and that it was with the rebellion that we were
making war, and not with the States themselves as States, and still less
as a separate, as a foreign Power.

* * * * *

Why, sir, if there be no constitution of any sort in a State, no
law, nothing but chaos, then that State would no longer exist as an
organization. But that has not been the case, it never is the case
in great communities, for they always have constitutions and forms of
government. It may not be a constitution or form of government adapted
to its relation to the Government of the United States; and that would
be an evil to be remedied by the Government of the United States. That
is what we have been trying to do for the last four years. The practical
relations of the governments of those States with the Government of
the United States were all wrong--were hostile to that Government. They
denied our jurisdiction, and they denied that they were States of the
Union, but their denial did not change the fact; and there was never any
time when their organizations as States were destroyed. A dead State is
a solecism, a contradiction in terms, an impossibility.

These are, I confess, rather metaphysical distinctions, but I did not
raise them. Those who assert that a State is destroyed whenever its
constitution is changed, or whenever its practical relations with
this Government are changed, must be held responsible for whatever
metaphysical niceties may be necessarily involved in the discussion.

I do not know, sir, that I have made my views on this point clear to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Kelley), who has questioned me upon it,
and I am still more doubtful whether, even if they are intelligible, he
will concur with me as to their justice. But I regard these States as
just as truly within the jurisdiction of the Constitution, and therefore
just as really and truly States of the American Union now as they were
before the war. Their practical relations to the Constitution of the
United States have been disturbed, and we have been endeavoring, through
four years of war, to restore them and make them what they were before
the war. The victory in the field has given us the means of doing this;
we can now re-establish the practical relations of those States to
the Government. Our actual jurisdiction over them, which they vainly
attempted to throw off, is already restored. The conquest we have
achieved is a conquest over the rebellion, not a conquest over the
States whose authority the rebellion had for a time subverted.

For these reasons I think the views submitted by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Stevens) upon this point are unsound. Let me next
cite some of the consequences which, it seems to me, must follow the
acceptance of his position. If, as he asserts, we have been waging war
with an independent Power, with a separate nation, I cannot see how we
can talk of treason in connection with our recent conflict, or demand
the execution of Davis or anybody else as a traitor. Certainly if we
were at war with any other foreign Power we should not talk of the
treason of those who were opposed to us in the field. If we were engaged
in a war with France and should take as prisoner the Emperor Napoleon,
certainly we would not talk of him as a traitor or as liable to
execution. I think that by adopting any such assumption as that of the
honorable gentleman, we surrender the whole idea of treason and the
punishment of traitors. I think, moreover, that we accept, virtually and
practically, the doctrine of State sovereignty, the right of a State to
withdraw from the Union, and to break up the Union at its own will
and pleasure. I do not see how upon those premises we can escape that
conclusion. If the States that engaged in the late rebellion constituted
themselves, by their ordinances of secession or by any of the acts with
which they followed those ordinances, a separate and independent Power,
I do not see how we can deny the principles on which they professed
to act, or refuse assent to their practical results. I have heard no
clearer, no stronger statement of the doctrine of State sovereignty as
paramount to the sovereignty of the nation than would be involved in
such a concession. Whether he intended it or not, the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Stevens) actually assents to the extreme doctrines of
the advocates of secession.

THADDEUS STEVENS,

OF PENNSYLVANIA. (BORN 1792, DIED 1868.)

ON THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION BILL;

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 3, 1867

MR. SPEAKER:

What are the great questions which now divide the nation? In the midst
of the political Babel which has been produced by the intermingling
of secessionists, rebels, pardoned traitors, hissing Copperheads, and
apostate Republicans, such a confusion of tongues is heard that it
is difficult to understand either the questions that are asked or the
answers that are given. Ask what is the "President's policy," and it is
difficult to define it. Ask what is the "policy of Congress," and the
answer is not always at hand. A few moments may be profitably spent in
seeking the meaning of each of these terms.

In this country the whole sovereignty rests with the people, and is
exercised through their Representatives in Congress assembled. The
legislative power is the sole guardian of that sovereignty. No other
branch of the government, no other department, no other officer of the
government, possesses one single particle of the sovereignty of the
nation. No government official, from the President and Chief-Justice
down, can do any one act which is not prescribed and directed by the
legislative power. Suppose the government were now to be organized
for the first time under the Constitution, and the President had
been elected, and the judiciary appointed; what could either do until
Congress passed laws to regulate their proceedings? What power would
the President have over any one subject of government until Congress had
legislated on that subject? * * * The President could not even create
bureaus or departments to facilitate his executive operations. He must
ask leave of Congress. Since, then, the President cannot enact, alter,
or modify a single law; cannot even create a petty office within his
own sphere of operations; if, in short, he is the mere servant of the
people, who issue their commands to him through Congress, whence does
he derive the constitutional power to create new States, to remodel old
ones, to dictate organic laws, to fix the qualifications of voters, to
declare that States are republican and entitled to command Congress, to
admit their Representatives? To my mind it is either the most ignorant
and shallow mistake of his duties, or the most brazen and impudent
usurpation of power. It is claimed for him by some as commander-in-chief
of the army and navy. How absurd that a mere executive officer should
claim creative powers. Though commander-in-chief by the Constitution,
he would have nothing to command, either by land or water until Congress
raised both army and navy. Congress also prescribes the rules
and regulations to govern the army; even that is not left to the
Commander-in-chief.

Though the President is commander-in-chief, Congress is his commander;
and, God willing, he shall obey. He and his minions shall learn that
this is not a government of kings and satraps, but a government of
the people, and that Congress is the people. * * * To reconstruct the
nation, to admit new States, to guarantee republican governments to
old States, are all legislative acts. The President claims the right to
exercise them. Congress denies it, and asserts the right to belong to
the legislative branch. They have determined to defend these rights
against all usurpers. They have determined that, while in their keeping,
the Constitution shall not be violated with impunity. This I take to
be the great question between the President and Congress. He claims the
right to reconstruct by his own power. Congress denies him all power in
the matter except that of advice, and has determined to maintain such
denial. "My policy" asserts full power in the Executive. The policy of
Congress forbids him to exercise any power therein.

Beyond this I do not agree that the "policy" of the parties is defined.
To be sure, many subordinate items of the policy of each may be easily
sketched. The President * * * desires that the traitors (having sternly
executed that most important leader Rickety Wirz, as a high example)
should be exempt from further fine, imprisonment, forfeiture, exile, or
capital punishment, and be declared entitled to all the rights of
loyal citizens. He desires that the States created by him shall be
acknowledged as valid States, while at the same time he inconsistently
declares that the old rebel States are in full existence, and always
have been, and have equal rights with the loyal States. He opposes the
amendment to the Constitution which changes the basis of representation,
and desires the old slave States to have the benefit of their increase
of freemen without increasing the number of votes; in short, he desires
to make the vote of one rebel in South Carolina equal to the votes of
three freemen in Pennsylvania or New York. He is determined to force
a solid rebel delegation into Congress from the South, which, together
with Northern Copperheads, could at once control Congress and elect all
future Presidents.

Congress refuses to treat the States created by him as of any validity,
and denies that the old rebel States have any existence which gives
them any rights under the Constitution. Congress insists on changing the
basis of representation so as to put white voters on an equality in both
sections, and that such change shall precede the admission of any
State. * * * Congress denies that any State lately in rebellion has
any government or constitution known to the Constitution of the United
States, or which can be recognized as a part of the Union. How, then,
can such a State adopt the (XIIIth) amendment? To allow it would be
yielding the whole question, and admitting the unimpaired rights of the
seceded States. I know of no Republican who does not ridicule what
Mr. Seward thought a cunning movement, in counting Virginia and other
outlawed States among those which had adopted the constitutional
amendment abolishing slavery.

It is to be regretted that inconsiderate and incautious Republicans
should ever have supposed that the slight amendments already proposed
to the Constitution, even when incorporated into that instrument, would
satisfy the reforms necessary for the security of the government. Unless
the rebel States, before admission, should be made republican in spirit,
and placed under the guardianship of loyal men, all our blood and
treasure will have been spent in vain. * * *

The law of last session with regard to Territories settled the
principles of such acts. Impartial suffrage, both in electing the
delegates and in ratifying their proceedings, is now the fixed rule.
There is more reason why colored voters should be admitted in the rebel
States than in the Territories. In the States they form the great mass
of the loyal men. Possibly, with their aid, loyal governments may be
established in most of those States. Without it all are sure to be ruled
by traitors; and loyal men, black or white, will be oppressed, exiled,
or murdered.

There are several good reasons for the passage of this bill. In the
first place, it is just. I am now confining my argument to negro
suffrage in the rebel States. Have not loyal blacks quite as good a
right to choose rulers and make laws as rebel whites? In the second
place, it is a necessity in order to protect the loyal white men in
the seceded States. With them the blacks would act in a body; and it is
believed then, in each of said States, except one, the two united would
form a majority, control the States, and protect themselves. Now they
are the victims of daily murder. They must suffer constant persecution
or be exiled.

Another good reason is that it would insure the ascendency of the Union
party. "Do you avow the party purpose?" exclaims some horror-stricken
demagogue. I do. For I believe, on my conscience, that on the continued
ascendency of that party depends the safety of this great nation. If
impartial suffrage is excluded in the rebel States, then every one of
them is sure to send a solid rebel representation to Congress, and cast
a solid rebel electoral vote. They, with their kindred Copperheads of
the North, would always elect the President and control Congress. While
slavery sat upon her defiant throne, and insulted and intimidated the
trembling North, the South frequently divided on questions of policy
between Whigs and Democrats, and gave victory alternately to the
sections. Now, you must divide them between loyalists, without regard
to color, and disloyalists, or you will be the perpetual vassals of the
free-trade, irritated, revengeful South. For these, among other reasons,
I am for negro suffrage in every rebel State. If it be just, it should
not be denied; if it be necessary, it should be adopted; if it be a
punishment to traitors, they deserve it.

VIII.--FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION.

THE periods into which this series has been divided will furnish,
perhaps, some key to the brief summary of tariff discussion in the
United States which follows. For it is not at all true that tariff
discussion or decision has been isolated; on the contrary, it has
influenced, and been influenced by, every other phase of the national
development of the country.

Bancroft has laid none too great stress on the influence of the English
mercantile system in forcing the American Revolution, and on the
attitude of the Revolution as an organized revolt against the English
system. One of the first steps by which the Continental Congress
asserted its claim to independent national action was the throwing
open of American ports to the commerce of all nations--that is, to free
trade. It should, however, be added that the extreme breadth of this
liberality was due to the inability of Congress to impose any duties on
imports; it had a choice only between absolute prohibition and absolute
free trade, and it chose the latter. The States were not so limited.
Both under the revolutionary Congress and under the Confederation they
retained the entire duty power, and they showed no fondness for free
trade. Commerce in general was light, and tariff receipts, even in the
commercial States, were of no great importance; but, wherever it
was possible, commercial regulations were framed in disregard of the
free-trade principle. In order to retain the trade in firewood and
vegetables within her own borders, New York, in 1787, even laid
prohibitory duties on Connecticut and New Jersey boats; and retaliatory
measures were begun by the two States attacked.

The Constitution gave to Congress, and forbade to the States, the power
to regulate commerce. As soon as the Constitution came to be put into
operation, the manner and objects of the regulation of commerce by
Congress became a public question. Many other considerations were
complicated with it. It was necessary for the United States to obtain
a revenue, and this could most easily be done by a tariff of duties on
imports. It was necessary for the Federalist majority to consider the
party interests both in the agricultural States, which would object
to protective duties, and in the States which demanded them. But the
highest consideration in the mind of Hamilton and the most influential
leaders of the party seems to have been the maintenance of the
Union. The repulsive force of the States toward one another was still
sufficiently strong to be an element of constant and recognized danger
to the Union. One method of overcoming it, as a part of the whole
Hamiltonian policy, was to foster the growth of manufactures as an
interest entirely independent of State lines and dependent on the
national government, which would throw its whole influence for the
maintenance of the Union. This feeling runs through the speeches even of
Madison, who prefaced his remarks by a declaration in favor of "a trade
as free as the policy of nations would allow." Protection, therefore,
began in the United States as an instrument of national unity, without
regard to national profit; and the argument in its favor would have been
quite as strong as ever to the mind of a legislator who accepted every
deduction as to the economic disadvantages of protection. Arguments for
its economic advantages are not wanting; but they have no such form and
consistency as those of subsequent periods. The result of the discussion
was the tariff act of July 4, 1789, whose preamble stated one of its
objects to be "the encouragement and protection of manufactures." Its
average duty, however, was but about 8.5 per cent. It was followed by
other acts, each increasing the rate of general duties, until, at the
outbreak of the War of 1812, the general rate was about 21 per cent. The
war added about 6 per cent, to this rate.

Growth toward democracy very commonly brings a curious bias toward
protection, contrasted with the fundamental free-trade argument that a
protective system and a system of slave labor have identical bases. The
bias toward a pronounced protective system in the United States makes
its appearance with the rise of democracy; and, after the War of 1812,
is complicated with party interests. New England was still the citadel
of Federalism. The war and its blockade had fostered manufactures in New
England; and the manufacturing interest, looking to the Democratic
party for protection, was a possible force to sap the foundations of the
citadel. Dallas, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of the Treasury, prepared,
and Calhoun carried through Congress, the tariff of 1816. It introduced
several protective features, the "minimum" feature, by which the
imported article was assumed to have cost at least a certain amount in
calculating duties, and positive protection for cottons and woollens.
The duties paid under this tariff were about 30 per cent. on all
imports, or 33 per cent. on dutiable goods. In 1824 and 1828, under the
lead of Clay, tariffs were adopted which made the tariff of duties still
higher and more systematically protective; they touched high-water
mark in 1830, being 40 per cent. on all imports, or 48.8 per cent. on
dutiable goods. The influence of nullification in forcing through the
compromise tariff of 1833, with its regular decrease of duties for ten
years, has been stated in the first volume.

Under the workings of the compromise tariff there was a steady decrease
in the rate on all imports, but not in the rate on dutiable goods, the
comparison being 22 per cent. on total to 32 per cent. on dutiable for
1833, and 16 per cent. on total to 32 per cent. on dutiable for 1841.
The conjunction of the increase in non-dutiable imports and the approach
of free trade, with general financial distress, gave the Whigs
success in the elections of 1840; and in 1841 they set about reviving
protection. Unluckily for them, their chosen President, Harrison, was
dead, and his successor, Tyler, a Democrat by nature, taken up for
political reasons by the Whigs, was deaf to Whig eloquence on the
subject of the tariff. After an unsuccessful effort to secure a
high tariff and a distribution of the surplus among the States, the
semi-protective tariff of 1842 became law. Its result for the next four
years was that the rate on dutiable goods was altered very little, while
the rate on total imports rose from 16 per cent. to 26 per cent. The
return of the Democrats to power was marked by the passage of the
revenue tariff of 1846, which lasted, with a slight further reduction
of duties in 1857, until 1861. Under its operation the rates steadily
decreased until, in 1861, they were 18.14 per cent, on dutiable goods,
and 11.79 per cent. on total imports.

The platform of the Republican party in the election of 1856 made no
declaration for or against free trade or protection. The results of the
election showed that the electoral votes of Pennsylvania and Illinois
would have been sufficient to give the party a victory in 1856. Both
party policy and a natural regard to its strong Whig membership dictated
a return to the protective feature of the Whig policy. In March,
1860, Mr. Morrill introduced a protective tariff bill in the House of
Representatives, and it passed that body; and, in June, the Republican
National Convention adopted, as one of its resolutions, a declaration
in favor of a protective system. The Democratic Senate postponed the
Morrill bill until the following session. When it came up again
for consideration, in February, 1861, conditions had changed very
considerably. Seven States had seceded, taking off fourteen Senators
opposed to the bill; and it was passed. It was signed by President
Buchanan, March 2, 1861, and went into operation April 1, raising the
rates to about 20 per cent. In August and in December, two other acts
were passed, raising the rates still higher. These were followed by
other increases, which ran the maximum up, in 1868, to 48 per cent. on
dutiable goods, the highest rate from 1860 to date. It may be noted,
however, that the rate of 1830--48.8 per cent. on dutiable goods--still
retains its rank as the highest in our history.

The controlling necessity for ready money, to prevent the over-issue of
bonds and green-backs, undoubtedly gained votes in Congress sufficient
to sustain the policy of protection, as a means of putting the capital
of the country into positions where it could be easily reached by
internal-revenue taxation. This conjunction of internal revenue and
protection proved a mutual support until the payment of the war debt
had gone so far as to provoke the reaction. The Democratic National
Convention of 1876 attacked the tariff system as a masterpiece of
iniquity, but no distinct issue was made between the parties on this
question. In 1880 and 1884, the Republican party was the one to force
the issue of protection or free trade upon its opponent, but its
opponent evaded it.

In 1884, both parties admit the necessity of a reduction in the rates
of duties, if for no other reason, in order to reduce the surplus of
Government receipts over expenditures, which is a constant stimulus
to congressional extravagance. The Republican policy is in general
to retain the principle of protection in the reduction; while the
Democratic policy, so far as it is defined, is to deal as tenderly as
possible with interests which have become vested under a protective
system. What influence will be exerted by the present over-production
and depression in business cannot, of course, be foretold; but the
report of Mr. McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, in December, 1884,
indicates an attempt to induce manufacturers to submit to an abandonment
of protection, as a means of securing a decrease in cost of production,
and a consequent foreign market for surplus product.

In taking Clay's speech in 1832 as the representative statement of the
argument for protection, the editor has consulted Professor Thompson,
of the University of Pennsylvania, and has been guided by his advice. On
the other side, the statement of Representative Hurd, in 1881, has been
taken as, on the whole, the best summary of the free-trade argument. In
both cases, the difficulty has been in the necessary exclusion of merely
written arguments.

HENRY CLAY,

OF KENTUCKY. (BORN 1777, DIED 1852.)

ON THE AMERICAN SYSTEM;

IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FEBRUARY 2-6, 1832.

THE question which we are now called upon to determine, is not, whether
we shall establish a new and doubtful system of policy, just proposed,
and for the first time presented to our consideration, but whether we
shall break down and destroy a long-established system, carefully and
patiently built up and sanctioned, during a series of years, again and
again, by the nation and its highest and most revered authorities. And
are we not bound deliberately to consider whether we can proceed to this
work of destruction without a violation of the public faith? The people
of the United States have justly supposed that the policy of protecting
their industry against foreign legislation and foreign industry was
fully settled, not by a single act, but by repeated and deliberate acts
of government, performed at distant and frequent intervals. In full
confidence that the policy was firmly and unchangeably fixed, thousands
upon thousands have invested their capital, purchased a vast amount of
real and other estate, made permanent establishments, and accommodated
their industry. Can we expose to utter and irretrievable ruin this
countless multitude, without justly incurring the reproach of violating
the national faith? * * *

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