American Eloquence, Volume I. (of 4) by Various

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Another article of the new treaty which is connected with the provisions
of the treaty of 1783 deserves consideration; I mean what relates to the
Mississippi. At the time when the navigation of that river to its mouth
was by the treaty of peace declared to be common to both nations, Great
Britain communicated to America a right which she held by virtue of the
treaty of 1763, and as owner of the Floridas; but since that cession to
the United States, England has ceded to Spain her claim on the Floridas,
and does not own at the present time an inch of ground, either on the
mouth or on any part of that river. Spain now stands in the place of
Great Britain, and by virtue of the treaty of 1783 it is to Spain and
America, and not to England and America, that the navigation of the
Mississippi is at present to be common. Yet, notwithstanding this change
of circumstances, we have repeated that article of the former treaty in
the late one, and have granted to Great Britain the additional privilege
of using our ports on the eastern side of the river, without which, as
they own no land thereon, they could not have navigated it. Nor is this
all. Upon a supposition that the Mississippi does not extend so far
northward as to be intersected by a line drawn due west from the Lake of
the Woods, or, in other words, upon a supposition that Great Britain has
not a claim even to touch the Mississippi, we have agreed, not upon what
will be the boundary line, but that we will hereafter negotiate to
settle that line. Thus leaving to future negotiation what should have
been finally settled by the treaty itself, in the same manner as all
other differences were, is calculated for the sole purpose, either of
laying the foundation of future disputes, or of recognizing a claim in
Great Britain on the waters of the Mississippi, even if their boundary
line leaves to the southward the sources of that river. Had not that
been the intention of Great Britain the line would have been settled at
once by the treaty, according to either of the two only rational ways of
doing it in conformity to the treaty of 1783, that is to say, by
agreeing that the line should run from the northernmost sources of the
Mississippi, either directly to the western extremity of the Lake of the
Woods, or northwardly till it intersected the line to be drawn due west
from that lake. But by repeating the article of the treaty of 1783; by
conceding the free use of our ports on the river, and by the insertion
of the fourth article, we have admitted that Great Britain, in all
possible events, has still a right to navigate that river from its
source to its mouth. What may be the future effects of these provisions,
especially as they regard our intercourse with Spain, it is impossible
at present to say; but although they can bring us no advantage, they may
embroil us with that nation: and we have already felt the effect of it
in our late treaty with Spain, since we were obliged, on account of that
clause of the British treaty, to accept as a gift and a favor the
navigation of that river which we had till then claimed as a right.

But if, leaving commercial regulations, we shall seek in the treaty for
some provisions securing to us the free navigation of the ocean against
any future aggressions on our trade, where are they to be found? I can
add nothing to what has been said on the subject of contraband articles:
it is, indeed, self-evident, that, connecting our treaty with England on
that subject with those we have made with other nations, it amounts to a
positive compact to supply that nation exclusively with naval stores
whenever they may be at war. Had the list of contraband articles been
reduced--had naval stores and provisions, our two great staple
commodities, been declared not to be contra-band, security would have
been given to the free exportation of our produce; but instead of any
provision being made on that head, an article of a most doubtful nature,
and on which I will remark hereafter, has been introduced. But I mean,
for the present, to confine my observations to the important question of
free bottoms making free goods. It was with the utmost astonishment that
I heard the doctrine advanced on this floor, that such a provision, if
admitted, would prove injurious to America, inasmuch as in case of war
between this country and any other nation, the goods of that nation
might be protected by the English flag. It is not to a state of war that
the benefits of this provision would extend; but it is the only security
which neutral nations can have against the legal plundering on the high
seas, so often committed by belligerent powers. It is not for the sake
of protecting an enemy's property; it is not for the sake of securing an
advantageous carrying trade; but it is in order effectually to secure
ourselves against sea aggressions, that this provision is necessary.
Spoliations may arise from unjust orders, given by the government of a
belligerent nation to their officers and cruisers, and these may be
redressed by application to and negotiation with that order. But no
complaints, no negotiations, no orders of government itself, can give
redress when those spoliations are grounded on a supposition, that the
vessels of the neutral nation have an enemy's property on board, as long
as such property is not protected by the flag of the neutral nation; as
long as it is liable to be captured, it is not sufficient, in order to
avoid detention and capture, to have no such property on board. Every
privateer, under pretence that he suspects an enemy's goods to be part
of a cargo, may search, vex, and capture a vessel; and if in any corner
of the dominions of the belligerent power, a single judge can be found
inclined, if not determined, to condemn, at all events, before his
tribunal, all vessels so captured will be brought there, and the same
pretence which caused the capture will justify a condemnation. The only
nation who persists in the support of this doctrine, as making part of
the law of nations, is the first maritime power of Europe, whom their
interest, as they are the strongest, and as there is hardly a maritime
war in which they are not involved, leads to wish for a continuation of
a custom which gives additional strength to their overbearing dominion
over the seas. All the other nations have different sentiments and a
different interest. During the American war, in the year 1780, so fully
convinced were the neutral nations of the necessity of introducing that
doctrine of free bottoms making free goods, that all of them, excepting
Portugal, who was in a state of vassalage to, and a mere appendage of,
Great Britain, united in order to establish the principle, and formed
for that purpose the alliance known by the name of the armed neutrality.
All the belligerent powers, except England, recognized and agreed to the
doctrine. England itself was obliged, in some measure, to give, for a
while, a tacit acquiescence. America, at the time, fully admitted the
principle, although then at war.

Since the year 1780, every nation, so far as my knowledge goes, has
refused to enter into a treaty of commerce with England, unless that
provision was inserted. Russia, for that reason, would not renew their
treaty, which had expired in 1786; although I believe that, during the
present war, and in order to answer the ends of the war, they formed a
temporary convention, which I have not seen, but which, perhaps, does
not include that provision. England consented to it in her treaty with
France, in 1788, and we are the first neutral nation who has abandoned
the common cause, given up the claim, and by a positive declaration
inserted in our treaty, recognized the contrary doctrine. It has been
said that, under the present circumstances, it could not be expected
that Great Britain would give up the point; perhaps so; but the
objection is not, that our negotiator has not been able to obtain that
principle, but that he has consented to enter into a treaty of commerce
which we do not want, and which has no connection with an adjustment of
our differences with Great Britain, without the principle contended for
making part of that treaty. Unless we can obtain security for our
navigation, we want no treaty; and the only provision which can give us
that security, should have been the _sine qua non_ of a treaty. On the
contrary, we have disgusted all the other neutral nations of Europe,
without whose concert and assistance there is but little hope that we
shall ever obtain that point; and we have taught Great Britain that we
are disposed to form the most intimate connections with her, even at the
expense of recognizing a principle the most fatal to the liberty of
commerce and to the security of our navigation.

But, if we could not obtain anything which might secure us against
future aggressions, should we have parted, without receiving any
equivalent, with those weapons of self-defence, which, although they
could not repel, might, in some degree, prevent any gross attacks upon
our trade--any gross violation of our rights as a neutral nation? We
have no fleet to oppose or to punish the insults of Great Britain; but,
from our commercial relative situation, we have it in our power to
restrain her aggressions, by restrictions on her trade, by a total
prohibition of her manufactures, or by a sequestration of the debts due
to her. By the treaty, not satisfied with receiving nothing, not
satisfied with obtaining no security for the future, we have, of our own
accord, surrendered those defensive arms, for fear they might be abused
by ourselves. We have given up the two first, for the whole time during
which we might want them most, the period of the present war; and the
last, the power of sequestration, we have abandoned for ever: every
other article of the treaty of commerce is temporary; this perpetual.

I shall not enter into a discussion of the immorality of sequestering
private property. What can be more immoral than war; or plundering on
the high seas, legalized under the name of privateering? Yet
self-defence justifies the first, and the necessity of the case may, at
least in some instances, and where it is the only practicable mode of
warfare left to a nation, apologize even for the last. In the same
manner, the power of sequestration may be resorted to, as the last
weapon of self-defence, rather than to seek redress by an appeal to
arms. It is the last peace measure that can be taken by a nation; but
the treaty, by declaring, that in case of national differences it shall
not be resorted to, has deprived us of the power of judging of its
propriety, has rendered it an act of hostility, and has effectually
taken off that restraint, which a fear of its exercise laid upon Great
Britain.

Thus it appears that by the treaty we have promised full compensation to
England for every possible claim they may have against us, that we have
abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we have consented
to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new
conditions and restrictions never before contemplated; that after having
obtained by those concessions an adjustment of past differences, we have
entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those objects, which have
heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations; and that
by this treaty of commerce and navigation, we have obtained no
commercial advantage which we did not enjoy before, we have obtained no
security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom
of our navigation, and we have parted with every pledge we had in our
hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of
self-defence which is calculated to give us any security.

From the review I have taken of the treaty, and the opinions I have
expressed, it is hardly necessary for me to add, that I look upon the
instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the United States,
and that I earnestly wish it never had been made; but whether in its
present stage the House ought to refuse to carry it into effect, and
what will be the probable consequences of a refusal, is a question which
requires the most serious attention, and which I will now attempt to
investigate.

Should the treaty be finally defeated, either new negotiations will be
more successful or Great Britain will refuse to make a new arrangement,
and leave things in the situation in which they now are, or war will be
the consequence. I will, in the course of my observations, make some
remarks on the last supposition. I do not think that the first will be
very probable at present, and I am of opinion that, under the present
circumstances, and until some change takes place in our own or in the
relative political situation of the European nations, it is to be
apprehended that, in such a case, new negotiations will either be
rejected or prove unsuccessful. Such an event might have perhaps
followed a rejection of the treaty even by the Senate or by the
President. After the negotiator employed by the United States had once
affixed his signature it must have become very problematical, unless he
had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he
had made would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect
of a new treaty. I conceive that the hopes of obtaining better
conditions by a new negotiation are much less in the present stage of
the business than they were when the treaty was in its inchoate form
before the Executive; and in order to form a just idea of the
consequences of a rejection at present, I will contemplate them upon
this supposition, which appears to me most probable, to wit, that no new
treaty will take place for a certain period of time.

In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, I have already stated
the advantages which in my opinion would result to the United States
from the non-existence of that instrument; I will not repeat, but
proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue that can be set off
against those advantages.

The further detention of the posts, the national stain that will result
from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the
uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain,
are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a rejection of the
treaty; and when to those considerations I add that of the present
situation of this country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of
the advantages that will arise from union of sentiments, however
injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, however repugnant it
may be to my feelings, and perhaps to my prejudices, I feel induced to
vote for it, and will not give my assent to any proposition which will
imply its rejection. But the conduct of Great Britain since the treaty
was signed, the impressment of our seamen, and their uninterrupted
spoliations on our trade, especially by seizing our vessels laden with
provisions, a proceeding which they may perhaps justify by one of the
articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as may induce us to pause
awhile, in order to examine whether it is proper, immediately and
without having obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolution
on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws necessary to carry
the treaty into effect.

Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty, they will not
attend a postponement. To suspend our proceedings will not throw us into
a situation which will require new negotiations, new arrangements on the
points already settled and well understood by both parties. It will be
merely a delay, until an explanation of the late conduct of the British
towards us may be obtained, or until that conduct may be altered. If, on
the contrary, we consent to carry the treaty into effect, under the
present circumstances, what will be our situation in future? It is by
committing the most wanton and the most unprovoked aggressions on our
trade; it is by seizing a large amount of our property as a pledge for
our good behavior, that Great Britain has forced the nation into the
present treaty. If by threatening new hostilities, or rather by
continuing her aggressions, even after the treaty is made, she can force
us also to carry it into effect, our acquiescence will be tantamount to
a declaration that we mean to submit in proportion to the insults that
are offered to us; and this disposition being once known, what security
have we against new insults, new aggressions, new spoliations, which
probably will lay the foundation of some additional sacrifices on ours?
It has been said, and said with truth, that to put up with the
indignities we have received without obtaining any reparation, which
will probably be the effect of defeating the treaty, is highly
dishonorable to the nation.

In my opinion it is still more so not only tamely to submit to a
continuation of these national insults, but while they thus continue
uninterrupted, to carry into effect the instrument we have consented to
accept as a reparation for former ones. When the general conduct of
Great Britain towards us from the beginning of the present war is
considered; when the means by which she has produced the treaty are
reflected on, a final compliance on our part while she still persists in
that conduct, whilst the chastening rod of that nation is still held
over us, is in my opinion a dereliction of national interest, of
national honor, of national independence.

But it is said, that war must be the consequence of our delaying to
carry the treaty into effect. Do the gentlemen mean, that if we reject
the treaty, if we do not accept the reparation there given to us, in
order to obtain redress, we have no alternative left but war? If we must
go to war in order to obtain reparation for insults and spoliations on
our trade, we must do it, even if we carry the present treaty into
effect; for this treaty gives us no reparation for the aggressions
committed since it was ratified, has not produced a discontinuance of
those acts of hostility, and gives us no security that they shall be
discontinued. But the arguments of those gentlemen, who suppose that
America must go to war, apply to a final rejection of the treaty, and
not to a delay. I do not propose to refuse the reparation offered by the
treaty, and to put up with the aggressions committed; I have agreed that
that reparation, such as it is, is a valuable article of the treaty; I
have agreed, that under the present circumstances, a greater evil will
follow a total rejection of, than an acquiescence in, the treaty. The
only measure which has been mentioned, in preference to the one now
under discussion, is a suspension, a postponement, whilst the present
spoliations continue, in hopes to obtain for them a similar reparation,
and assurances that they shall cease.

But is it meant to insinuate that it is the final intention of those who
pretend to wish only for a postponement, to involve this country in a
war? There has been no period during the present European war, at which
it would not have been equally weak and wicked to adopt such measures as
must involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake
of self-defence; but, at this time, to think of it would fall but little
short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to
the idea; and it might at least have been recollected, that war can not
be declared, except by Congress, and that two of the branches of
government are sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of
this kind.

If there is no necessity imposed upon America to go to war, if there is
no apprehension she will, by her own conduct, involve herself in one,
the danger must arise from Great Britain, and the threat is, that she
will make war against us if we do not comply. Gentlemen first tell us
that we have made the best possible bargain with that nation; that she
has conceded everything, without receiving a single iota in return, and
yet they would persuade us, that she will make war against us in order
to force us to accept that contract so advantageous to us, and so
injurious to herself. It will not be contended that a delay, until an
amicable explanation is obtained, could afford even a pretence to Great
Britain for going to war; and we all know that her own interest would
prevent her. If another campaign takes place, it is acknowledged, that
all her efforts are to be exerted against the West Indies. She has
proclaimed her own scarcity of provisions at home, and she must depend
on our supplies to support her armament. It depends upon us to defeat
her whole scheme, and this is a sufficient pledge against open
hostility, if the European war continues. If peace takes place, there
will not be even the appearance of danger; the moment when a nation is
happy enough to emerge from one of the most expensive, bloody, and
dangerous wars in which she ever has been involved, will be the last she
would choose to plunge afresh into a similar calamity.

But to the cry of war, the alarmists do not fail to add that of
confusion; and they have declared, even on this floor, that if the
resolution is not adopted government will be dissolved. Government
dissolved in case a postponement takes place! The idea is too absurd to
deserve a direct answer. But I will ask those gentlemen, by whom is
government to be dissolved? Certainly not by those who may vote against
the resolution; for although they are not perhaps fortunate enough to
have obtained the confidence of the gentlemen who voted against them,
still it must be agreed, that those who succeed in their wishes, who
defeat a measure they dislike, will not wish to destroy that government,
which they hold so far in their hands as to be able to carry their own
measures. For them to dissolve government, would be to dissolve their
own power. By whom, then, I again ask, is the government to be
dissolved? The gentlemen must answer--by themselves--or they must
declare that they mean nothing but to alarm. Is it really the language
of those men, who profess to be, who distinguish themselves by the
self-assumed appellation of friends to order, that if they do not
succeed in all their measures they will overset government--and have all
their professions been only a veil to hide their love of power, a
pretence to cover their ambition? Do they mean, that the first event
which shall put an end to their own authority shall be the last act of
government? As to myself, I do not believe that they have such
intentions; I have too good an opinion of their patriotism to allow
myself to admit such an idea a single moment; but I think myself
justifiable in entertaining a belief, that some amongst them, in order
to carry a favorite, and what they think to be an advantageous measure,
mean to spread an alarm which they do not feel; and I have no doubt,
that many have contracted such a habit of carrying every measure of
government as they please, that they really think that every thing must
be thrown into confusion the moment they are thwarted in a matter of
importance. I hope that experience will in future cure their fears. But,
at all events, be the wishes and intentions of the members of this House
what they may, it is not in their power to dissolve the government. The
people of the United States, from one end of the continent to the other,
are strongly attached to their Constitution; they would restrain and
punish the excesses of any party, of any set of men in government, who
would be guilty of the attempt; and on them I will rest as a full
security against every endeavor to destroy our Union, our Constitution,
or our government.

If the people of the United States wish this House to carry the treaty
into effect immediately, and notwithstanding the continued aggressions
of the British, if their will was fairly and fully expressed, I would
immediately acquiesce; but since an appeal has been made to them, it is
reasonable to suspend a decision until their sentiments are known. Till
then I must follow my own judgment; and as I cannot see that any
possible evils will follow a delay, I shall vote against the resolution
before the committee, in order to make room, either for that proposed by
my colleague, Mr. Maclay, or for any other, expressed in any manner
whatever, provided it embraces the object I have in view, to wit, the
suspension of the final vote--a postponement of the laws necessary to
carry the treaty into effect, until satisfactory assurances are obtained
that Great Britain means, in future, to show us that friendly
disposition which it is my earnest wish may at all times be cultivated
by America towards all other nations.

FISHER AMES,

OF MASSACHUSETTS. (BORN 1758, DIED 1808.)

ON THE BRITISH TREATY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 28, 1796.

It would be strange, that a subject, which has aroused in turn all the
passions of the country, should be discussed without the interference of
any of our own. We are men, and therefore not exempt from those
passions; as citizens and representatives, we feel the interests that
must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to agitate
strong passions. We are not disinterested; it is impossible we should be
dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may becloud the judgment,
and, for a time, pervert the understanding. But the public sensibility,
and our own, has sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation
to the debate. The public attention has been quickened to mark the
progress of the discussion, and its judgment, often hasty and erroneous
on first impressions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our
result will, I hope, on that account, be safer and more mature, as well
as more accordant with that of the nation. The only constant agents in
political affairs are the passions of men. Shall we complain of our
nature--shall we say that man ought to have been made otherwise? It is
right already, because He, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it
so; and because thus made and thus acting, the cause of truth and the
public good is more surely promoted.

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