American Eloquence, Volume I. (of 4) by Various

V >> Various >> American Eloquence, Volume I. (of 4)

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15

But the honorable member has satirized, with peculiar acrimony, the
powers given to the general government by this Constitution. I conceive
that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be
necessary; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either
submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the Union. Let us consider
the most important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation
is most generally objected to. With respect to the exigencies of
government, there is no question but the most easy mode of providing for
them will be adopted. When, therefore, direct taxes are not necessary,
they will not be recurred to. It can be of little advantage to those in
power, to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people. To consult
the conveniences of the people, will cost them nothing, and in many
respects will be advantageous to them. Direct taxes will only be
recurred to for great purposes. What has brought on other nations those
immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labor? Not the
expenses of their governments, but war. If this country should be
engaged in war, (and I conceive we ought to provide for the possibility
of such a case,) how would it be carried on? By the usual means provided
from year to year? As our imports will be necessary for the expenses of
government, and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the
means of defence? How is it possible a war could be supported without
money or credit? And would it be possible for government to have credit,
without having the power of raising money? No, it would be impossible
for any government, in such a case, to defend itself. Then, I say, sir,
that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies,
and give this power to the general government; for the utter inutility
of previous requisitions on the States is too well known. Would it be
possible for those countries, whose finances and revenues are carried to
the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of government on
great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, without an
uncontrolled power of raising money? Has it not been necessary for Great
Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collection of her taxes, to
have recourse very often to this and other extraordinary methods of
procuring money? Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was
known that her power to raise money was limited? Has not France been
obliged, on great occasions, to recur to unusual means, in order to
raise funds? It has been the case in many countries, and no government
can exist unless its powers extend to make provisions for every
contingency. If we were actually attacked by a powerful nation, and our
general government had not the power of raising money, but depended
solely on requisitions, our condition would be truly deplorable: if the
revenues of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct
authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations.
This must be obvious to every member here: I think, therefore, that it
is necessary for the preservation of the Union, that this power should
be given to the general government.

But it is urged, that its consolidated nature, joined to the power of
direct taxation, will give it a tendency to destroy all subordinate
authority; that its increasing influence will speedily enable it to
absorb the State governments. I cannot bring myself to think that this
will be the case. If the general government were wholly independent of
the governments of the particular States, then indeed, usurpation might
be expected to the fullest extent: but, sir, on whom does this general
government depend? It derives its authority from these governments, and
from the same sources from which their authority is derived. The members
of the federal government are taken from the same men from whom those of
the State legislatures are taken. If we consider the mode in which the
federal representatives will be chosen, we shall be convinced, that the
general never will destroy the individual governments; and this
conviction must be strengthened by an attention to the construction of
the Senate. The representatives will be chosen, probably under the
influence of the State legislatures: but there is not the least
probability that the election of the latter will be influenced by the
former. One hundred and sixty members representing this commonwealth in
one branch of the legislature, are drawn from the people at large, and
must ever possess more influence than the few men who will be elected to
the general legislature. Those who wish to become federal
representatives, must depend on their credit with that class of men who
will be the most popular in their counties, who generally represent the
people in the State governments: they can, therefore, never succeed in
any measure contrary to the wishes of those on whom they depend. So
that, on the whole, it is almost certain that the deliberations of the
members of the federal House of Representatives will be directed to the
interests of the people of America. As to the other branch, the Senators
will be appointed by the legislatures, and, though elected for six
years, I do not conceive they will so soon forget the source whence they
derive their political existence. This election of one branch of the
federal, by the State legislatures, secures an absolute independence of
the former on the latter. The biennial exclusion of one third will
lessen the facility of a combination, and preclude all likelihood of
intrigues. I appeal to our past experience, whether they will attend to
the interests of their constituent States. Have not those gentlemen who
have been honored with seats in Congress often signalized themselves by
their attachment to their States? Sir, I pledge myself that this
government will answer the expectations of its friends, and foil the
apprehensions of its enemies. I am persuaded that the patriotism of the
people will continue, and be a sufficient guard to their liberties, and
that the tendency of the Constitution will be, that the State
governments will counteract the general interest, and ultimately
prevail. The number of the representatives is yet sufficient for our
safety, and will gradually increase; and if we consider their different
sources of information, the number will not appear too small.

Sir, that part of the proposed Constitution which gives the general
government the power of laying and collecting taxes, is indispensable
and essential to the existence of any efficient, or well organized
system of government: if we consult reason, and be ruled by its
dictates, we shall find its justification there: if we review the
experience we have had, or contemplate the history of nations, there too
we shall find ample reasons to prove its expediency. It would be
preposterous to depend for necessary supplies on a body which is fully
possessed of the power of withholding them. If a government depends on
other governments for its revenues; if it must depend on the voluntary
contributions of its members, its existence must be precarious. A
government that relies on thirteen independent sovereignties for the
means of its existence, is a solecism in theory, and a mere nullity in
practice. Is it consistent with reason, that such a government can
promote the happiness of any people? It is subversive of every principle
of sound policy, to trust the safety of a community with a government
totally destitute of the means of protecting itself or its members. Can
Congress, after the repeated unequivocal proofs it has experienced of
the utter inutility and inefficacy of requisitions, reasonably expect
that they would be hereafter effectual or productive?

Will not the same local interests, and other causes, militate against a
compliance? Whoever hopes the contrary must for ever be disappointed.
The effect, sir, cannot be changed without a removal of the cause. Let
each county in this commonwealth be supposed free and independent: let
your revenues depend on requisitions of proportionate quotas from them:
let application be made to them repeatedly, and then ask yourself, is it
to be presumed that they would comply, or that an adequate collection
could be made from partial compliances? It is now difficult to collect
the taxes from them: how much would that difficulty be enhanced, were
you to depend solely on their generosity? I appeal to the reason of
every gentleman here, and to his candor, to say whether he is not
persuaded that the present confederation is as feeble as the government
of Virginia would be in that case; to the same reason I appeal, whether
it be compatible with prudence to continue a government of such manifest
and palpable weakness and inefficiency.

II. -- CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

Constitutional government in the United States began, in its national
phase, with the inauguration of Washington, but the experiment was for a
long time a doubtful one. Of the two parties, the federal and the
anti-federal parties, which had faced one another on the question of the
adoption of the Constitution, the latter had disappeared. Its
conspicuous failure to achieve the fundamental object of its existence,
and the evident hopelessnesss of reversing its failure in future,
blotted it out of existence. There was left but one party, the federal
party; and it, strong as it appeared, was really in almost as precarious
a position as its former opponent, because of the very completeness of
its success in achieving its fundamental object. Hamilton and Jefferson,
two of its representative members, were opposed in almost all the
political instincts of their natures; the former chose the restraints of
strong government as instinctively as the latter clung to individualism.
They had been accidentally united for the time in desiring the adoption
of the Constitution, though Hamilton considered it only a temporary
shift for something stronger, while Jefferson wished for a bill of
rights to weaken the force of some of its implications. Now that the
Constitution was ratified, what tie was there to hold these two to any
united action for the future? Nothing but a shadow--the name of a party
not yet two years old. As soon, therefore, as the federal party fairly
entered upon a secure tenure of power, the divergent instincts of the
two classes represented by Hamilton and Jefferson began to show
themselves more distinctly until there was no longer any pretence of
party unity, and the democratic (or republican) party assumed its place,
in 1792-3, as the recognized opponent of the party in power. It would be
beside the purpose to attempt to enumerate the points in which the
natural antagonism of the federalists and the republicans came to the
surface during the decade of contest which ended in the downfall of the
federal party in 1800-1. In all of them, in the struggles over the
establishment of the Bank of the United States and the assumption of the
State debts, in the respective sympathy for France and Great Britain, in
the strong federalist legislation forced through during the war feeling
against France in 1798, the controlling sympathy of the republicans for
individualism and of the federalists for a strong national government is
constantly visible, if looked for. The difficulty is that these
permanent features are often so obscured by the temporary media in which
they appear that the republicans are likely to be taken as a merely
State-rights party, and the federalists as a merely commercial party.

To adopt either of these notions would be to take a very erroneous idea
of American political history. The whole policy of the republicans was
to forward the freedom of the individual; their leader seems to have
made all other points subordinate to this. There is hardly any point in
which the action of the individual American has been freed from
governmental restraints, from ecclesiastical government, from sumptuary
laws, from restrictions on suffrage, from restrictions on commerce,
production, and exchange, for which he is not indebted in some measure
to the work and teaching of Jefferson between the years of 1790 and
1800. He and his party found the States in existence, understood well
that they were convenient shields for the individual against the
possible powers of the new federal government for evil, and made use of
them. The State sovereignty of Jefferson was the product of
individualism; that of Calhoun was the product of sectionalism.

On the other hand, if Jeffersonian democracy was the representative of
all the individualistic tendencies of the later science of political
economy, Hamiltonian federalism represented the necessary corrective
force of law. It was in many respects a strong survival of colonialism.
Together with some of the evil features of colonialism, its imperative
demands for submission to class government, its respect for the
interests and desires of the few, and its contempt for those of the
many, it had brought into American constitutional life a very high ratio
of that respect for law which alone can render the happiness and
usefulness of the individual a permanent and secure possession. It was
impossible for federalism to resist the individualistic tendency of the
country for any length of time; it is the monument of the party that it
secured, before it fell, abiding guaranties for the security of the
individual under freedom.

The genius of the federalists was largely practical. It was shown in
their masterly organization of the federal government when it was first
entrusted to their hands, an organization which has since been rather
developed than disturbed in any of its parts. But the details of the
work absorbed the attention of the leaders so completely that it would
be impossible to fix on any public address as entirely representative of
the party. Fisher Ames' speech on the Jay treaty, which was considered
by the federalists the most effective piece of oratory in their party
history, has been taken as a substitute. The question was to the
federalists partly of commercial and partly of national importance. John
Jay had secured the first commercial treaty with Great Britain in 1795.
It not only provided for the security of American commerce during the
European wars to which Great Britain was a party, and obtained the
surrender of the military posts in the present States of Ohio and
Michigan; it also gave the United States a standing in the family of
nations which it was difficult to claim elsewhere while Great Britain
continued to refuse to treat on terms of equality. The Senate therefore
ratified the treaty, and it was constitutionally complete. The
democratic majority in the House of Representatives, objecting to the
treaty as a surrender of previous engagements with France, and as a
failure to secure the rights of individuals against Great Britain,
particularly in the matter of impressment, raised the point that the
House was not bound to vote money for carrying into effect a treaty with
which it was seriously dissatisfied. The speech of Gallatin has been
selected to represent the republican view. It is a strong reflection of
the opposition to the Treaty. The reply of Ames is a forcible
presentation of both the national and the commercial aspects of his
party; it had a very great influence in securing, though by a very
narrow majority, the vote of the House in favor of the appropriation.

There is some difficulty in fixing on any completely representative
oration to represent the republican point of view covering this period.
Gallatin's speech on the Jay Treaty together with Nicholas' argument for
the repeal of the sedition law may serve this purpose. The speech of
Nicholas shows the instinctive sympathy of the party for the individual
rather than for the government. It shows the force with which this
sympathy drove the party into a strict construction of the Constitution.
It seems also to bear the strongest internal indications that it was
inspired, if not entirely written, by the great leader of the party,
Jefferson. The federalists had used the popular war feeling against
France in 1798, not only to press the formation of an army and a navy
and the abrogation of the old and trouble-some treaties with France, but
to pass the alien and sedition laws as well. The former empowered the
President to expel from the country or imprison any alien whom he should
consider dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. The
latter forbade, under penalty of fine and imprisonment, the printing or
publishing of any "false, scandalous, or malicious writings" calculated
to bring the Government, Congress, or the President into disrepute, or
to excite against them the hatred of the good people of the United
States, or to stir up sedition. It was inevitable that the republicans
should oppose such laws, and that the people should support them in
their opposition. At the election of 1800, the federal party was
overthrown, and the lost ground was never regained. With Jefferson's
election to the presidency, began the democratic period of the United
States; but it has always been colored strongly and naturally by the
federal bias toward law and order.

ALBERT GALLATIN,

OF PENNSYLVANIA. (BORN 1761, DIED 1849.)

ON THE BRITISH TREATY

--HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 26, 1796.

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I will not follow some of the gentlemen who have preceded me, by
dwelling upon the discretion of the legislature; a question which has
already been the subject of our deliberations, and been decided by a
solemn vote. Gentle-men who were in the minority on that question may
give any construction they please to the declaratory resolution of the
House; they may again repeat that to refuse to carry the treaty into
effect is a breach of the public faith which they conceive as being
pledged by the President and Senate. This has been the ground on which a
difference of opinion has existed since the beginning of the discussion.
It is because the House thinks that the faith of the nation cannot, on
those subjects submitted to the power of Congress, be pledged by any
constituted authority other than the legislature, that they resolved
that in all such cases it is their right and duty to consider the
expediency of carrying a treaty into effect. If the House think the
faith of the nation already pledged they can not claim any discretion;
there is no room left to deliberate upon the expediency of the thing.
The resolution now under consideration is merely "that it is expedient
to carry the British treaty into effect," and not whether we are bound
by national faith to do it. I will therefore consider the question of
expediency alone; and thinking as I do that the House has full
discretion on this subject, I conceive that there is as much
responsibility in deciding in the affirmative as in rejecting the
resolution, and that we shall be equally answerable for the consequences
that may follow from either.

It is true, however, that there was a great difference between the
situation of this country in the year 1794, when a negotiator was
appointed, and that in which we are at present; and that consequences
will follow the refusal to carry into effect the treaty in its present
stage, which would not have attended a refusal to negotiate and to enter
into such a treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumes
before us a different and more complex shape than when before the
negotiator, the Senate, or the President. The treaty, in itself and
abstractedly considered, may be injurious; it may be such an instrument
as in the opinion of the House ought not to have been adopted by the
Executive; and yet such as it is we may think it expedient under the
present circumstances to carry it into effect. I will therefore first
take a view of the provisions of the treaty itself, and in the next
place, supposing it is injurious, consider, in case it is not carried
into effect, what will be the natural consequences of such refusal.

The provisions of the treaty relate either to the adjustment of past
differences, or to the future intercourse of the two nations. The
differences now existing between Great Britain and this country arose
either from non-execution of some articles of the treaty of peace or
from the effects of the present European war. The complaints of Great
Britain in relation to the treaty of 1783 were confined to the legal
impediments thrown by the several States in the way of the recovery of
British debts. The late treaty provides adequate remedy on that subject;
the United States are bound to make full and complete compensation for
any losses arising from that source, and every ground of complaint on
the part of Great Britain is removed.

Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America has a right
to expect that equal attention shall be paid to her claims arising from
infractions of the treaty of peace, viz., compensation for the negroes
carried away by the British; restoration of the western posts, and
indemnification for their detention.

On the subject of the first claim, which has been objected to as
groundless, I will observe that I am not satisfied that the construction
given by the British government to that article of the treaty is
justified even by the letter of the article. That construction rests on
the supposition that slaves come under the general denomination of
booty, and are alienated the moment they fall into possession of an
enemy, so that all those who were in the hands of the British when the
treaty of peace was signed, must be considered as British and not as
American property, and are not included in the article. It will,
however, appear by recurring to Vattel when speaking of the right of
"Postliminium," that slaves cannot be considered as a part of the booty
which is alienated by the act of capture, and that they are to be ranked
rather with real property, to the profits of which only the captors are
entitled. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the construction
given by America is that which was understood by the parties at the time
of making the treaty. The journals of Mr. Adams, quoted by a gentleman
from Connecticut, Mr. Coit, prove this fully; for when he says that the
insertion of this article was alone worth the journey of Mr. Laurens
from London, can it be supposed that he would have laid so much stress
on a clause, which, according to the new construction now attempted to
be given, means only that the British would commit no new act of
hostility--would not carry away slaves at that time in possession of
Americans? Congress recognized that construction by adopting the
resolution which has been already quoted, and which was introduced upon
the motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and it has not been denied that
the British ministry during Mr. Adams' embassy also agreed to it.

But when our negotiator had, for the sake of peace, waived that claim;
when he had also abandoned the right which America had to demand an
indemnification for the detention of the posts, although he had conceded
the right of a similar nature, which Great Britain had for the detention
of debts; when he had thus given up everything which might be supposed
to be of a doubtful nature, it might have been hoped that our last
claim--a claim on which there was not and there never had been any
dispute--the western posts should have been restored according to the
terms of the treaty of peace. Upon what ground the British insisted, and
our negotiator conceded, that this late restitution should be saddled
with new conditions, which made no part of the original contract, I am
at a loss to know. British traders are allowed by the new treaty to
remain within the posts without becoming citizens of the United States;
and to carry on trade and commerce with the Indians living within our
boundaries without being subject to any control from our government. In
vain is it said that if that clause had not been inserted we would have
found it to our interest to effect it by our own laws. Of this we are
alone competent judges; if that condition is harmless at present it is
not possible to foresee whether, under future circumstances, it will not
prove highly injurious; and whether harmless or not, it is not less a
permanent and new condition imposed upon us. But the fact is, that by
the introduction of that clause, by obliging us to keep within our
jurisdiction, as British subjects, the very men who have been the
instruments used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our
frontiers; by obliging us to suffer those men to continue their commerce
with the Indians living in our territory, uncontrolled by those
regulations which we have thought necessary in order to restrain our own
citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great Britain has
preserved her full influence with the Indian nations. By a restoration
of the posts under that condition we have lost the greatest advantage
that was expected from their possession, viz.: future security against
the Indians. In the same manner have the British preserved the
commercial advantages which result from the occupancy of those posts, by
stipulating as a permanent condition, a free passage for their goods
across our portages without paying any duty.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15