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American Eloquence, Volume I. (of 4) by Various

V >> Various >> American Eloquence, Volume I. (of 4)




It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every
country desire sincerely its prosperity; but it is equally
unquestionable, that they do not possess the discernment and stability
necessary for systematic government. To deny that they are frequently
led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, would be a
flattery which their own good sense must despise. That branch of
administration especially, which involves our political relations with
foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to. These truths
are not often held up in public assemblies: but they cannot be unknown
to any who hear me. From these principles it follows, that there ought
to be two distinct bodies in our government: one, which shall be
immediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people, and
possess all the popular features; another, formed upon the principle,
and for the purposes, before explained. Such considerations as these
induced the convention who formed your State constitution, to institute
a Senate upon the present plan. The history of ancient and modern
republics had taught them, that many of the evils which these republics
had suffered, arose from the want of a certain balance and mutual
control indispensable to a wise administration; they were convinced that
popular assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden
impulses, and the intrigues of ambitious men; and that some firm barrier
against these operations was necessary; they, therefore, instituted your
Senate, and the benefits we have experienced have fully justified their
conceptions.

Gentlemen, in their reasoning, have placed the interests of the several
States, and those of the United States in contrast; this is not a fair
view of the subject; they must necessarily be involved in each other.
What we apprehend is, that some sinister prejudice, or some prevailing
passion, may assume the form of a genuine interest. The influence of
these is as powerful as the most permanent conviction of the public
good; and against this influence we ought to provide. The local
interests of a State ought in every case to give way to the interests of
the Union; for when a sacrifice of one or the other is necessary, the
former becomes only an apparent, partial interest, and should yield, on
the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one.
When you assemble from your several counties in the Legislature, were
every member to be guided only by the apparent interests of his county,
government would be impracticable. There must be a perpetual
accommodation and sacrifice of local advantages to general expediency;
but the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by
this important principle. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the
Senate should be so formed, as to be unbiased by false conceptions of
the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good of their
several States.

Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable apprehensions of danger to the
State governments; they seem to suppose that the moment you put men into
a national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all
their affection for their fellow-citizens. But can we imagine that the
Senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage, as to
sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents? The State
governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit of the
general system. As long, therefore, as Congress has a full conviction of
this necessity, they must, even upon principles purely national, have as
firm an attachment to the one as to the other. This conviction can never
leave them, unless they become madmen. While the constitution continues
to be read, and its principle known, the States must, by every rational
man, be considered as essential, component parts of The Union; and
therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to the latter is wholly
inadmissible.

The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of
State governments, which will ever give them an important superiority
over the general government. If we compare the nature of their different
powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall
find the advantage entirely on the side of the States. This
consideration, important as it is, seems to have been little attended
to. The aggregate number of representatives throughout the States may be
two thousand. Their personal influence will, therefore, be
proportionably more extensive than that of one or two hundred men in
Congress. The State establishments of civil and military officers of
every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible
correspondent establishments in the general government, will create such
an extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secure the
predilection and support of the people. Whenever, therefore, Congress
shall meditate any infringement of the State constitutions, the great
body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic
representatives. Can the general government withstand such an united
opposition? Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their
privileges? Will they suffer their Legislatures to be reduced to a
shadow and a name? The idea is shocking to common-sense.

From the circumstances already explained, and many others which might be
mentioned, results a complicated, irresistible check, which must ever
support the existence and importance of the State governments. The
danger, if any exists, flows from an opposite source. The probable evil
is, that the general government will be too dependent on the State
Legislatures, too much governed by their prejudices, and too obsequious
to their humors; that the States, with every power in their hands, will
make encroachments on the national authority, till the Union is weakened
and dissolved.

Every member must have been struck with an observation of a gentleman
from Albany. Do what you will, says he, local prejudices and opinions
will go into the government.

What! shall we then form a constitution to cherish and strengthen these
prejudices? Shall we confirm the distemper, instead of remedying it. It
is undeniable that there must be a control somewhere. Either the general
interest is to control the particular interests, or the contrary. If the
former, then certainly the government ought to be so framed, as to
render the power of control efficient to all intents and purposes; if
the latter, a striking absurdity follows; the controlling powers must be
as numerous as the varying interests, and the operations of the
government must therefore cease; for the moment you accommodate these
different interests, which is the only way to set the government in
motion, you establish a controlling power. Thus, whatever constitutional
provisions are made to the contrary, every government will be at last
driven to the necessity of subjecting the partial to the universal
interest. The gentlemen ought always, in their reasoning, to distinguish
between the real, genuine good of a State, and the opinions and
prejudices which may prevail respecting it; the latter may be opposed to
the general good, and consequently ought to be sacrificed; the former is
so involved in it, that it never can be sacrificed.

There are certain social principles in human nature from which we may
draw the most solid conclusions with respect to the conduct of
individuals and of communities. We love our families more than our
neighbors; we love our neighbors more than our countrymen in general.
The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as they
depart from the centre, and become languid in proportion to the
expansion of the circle on which they act. On these principles, the
attachment of the individual will be first and forever secured by the
State governments; they will be a mutual protection and support. Another
source of influence, which has already been pointed out, is the various
official connections in the States. Gentlemen endeavor to evade the
force of this by saying that these offices will be insignificant. This
is by no means true. The State officers will ever be important, because
they are necessary and useful. Their powers are such as are extremely
interesting to the people; such as affect their property, their liberty,
and life. What is more important than the administration of justice and
the execution of the civil and criminal laws? Can the State governments
become insignificant while they have the power of raising money
independently and without control? If they are really useful; if they
are calculated to promote the essential interests of the people; they
must have their confidence and support. The States can never lose their
powers till the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties.
These must go together; they must support each other, or meet one common
fate. On the gentleman's principle, we may safely trust the State
governments, though we have no means of resisting them; but we cannot
confide in the national government, though we have an effectual
constitutional guard against every encroachment. This is the essence of
their argument, and it is false and fallacious beyond conception.

With regard to the jurisdiction of the two governments, I shall
certainly admit that the Constitution ought to be so formed as not to
prevent the States from providing for their own existence; and I
maintain that it is so formed; and that their power of providing for
themselves is sufficiently established. This is conceded by one
gentleman, and in the next breath the concession is retracted. He says
Congress has but one exclusive right in taxation--that of duties on
imports; certainly, then, their other powers are only concurrent. But to
take off the force of this obvious conclusion, he immediately says that
the laws of the United States are supreme; and that where there is one
supreme there cannot be a concurrent authority; and further, that where
the laws of the Union are supreme, those of the States must be
subordinate; because there cannot be two supremes. This is curious
sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act together is false. They
are inconsistent only when they are aimed at each other or at one
indivisible object. The laws of the United States are supreme, as to all
their proper, constitutional objects; the laws of the States are supreme
in the same way. These supreme laws may act on different objects without
clashing; or they may operate on different parts of the same common
object with perfect harmony. Suppose both governments should lay a tax
of a penny on a certain article; has not each an independent and
uncontrollable power to collect its own tax? The meaning of the maxim,
there cannot be two supremes, is simply this--two powers cannot be
supreme over each other. This meaning is entirely perverted by the
gentlemen. But, it is said, disputes between collectors are to be
referred to the federal courts. This is again wandering in the field of
conjecture. But suppose the fact is certain; is it not to be presumed
that they will express the true meaning of the Constitution and the
laws? Will they not be bound to consider the concurrent jurisdiction; to
declare that both the taxes shall have equal operation; that both the
powers, in that respect, are sovereign and co-extensive? If they
transgress their duty, we are to hope that they will be punished. Sir,
we can reason from probabilities alone. When we leave common-sense, and
give ourselves up to conjecture, there can be no certainty, no security
in our reasonings.

I imagine I have stated to the committee abundant reasons to prove the
entire safety of the State governments and of the people. I would go
into a more minute consideration of the nature of the concurrent
jurisdiction, and the operation of the laws in relation to revenue; but
at present I feel too much indisposed to proceed. I shall, with leave of
the committee, improve another opportunity of expressing to them more
fully my ideas on this point. I wish the committee to remember that the
Constitution under examination is framed upon truly republican
principles; and that, as it is expressly designed to provide for the
common protection and the general welfare of the United States, it must
be utterly repugnant to this Constitution to subvert the State
governments or oppress the people.




JAMES MADISON,

OF VIRGINIA. (BORN 1751, DIED 1836.)


ON THE EXPEDIENCY OF ADOPTING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION--CONVENTION OF
VIRGINIA,

JUNE 6, 1788.


MR. CHAIRMAN:

In what I am about to offer to this assembly, I shall not attempt to
make impressions by any ardent professions of zeal for the public
welfare. We know that the principles of every man will be, and ought to
be, judged not by his professions and declarations, but by his conduct.
By that criterion, I wish, in common with every other member, to be
judged; and even though it should prove unfavorable to my reputation,
yet it is a criterion from which I by no means would depart, nor could
if I would. Comparisons have been made between the friends of this
constitution and those who oppose it. Although I disapprove of such
comparisons, I trust that in everything that regards truth, honor,
candor, and rectitude of motives, the friends of this system, here and
in other States, are not inferior to its opponents. But professions of
attachment to the public good, and comparisons of parties, at all times
invidious, ought not to govern or influence us now. We ought, sir, to
examine the Constitution exclusively on its own merits. We ought to
inquire whether it will promote the public happiness; and its aptitude
to produce that desirable object ought to be the exclusive subject of
our researches. In this pursuit, we ought to address our arguments not
to the feelings and passions, but to those understandings and judgments
which have been selected, by the people of this country, to decide that
great question by a calm and rational investigation. I hope that
gentlemen, in displaying their abilities on this occasion, will, instead
of giving opinions and making assertions, condescend to prove and
demonstrate, by fair and regular discussion. It gives me pain to hear
gentlemen continually distorting the natural construction of language.
Assuredly, it is sufficient if any human production can stand a fair
discussion. Before I proceed to make some additions to the reasons which
have been adduced by my honorable friend over the way, I must take the
liberty to make some observations on what was said by another gentleman
(Mr. Henry). He told us that this constitution ought to be rejected,
because, in his opinion, it endangered the public liberty in many
instances. Give me leave to make one answer to that observation--let the
dangers with which this system is supposed to be replete, be clearly
pointed out. If any dangerous and unnecessary powers be given to the
general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated, and let us not
rest satisfied with general assertions of dangers, without proof,
without examination. If powers be necessary, apparent danger is not a
sufficient reason against conceding them. He has suggested, that
licentiousness has seldom produced the loss of liberty; but that the
tyranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since the general
civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the
abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent
encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations;
but on a candid examination of history, we shall find that turbulence,
violence, and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the rights of
the minority, have produced factions and commotions which, in republics,
have, more frequently than any other cause, produced despotism. If we go
over the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find
their destruction to have generally resulted from those causes. If we
consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and go to the
sources of that diversity of sentiment which pervades its inhabitants,
we shall find great danger to fear that the same causes may terminate
here in the same fatal effects which they produced in those republics.
This danger ought to be wisely guarded against. In the progress of this
discussion, it will perhaps appear, that the only possible remedy for
those evils, and the only certain means of preserving and protecting the
principles of republicanism, will be found in that very system which is
now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression. I must confess that I
have not been able to find his usual consistency in the gentleman's
arguments on this occasion. He informs us that the people of this
country are at perfect repose; that every man enjoys the fruits of his
labor peaceably and securely, and that everything is in perfect
tranquillity and safety. I wish sincerely, sir, this were true. But if
this be really their situation, why has every State acknowledged the
contrary? Why were deputies from all the States sent to the general
convention? Why have complaints of national and individual distresses
been echoed and re-echoed throughout the continent? Why has our general
government been so shamefully disgraced, and our Constitution violated?
Wherefore have laws been made to authorize a change, and wherefore are
we now assembled here? A federal government is formed for the protection
of its individual members. Ours was itself attacked with impunity. Its
authority has been boldly disobeyed and openly despised. I think I
perceive a glaring inconsistency in another of his arguments. He
complains of this Constitution, because it requires the consent of at
least three fourths of the States to introduce amendments which shall be
necessary for the happiness of the people. The assent of so many, he
considers as too great an obstacle to the admission of salutary
amendments, which he strongly insists ought to be at the will of a bare
majority, and we hear this argument at the very moment we are called
upon to assign reasons for proposing a Constitution which puts it in the
power of nine States to abolish the present inadequate, unsafe, and
pernicious confederation! In the first case, he asserts that a majority
ought to have the power of altering the government, when found to be
inadequate to the security of public happiness. In the last case, he
affirms that even three fourths of the community have not a right to
alter a government which experience has proved to be subversive of
national felicity; nay, that the most necessary and urgent alterations
cannot be made without the absolute unanimity of all the States. Does
not the thirteenth article of the confederation expressly require, that
no alteration shall be made without the unanimous consent of all the
States? Can any thing in theory be more perniciously improvident and
injudicious than this submission of the will of the majority to the most
trifling minority? Have not experience and practice actually manifested
this theoretical inconvenience to be extremely impolitic? Let me mention
one fact, which I conceive must carry conviction to the mind of any
one,--the smallest State in the Union has obstructed every attempt to
reform the government; that little member has repeatedly disobeyed and
counteracted the general authority; nay, has even supplied the enemies
of its country with provisions. Twelve States had agreed to certain
improvements which were proposed, being thought absolutely necessary to
preserve the existence of the general government; but as these
improvements, though really indispensable, could not, by the
confederation, be introduced into it without the consent of every State,
the refractory dissent of that little State prevented their adoption.
The inconveniences resulting from this requisition of unanimous
concurrence in alterations of the confederation, must be known to every
member in this convention; it is therefore needless to remind them of
them. Is it not self-evident, that a trifling minority ought not to bind
the majority? Would not foreign influence be exerted with facility over
a small minority? Would the honorable gentleman agree to continue the
most radical defects in the old system, because the petty State of Rhode
Island would not agree to remove them?

He next objects to the exclusive legislation over the district where the
seat of the government may be fixed. Would he submit that the
representatives of this State should carry on their deliberations under
the control of any one member of the Union? If any State had the power
of legislation over the place where Congress should fix the general
government, it would impair the dignity and hazard the safety of
Congress. If the safety of the Union were under the control of any
particular State, would not foreign corruption probably prevail in such
a State, to induce it to exert its controlling influence over the
members of the general government? Gentlemen cannot have forgotten the
disgraceful insult which Congress received some years ago. And, sir,
when we also reflect, that the previous cession of particular States is
necessary, before Congress can legislate exclusively anywhere, we must,
instead of being alarmed at this part, heartily approve of it.

But the honorable member sees great danger in the provision concerning
the militia. Now, sir, this I conceive to be an additional security to
our liberties, without diminishing the power of the States in any
considerable degree; it appears to me so highly expedient, that I should
imagine it would have found advocates even in the warmest friends of the
present system. The authority of training the militia and appointing the
officers is reserved to the States. But Congress ought to have the power
of establishing a uniform system of discipline throughout the States;
and to provide for the execution of the laws, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions. These are the only cases wherein they can interfere
with the militia; and the obvious necessity of their having power over
them in these cases must flash conviction on any reflecting mind.
Without uniformity of discipline, military bodies would be incapable of
action; without a general controlling power to call forth the strength
of the Union, for the purpose of repelling invasions, the country might
be overrun and conquered by foreign enemies. Without such a power to
suppress insurrections, our liberties might be destroyed by intestine
faction, and domestic tyranny be established.

Give me leave to say something of the nature of the government, and to
show that it is perfectly safe and just to vest it with the power of
taxation. There are a number of opinions; but the principal question is,
whether it be a federal or a consolidated government. In order to judge
properly of the question before us, we must consider it minutely, in its
principal parts. I myself conceive that it is of a mixed nature; it is,
in a manner, unprecedented. We cannot find one express prototype in the
experience of the world: it stands by itself. In some respects, it is a
government of a federal nature; in others, it is of a consolidated
nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which the Constitution is
investigated, ratified, and made the act of the people of America, I can
say, notwithstanding what the honorable gentleman has alleged, that this
government is not completely consolidated; nor is it entirely federal.
Who are the parties to it? The people--not the people as composing one
great body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties. Were it,
as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a
majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as
a majority have adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound
by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it. Were
it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the
people of this State, without having had the privilege of deliberating
upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own
consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a government
established by the thirteen States of America, not through the
intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this
particular respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed
governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from
the dependent, derivative authority of the legislatures of the States;
whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we
look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same
idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system, a majority of the
States cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the States required for
that purpose; three fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this
there is a departure from the federal idea. The members to the national
House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in
proportion to the numbers in the respective districts. When we come to
the Senate, its members are elected by the States in their equal and
political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated,
the Senate would have been chosen by the people, in their individual
capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house. Thus it
is of complicated nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found
to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere
confederacy. If Virginia were separated from all the States, her power
and authority would extend to all cases; in like manner, were all powers
vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government;
but the powers of the federal government are enumerated; it can only
operate in certain cases: it has legislative powers on defined and
limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.

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