A Portraiture of Quakerism, Volume III (of 3) by Thomas Clarkson

T >> Thomas Clarkson >> A Portraiture of Quakerism, Volume III (of 3)

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It has been an established rule with the Quakers, from the formation of
their society, not to temporize, or to violate their consciences, or, in
other words, not to do that which as a body of Christians they believe
to be wrong, though the usages of the world, or the government of the
country under which they live, should require it, but rather to submit
to the frowns and indignation of the one, and the legal penalties
annexed to their disobedience by the other. This suffering in preference
of the violation of their consciences, is what the Quakers call "the
bearing of their testimony," or a demonstration to the world, by the
"testimony of their own example," that they consider it to be the duty
of Christians rather to suffer, than to have any concern with that which
they conceive to be evil.

The Quakers, in putting this principle into practice, stand, I believe,
alone. For I know of no other Christians, who as a body[34] pay this
homage to their scruples, or who determine upon an ordeal of suffering
in preference of a compromise with their ease and safety.

[Footnote 34: The Moravians, I believe, protest against war upon
scriptural grounds. But how far in this, or in any other case, they bear
a testimony, like the Quakers, by suffering, I do not know.]

The subjects, in which this trait is conspicuous, are of two kinds,
first as they relate to things enjoined by the government, and secondly
as they relate to things enjoined by the customs or fashions of the
world.

In the first case there was formerly much more suffering than there is
at present, though the Quakers still refuse a compliance with as many
injunctions of the law as they did in their early times.

It has been already stated that they refused, from the very institution
of their society, to take a civil oath. The sufferings, which they
underwent in consequence, have been explained also. But happily, by the
indulgence of the legislature, they are no longer persecuted for this
scruple, though they still persevere in it, their affirmation having
been made equal to an oath in civil cases.

It has been stated again, that they protested against the religious
observance of many of those days, which the government of the country
for various considerations had ordered to be kept as holy. In
consequence of this they were grievously oppressed in the early times of
their history. For when their shops were found open on Christmas day,
and on Good Friday, and on the different fast-days which had been
appointed, they were taken up and punished by the magistrates on the one
hand, and insulted and beaten by the people on the other. But,
notwithstanding this ill usage, they persevered as rigidly in the
non-observance of particular days and times, as in their non-compliance
with oaths, and they still persevere in it. It does not appear, however,
that their bearing of their testimony in this case is any longer a
source of much vexation or trouble to them: for though the government of
the country still sanctions the consecration of particular days, and,
the great majority of the people join in it, there seems, to have been a
progressive knowledge or civilization in both, which has occasioned them
to become tender on account of this singular deviation from their own
practice.

But though the Quakers have been thus relieved by the legislature, and
by the more mild and liberal disposition of the people, from so much
suffering in bearing their testimony on the two occasions which have
been mentioned, yet there are others, where the laws of government are
concerned, on which they find themselves involved in a struggle between
the violation of their consciences and a state of suffering, and where
unfortunately there is no remedy at hand, without the manifestation of
greater partiality towards them, than it may be supposed an equal
administration of justice to all would warrant.

Hie first of these occasions is when military service, is enjoined. The
Quakers, when drawn for the militia, refuse either to serve, or to
furnish substitutes. For this refusal they come under the cognizance of
the laws. Their property, where they have any, is of course distrained
upon, and a great part of a little substance is sometimes taken from
them on, this account. Where they have not distrainable property, which
is occasionally the case, they never fly, but submit to the known
punishment, and go patiently to prison. The legislature, however, has
not been inattentive to the Quakers even upon this occasion; for it has
limited their confinement to three months. The government also of the
country afforded lately, in a case in which the Quakers were concerned,
an example of attention to religious scruples upon this subject. In the
late bill for arming the country _en masse_, both the Quakers and the
Moravians were exempted from military service. This homage to religious
principle did the authors of these exemptions the highest honour. And it
certainly becomes the Quakers to be grateful for this unsolicited
favour; and as it was bestowed upon them upon the full belief that they
were the people they professed themselves, they should be particularly
careful that they do not, by any inconsistency of conduct, tarnish the
high reputation, which has been attached to them by the government under
which they live.

The second occasion is, when tithes or other dues are demanded by the
church. The Quakers refuse the payment of these upon principles, which
have been already explained. They come of course again under the
cognizance of the laws. Their property is annually distrained upon by
warrant from justices of the peace, where the demand does not exceed the
value of ten pounds, and this is their usual suffering in this case. But
there have not been wanting instances where an unusual hardness, of
heart has suggested a process, still allowable by the law, which has
deprived them of all their property, and consigned them for life to the
habitation of a prison.[35]

[Footnote 35: One died, not a great while ago, in York Castle, and
others, who were confined with him, would have shared his fate, but for
the interference of the king.

It is surprising, that the clergy should not unite in promoting a bill
in parliament, to extend the authority of the justices to grant warrants
of distraint for tithes to more than the value of ten pounds, and to any
amount, as this is the most cheap and expeditious way for themselves. If
they apply to the ecclesiastical courts, they can enforce no payment of
their tithes then. They can put the poor Quaker into prison, but they
cannot obtain their debt. If they apply to the exchequer, they may find
themselves, at the conclusion of their suit, and this after a delay of
three years, liable to the payment of extra costs, to the amount of
forty or fifty pounds, with which they cannot charge the Quaker, though
they may confine him for life. Some, to my knowledge, have been glad to
abandon these suits, and put up with the costs, incurred in them; rather
than continue them. Recourse to such courts occasion the clergy
frequently to be charged with cruelty, when, if they had only understood
their own interests better, they would have avoided them.]

But it is not only in cases, of which the laws of the land take
cognizance, that the Quakers prefer suffering to doing that which their
consciences disapprove. There are other cases, connected, as I observed
before, with the opinion of the world, where they exhibit a similar
example. If they believe any custom or fashion of the world to be evil
in itself, or to be attended with evil, neither popular applause nor
popular fury can make them follow it, but they think it right to bear
their testimony against it by its disuse, and to run the hazard of all
the ridicule, censure, or persecution, which may await them for so
doing.

In these cases, as in the former, it must be observed, that the
sufferings of the Quakers have been much diminished, though they still
refuse a compliance in as many instances as formerly, with the fashions
of the world.

It was stated in the first volume, that they substituted the word Thou
for You, in order that they might avoid by their words, as well as by
their actions, any appearance of flattery to men. It was stated also,
that they suffered on this account; that many magistrates, before whom
they were carried in the early times of their institution, occasioned
their punishment to be more severe, and that they were often abused and
beaten by others, and put in danger of their lives. This persecution,
however, for this singularity in their language, has long ceased; and
the substitution of Thou for You is now only considered as an innocent
distinction between Quakers and other people.

It was stated again in the same volume, that the Quakers abstained from
the usual address of the world, such as from pulling off their hats, and
from bowing the body, and from their ceremonious usages. It was
explained also, that they did this upon two principles. First, because,
as such ceremonies were no real marks of obeisance, friendship or
respect, they ought to be discouraged by a people, whose religion
required that no image should be held out, which was not a faithful
picture of its original, and that no action should be resorted to, which
was not correspondent with the feelings of the heart. Secondly, because
all such ceremonies were of a complimentary or flattering nature, and
were expressly forbidden by Jesus Christ. It was stated also, that, on
account of their rejection of such outward usages, their hats were
forcibly taken from their heads and thrown away; that they were beaten
and imprisoned on this sole account; and that the world refused to deal
with them as tradesmen, in consequence of which many could scarcely
supply their families with bread. But this deviation from the general
practice, though it still characterizes the members of this society, is
no longer a source of suffering. Magistrates sometimes take care that
their hats shall be taken gently from their heads on public occasions,
and private persons expect now no such homage from Quakers, when they
meet them.

There is, however, a custom, against which the Quakers anciently bore
their testimony, and against which they continue to bear it, which
subjects them occasionally to considerable inconvenience and loss. In
the case of a general illumination, they never light up their houses,
but have the courage to be singular in this respect, whatever may be the
temper of the mob.

They believe that the practice of general illuminations cannot be
adopted consistently by persons, who are lovers of the truth. They
consider it as no certain criterion of joy. For, in the first place, how
many light up their houses, whose hearts are overwhelmed with sorrow?
And, in the second place, the event which is celebrated, may not always
be a matter of joy to good minds. The birth-day of a prince, for
example, may be ushered in as welcome, and the celebration of it may
call his actions to mind, upon which a reflection may produce pleasure,
but the celebration of the slaughter or devastation of mankind can
afford no happiness to the Christian.

They consider the practice again, accompanied as it is with all its
fiery instruments, as dangerous and cruel. For how many accidents have
happened, and how many lives have been lost upon such occasions?

They consider it again as replete with evil. The wild uproar which it
creates, the mad and riotous joy which it produces, the licentiousness
which it favours, the invidious comparisons which it occasions, the
partial favour which it fixes on individuals who have probably no moral
merit, the false joys which it holds out, and the enmity which it has on
some occasions a tendency to perpetuate; are so many additional
arguments against it in the opinion of the Quakers.

For these and other reasons they choose not to submit to the custom, but
to bear their testimony against it, and to run the hazard of having
their windows broken, or their houses pillaged, as the populace may
dictate: And in the same manner, if there be any other practice, in
which the world may expect them to coincide, they reject it, fearless of
the consequences, if they believe it to be productive of evil.

This noble practice of bearing testimony, by which a few individuals
attempt to stem the torrent of immorality by opposing themselves to its
stream, and which may be considered as a living martyrdom, does, in a
moral point of view, a great deal of good to those, who conscientiously
adopt it. It recalls first principles to their minds. It keeps in their
remembrance the religious rights of man. It teaches them to reason upon
principle, and to make their estimates by a moral standard. It is
productive both of patience and of courage. It occasions them to be kind
and attentive, and merciful to those who are persecuted and oppressed.
It throws them into the presence of the Divinity when they are
persecuted themselves. In short, it warms their moral feelings, and
elevates their religious thoughts. Like oil, it keeps them from rusting.
Like a whetstone, it gives them a new edge. Take away this practice from
the constitution of the Quakers, and you pull down a considerable
support of their moral character. It is a great pity that, as professing
Christians, we should not, more of us, incorporate this noble principle
individually into our religion. We concur unquestionably in customs,
through the fear of being reputed singular, of which our hearts do not
always approve, though nothing is more true, than that a Christian is
expected to be singular with respect to the corruptions of the world.
What an immensity of good would be done, if cases of persons, choosing
rather to suffer than to temporize, were so numerous as to attract the
general notice of men! Would not every case of suffering operate as one
of the most forcible lessons that could be given to those who should see
it? And how long would that infamous system have to live, which makes a
distinction between political expediency and moral right?

CHAP. VI.

_A fourth trait is, that, in political affairs, they reason upon
principle, and not from consequences--This mode of reasoning insures the
adoption of the maxim of not doing evil that good may come--Had Quakers
been legislators, many public evils had been avoided, which are now
known in the world--Existence of this trait probable from the influence
of the former trait--and from the influence of the peculiar customs of
the Quakers--and from the influence of their system of discipline upon
their minds._

The next trait, which I shall lay open to the world as belonging to the
Quaker character, is, that in all those cases, which may be called
political, the Quakers generally reason upon principle, and but seldom
upon consequences.

I do not know of any trait, which ever impressed me more than this in
all my intercourse with the members of this society. It was one of those
which obtruded itself to my notice on my first acquaintance with them,
and it has continued equally conspicuous to the present time.

If an impartial philosopher, from some unknown land, and to whom our
manners, and opinions, and history, were unknown, were introduced
suddenly into our metropolis, and were to converse with the Quakers
there on a given political subject, and to be directly afterwards
conveyed to the west end of the town, and there to converse with
politicians, or men of fashion, or men of the world, upon the same, he
could not fail to be greatly surprised. If he thought the former wise,
or virtuous, or great, he would unavoidably consider the latter as
foolish, or vicious, or little. Two such opposite conclusions, as he
would hear deduced from the reasonings of each, would impress him with
an idea, that he had been taken to a country inhabited by two different
races of men. He would never conceive, that they had been educated in
the same country, or under the same government. If left to himself, he
would probably imagine, that they had embraced two different religions.
But if he were told that they professed the same, he would then say,
that the precepts of this religion had been expressed in such doubtful
language, that they led to two sets of principles contradictory to one
another. I need scarcely inform the reader, that I allude to the two
opposite conclusions, which will almost always be drawn, where men
reason from motives of policy or from moral right.

If it be true that the Quakers reason upon principle in political
affairs, and not upon consequences, it will follow as a direct
inference, that they will adopt the Christian maxim, that men ought not
to do evil that good may come. And this is indeed the maxim, which you
find them adopting in the course of their conversation on such subjects,
and which I believe they would have uniformly adopted, if they had been
placed in political situations in life. Had the Quakers been the
legislators of the world, we should never have seen many of the public
evils that have appeared in it. It was thought formerly, for example, a
glorious thing to attempt to drive Paganism from the Holy Land, but
Quakers would never have joined in any of the crusades for its
expulsion. It has been long esteemed, again, a desideratum in politics,
that among nations, differing in strength and resources, a kind of
balance of power should be kept up, but Quakers would never have engaged
in any one war to preserve it. It has been thought again, that it would
contribute to the happiness of the natives of India, if the blessings of
the British constitution could be given them instead of their own. But
Quakers would never have taken possession of their territories for, the
accomplishment of such a good. It has been long thought again a matter
of great political importance, that our West-Indian settlements should
be cultivated by African labourers. But Quakers would never have
allowed a slave-trade for such a purpose. It has been thought again, and
it is still thought, a desirable thing, that our property should be
secured from the petty depredations of individuals. But Quakers would
never have consented to capital punishments for such an end. In short,
few public evils would have arisen among mankind, if statesmen had
adopted the system, upon which the Quakers reason in political affairs,
or if they had concurred with an ancient Grecian philosopher in
condemning to detestation the memory of the man, who first made a
distinction between expediency and moral right.

[36]That this trait of reasoning upon principle, regardless of the
consequences, is likely to be a feature in the character of the Quakers,
we are warranted in pronouncing, when we discover no less than three
circumstances in the constitution of the Quakers, which may be causes in
producing it.

[Footnote 36: The Sierra Leone Company, which was founded for laudable
purposes, ought have been filled by Quakers; but when they understood
that there was to be a fort and depot of arms in the settlement, they
declined becoming proprietors.]

This trait seems, in the first place, to be the direct and legitimate
offspring of the trait explained in the last chapter. For every time a
Quaker is called upon to bear his testimony by suffering, whether in the
case of a refusal to comply with the laws, or with the customs and
fashions of the land, he is called upon to refer to his own conscience,
against his own temporal interest, and against the opinion of the world.
The moment he gives up principle for policy in the course of his
reasoning upon such occasions, then he does as many others do, that is,
he submits to the less inconvenience, and then he ceases to be a Quaker.
But while he continues to bear his testimony, it is a proof that he
makes expediency give way to what he imagines to be right. The bearing
therefore of testimony, where it is conscientiously done, is the parent,
as it is also the bulwark and guardian of reasoning upon principle. It
throws out a memento whenever it is practised, and habituates the
subject of it to reason in this manner. But this trait is nourished and
supported again by other causes, and first by the influence, which the
peculiar customs of the Quakers must occasionally have upon their minds.
A Quaker cannot go out of doors, but he is reminded of his own
singularity, or of his difference in a variety of respects from his
fellow-citizens. Now every custom, in which he is singular, whether it
be that of dress or of language, or of address, or any other, is
founded, in his own mind, on moral principle, and in direct opposition
to popular opinion and applause. He is therefore perpetually reminded,
in almost all his daily habits, of the two opposite systems of
reasoning, and is perpetually called upon as it were to refer to the
principles, which originally made the difference between him and another
citizen of the world.

Neither has the discipline of the Quakers a less tendency to the
production of the trait in question. For the business, which is
transacted in the monthly and quarterly and yearly meetings, is
transacted under the deliberations of grave and serious men, who
consider themselves as frequently under the divine influence, or as
spiritually guided on such occasions. In such assemblies it would be
thought strange if any sentiment were uttered, which savoured of
expediency in opposition to moral right. The youth therefore, who are
present, see no other determination of any question than by a religious
standard. Hence these meetings operate as schools, in which they are
habituated to reason upon principle, and to the exclusion of all worldly
considerations, which may suggest themselves in the discussion of any
point.

CHAP. VII.

_A fifth trait is, that they have an extraordinary independence of
mind--This probable, because the result of the farmer trait--because
likely to be produced by their discipline--by their peculiar custom--and
by their opinions on the supposed dignity of situations in life--because
again, they are not vulnerable by the seduction of governments--or by
the dominion of the church--or by the power of fashion and of the
opinion of the world._

The next trait, conspicuous in the character of the Quakers, and which
is nearly allied to the former, is that of independence of mind.

This trait is of long standing, having been coeval with the society
itself. It was observed by Cromwell, that "he could neither win the
Quakers by money, nor by honours, nor by places, as he could other
people." A similar opinion is entertained of them at the present day.
For of all people it is generally supposed that they are the least
easily worked upon, or the least liable to be made tools or instruments
in the bands of others. Who, for example, could say, on any
electioneering occasion, whatever his riches might be, that he could
command their votes?

There will be no difficulty in believing this to be a real feature in
the character of the Quakers. For when men are accustomed to refer
matters to their reason, and to reason upon principle, they will always
have an independence of mind, from a belief that they are right. And
wherever it be a maxim with them not to do evil that good may come, they
will have a similar independence from a consciousness, that they have
never put themselves into the power of the world. Hence this
independence of mind must be a result of the trait explained in the
former chapter.

But in looking into the constitution of the Quakers, we shall find it
full of materials for the production of this noble trait.

Their discipline has an immediate tendency to produce it. For in no
community does a man feel himself so independent as a man. A Quaker is
called upon in his own society to the discharge of important offices. He
sits as a representative, a legislator, and a judge. In looking round
him, he finds all equal in privileges, but none superior, to himself.

Their peculiar customs have the same tendency, for they teach them to
value others, who are not of the society, by no higher standard than
that by which they estimate themselves. They neither pull off their
hats, nor bow, nor scrape. In their speech they abstain from the use of
flattering words and of titles. In their letters, they never subscribe
themselves the humble servants of any one. They never use, in short, any
action or signature, which, serving as a mark of elevation to others,
has any influence towards the degradation of themselves.

Their opinions also upon the supposed dignity of situations in life
contribute towards the promotion of this independence of their minds.

They value no man, in the first place, on account of his earthly title.
They pay respect to magistrates, and to all the nobility of the land, in
their capacity of legislators, whom the chief magistrate has appointed;
but they believe that the mere letters in a schedule of parchment can
give no more intrinsic worth to a person, than they possess themselves,
and they think with Juvenal, that "the only true nobility is virtue."
Hence titles, in the glare of which some people lose the dignity of
their vision, have no magical effect upon Quakers.

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