A Portraiture of Quakerism, Volume III (of 3) by Thomas Clarkson

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CHAP. V.

_Education continued, as consisting of knowledge and prohibitions--Good,
which the Quakers have done by prohibitions, without any considerable
knowledge--Greater good, which they would do with it--Knowledge then a
great desideratum in the Quaker education--Favourable state of the
society for the communication of it with purity, or without detriment to
morals--In what this knowledge should consist--General advantages of
it--Peculiar advantages, which it would bring to the society._

When we consider that men have all the same moral nature, we wonder, at
the first sight, at the great difference of conduct which they exhibit
upon earth. But when we consider the power of education upon the mind,
we seem to lose our surprize. If men in all countries were educated
alike, we should find a greater resemblance in their character. It is,
in short, education, which makes the man. And as education appears to me
to be of so much importance in life, I shall make it the subject of this
and the succeeding chapter.

All education should have two objects in view, the opening of the
understanding and the improvement of the heart. Of the two, the latter
is most important. There cannot be a question, whether the person of the
most desirable character be the virtuous or the learned man. Without
virtue knowledge loses half its value. Wisdom, without virtue, may be
said to be merely political; and such wisdom, whenever it belongs to a
man, is little better than the cunning or craftiness of a fox. A man of
a cultivated mind, without an unshaken love of virtue, is but a dwarf of
a man. His food has done him no good, as it has not contributed to his
growth. And it would have been better, for the honour of literature, if
he had never been educated at all. The talents of man, indeed,
considering him as a moral being, ought always to be subservient to
religion. "All philosophy, says the learned Cudworth, to a wise man, to
a truly sanctified mind, as he in Plutarch speaketh, is but matter for
divinity to work upon. Religion is the queen of all those inward
endowments of the soul: and all pure natural knowledge, all virgin and
undeflowered arts and sciences, are her handmaids, that rise up and call
her blessed."

Now if the opening of the understanding, and the improvement of the
heart, be the great objects to be attained, it will follow, that both
knowledge and wise prohibitions should always be component parts of the
education of youth. The latter the Quakers have adopted ever since the
institution of their society. The former they have been generally
backward to promote, at least to any considerable extent. That they have
done good, however, by their prohibitions, though unaccompanied by any
considerable knowledge, it would be disingenuous not to acknowledge. But
this goad has been chiefly confined to the children of those who have
occupied middle stations in the society. Such children have undoubtedly
arrived at the true wisdom of life at an early age, as I described in
the first volume, and have done honour to the religion they professed.
But prohibitions, without knowledge, have not been found to answer so
well among the children of those who have had the prospect of a large
moneyed independence before them, and who have not been afraid either of
the bad opinion of their own society, or of the bad opinion of the
world. It has been shewn, however, that knowledge with prohibitions
would, in all probability, be useful to these; that it would have a
tendency to enable them, in the perilous situation in which they are
placed, to stand against the corrupt opinions and fashions, and while
they were living in the world, to live out of it, or to deny it.

Peculiarly situated as the Quakers are, they have opportunities, beyond
any other people, of ingrafting knowledge into their system of education
without danger, or, in other words, of giving knowledge to their
children with the purity which Christianity would prescribe. The great
misfortune in the world is, that a learned education is frequently
thought more of than a virtuous one; that youth, while they are
obtaining knowledge, are not properly watched and checked; and that they
are suffered to roam at large in the pursuit of science, and to
cultivate or not, at their own option, the science, if I may so call it,
of religion. Hence it will happen, that, where we see learned men, we
shall not always see these of the most exemplary character. But the
Quakers have long ago adopted a system of prohibitions, as so many
barriers against vice, or preservatives of virtue. Their constitution
forbids all indulgences that appear unfriendly to morals. The Quakers
therefore, while they retain the prohibitions which belong to their
constitution, may give encouragement to knowledge, without a fear that
it will be converted to the purposes of vice.

The Quakers, again, have opportunities or advantages, which others have
not, in another point of view. In the great public seminary at Ackworth,
which belongs to them, and which is principally for those who are of the
poor and middle classes, every thing is under the inspection and
guidance of committees, which can watch and enforce an observance of any
rules that may be prescribed. Why then, if public seminaries were
instituted for the reception of the children of the rich, or if the rich
were to give encouragement to large private seminaries for the same
purposes, should they not be placed under the visiting discipline of the
society? Why should they not be placed under the care of committees
also? Why should not these committees see that the two great objects of
the education proposed were going on at the same time, or that, while
knowledge was obtaining, discipline had not been relaxed. Why should not
such seminaries produce future Penns, and Barclays, and others, who,
while they were men capable of deep literary researches, should be
exemplary for their virtue?

As knowledge then ought to form a part of the proposed education, on a
much larger scale than has been hitherto encouraged, I shall say a few
words as to the component parts of it, and as to the general advantages
of these, and I shall afterwards speak to the advantages which the
society in particular would derive from such a change.

In the education I propose, I do not mean, in the slightest manner, to
break in upon the moral system of the Quakers, as described in the first
volume. I do not propose to them the polite arts. I do not recommend
them to make children musicians, or that they should learn, under the
dancing-master, to step gracefully. I advise only such knowledge as will
be strictly innocent and useful.

In the first place, I recommend a better classical education. Classical
knowledge gives the foundation both of particular and universal grammar.
While it gives the acquisition of the dead languages, it is the root,
and thereforce facilitates the acquisition of many of the living. As
most of the technical terms in the professions and sciences are borrowed
from these languages, it renders them easily understood. The study of
the structure and combination of words and sentences calls forth the
reflecting powers of youth, and expands their genius. It leads to
penetration and judgement. It induces habits of diligence and patience.
By means of this knowledge we have access to the sacred writings in the
languages in which they were written, and we are therefore not liable to
be imposed upon, for the sense of them, by others. We become acquainted
also, by means of it, with the sentiments and knowledge of the ancients.
We see their thoughts and expressions. We acquire a literary taste.

A knowledge of ancient history is necessarily conpected with the former.
To this, however, should be added that of the modern. History, while it
entertains us, instructs us morally. We cannot see the rise and fall of
empires, or the causes of their formation and dissolution, or read the
histories of good and bad men, without impressions of moral importance
to ourselves.

A philosophical education is peculiarly important. By this I mean, a
general knowledge of the mathematics, of mechanics, optics,
hydrostatics, astronomy, chemistry, botany, and the like. The teaching
of these should be accompanied by experiments. Experimental philosophy,
as I observed before, is peculiarly interesting to youth. Such knowledge
teaches us the causes of things. Mysteries, hitherto hidden both in the
garden and in the field, and in the heaven and in the air, lie unfolded
to our view. Every walk we take, while the surface of the earth remains
as it is, and the canopy of the firmament is spread over us, gives its
the opportunity, in all the innumerable objects presented to our view,
of almost endless investigation and delight. And the deeper we go into
the hidden things of nature, and the more we unfold them, have we not a
better belief of the existence of the Creator, and grander notions of
the symmetry, order, beauty, and wisdom of his works? Such knowledge
leads also, as it has always done, to discoveries, by which we may make
ourselves useful to mankind. And, besides the utility, of which it may
make us capable, can discoveries of the principles of nature lessen oar
love and admiration of the first great Cause?

To philosophical knowledge should be added general reading. Such reading
should be of the purest kind. Of knowledge, acquired in this manner, it
maybe said, that it opens new sources of right views and sentiments, and
this even independently of Christianity, from which our most valuable
information is derived. Thus at a time, when as a nation we professed to
be Christians, we shed the blood of the martyrs. Thus when even such men
as the great Sir Matthew Hale, one of the brightest Christian patterns
in our country, were at the head of it, we condemned persons to death
for witchcraft. But knowledge superior to that of those times, has
taught us better things. By means of it we perceive, that persecution
does not destroy, but that it propagates opinions, and that the belief
of the existence of witchcraft is absurd.

These then appear to me to be the general advantages, or such as are
inseparable from education when composed of the various branches of
knowledge which have been described. I shall now endeavour to shew the
peculiar advantages, which the Quakers would derive from it.

It will appear then, if we look back into the character of the Quakers,
as described in this volume, that the world charges them, I mean the
more affluent part of them, with having less learning, than others in a
similar rank of life. But surely the education I propose would remove
this intellectual defect.

The world again, as we have seen, has fixed another intellectual blemish
upon them by the imputation of superstition. But how does superstition
enter, but where there is a want of knowledge? Does not all history bear
testimony, that in proportion as men have been more or less enlightened,
they have been less or more liable to this charge? It is knowledge then,
which must banish this frightful companion of the mind. Wherever
individuals acknowledge, in a more extensive degree than others, the
influence of the Divine Spirit in man, these, of all other people, will
find the advantages of it. Knowledge leads to a solution of things, as
they are connected with philosophy, or the theory of the human mind. It
enables men to know their first and their second causes, so as to
distinguish between causes and occasions. It fixes the nature of action
and of thought; and, by referring effects to their causes, it often
enables men to draw the line between the probability of fancy and
inspiration. How many good men are there, who, adopting a similar creed
with that of the Quakers on this subject, make themselves uneasy, by
bringing down the Divine Being, promiscuously and without due
discrimination, into the varied concerns of their lives? How many are
there, who attribute to him that which is easily explained by the
knowledge of common causes? Thus, for instance, there are appearances in
nature, which a person of an uninformed mind, but who should adopt the
doctrine of the influence of the Spirit, would place among signs, and
wonders, and divine notices, which others, acquainted with the
philosophy of nature, would almost instantly solve. Thus again there may
be occasions, which persons, carrying the same doctrine to an undue
extent, might interpret into warning or prophetic voices, but which a
due exercise of the intellect, where such exercise has been properly
encouraged, would easily explain. This reminds me of a singular
occurrence: A friend of mine was lately walking in a beautiful vale. In
approaching a slate-quarry he heard an explosion, and a mass of stone,
which had been severed by gunpowder, fell near him as he walked along.
He went immediately to the persons employed. He represented the
impropriety of their conduct in not having given proper notice to such
as were passing by, and concluded by declaring emphatically, that they
themselves would be soon destroyed. It happened, but six weeks
afterwards, that two of these men were blown to pieces. The words then
of my friend were verified. Now I have no doubt that ignorant persons,
in the habit of referring every thing promiscuously to the Divine
interference, would consider my friend as a prophet, and his words as a
divinely forewarning voice. But what did my friend mean? or where did he
get his foresight on this occasion? The answer is, that my friend, being
accustomed to the exercise of his rational faculties, concluded, that if
the people in question were so careless with respect to those who should
be passing by in such times of danger, they would by custom become
careless with respect to themselves, and that ultimately some mischief
would befal them. It is knowledge, then, acquired by a due exercise of
the intellectual powers, and through the course of an enlightened
education, which will give men just views of the causes and effects of
things, and which, while it teaches them to discover and acknowledge the
Divine Being in all his wondrous works, and properly to distinguish him
in his providences, preserves them from the miseries of superstition.

The world again has fixed the moral blemish of the money-getting, spirit
upon the Quaker character. But knowledge would step in here also as a
considerable corrector of the evil. It would shew, that there were other
objects besides money, which were worthy of pursuit. Nor would it point
out only new objects, but it would make a scale of their comparative
importance. It would fix intellectual attachments, next to religion, in
the highest class. Thus money would sink in importance as a pursuit, or
be valued only as it was the means of comfort to those who had it, or of
communicating comfort to others. Knowledge also would be useful in
taking off, to a certain degree, the corruptive effects of this spirit,
for it would prevent it by the more liberal notions it would introduce,
from leaving the whole of its dregs of pollution upon the mind.

The Quakers again, as we have seen, have been charged with a want of
animation, from whence an unjust inference has been drawn of the
coldness of their hearts. But knowledge would diminish this appearance.
For, in the first place, it would enlarge the powers, and vary the
topics of conversation. It would enliven the speaker. It would give him
animation in discourse. Animation again would produce a greater
appearance of energy, and energy of the warmth of life. And there are
few people, whatever might be the outward cold appearance of the person
with whom they conversed, whose prejudices would not die away, if they
found a cheerful and an agreeable companion.

Another charge against the Quakers was obstinacy. This was shewn to be
unjust. The trait, in this case, should rather have been put down as
virtue. Knowledge, however, would even operate here as a partial remedy.
For while the Quakers are esteemed deficient in literature, their
opposition to the customs of the world, will always be characterized as
folly. But if they were to bear in the minds of their countrymen a
different estimation as to intellectual attainments, the trait might be
spoken of under another name. For persons are not apt to impute
obstinacy to the actions of those, however singular, whom they believe
to have paid a due attention to the cultivation of their minds.

It is not necessary to bring to recollection the other traits that were
mentioned, to see the operation of a superior education upon these. It
must have already appeared, that, whatever may be the general
advantages of learning, they would be more than usually valuable to the
Quaker character.

CHAP. VI.

_Arguments of those of the society examined, who may depreciate human
knowledge--This depreciation did not originate with the first
Quakers--with Barclay--Penn--Ellwood--but arose afterwards--Reputed
disadvantages of a classical education--Its heathen mythology and
morality--Disadvantages of a philosophical one--Its scepticism--General
disadvantages of human learning--Inefficiency of all the arguments
advanced._

Having shewn the advantages, which generally accompany a superior
education, I shall exhibit the disadvantages which may be thought to
attend it, or I shall consider those arguments, which some persons of
this society, who have unfortunately depreciated human learning, though
with the best intentions, might use against it, if they were to see the
contents of the preceding chapter.

But, before I do this, I shall exonerate the first Quakers from the
charge of such a depreciation. These exhibited in their own persons the
practicability of the union of knowledge and virtue. While they were
eminent for their learning, they were distinguished for the piety of
their lives. They were indeed the friends of both. They did not
patronize the one to the prejudice and expulsion of the other.[53]

[Footnote 53: George Fox was certainly an exception to this as a
scholar. He was also not friendly to classical learning on account of
some of the indelicate passages contained in the classical authors,
which he and Farley and Stubbs, took some pains to cite, but, if these
had been removed, I believe his objections would have ceased.]

Barclay, in his celebrated apology, no where condemns the propriety or
usefulness of human learning, or denies it to be promotive of the
temporal comforts of man. He says that the knowledge of Latin, Greek and
Hebrew, or of logic and philosophy, or of ethics, or of physics and
metaphysics, is not necessary. But not necessary for what? Mark his own
meaning. Not necessary to make a minister of the Gospel. But where does
he say that knowledge, which he himself possessed to such a considerable
extent, was not necessary, or that it did not contribute to the innocent
pleasures of life? What would have been the character of his own book,
or what would have been its comparative value and usefulness, if he had
not been able to quote so many authors to his purpose in their original
texts, or to have detected so many classical errors, or to have
introduced such apposite history, or to have drawn up his propositions
with so much logical and mathematical clearness and precision, or if he
had not been among the first literary characters of his day?

William Penn was equally celebrated with Barclay as a scholar. His works
afford abundant proof of his erudition, or of the high cultivation of
his mind. Like the rest of his associates, he was no advocate for
learning, as a qualification for a minister of the Gospel, but he was
yet a friend to it, on the principle, that it enlarged the
understanding, and that it added to the innocent pleasures of the mind.
He entreated his wife, in the beautiful letter which he left her, before
he embarked on his first voyage to America, "not to be sparing of
expence in procuring learning for his children, for that by such
parsimony all was lost that was saved." And he recommended also in the
same letter the mathematical or philosophical education which I have
described.

Thomas Ellwood, a celebrated writer among the early Quakers, and the
friend of the great John Milton, was so sensible of the disadvantages
arising from a want of knowledge, that he revived his learning, with
great industry, even after he had become a Quaker. Let us hear the
account which he gives of himself in his own Journal. "I mentioned
before, says he, that, when I was a boy, I made some progress in
learning, and that I lost it all again before I came to be a man. Nor
was I slightly sensible of my last therein, till I came amongst the
Quakers. But then I both saw my loss, and lamented it; and applied
myself with the utmost diligence, at all leisure times to recover it. So
false I found that charge to be, which in those times was east as a
reproach upon the Quakers, that they despised and decried all human
learning, because they denied it to be essentially necessary to a Gospel
ministry, which was one of the controversies of those times."

"But though I toiled hard, and spared no pains to regain what I had once
been master of, yet I found it a matter of so great difficulty, that I
was ready to say, as the noble eunuch to Philip, in another case, how
can I, unless I had some man to guide me?"

"This I had formerly complained of to my especial friend Isaac
Pennington, but now more earnestly; which put him upon considering and
contriving a means for my assistance."

"He had an intimate acquaintance with Dr. Paget, a physician of note in
London, and he with John Milton, a gentleman of great note for learning,
throughout the learned world, for the accurate pieces he had Written on
various subjects and occasions."

"This person, having filled a public station in the former times, lived
now a private and retired life in London; and, having wholly lost his
sight, kept always a man to read to him, which usually was the son of
some gentleman of his acquaintance, whom in kindness he took to improve
in his learning."

"Thus by the mediation of my friend Isaac Pennington with Dr. Paget, and
of Dr. Paget with John Milton, was I admitted to come to him; not as a
servant to him (which at that time he needed not) nor to be in the house
with him; but only to have the liberty of coming to his house at certain
hours, when I would, and to read to him what books he should appoint me,
which was all the favour I desired."

By means of this extract, made from the life of Thomas Ellwood, we come
to three conclusions. First, that the early Quakers were generally men
of eminent learning. Secondly, that they did not decry or depreciate
human knowledge. And thirdly, that the calumny of such a depreciation by
them arose from the controversy which they thought it right to maintain,
in which they denied it to be necessary as a qualification for a Gospel
minister.

This latter conclusion brings me round again to the point. And here I
must observe, that, though this famous controversy occasioned the first
Quakers to be unduly blamed on account of such a depreciation, yet it
contributed to make some of their immediate successors, as I stated in a
former volume, justly chargeable with it. But whether this was or was
not the real cause, it is not material to the question. Many of the
society, from came cause or other, did undoubtedly, in the age
immediately succeeding that of their founders, begin to depreciate human
knowledge, the effects of which, though gradually dissipating, have not
been wholly done away at the present day. The disadvantages, therefore,
of human learning, or the arguments which would be advanced against it
by those who may undervalue it, I shall now consider.

These arguments may be divided into particular and general. On the
former I shall first speak.

A classical education is considered to be objectionable, first, on
account of the Heathen mythology that is necessarily connected with it.
Its tendency, as it relates to fabulous occurrences, is thought to be
unfavourable, as it may lead to a romantic propensity, and a turn for
fiction. But surely the meaning of such occurrences cannot be well
mistaken. If they are represented to our view in fable, they have had
their foundation in truth. Many of them again are of such importance,
that we could not wish to see them annihilated. Let us refer, for
example, to the story of Deucalion and Pyrrha. Is it not one among the
many outward confirmations of the truth of the history of Moses? Or do
we not trace in it additional proofs of the deluge, and of the renewal
of mankind?

Its tendency again, as it relates to the fabulous history of the Heathen
gods, their number, their offices, and their character, is considered as
degrading and exceptionable. I will concede this for a moment. But may
it not, on the other hand, be rendered instructive and useful? May not
the retention of such an history be accompanied with great moral
advantages to our children? The emperor Theodosius commanded the idol
temples to be destroyed. Instead of devoting them to the use of the
Christians of those times, by which they might have been preserved to
future generations, the most beautiful remains of antiquity were
reduced to ruins. But would it not have been better, if Theodosius had
brought good out of evil by retaining them? Would it not have been a
high moral gratification to those who knew the fact, that temples,
appropriated to the worship of idols, had been devoted to the service of
the only true God? Would it not have been a matter of joy to these to
have reflected upon the improving condition of mankind? And, while they
looked up to these beautiful structures of art, might not the sight of
them have contributed to the incitement of their virtue? If it be the
tendency of the corrupt part of our nature to render innocent things
vicious, it is, on the other hand, in the essence of our nature to
render vicious things in process of time innocent, so that the very
remnants of idolatry may be made subservient to our moral improvement.
"If, as I observed in the first volume, we were to find an alter which
had been sacred to Moloch, but which had been turned into a
stepping-stone to help the aged and infirm upon their horses, why should
we destroy it? Might it not be made useful to our morality, as for as it
could be made to excite sorrow for the past and gratitude for the
present?" And in the same manner the retention of the Heathen mythology
might be made serviceable. Ought it not, whenever we contemplate it, to
make us thankful, that we have not the dark and cheerless path of our
ancestors to tread; that we have clearer light; that we have surer
prospects; that we have a steadier ground of hope; and ought we not, on
a contemplation of these superior advantages, brought to us by
revelation, to be roused into the practice of a superior virtue.

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