A \ B \ C \ D \ E \ F \ G \ H \ I \ J \ K \ L \ M \ N \ O \ P \ R \ S \ T \ U \ V \ W \Z

Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government by T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth

T >> T. R. Ashworth and H. P. C. Ashworth >> Proportional Representation Applied To Party Government



PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION APPLIED TO PARTY GOVERNMENT

A NEW ELECTORAL SYSTEM

BY

T.R. ASHWORTH (_President of the Victorian Division, Australian Free
Trade and Liberal Association_)

AND

H.P.C. ASHWORTH (_Civil Engineer_)



LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM.

PATERNOSTER SQUARE

1901




CONTENTS.


CHAPTER PAGE

I.--THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 1

II.--THE SO-CALLED REPRESENTATIVE PRINCIPLE 22

III.--THE PRESENT POSITION or PARTY GOVERNMENT 47

IV.--THE REFORM: TRUE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 97

V.--HOW THE EVILS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM WILL
BE REMEDIED 122

VI.--THE HARE SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL DELEGATION 141

VII.--THE FREE LIST SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL
DELEGATION 162

VIII.--PREFERENTIAL VOTING, THE BLOCK VOTE,
THE LIMITED VOTE, &C. 172

IX.--ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT SYSTEM 188

X.--APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN
LEGISLATURES 194

XI.--THE CONDITIONS OF SOCIAL PROGRESS 208




"Majority and minority, in and for themselves, are the first
requisite of popular government, and not the development or
representation of separate groups."--Bradford's "Lesson of Popular
Government," vol. ii., page 179.




PREFACE.


The subject of electoral reform has been brought into prominence in
Australia by a clause in the Commonwealth Bill which provides that the
Federal Senate shall consist of six senators from each State, directly
chosen by the people, voting as one electorate. The problem thus
presented has been keenly discussed. On the one hand we have the
advocates of the Block Vote asserting that the party in a majority is
entitled to return all six senators; and on the other, a small band of
ardent reformers pressing the claims of the Hare system, which would
allow the people in each State to group themselves into six sections,
each returning one senator. The claim that every section of the people
is entitled to representation appears at first sight so just that it
seems intolerable that a method should have been used all these years
which excludes the minority in each electorate from any share of
representation; and, of course, the injustice becomes more evident when
the electorate returns several members. But in view of the adage that
it is the excellence of old institutions which preserves them, it is
surely a rash conclusion that the present method of election has no
compensating merit. We believe there is such a merit--namely, that _the
present method of election has developed the party system_. Once this
truth is grasped, it is quite evident that the Hare system would be
absolutely destructive to party government, since each electorate would
be contested, not by two organized parties, but by several groups. For
it is precisely this splitting into groups which is causing such anxiety
among thoughtful observers as to the future of representative
institutions; Mr. Lecky has attributed to it, in his "Democracy and
Liberty," the decline in the parliamentary system which has accompanied
the progress of democracy all over the world. The object of this book is
to suggest a reform, which possesses the advantages of both methods and
the disadvantages of neither; which will still ensure that each
electorate is contested by the two main parties, but will allow its just
share of representation to each; and which will, by discouraging the
formation of minor groups, provide a remedy for the evil instead of
aggravating it.

T.R.A.
H.P.C.A.

325 COLLINS STREET, MELBOURNE.




PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

APPLIED TO

PARTY GOVERNMENT.




CHAPTER I.

THE TRUE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATION.


Old establishments, like the British Constitution, said Edmund Burke,
"are not often constructed after any theory; theories are rather drawn
from them." In setting out on an endeavour to understand the principles
underlying political representation, the saying expresses exactly the
course which should be followed. The inquiry is the more necessary as,
although representation more than anything else in the domain of
government distinguishes the modern from the ancient world, the ideas
which prevail as to the part it has played, is playing, and is destined
to play on the world's stage are not merely hazy, but extremely
inaccurate. The intimate connection of representation with the progress
which has followed its introduction is so little recognized that the
most advanced democracies are now willing to listen to any proposal to
return to direct government. In spite of the fact that the nineteenth
century has witnessed the triumph of the historical method in most
fields of social inquiry, the dangers of _a priori_ speculation on
political institutions are as much in evidence as when Burke wrote.

If we would understand, then, the meaning of representative
institutions, it is in the gradual development of the "mother of
parliaments" that we must seek for the most reliable information. We
must be careful, however, to leave out of sight those features of the
growth of the British Constitution which are merely the expression of
transitory social conditions, and to confine our attention to the
landmarks which bear directly on the inquiry. The subject is best
divided into two stages; the first characterized by the origin of
representation; and the second by the division into parties, and the
creation of cabinet government.

+The First Stage of Representation.+--Rightly to understand the
conditions which led to the introduction and development of the
representative principle, we must look back to the period immediately
following the signing of the Great Charter by the tyrant King John.

The Charter reaffirmed the ancient principle that free Englishmen should
not be taxed without their consent, and representation was the natural
outcome of that provision. A brief glance at the social conditions of
the time is necessary to understand why this was so. First, it must be
remembered that the true political unit of ancient times was the city
or local community. England at that time was a collection of local
communities, having more or less a corporate life. Then, again, there
were the three estates of the realm--the clergy, the lords, and the
commons--who were accustomed to confer with the King on public affairs.
The stage which marks the birth of representation was when these
different estates and communities were asked to tax themselves to
relieve the necessities of the King. It was obviously impossible that
the consent of every freeman should be obtained, hence the duty had to
be deputed to agents. Now, the idea of agency was not unknown in the
ancient world, but that agents should have power to bind those for whom
they acted was something entirely new. It was necessary, however, that
they should have this power, and it suited the King's convenience that
they should exercise it. Already, in the earliest writ of which we have
knowledge, summoning each shire to send two good and discreet knights,
it was provided that they should be chosen in the stead of each and all.
This happened in 1254, and in the following year the clergy were also
summoned for the same purpose of granting aid to the King. In the
meantime the merchants and trade guilds in the cities were growing rich.
The King cast longing eyes on their possessions, and wished to tax them.
So we find that in 1264 Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, issued the
celebrated writ summoning each of the cities and boroughs to send two
of its more discreet and worthy citizens and burgesses. This is
sometimes regarded as the beginning of the House of Commons, but it was
really not until the fourteenth century that these several assemblies,
each of which up till then taxed itself separately and legislated in its
own sphere, coalesced into the present Houses. First the lower clergy
fell out, and, with the knights, citizens, and burgesses, were merged
into the House of Commons; and the higher prelates with the earls and
barons formed the House of Lords.

This, then, is the first stage of representation. What was the nature of
this new force which had come into the world and was destined to so
profoundly affect the whole course of human affairs? One result of
immense importance is apparent at a glance. It solved a problem which
had baffled the ancients--that of the nationalization of local
communities on a free basis. But it is generally assumed that the only
difficulty overcome was that of size; that the representative assembly
is a mere substitute for the larger assembly of the whole nation.
Starting with this assumption, it is claimed that the representative
assembly should be a mirror of the people on a small scale, and the more
faithfully it reflects their faults as well as their virtues, their
ignorance as well as their intelligence, the more truly representative
it is said to be. It is even asserted that with the modern facilities
for taking a poll, representative government might be dispensed with
and the people allowed to govern themselves. Democracy, we are assured,
means that every man should exercise an equality of political power.
Now, if this conception is correct, we should at once insist that every
law should be submitted to a direct referendum of the people; that
legislators should be mere agents for drawing up laws; and that the
executive should be directly responsible to and elected by the people.
But if representation is not a mere substitute for the direct action of
the people this idea as to the true line of democratic progress falls to
the ground. The whole question, therefore, hinges on what representation
is and what are the principles underlying it.

Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it
was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not
regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives.
Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the
_Contemporary Review_ for December, 1898, in which he advances the
theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed
from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources. As
to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for
the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages
till crimes were punished or fines paid. In England, where these ideas
were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in
France, Germany, &c, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency
prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak,
absolute monarchy held its ground. When Edward I. desired for purposes
of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political
representatives, and insisted that they should have "full and sufficient
power to do what of common council shall be ordained," he probably never
realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a
formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in
time haughty plenipotentiaries. But whatever may have been the social
conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the
power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled
the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the
liberties of the people. At first they were not legislators, but merely
sought to uphold the ancient laws. They presented petitions to redress
their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they
refused to grant the King's subsidies till the demands were complied
with. It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which
enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the
King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more,
it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before
they could learn to govern themselves. Yet we have seen that if we apply
the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been
made. In what respects, then, did these early representative
institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the
people on a small scale? One obvious difference at once suggests itself.
The representatives were not average members of the communities; they
were the most influential; they were selected because of their special
fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not
followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it
to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their
judgment to act for them and protect their interests. Here, then, we
arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is
leadership.

But there is another and still more important difference between a
representative assembly and a primary assembly of the people. It is
this: that a representative cannot be a violent partisan of a small
section of his constituents; he must be in general favour with all
sections. Therefore a representative assembly is composed of moderate
men, representing a compromise of the views of their individual
supporters. Moreover, the representatives appeal to the people to sink
their minor differences for the general welfare. This feature is very
prominent in the early parliaments. The local communities were arrayed
as a united people against the aggression of the monarchy. The principle
which is here apparent is that of organization. In the first stage of
English parliamentary history we may say at once that these two
principles--organization and leadership--were most conspicuous. The
people, sinking all minor differences, formed one united party; and
recognised that their struggle against the party of prerogative depended
on the ability, influence, and integrity of their deputies.

+The Second Stage of Representation.+--There is no need to enter into
that long struggle between the nation and the monarchy which followed.
We pass on, then, to the time when the parliaments, having wrested a
share of power, began to split up into parties. It was natural that when
power became divided two parties should arise; one upholding the
authority of the Parliament against the King; and the other favouring
the divine right of Kings. The Puritans and Cavaliers in the troublous
times of Charles I. were the earliest signs of this tendency. The Long
Parliament, which met in 1640, was divided on these lines; the
misdemeanors of the King brought on civil war; the parliamentary troops
defeated the royal troops after a bloody struggle; and the King was
brought to execution. The succeeding events were full of instruction.
The Parliament attempted to govern the nation--or, rather, we should say
the House of Commons did, for the House of Lords was abolished. But it
proved quite unfit for the purpose. It was thoroughly disorganized, and
rent by violent factions. The anarchy which ensued was ended by a
military despot, Oliver Cromwell, who entered the House of Commons in
1653 with his soldiers. The Speaker was pulled from his chair; the
members were driven from the House; and Cromwell was proclaimed
dictator. It is strange, indeed, that the lesson which is to be drawn
from this event, and which has been repeated in France time after time
since the Revolution, has not yet been learned: the only escape from
continued political anarchy is despotism. But the weakness of despotism
is that it ends with the life of the despot. Cromwell's son was forced
to abdicate, and the monarchy was restored. The same division of parties
in the Parliament continued, and they began to take the names of Whigs
and Tories. Towards the end of the seventeenth century, the dissensions
of these two factions again threatened to make government impossible. In
administration the evil was felt most; the union of ministers of both
parties was proving unworkable. So fickle did legislation become that no
one could say one day what the House would do the next. It was at this
crisis, and about the year 1693, that William III., who cared more for a
strong administration than for political differences, created what is
known as cabinet government, and, as Professor Gardiner says, "refounded
the government of England on a new basis." Recognizing that power should
not be separated from responsibility, he affirmed the principle that the
ministers of state should be selected from the party which had a
majority in the House of Commons. But the time was not yet ripe for the
complete application of this principle. Early in the eighteenth century
Sir Robert Walpole set the example of resigning when he no longer
possessed the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons; but in
the latter half of the century the great Earl of Chatham introduced
again the practice of selecting ministers irrespective of party. Despite
the fact that he was supported by the personal influence of George III.,
the attempt failed. A succession of weak ministries followed; and out of
the confusion the modern division of Liberals and Conservatives emerged.
Thus it was not until the beginning of the present century that the
doctrines of the solidarity of the Cabinet and its complete dependence
on a majority of the House of Commons were thoroughly developed in their
present form. England, now grown into the United Kingdom, had at last,
after six centuries of strife, won her national independence, and for
one brief century has enjoyed a full measure of self-government.

+Comparison of the Two Stages.+--How do the conditions presented by the
nineteenth century differ from those of the fourteenth? And how is the
problem of representation affected? We have seen that the great forces
which animated the nation in the fourteenth century were organization
and leadership. Have these forces ceased to operate? Assuredly not. In
the fourteenth century we had a united people organized under its chosen
leaders against the encroachments of the King and nobility on its
national liberty. In the nineteenth century the people have won their
political independence, but the struggle is now carried on between two
great organized parties. The principle of leadership is still as strong
as ever. The careers of Pitt, Peel, Palmerston, Beaconsfield, and
Gladstone attest that fact. The one great difference, then, between the
fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries is that instead of one party
there are two. The problem of representation in the fourteenth century
was to keep the people together in one united party, and to allow them
to select their most popular leaders. Surely the problem is different in
the nineteenth century. The requirements now are to organize the people
into two great parties, and to allow each party separately to elect its
most popular leaders. And yet we are still using the same method of
election as our forefathers used six centuries ago. Although the
conditions have entirely changed, we have not adapted the electoral
machinery to the change. The system of single-membered electorates was
rational in the fourteenth century, because there was only one party. Is
it not on the face of it absurd to-day, when there are two parties?

+The Meaning of Party Government.+--Why should there be two parties
instead of one in order that the people should be able to govern
themselves? To answer this question we must start at the beginning, and
consider what is the problem of popular government. The best definition
is that it is to promote the general welfare--to reconcile or average
the real interests of all sections of the community. Now, if the people
could all agree what is best in the interests of all, unity of action
might certainly be obtained; but even then the problem would not be
solved, for the people are not infallible. The greater part of the
problem consists in finding out what is best in the interests of all,
and no amount of mere abstract speculation can solve this part. So
diverse and so complex are the interests to be reconciled, so interwoven
and interdependent one with another, that the problem of securing a just
balance is incapable of solution by anything short of omniscience. But
in any case the people cannot be always got to agree to one course of
action. Therefore the people cannot govern themselves as one united
party. The only workable basis is, then, the rule of the majority, and
the problem of popular government is how to ensure that the majority
shall rule in the interests of all.

Party government provides the best known means of solving this problem.
The only way of finding out what is best for the whole people is by the
incessant action and interaction of two great organized parties under
their chosen leaders; each putting forth its energies to prove its
fitness to hold the reins of government; each anxious to expose the
defects of the other. This healthy emulation as to what is best for all,
with the people to judge, is the real secret of free government. The
two parties are virtually struggling as to which shall be king. Each is
striving to gain the support of a majority of the people; and the
grounds on which it appeals for support are that the measures it
proposes are the best for the country, and that the men it puts forward
are the best men for passing those measures into law and carrying on the
administration of the country. This constant agitation, and this mutual
competition to devise new measures, and to bring forward new men,
prevent stagnation. Both sides of every leading public question of the
day are presented in the rival party policies, and the people are
invited to decide between them. The forces on which the parties rely to
move the people are enthusiasm for measures and enthusiasm for
men--party and personality, or, in other words, organization and
leadership. It is in opposing these forces to counteract the selfish and
anti-social passions that party government acquires its virtue. By
appealing to their higher nature it induces the people to subordinate
their class prejudices to the general welfare, and by setting before
them definite moral ideals, and appealing to them by the force of
personality, it raises the character of public opinion, and moulds
individual and national character to an extent that is seldom
appreciated. Here, then, is the key of human progress. Direct
democracies may hold together so long as there are external enemies to
induce the people to sink their differences in the common interest, or
so long as there is a slave caste to do the menial work, as in the
ancient democracies; but representative democracy offers the only hope
of welding together a free people into a united whole. The unrestrained
rule of the majority under direct democracy must degenerate into the
tyranny of the majority. Instead of the equality of political power
which it promises, the minority is deprived of all power. Representative
democracy, on the other hand, deprives the people of the personal
exercise of political power, in order to save them from the free play of
their self-assertive passions, but still leaves to every man an equality
of influence in deciding the direction of progress. Thus every man is
induced to express his opinion as to the direction of progress; and the
party policy is the resultant direction of progress of all the party
electors, and therefore represents their organized opinion. Now, bear in
mind that the true direction of progress is not known, and can only be
found out by constant experiment directed by the most far-seeing and
capable minds. It is the means of carrying on this experiment which
party government provides. The party representing the organized opinion
of the majority has, rightly, complete control of the direction of
progress so long as it remains in a majority. But, although deliberation
is the work of many, execution is the work of one. Hence the creation of
a small committee of the party in power--the cabinet--associated with
the leader of the party, who becomes for the time being the Prime
Minister, the cabinet ministers being jointly responsible for the
control of administration and the initiation of measures for the public
good. But an organized minority is quite as essential to progress as an
organized majority--not merely to oppose, but to criticise and expose
the errors of the party in power, and to supplant it when it ceases to
possess the confidence of the country. Hence progress under party
government may be compared to a zigzag line, in which the changes in
direction correspond to changes in ministry. By this mutual action and
alternation of parties every vote cast has, in the long run, an equal
influence in guiding progress. The only justification for majority rule
sanctioned by free government is that when two parties differ as to what
is best for the whole people the majority shall prevail, and party
government tends to realize this condition. But direct government by the
people offers no check whatever on the power of the majority, which is
as absolute as that of the Czar of Russia. As Calhoun, the American
statesman, writes in his "Disquisition on Government," "the principle by
which constitutional governments are upheld, is _compromise_, that of
absolute governments is _force_!" Now, the significance of party
government as a guarantee of free government lies in this: that party
policies represent a compromise of what every section composing each
party supposes to be the interests of the whole people; and the parties
are engaged in fighting out a compromise of the real interests of every
section of the people.

Copyright (c) 2007. bestextbooks.com. All rights reserved.

Various - "Punch, Or The London Charivari, Volume 102, July 2, 1892"

James H. Snowden - "A Wonderful Night; An Interpretation Of Christmas"

Various - "Punch, Or The London Charivari, Vol. 103, October 8, 1892"

William Carleton - "The Station; The Party Fight And Funeral; The Lough Derg Pilgrim"