Lessons of the War by Spenser Wilkinson

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LESSONS OF THE WAR

Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of Ladysmith

by

SPENSER WILKINSON

Westminster
Archibald Constable & Company
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company.

1900

PREFACE

The history of a war cannot be properly written until long after its
close, for such a work must be based upon a close study of the military
correspondence of the generals and upon the best records, to be had of
the doings of both sides. Nor can the tactical lessons of a war be fully
set forth until detailed and authoritative accounts of the battles are
accessible.

But for the nation the lessons of this war are not obscure, at any rate
not to those whose occupations have led them to indulge in any close
study of war.

Since the middle of December I have written a daily introduction to the
telegrams for one of the morning papers. Before I contemplated that work
I had undertaken for my friend Mr. Locker, the Editor of _The London
Letter_, to write a weekly review of the war.

Many requests have been made to me by publishers for a volume on the
history of the war, with which, for the reasons given above, it is
impossible at present to comply; but to the proposal of my old friends,
Messrs. Archibald Constable and Co., to reprint my weekly reviews from
_The London Letter_, the same objections do not hold.

In revising the articles, I have found but few alterations necessary.
My views have not changed, and to make the details of the battles
accurate would hardly be practicable without more information than is
likely to be at hand until after the return of the troops.

S.W.

March 9th, 1900

CONTENTS

THE EVE OF WAR

THE MILITARY ISSUES

A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN

PLAYING WITH FIRE

HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY

TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?

BULLER'S PROBLEM

FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS

THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS

THE NATION'S PROBLEM

MORE AWAKENING

THE NATION'S BUSINESS

WANTED, THE MAN

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

THE DECISIVE BATTLE

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS

THE ELEVENTH HOUR

TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN

A COMMANDER

CRONJE'S SEDAN

THE BOER DEFEATS

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER

THE EVE OF WAR

The next six weeks will be an anxious time for the British Empire. The
war which begins as I write between three and four on Wednesday
afternoon, October 11th, 1899, is a conflict for supremacy in South
Africa between the Boer States, their aiders and abettors, and the
British Empire. In point of resources the British Empire is so
incomparably stronger than the Boer States that there ought to be no
possibility of doubt about the issue. But the Boer States with all their
resources are actually in the theatre of war, which is, separated by the
wide oceans from all the sources of British power, from Great Britain,
from India, from the Australian and Canadian colonies. The
reinforcements ordered on September 8th have not yet all arrived,
though the last transports are due to arrive during the next four or
five days. After that no further reinforcements can be expected for a
month, so that during the next few weeks the whole strength of the
Boers, so far as it is available at all, can be employed against a mere
fragment of the British power. To the gravity of this situation it would
be folly to shut our eyes. It contains the possibility of disaster,
though what the consequences of disaster now would involve must for the
present be left unsaid. Yet it may be well to say one word on the origin
of the unpleasant situation which exists, in order to prevent needless
misgivings in case the first news should not be as favourable as we all
hope. There is no sign of any mistake or neglect in the military
department of the Army. The quantity and character of the force required
to bring the war to a successful issue has been most carefully estimated
in advance; every preparation which forethought can suggest has been
thought out, so that the moment the word was given by the supreme
authority, the Cabinet, the mobilisation and despatch of the forces
could begin and proceed without a hitch. The Army was never in better
condition either as regards the zeal and skill of its officers from the
highest to the lowest, the training and discipline of the men, or the
organisation of all branches of the service. Nor is the present
condition of the Army good merely by comparison with what it was twenty
years ago. A very high standard has been attained, and those who have
watched the Army continuously for many years feel confident that all
ranks and all arms will do their duty. The present situation, in which
the Boers start favourably handicapped for five weeks certain, is the
foreseen consequence of the decision of the Cabinet to postpone the
measures necessary for the defence of the British colonies and for
attack upon the Boer States. This decision is not attributable to
imperfect information. It was regarded as certain so long ago as
December last, by those in a position to give the best forecast, that
the Boers of both States meant war with the object of establishing Boer
supremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly and deliberately taken
upon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In this
deliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping that
the risks are not so great as they seem.

The two Boer Republics are well supplied with money, arms, and
ammunition, and I believe have collected large stores of supplies. Their
armies consist of their burghers, with a small nucleus of professional
artillery, officers, and men. The total number of burghers of both
States is about fifty thousand, and that number is swollen by the
addition of non-British Uitlanders who have been induced to take arms by
the offer of burghership. The two States are bound by treaty to stand or
fall together, and the treaty gives the Commander-in-Chief of both
armies to the Transvaal Commander-in-Chief, who is however, bound to
consult his subordinate colleague of the Orange Free State. The whole of
the fifty thousand burghers cannot take the field. Some must remain to
watch the native population, which far outnumbers the burghers and is
not well affected. Some must be kept to watch the Basutos, who are
anxious to raid the Free State, and there will be deductions for sick
and absentees as well as for the necessary duties of civil
administration. The forts of Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfontein
require permanent garrisons. In the absence of the accurate data
obtainable in the case of an army regularly organised into tactical and
administrative units, the most various estimates are current of the
force that the two States can put into the field as a mobile army
available for attack as well as for defence. I think thirty-five
thousand men a safer estimate than twenty-five thousand. The Boers are
fighting for their political existence, which to their minds is
identical with their monopoly of political rights, and therefore their
States will and must exert themselves to the uttermost. This view is
confirmed by the action of the British military authorities, who
estimate the British force necessary to disarm the Boer States at over
seventy thousand men, a number which would seem disproportionate to a
Boer field force of only twenty-five thousand. The British forces now in
South Africa are in two separate groups. In Natal Sir George White has
some ten thousand regular troops and two thousand volunteers, the
regulars being eight or nine infantry battalions, four regiments of
cavalry, six field batteries, and a mounted battery. He appears to have
no horse artillery. In the Cape Colony there are seven British
battalions and, either landed or on passage, three field batteries. A
part of this force is scattered in small garrisons of half a battalion
each at points on the railways leading to the Free State--Burghersdrop,
Naauwpoort, and Kimberley. At Mafeking Colonel Baden-Powell has raised a
local force and has fortified the place as well as its resources
permit. A force of Rhodesian volunteers is moving from Buluwayo towards
Tuli, on the northern border of the Transvaal. There are volunteer corps
in the Cape Colony with a total of some seven thousand men, but it is
not clear whether the Schreiner Ministry, whose sympathies with the
Boers are undisguised, has not prevented the effective arming of these
corps.

The reports of the distribution of the Boer forces on the frontiers must
be taken with caution. Apparently there are preparations for the attack
of Mafeking and of Kimberley, and it is open for the Boers to bring
against either or both of these places forces largely outnumbering their
defenders. Both places are prepared for defence against ordinary field
forces. The actions at these places cannot very greatly affect the
general result. Their nearness to the frontier makes it likely that the
first engagements will take place on this border. On the other side of
the theatre of war the Boers may be expected to invade Natal and to
attack Sir George White, whose forces a few days ago were divided
between positions near Ladysmith and Glencoe, places nearly thirty-five
miles apart. The bulk of the Boer forces are deployed on two sides of
the angle formed by the Natal border, where it meets the frontiers of
the Transvaal and of the Free State. From the Free State border
Ladysmith is about twenty-five miles distant in a straight line, and
from the Transvaal border near Vryheid to Ladysmith is about twice that
distance. If the Boers move on Thursday morning they would be able
easily to collect their whole force at Ladysmith on Sunday morning,
supposing the country contained no British troops. By Sunday, therefore,
the Boer commander, if he knows his business, ought to be able to attack
Sir George White with a force outnumbering the British by something like
two to one.

If I were a Cabinet Minister I should not sleep for the next few days,
but as an irresponsible citizen I trust that the Boers will be shocked
to find how much better the British soldier shoots in 1899 than he did
in 1881.

THE MILITARY ISSUES

_October 18th_, 1899

When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand
British troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six
weeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not be
substantially increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement of
the dispute satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory to
themselves they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we are
bound to do, that they had really faced the situation and thought it
out, they must have had in their minds some course of action by which if
they should begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gain
their end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. They
could hardly expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, but
they might hope to make the occupation of their country so difficult
that Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment of
success. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than
to gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple
Great Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power
might interfere.

If before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers could
destroy a considerable fraction of the British forces now in South
Africa, their chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatly
improved. These forces were in two groups. There was the small army of
Sir George White in Natal, something more than fifteen thousand men, and
there were the detached parties holding points on the colonial railway
system, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, Kimberley and Mafeking. These
detachments, however, are largely made up of local levies, and the total
number of British troops among them can hardly amount to three
thousand. The whole set might be captured or otherwise swept from the
board without any material improvement in the Boer position. Sir Redvers
Buller is not tied to the line of railway which most of the detachments
guard, and the disappearance both of the railway and of its protectors
would be merely a temporary inconvenience to the British. But if during
the six weeks' respite it were possible to destroy Sir George White's
force the position would be very substantially changed. The confidence
of the Boers would be so increased as to add greatly to their fighting
power, the difficulties of Sir Redvers Buller would be multiplied, the
probability of outside intervention might be brought nearer, and the
Army of invasion to be eventually resisted would be weaker by something
like a quarter. For these reasons I think Sir George White's force the
centre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it their
case is hopeless; if they can crush it they may have hopes of ultimate
success. That was the bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago,
and it still holds good. The week's news does not enable us to judge
whether the Boers have grasped it. You can never be too strong at the
decisive point, and a first-rate general never lets a single man go away
from his main force except for a necessary object important enough to be
worth the risk of a great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of
Kimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers
for failure in Natal. Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich
would be likely to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I should
therefore have expected the Boers merely to watch these places with
parties hardly larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energy
into a determined attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sent
considerable bodies, in each case several thousand men, against both
Mafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have a
superabundance of force at their disposal or that they have failed to
grip the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and their
troops upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to be
the true interpretation.

If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive
blow, its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you
can, for in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy
to judge whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission.
When the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border line
of the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would
concentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not
been resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of the
combined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, while
the bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movement
has not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult--marches through a
mountainous country and in bad weather always take incomparably longer
than is expected--the delay may be due not to lack of energy but to the
inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws no light
on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity in the
decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with the
Army, the country, and the weather.

Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until Sir
Redvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent the
Boers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could be
gained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of the
Boer party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly Sir
George White may be expected to take the first opportunity of showing
the Boers that his men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagement
such as might commit a fraction of his force against the Boer main body.
The detachment which was a few days ago near Glencoe may be expected, as
the Boer advance continues, to act as a rear guard, of which the
business is to delay the enemy without running too great a risk of being
itself cut off, or as an advance guard, which is to be reinforced so
soon as the general drift of the Boer movements has been made out. The
next few days can hardly pass without an engagement in this quarter of
Natal, and the first serious engagement will throw a flood of light upon
the aims of both generals and upon the quality of the troops of both
sides. Meantime the incidents of last week, the wreck of the armoured
train, and the attacks which have probably been made upon Mafeking and
Kimberley, are of minor importance.

A very serious piece of news, if it should be confirmed, is that the
Basutos have begun to attack the Free State. The British authorities
have exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent this and to keep the
Kaffir population quiet. The mere fact of the existence all over South
Africa of a Kaffir population outnumbering Boers and British together
made it an imperative duty of both white races to come to a peaceful
settlement. This was as well known to the Boers as to the British, and
forms an essential factor in any judgment on the action which has caused
and precipitated the conflict.

A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN

_October 25th_, 1899

The Boer Commander-in-Chief has beyond doubt grasped the situation. His
total force seems to be larger than was usually expected and to exceed
my own rough estimate of thirty-five thousand men, the balance to his
advantage being due probably to the British efforts to keep the Basutos
from attacking the Free State. Thus the Boers have been able to overrun
their western and southern borders in force sufficient to make a
pretence of occupying a large extent of territory in which only the
important posts specially prepared by the British for defence continue
to hold out. Of these posts, however, Mafeking and Kimberley are as yet
the only ones that have been attacked or threatened.

For operations in the northern corner of Natal the Boer commander was
able to collect some thirty thousand men, who on the eve of hostilities
were posted in separate columns upon the various routes leading from the
Free State and from the Transvaal into the triangle of northern Natal.
This triangle is like a letter _A_, the cross-stroke being the range of
hills known as the Biggarsberg, which is intersected near the centre on
a north and south line by the head-stream of the Waschbank River forming
a pass through which run the railway and the Dundee-Ladysmith road.
North of the Biggarsberg the gates of the frontier are Muller's Pass,
Botha's Pass, the Charlestown road, Wool's Drift, and De Jager's Drift,
of which Landman's Drift is a wicket-gate. At each of these points,
except perhaps Muller's Drift, of which I have seen no specific mention,
the Boers had a column waiting. South of the Biggarsberg are on the
east Rorke's Drift, and on the west the passes of Ollivier's Hoek,
Bezuidenhout, Tintwa, Van Reenen, De Beers, Bramkock, and Collins. At
all these points there were Boer gatherings, though on the west the Free
Staters, having their headquarters at Albertina, were likely to put
their main column on the road leading through Van Reenen's Pass to
Ladysmith.

By Thursday morning the Boer advance had developed. The columns from
Botha's Pass, Charlestown, and Wool's Drift had advanced through
Newcastle, where they had converged, and moved south along the main
road. The Landman's Drift column had moved towards Dundee, the Rorke's
Drift column had pushed some distance towards the west, and the forces
from Albertina had showed the heads of their columns on the Natal side
of the passes.

The British force was divided between Dundee and Ladysmith. The
Biggarsberg range, the cross-line of the A, is about fifty miles long.
It is traversed from north to south by three passes. In the centre runs
the railway through a defile. Twelve miles to the west of the railway
runs the direct Newcastle-Ladysmith road; eight miles to the east runs
the road Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee-Helpmakaar. A third road runs from
De Jager's Drift through Dundee to Glencoe and thence follows the
railway to Ladysmith. Dundee is about five miles from Glencoe on a spur
of the Biggarsberg range. Between the two places by the Craigie Burn was
the camp of Sir Penn Symons, who had under him the eighth brigade (four
battalions), three batteries, the 18th Hussars, and a portion of the
Natal Mounted Volunteers, in all about four thousand men. Thirty-five
miles away at Ladysmith, the junction of the Natal and Free State
railways, as well as of the Natal and Free State road systems, Sir
George White had a larger force, the seventh brigade, three field
batteries, a mountain battery, the Natal battery, two or three cavalry
regiments, the newly-raised Imperial Light Horse, and some Natal
Mounted Volunteers. It is not clear whether there were more infantry
battalions and it seems probable that one battalion and perhaps a
battery were at Pietermaritzburg. The Ladysmith force was at least six
thousand five hundred strong, and its total may have been as high as
eight thousand.

The Boer plan was dictated by the configuration of the frontier and of
the obstacles and communications in Northern Natal. The various columns
to the north of the Biggarsberg had only to move forward in order to
effect their junction on the Newcastle-Dundee road, and their advance
southwards on that road would enable them at Dundee to meet the column
from Landman's Drift. The movement, if well timed, must lead to an
enveloping attack upon Sir Penn Symons, whose brigade would thus have to
resist an assault delivered in the most dangerous form by a force of
twenty thousand men. From the point of view of the Boer
Commander-in-Chief, the danger was that the Glencoe and Dundee force
should escape his blow by retiring to Ladysmith, or should be reinforced
by the bulk of the Ladysmith force before his own combined blow could be
delivered. It was essential for him to keep Sir George White at
Ladysmith and also to cut the communications between Glencoe and
Ladysmith. Accordingly, on Wednesday, the 18th, the Free State forces
from Albertina, the heads of whose columns had been shown on Tuesday,
moved forward towards Acton Homes and Bester's Station, and led Sir
George White to hope for the opportunity to strike a blow at them on
Thursday, the 18th. At the same time a detachment from the main column
was pushed on southwards, and was able on Thursday, while Sir George
White was watching the Free State columns, to reach the
Glencoe-Ladysmith line near Elandslaagte, to break it up, and to take
position to check any northward movement from Ladysmith. Everything was
thus ready for the blow to be struck at Dundee, but by some want of
concert the combination was imperfect. On Friday morning the Landman's
Drift column, which had been reinforced during the previous days by a
part of the Newcastle column, was in position on the two hills to the
east of Dundee, and began shelling the British camp at long range. At
the same time the column from the north was within an easy march from
the British position. Sir Penn Symons decided promptly to attack the
Landman's Drift column and to check the northern column's advance. Three
battalions and a couple of batteries were devoted to the attack of the
Boer position, while a battalion and a battery were sent along the north
road to delay the approaching column. Both measures were successful. The
attack on the Boer position of Talana or Smith's Hill was a sample of
good tactical work, in which the three arms, or if mounted infantry may
be considered a special arm, the four arms, were alike judiciously and
boldly handled. The co-operation of rifle and gun, of foot and horse,
was well illustrated, and the Boer force was after a hard fight driven
from its position and pursued to the eastward. Unhappily, Sir Penn
Symons, who himself took charge of the fight, was mortally wounded at
the moment of victory, leaving the command of the force in the hands of
the brigadier, Lieut.-Colonel Yule. The northern Boer column seems to
have disappeared early in the day. Possibly only its advance guard was
within striking distance and had no orders to make an independent attack
on the British delaying force.

On Saturday morning Sir George White sent a small force of cavalry and
artillery to reconnoitre along the line of the interrupted railway. Some
two thousand Boers were found in position near Elandslaagte, and
accordingly during the day the British were reinforced by road and rail
from Ladysmith, until in the afternoon the Boer position could be
attacked by two battalions, three batteries, two cavalry regiments, and
a regiment and a half of mounted infantry--about three thousand five
hundred men. The Boers were completely crushed and a large number of
prisoners taken, including the commander and the commanding officer of
the German contingent. The British loss, however, as at Glencoe, was
heavy, especially in officers. The force returned on Sunday to
Ladysmith.

The British force at Dundee-Glencoe was thus still isolated, and until
now no detailed account of its movements has reached England. On
Saturday it was again attacked and, there is reason to believe, it again
repulsed a large Boer force, probably the main northern column. On
Sunday also the attack seems to have been renewed, this time apparently
by two columns, one of which may have been composed of Free State troops
from Muller's Pass. Either on Sunday or Monday General Yule determined
to withdraw from a position in which he could hardly hope without
destruction to resist the overwhelming numbers brought to bear against
him, especially as the Boer forces, either from the direction of
Muller's Pass or from Bester's Station, were threatening his line of
retreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road. Accordingly, leaving in hospital
at Dundee those of his wounded who could not be moved, he retired along
the Helpmakaar road, which he followed as far as Beith, about fourteen
miles from Dundee, and near there he bivouacked on Monday night. On
Tuesday he continued his march from Beith towards Ladysmith, expecting
to reach Sunday's River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George White,
informed of this movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force to
the west of the Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning to
interpose between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smart
attack at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat of
General Yule's brigade.

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