The Record of a Regiment of the Line by M. Jacson

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The force halted at Amersfoort on the following day, owing firstly to
the fog which enveloped everything, and secondly to allow of the baggage
train coming up. This began to arrive at 10 a.m., having been detained
at the drift the whole night.

During the fog a few Boers came down from the high ground above the
river and fired into the horses watering, at very close range. They
failed, however, to do any damage.

On August 9th the army continued its advance. On leaving Amersfoort, a
bad drift with a steep climb of half a mile on the further side was met
with, and the baggage was formed into two columns. This was assisted up
the hill by two companies of the Regiment, Sir Redvers Buller personally
superintending. Klippaal Drift was reached late in the afternoon after a
difficult march of ten miles.

General Buller's army was now on the high veldt in winter time. The cold
was intense, especially at night, when there were several degrees of
frost. Owing to the intense cold, two men of the Rifle Brigade died from
exposure during the night.

[Illustration: The Baggage of General Buller's Army Crossing Beginderlyn
Bridge]

On the following day the force continued its march to Beginderlyn
Bridge. This was found intact, and there was no opposition, and the
march was resumed on the 11th as far as Kleinfontein. On August 12th
Ermelo was occupied, and a few of the leading Boers belonging to the
place surrendered.

So far, and until Twyfelaar was reached, Buller's army received little
or no opposition from the Boers. Chris. Botha, who had occupied
Amersfoort, had retired east after evacuating that place, and was
marching parallel to the British force and at a distance of about ten
miles on its right flank. They were evidently watching Buller, probably
thinking that he would turn east towards Piet Retief, where almost all
their stock, sheep, and cattle had been driven, the mountainous and
difficult country there being suitable for its concealment and
protection.

The main body of the Boers was concentrated between Belfast and
Machadodorp, north-east of Twyfelaar, in a country eminently suited for
what was considered their final effort. The valley of the Komati River
was exceedingly difficult country for the British army to operate over.
The Boers to the end of the war were very fond of this country, and it
was there, or in the vicinity towards Lake Chrissie, that several
engagements took place later on, during the guerilla stage of the war,
not always in favour of the British.

The town of Ermelo, which the Regiment was destined to see again on
several future occasions, was left on August 13th, on the evening of
which day the force reached Klipfontein. The Regiment, being rear-guard,
did not reach its bivouac till after dark. Witbank was reached the
following day, and communication was opened up with General French's
column, fifteen miles to the north-west. Carolina could be seen eight
miles away to the north-east.

The force marched next day to Twyfelaar, and here a halt was made till
August 21st, in order to allow of Lord Roberts's army, which was
advancing east from Pretoria along the Lorenzo Marques railway, joining
hands with General Buller's army.

The rear-guard of the force was attacked by the Boers on August 21st on
its march from Twyfelaar to Van Wycks Vlei. The Gordon Highlanders lost
nine killed and eight wounded, and the Liverpool Mounted Infantry eight
killed.

On the following morning a force consisting of Devons, Manchesters,
Gordons, South African Light Horse, one field battery, and the
howitzers, advanced from Van Wycks Vlei under General W. Kitchener, for
the purpose of reconnoitring and driving some Boers off the hills east
of General Buller's camp, so that the road for the next day's march
might be cleared of the enemy. A large number of Boers was seen in the
direction of Carolina, and it was supposed that Chris. Botha's force was
opposed to the column. The Manchester Regiment led the advance,
supported by the Devon Regiment. The former, on crossing a nek to a low
underlying hill, came under a heavy rifle fire from the Boers below and
across the valley, and lost two killed and nine wounded. The force
returned to camp at 6 p.m.

On the following day Buller's army advanced to Geluk, some five or six
miles, the battalion with the Gordons and mounted troops of Dundonald's
Brigade, acting as rear-guard. A very difficult spruit, with steep
sides, was crossed, and the high hills on the further side occupied.
These had been held by the Boers in strength, but they had retired on
Buller's approach. As soon as the infantry of the rear-guard had arrived
in camp, the mounted troops of the rear-guard were attacked rather
sharply, but they managed to hold their own and to beat off the Boers.
Two companies of the Liverpool Regiment, who formed part of the advance
guard, fell into an ambush and lost considerably, leaving, it was
reported, some eighty men either killed, wounded, or prisoners in the
hands of the Boers. Shortly after arrival in camp, five companies of the
Regiment were sent out on outpost duty, taking up a short line and
entrenching--two companies were entrenched in front and furnished
sentries, with three companies entrenched in rear in support.

On August 24th and 25th the force stood fast, exchanging occasional big
gun and musketry fire with the Boers. Information was received that Lord
Roberts had entered Belfast on the 24th, thus practically joining hands
with Sir Redvers Buller.

The position taken up by the Boers already referred to, an immensely
powerful one, straddled the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway east of Belfast and
west of Machadodorp. Botha had taken up a front of some fifty miles in
length, and his force numbered about 5000 men. His right rested on the
broken mountainous country of Elandskloof to the north, and his left on
the mountains overlooking the Komati to the south. His centre was at
Bergendal Farm and the rugged and precipitous hills in the rear of the
farm, through which wound the railway and road, his line of retreat,
quite concealed from the fire and view of the British force. On the
extreme left a big gun with two or three smaller pieces were mounted,
but these were useless to give much support to the centre, as they were
too distant. The line of retreat to Komati Poort, which, from the nature
of the country, could not be threatened except by an extended movement
round the north or south, lay along the Belfast-Machadodorp road and the
railway line.

Briefly, the course of the two days' battle may be described as
follows:--

While Pole Carew threatened the centre at Belfast and the position north
of the railway, French was sent with his cavalry division still further
north to threaten the Boer line of retreat towards Pilgrim's Rest, and
their right flank. Buller attacked the Boers' left with the intention of
driving it in and getting behind their centre on their line of retreat.
He on the first day, however, could make no impression on them, and the
two forces held on to the position they were in for the night. On the
morning of the second day Buller, leaving a brigade of infantry and
Dundonald's mounted brigade to watch the Boers' left, moved across their
front under cover of the undulating slopes of ground, and made an attack
at Bergendal Farm and Kopje. After a sharp fight this was carried, and
the Boers retired all along their line in the direction of Machadodorp.

It is necessary to state in detail the part played by the Regiment.

On the morning of Sunday, August 26th, Buller's force was put in motion.
The Regiment was advance guard to the division. When about half a mile
from the camp, the four advanced and extended companies under Captain
Jacson came under fire from some high ground on their right flank,
losing two men. Major Davies, proceeding along this ridge of high ground
with the remainder of the Regiment, forced the Boers posted there off
the hills. The advance guard companies then continued their march with
orders to make Bergendal Farm their point, but not to go beyond it.

When these companies had proceeded some four or five miles, it was found
that General Buller's main body had changed direction to the right and
had gone east. On retracing their steps, the companies with great
difficulty ascertained the whereabouts of Buller's force. Sir Redvers
was now attacking the Boer left within a mile or two of his former
camping ground. A message was then received stating that the Regiment
was at that time a left flank guard to Buller's army, and that the
former advance guard companies were to join the remainder of the
Regiment.

The Boers, opposed to Buller in very considerable numbers, were sangared
on some low hills about 800 yards distant from and in front of and below
the high ridge over which his force had to advance. Buller made his
dispositions behind this high ridge. The reverse slope was completely
raked by the Boer fire, and no cover except that afforded by some
ant-hills was obtainable. The dropping bullets followed the form and
slope of the hill, so that neither front nor rear was secure.

[Illustration: Trekking with General Buller; 5-Inch Guns on the March]

As soon as the Regiment was formed up, an order was sent to advance.
Captain Emerson with fifteen men extended, rushed down the forward slope
under a heavy fire, and took cover behind some ant-hills. The moment the
men showed over the crest line they were met by a hail of bullets, and
further advance was impossible.

Later, another order was sent to advance, but owing to the want of cover
it was found impossible for the line to make headway in the face of the
fire brought to bear upon it. It was not until the Howitzer Battery was
brought into action late in the day, to cover the retirement of the
advanced companies, that Captain Emerson and his men were able to get
back. This they did under a very heavy fire from rifles and machine
guns.

One company under Lieutenant Harris, which had been moved off to the
right, had advanced and got into an exposed place. The men took cover
behind ant-hills, and remained there for the rest of the day. Three
companies had been moved to the neighbourhood of the guns. These came
under shell fire from the Boer guns and had some casualties, amongst
whom was Colour-Sergeant Burchell, who was shot through the shoulder.
Under General Buller's direct supervision one company was ordered
forward. Immediately their four scouts showed over the crest line a
storm of bullets met them, and they were all hit. The four scouts were
found dead on the second day afterwards by the Liverpool Mounted
Infantry.

Dusk found the companies posted as under: Three companies extended on
the ridge on the left, with two companies extended in support on the
rear side of the hill. One company was extended on the ridge in the
centre, whilst three companies were near the guns, three-quarters of a
mile away on the right. One man was killed and one wounded just at dark
by unaimed fire and by the last shots fired. The companies on the ridge
retired to the crest of the hill after dark and took up an entrenched
outpost line for the night. Rations were then issued for the following
day. It was a pitch-black night, and two cooks' orderlies who had gone
to fetch their company's tea and sugar rations from their wagon, missed
their way in the dark when returning, and walked into the Boer position,
distant only a few hundred yards, and were made prisoners. These two men
were the first prisoners of war lost to the battalion up to this date;
and with the exception of one other prisoner, who was temporarily in the
hands of the Boers in the Badfontein valley in the following year, they
were the only men of the battalion taken prisoners during the war. The
casualties of the battalion for the day were 6 killed, 15 wounded, and 2
prisoners.

Early the following morning the 7th Brigade, with the exception of the
Manchester Regiment, moved off to the left, the Rifle Brigade, whose
turn it was to lead, being in front. The guns accompanied the brigade.

There was little or no opposition till the scouts came under fire from
Bergendal Kopje, or Drie Kraal as it was otherwise known. This rocky
kopje was strongly fortified and held by the Boers. A Field Battery
opened fire on to the kopje at about 3000 yards' range from some rising
ground. Shortly afterwards the remaining guns--5-inch, 4.7's, naval
12-pounders, in all to the number of about thirty-nine--commenced
pouring shells on to this one spot in the Boer position. This shelling
continued for about three hours.

Very early in the morning a train had been seen coming out from
Machadodorp with reinforcements. These, it was ascertained, were the
Johannesburg Police, to the number of about eighty, and they formed the
garrison of the kopje, about a hundred more being in the farm behind the
kopje. This kopje was a small hill covered with large boulders. The
rocks had been connected with large stones to form sangars, behind which
the garrison found cover. A pompom was included in the armament of the
position, which measured about eighty yards by forty yards only. It fell
away abruptly in the rear, the farm and outbuildings lying very close
under the steep rear side of the hill.

The English shells fell with terrible accuracy into the sangars, and
there was an almost continuous explosion on the hill. Yet the Boers kept
up their fire till the Rifle Brigade were within ten yards of them, and
their pompom was in action, although partly jammed and firing single
shots, till the very end. This pompom was bravely served by one man, the
remainder of the gun team having been either killed or wounded. It is
not known whether this plucky fellow survived or not.

General Walter Kitchener, who was commanding the infantry attack,
decided to attack with the Rifle Brigade along the ridge which ended in
the kopje, which was slightly above the level of the ridge. At the same
time he ordered the Inniskilling Fusiliers to attack over the low ground
on the Rifle Brigade's right, whilst the Gordon Highlanders and the
Devonshire Regiment were held in support.

The Rifle Brigade started from the foot of the hills under which they
had taken cover, and which was about 1200 yards from the Boer position,
and almost immediately came under heavy musketry fire, being much
exposed on the high open ridge.

They, however, continued their advance in perfect order and eventually
rushed the kopje, the British shells dropping and the Boers firing till
the assault had been delivered. The Inniskillings advanced across the
low ground underneath the Rifle Brigade. Their advance was slightly
delayed, and their delivery of the assault was consequently later than
that of the Rifle Brigade. Captain Emerson with one company of the
Regiment which had been told off as escort to the Maxim guns, advanced
with the leading company of the Inniskillings.

The whole Boer position was evacuated as soon as their line had been
penetrated by the capture of the Bergendal Kopje.

The casualties amongst the Rifle Brigade were severe, owing to the much
exposed ground over which it was necessary for the attack to be
delivered, and to the fact that, as the extended lines converged on to
the small kopje, the men naturally became crowded and formed a better
mark for the Boer rifles. They lost two officers and fourteen men killed
and five officers and fifty men wounded, of whom two officers died of
their wounds the following day. The Regiment had one man wounded.

The position was soon made good, although the Boers held on tenaciously
to a long rocky ridge in their rear to which they had retired, till
nightfall. The force bivouacked for the night near the farm.

This action was known officially as the battle of Belfast.

A quiet night was passed, and next morning, August 28th, the force
occupied Machadodorp with slight opposition. The Boers were seen
retreating up the road leading to Lydenburg, and on the high ground
above the town they brought two big guns into action.

The Gordon Highlanders, in support of Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, were
sent on through the town and occupied the high ground on the far side,
and the Boers retired before them.

The Boers had made a very hurried retirement. In Machadodorp on the
evening of the day of the fight, guns and cartloads of ammunition were
parked in the big open space in the centre of the town. These were moved
off very hurriedly on the approach of the British force, and the guns
had only reached the top of the hills on the further side of Machadodorp
when General Buller's infantry came in view. General Buller brought some
long-range guns into action and shelled them as they ascended the hill,
but without result.

From lack of efficient pursuit after the battle the evening before, and
a too cautious advance in the morning, an opportunity to do the Boer
forces considerable damage was apparently lost. A wagon containing
pompom ammunition was captured by Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, but the
pompom itself got away, notwithstanding the very slight opposition
offered by the Boers.

The following day General Buller's forces reached Helvetia Farm, where
General French's column and General Pole Carew's division joined up.

With the object of releasing the prisoners who had been sent by the
Boers from Pretoria to Noitgedacht down the railway line towards Komati
Poort, General Buller's force now turned eastwards and marched along the
heights on the north side of the railway. On the first day out from
Helvetia his cavalry saw some 2000 released English prisoners marching
up the line towards Waterval Onder from the direction of Noitgedacht,
and having been unable to obtain touch with the Boers, the force
retraced their steps, and encamped some six miles from Helvetia at
Vluchtfontein, and at this place a halt was made on the following day.

From here General Buller turned north, and on September 1st, advancing
up the Lydenburg road, reached Badfontein on the Crocodile River. Here
the army bivouacked for the night, and an advance was made up the
Badfontein valley next morning, but coming into contact with the Boers
who were holding the northern end of the valley, his further progress
was checked. The Boer position extended along the high hills which
straddled the road in a semicircular position some eight miles from
Badfontein.

The Regiment formed the infantry advance guard of the army, and on
reaching what was then named Redvers' Kopje and afterwards known as
Devon Kopje, came under shell fire from three big guns which the Boers
had brought into action on the hills above. At this place the Regiment
stopped for the day, taking cover from shell fire behind the large
boulders of rocks of which the kopje was composed. The remainder of Sir
Redvers Buller's force returned to its old encampment of the previous
night.

The two mounted brigades and one battery R.H.A., which had advanced to
the foot of the hills occupied by the Boers, returned to camp at dusk.

As soon as it was dark, four companies of the Regiment were left on
Devon Kopje as an advanced post, whilst the remainder of the Regiment
retired to the rear of the hill and bivouacked. The kopje was entrenched
and everything made comfortable for the following day. All the baggage
wagons were sent back to the main camp during the night.

September 3rd, 4th, and 5th were spent quietly in position, the Boers on
the 5th firing over the heads of the Regiment into the brigade camp, but
doing very little damage. On the evening of the 5th a hill to the east
was shelled, and after some opposition from the Boers, when Strathcona's
Horse had some casualties, the hill was occupied by the 60th Rifles and
the Leicester Regiment. A battery of artillery was then hauled up the
steep incline to the top.

On the 6th, General Ian Hamilton having brought up reinforcements
consisting of a brigade, from Belfast by way of Dullstrom, thus turning
the Boers' right, General Buller advanced the following day and found
that the Boers had evacuated their position. But, in ignorance of this
retirement, great preparations were made for a big fight.

The Devonshire Regiment headed the advance of the infantry. It was
divided into two half battalions, one half battalion under Major Davies
proceeding up the road in support of the mounted troops, whilst five
companies under Captain Jacson were sent more to the left to attack the
large farm at the foot of the hill, with orders "to proceed as far as
possible without severe loss." These manoeuvres having been accomplished
in safety without a shot being fired, the force reached the top and
bivouacked some two miles further on for the night. Owing to the
steepness of the road the baggage did not arrive till after midnight.

Lydenburg was occupied next day without opposition, the Boers having
retired to a position on Paardeplaats, a range of high and irregular
hills five miles distant from and overlooking Lydenburg on the
Mauchberg-Spitzkop road. From this position the Boers shelled the
baggage, bursting shrapnel over it as it defiled into the open in front
of the town. The train formed up and halted under cover behind a hill,
and came into camp at dusk.

The following morning, September 8th, Sir Redvers Buller decided to
attack the Boer position on Paardeplaats, and for this purpose he
detailed General Walter Kitchener's brigade to advance up the spurs of
the hills against the Boers' right, whilst General Ian Hamilton's
brigade was to turn the Boers' left, the attack being covered by the
artillery which proceeded up the main road in the centre.

General Kitchener's brigade moved out from Lydenburg on to the
race-course. The battalion being the leading regiment deployed and
advanced towards a hill jutting out into the plain, with the mounted
brigade of General Dundonald working round the left. This hill was
afterwards known to the Regiment as Ben Tor. As the Regiment deployed
into the open it came under shrapnel fire from two big guns posted on
Paardeplaats. The Regiment was, however, extended, and had only one man
wounded.

The Gordon Highlanders, who were in support, marched across the Boers'
front, in rear of the extended Devons, in column of companies. Several
shells burst amongst them, and one shell, bursting thirty feet above
graze, took their volunteer company end on and killed and wounded
fifteen.

With Dundonald's men on their left flank, four companies of the Regiment
under Captain Jacson advanced up the spurs without opposition, whilst
Major Davies, in command of the remaining companies, climbed the spurs
on Jacson's right. Little or no opposition was met with on this flank.
Jacson's companies were reinforced by four companies of the Gordon
Highlanders and the 60th Rifles, and at 4 p.m., when nearing the summit,
a thick mist came on, and the flanking brigade halted. Meanwhile Davies,
with two of his companies, had reached the top of the hill and was
proceeding down the far side when the fog lifted. It was then
ascertained that the Boers, under cover of the fog, had left the
position to which they had clung with great determination, and had
retired. The position had been turned by Ian Hamilton's right flank
attack.

The thick mist saved the Boers, who would otherwise undoubtedly have
lost their big guns in their retirement.

Just before dark the companies of the Regiment, which had become
scattered, were collected, and Captain Jacson received an order to
return with these to the old camp on the far side of Lydenburg; seven
companies were thus taken down the hills over very rough country to the
old camp, a distance of nearly six miles. On arrival there a message was
received which stated that the army was encamped half-way up the hill
towards Paardeplaats. The seven companies then returned, and finally
reached camp very late. They had been marching and climbing incessantly
from 7.30 a.m. till 10 p.m.

The brigades had by this time become rather intermingled. Of General
Kitchener's brigade the Manchester Regiment had been left behind at
Witklip, at the north end of the Badfontein valley. A garrison had also
been left at Lydenburg under General Howard, consisting of the Rifle
Brigade and Leicesters, with General Brocklehurst's Cavalry Brigade.

The Devonshire Regiment was now left behind at Paardeplaats, while
General Buller's force, consisting of the Gordon Highlanders and the
60th Rifles, with Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, two Field Batteries, and
the 5-inch guns, advanced on the 9th, the day following the capture of
Paardeplaats, in the direction of the Mauchberg.

The country was extremely difficult, and the Boer guns and pompoms well
served, and considerable opposition was met with in the advance.

General Buller's force reached the Mauchberg that evening and proceeded
on the following day to Devil's Knuckles, down the steep Mauchberg road
(known as Hell's Gate), where the two Boer big guns again narrowly
escaped capture, and so on to Spitzkop, just north of Nelspruit on the
Pretoria-Lorenzo Marques railway.

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