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Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian Stafford Corbett

J >> Julian Stafford Corbett >> Some Principles of Maritime Strategy




* * * * *

APPENDIX

* * * * *

THE
"GREEN PAMPHLET"

* * * * *

WAR COURSE

* * * * *

Strategical Terms
and Definitions
used in
Lectures on Naval History

BY

JULIAN S. CORBETT, ESQ., L.L.M.

* * * * *

NAVAL STRATEGY

Naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. It is only
a section of a division of the art of war.

The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy.

The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of
war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole.

War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics
which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.

OBJECTS.

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be
ulterior or immediate.

Immediate objects (also called "Primary") are the ends of particular
operations or movements. But it must be remembered that every primary
object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be
regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also
as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. Classified by
the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor
Strategy, with primary objects.

This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded
in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation (1)
to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is
immediately directed.

Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province
the plan of the war, and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or
primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2)
Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative
functions of the naval and military forces.

NOTE.--Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the
whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship.
It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled
together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view
constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which
depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and
financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is
maintained). The friction of these two considerations is inherent in
war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. It is
usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every
strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question
of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa.
For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of
view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice
versa. To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of
its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither
strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This interaction has to
be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction
of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the
Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for
fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals
with--

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces
of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order
to secure the object of the particular operation.
(2) The directing of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may be of three kinds:--

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet
only.
(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army
only.
(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army
and navy together.

NOTE.--It will be seen that what is usually called Naval Strategy or
Fleet Strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and
that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of
naval operations only.

NOTE.--Naval Strategy, being only a part of General Strategy, is
subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less
degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision
independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should,
therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any
line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is
strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

EXAMPLE.--Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven
Years War.

NATURE OF OBJECT

The solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor
Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.

All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.

A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for
ourselves.

A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent
his gaining something.

Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.

Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.

EXAMPLE.--When Togo attacked Rojesvensky his primary object was
offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the Russian Fleet. His
ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been
assigned to the Japanese Fleet.

NOTES.--This is a good example of true defensive; that is, Togo's
operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly
within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him.

The Offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective
form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a
rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power.

The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of
war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the
weaker Power.

NOTE.--The general truth of this proposition is not affected by
apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true.

_The Offensive must not be confused with the Initiative._ It is
possible to seize the Initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a
defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or
abandon the operation.

In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive,
it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or
concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal
in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.

The advantages of the Offensive are well known.

Its disadvantages are:--

(1) That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its
communications.
(2) That it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.
(3) That it continually increases the difficulty of retreat.

The advantages of Defence are chiefly:--

(1) Proximity to base.
(2) Familiar ground.
(3) Facility for arranging surprise by counter attack.

NOTE.--In modern Naval warfare these advantages--that is, the
advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving
greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo.

The disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or
line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be
neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEFENSIVE.

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

NOTE.--When the Dutch burnt our ships at Chatham, we were not acting on
the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all.

The strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke.

A well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack.

A general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive
operations.

The maxim is: If you are not relatively strong enough to assume the
offensive, assume the defensive till you become so--

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or
securing allies.

Except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is
seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire
anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. But where we are too
weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive,
and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and
permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's;
we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a
preparation.

As a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to
intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor
theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a
minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most
important theatre.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED WITH A DEFENSIVE INTENTION

(A) Counter attacks.
(B) Diversions.

(A) _Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes
himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this
form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise
advantage of defence."

(B) _Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside
the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention,
and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they
should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be
small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less
likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

It is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their
own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they
involve.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities
are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

NOTE.--_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric
attacks_. _Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a
positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy;
whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at
preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Being in the
category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made
in greater force than diversions.

EXAMPLES.--_Diversion._--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force,
about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instructions, "a
diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the
army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was
negative--preventative--defensive.

2. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815.
Intended force 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of
embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important
and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of
peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to
acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) and Belleisle
(eccentric attack) in the Seven Years War.

Note 2.--This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined
expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists.

Raids = Diversions.
Incursions = Eccentric attacks.
Invasions = True direct offence.

Compare these with Sir John Ardagh's classification (Report of Royal
Commission on Reserve Forces, 1904):--

"Raids," not exceeding 10,000 men.
"Small expeditions," not exceeding 50,000 men.
"Dangerous invasion," not exceeding 150,000 men.

NATURE OF ULTERIOR OBJECT

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification
of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.

(1) War with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek
to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or
interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the
liberation of Cuba.

(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the
enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must
agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.

NOTE.--Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as
the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them;
_e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the
immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_.

EXAMPLE 1.--Japanese position in the late war. Ulterior object of the
war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive).
Function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was
defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack
and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

EXAMPLE 2.--In the Spanish-American War the ulterior object of the war
was (for the Americans) to eject the Spanish Government from Cuba. This
was offensive. The ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the
Spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended
American invasion. This was defensive. The primary object of the fleet
was to bring the Spanish Fleet to action. This was offensive.

SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object
(_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or
unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of
the war."

This depends upon:--
(1) The theatre of the war.
(2) The means at our disposal.

1. _Theatre of the War._--Usually defined as "all the territory upon which
the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an
island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer
definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of
the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. _Theatre of Operations_.--Is generally used of the operations of one
belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory
we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within
which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the
particular operation."

Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be
defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or
movements may be offensive.

OBJECTIVE

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is
directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get
command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet
will usually be the _objective_.

LINES OF OPERATION

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate
from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the
interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of
operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more
quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a
position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior
Position" are the converse of these.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

This expression is used of three different things:--

(1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point
which the operating force has reached.

(2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in
one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to
each other's support.

(3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._,
leading back to the base.

These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and
communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century.

Ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways,
&c.

At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal
course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to
be supplied.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of
communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on
communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as
will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent
to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations.

MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet
may have to operate are:--

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond
to the communications of armies operating ashore). These tend to
increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of
modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c).

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea
base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the
national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the
"lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of
belligerents' possessions.

N.B.--Such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of
Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced
to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best
method of solving them.

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A
QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND
COMMUNICATION

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the
Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "passage and
communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own
communications and seizing those of the enemy.

PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command
of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the
Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of
political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on
conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's
theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false
analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is
the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as
a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the
"command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the
belligerents are adversely concerned.

COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of
territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime
war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century,
but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior
object of particular operations.

PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows
that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars)
have been threefold.

1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading
neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the
Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and
Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the
alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to
demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining
Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the
second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the
Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as
emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and
military aspects of major strategy.

These functions may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
(bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in
such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all
parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their
territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications,
is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first
can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.
Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is
mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the Fleet must
discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time
to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and
military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval
Strategy.)

EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the
unshaken Toulon Fleet. Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command
of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we
have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the
command when war breaks out.

VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act
dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his
own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously
with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send
squadrons to sea.

NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do
absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the
undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to
force our will upon him.

(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to
prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in
one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from
interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of
operation during the period required for gaining the object in view
(_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign).
This condition existed after Togo's first action.

(b) _Permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the
situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his
maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This
condition existed after Tsushima.

3. Command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different
states:--

(a) With us.
(b) With the enemy.
(c) In dispute.

If in dispute, it may be that:--

(1) We have preponderance.
(2) Our enemy has preponderance.
(3) Neither side preponderates.

COMMAND IN DISPUTE

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it
is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and
frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._,
till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of
dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive
actions as a rule when at war with England.

The truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is
not essential to all oversea operations_.

Copyright (c) 2007. bestextbooks.com. All rights reserved.

Samuel G. Blythe - "The Fun of Getting Thin"

Rudyard Kipling - "Songs from Books"

Horatio Nelson - "The Letters of Lord Nelson to Lady Hamilton, Vol II."

Joseph A. Altsheler - "The Texan Star"

President Obama teams up with one of Marvel's greatest heroes, reports Alison Flood
Articles published by guardian.co.uk Books

Murder One closing so did we commit this crime?

Barack Obama is teaming up with Spider-Man in a new comic from Marvel, which will see the future president exchanging a fist-bump with Peter Parker's alter ego.

The five-page story takes place in Washington DC on inauguration day, when one of Spidey's oldest enemies, the Chameleon, attempts to stop Obama's swearing-in ceremony. Fortunately, Peter Parker is covering the event as a photographer, and jumps in to save the day.

"Ya hear that, Chameleon? The president-elect here just appointed me ... secretary of shuttin' you up," Spider-Man says as he thwacks the Chameleon in the face. "I hope this doesn't ruin the inauguration for you," he tells Obama, as the Chameleon is led away by security officials. "Honestly, I'm more upset by the Chameleon's shockingly deficient understanding of the electoral process," Obama replies.

Spidey then cedes the limelight to Obama. "This is your day, after all, and I know it wouldn't look good to be seen palling around with me," he says, in a nod to Sarah Palin's comment that the then presidential candidate had been "palling around with terrorists".

The story, written by Zeb Wells and illustrated by Todd Nauck and Frank D'Armata, will appear as a bonus feature in Amazing Spider-Man 583, which goes on sale on 14 January.

"When we heard that president-elect Obama is a collector of Spider-Man comics, we knew that these two historic figures had to meet in our comics' Marvel Universe," said Marvel's editor-in-chief Joe Quesada. "A Spider-Man fan moving into the Oval Office is an event that must be commemorated in the pages of Amazing Spider-Man."

In October, graphic novel biographies of Obama and his then rival John McCain were published by IDW. April will see Michelle Obama appearing in the Female Force comic book series.

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Poetry Workshop creature features

For many years my local corner shop displayed a large sign in its window telling local residents to "use us or lose us!" It always looked a rather toothless threat to me. After all, if I didn't use them, what difference would it make to me if they weren't there? And surely a corner shop, one that had been there for years, would have enough customers to survive without recourse to such apocalyptic warning? But it didn't and was soon converted into flats.

This community shop was destroyed not so much by the pressures of the supermarkets or people's commuting patterns, but simply by customer apathy. It's something to think about as crime writers and readers across the world mourn the imminent passing of Maxim Jakubowski's celebrated Charing Cross Road bookshop in London, Murder One.

Apathy is a strange word to connect to a bookstore that thrives on passion. It's noticeable when you walk through the door, when you speak to the friendly, knowledgeable staff, when you look at the shelves and see the vast range of titles on offer. This isn't your regular kind of bookstore: the first time I visited spent a whole lunch break looking up and down, from floor to ceiling from table to table; it was an hour that changed my perception of both crime writing and of bookselling.

Murder One was – and for a few weeks will remain – a shop that took crime seriously. Not in the sense that it intellectualised it, or made unsubstantiated claims for its importance, but in the way that it treated crime writing with the respect it was due. With a genre that has so many off-shoots, branches and sub-genres, it took a shop of Murder One's calibre to show just how diverse, interesting and mentally stimulating crime could be – far more than the guilty pleasure I had, until then, considered it.

Thanks to judicious recommendations, enticing table displays and hours of foraging among the stacks, I discovered writers that I would never have picked up, let alone read. You could always get the latest blockbuster, but delve a little deeper and you'd find books that were not stocked anywhere else, novels that, like the perfect crime, were hidden from public view. The Martin Beck novels by Sjöwall & Wahlöö – probably my favourite sequence of novels in any genre – were introduced to me via Murder One, as were Kem Nunn, Sue Grafton, and Henning Mankell. It's also the staff of Murder One who piqued my interest in the inimitable Fred Vargas, and I can't thank them enough for the introduction.

Inclusive and without snobbery, Murder One amply demonstrated that the best bookshops are places not just of commerce, but of community; places that make feel you belong. It's the kind of store that bibliophiles dream about: well-stocked, well-staffed and shabby enough to lose days browsing within. It's just unfortunate that such shops don't have enough paying customers to keep them afloat, or that these customers visit all too infrequently – something of which I'm certainly guilty.

These kinds of shops are facing a long, bloody battle – and one which, without significant reinforcements, they are likely to lose. As we hear of the travesty of another brilliant independent going down, we'll mourn the loss, wring our hands and damn Amazon and the supermarkets and Waterstone's. Yet perhaps the most important detail we'll probably keep under wraps: the last time we actually spent any money there.

Murder One closing its doors for the final time is undoubtedly a .38 shell for independent bookshops, but whether it's body blow or a warning shot all depends upon us, the consumers. No one, no matter how iconic or established, can exist on fond memories alone: just ask Woolworths. Use these shops now, because it doesn't take a master sleuth to deduce what will happen if we don't.

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