Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman

C >> Carl W. Ackerman >> Germany, The Next Republic?

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16

When the food supplies began to decrease the Government instituted the
card system of distribution. Bread cards had been very successful, so
the authorities figured that meat, butter, potato and other cards would
be equally so. But their calculations were wrong.

When potato cards were issued each person was given nine pounds a week.
But the potato harvest was a big failure. The supply was so much less
than the estimates that seed potatoes had to be used to keep the people
satisfied. Even then the supply was short; and the quantity to be sold
on potato cards was cut to three pounds a week. Then transportation
difficulties arose, and potatoes spoiled before they reached Berlin,
Munich, Hamburg, Dresden, Leipsic and other large cities.

The same thing happened when the Government confiscated the fruit crop
last year.

One day I was asked on the telephone whether I wanted to buy an
11-pound ham. I asked to have it sent to my office immediately. When
it came the price was $2.50 a pound. I sent the meat back and told the
man I would not pay such a price.

"That's all right," he replied. "Dr. Stein and a dozen other people
will pay me that price. I sent it to you because I wanted to help you
out."

Dr. Ludwig Stein, one of the editors of the _Vossiche Zeitung_, paid
the price and ordered all he could get for the same money.

When I left Berlin the Government had issued an order prohibiting the
sale of all canned vegetables and fruit. It was explained that this
food would be sold when the present supplies of other foods were
exhausted. There were in Berlin many thousand cans, but no one can say
how long such food will last.

When Americans ask, "How long can Germany hold out?" I reply, "As long
as the German Government can satisfy the vanity and stimulate the
nerves of the people, and as long as the people permit the Government
to do the nation's thinking."

How long a time that will be no one can say. It was formerly believed
that whenever a nation reached the limit which Germany has reached it
would crumple up. But Germany fails to crumple. Instead of breaking
up, she fights harder and more desperately. Why can she do this? The
answer is simple: Because the German people believe in their Government
and the Government knows that as long as it can convince the people
that it is winning the war the people will fight.

Germany is to-day in the position of a man on the verge of a nervous
breakdown; in the position of a man who is under-nourished, who is
depressed, who is weighed down by colossal burdens, who is brooding
over the loss of friends and relatives, but of a man who feels that his
future health and happiness depend upon his ability to hold out until
the crisis passes.

If a physician were called in to prescribe for such a patient his first
act would in all probability be to stimulate this man's hope, to make
him believe that if he would only "hold out" he would pass the crisis
successfully. But no physician could say that his patient could stand
it for one week, a month or a year more. The doctor would have to
gamble upon that man's nerves. He would have to stimulate him daily,
perhaps hourly.

So it is with the German nation. The country is on the verge of a
nervous breakdown. Men and women, business men and generals, long ago
lost their patience. They are under-nourished. They are depressed,
distressed, suffering and anxious for peace. It is as true of the
Hamburg-American Line directors as it is true of the officers at the
front.

There have been more cases of nervous breakdowns among the people
during the last year than at any time in Germany's history. There have
been so many suicides that the newspapers are forbidden to publish
them. There have been so many losses on the battlefields that every
family has been affected not once, but two, three and four times.
Dance halls have been closed. Cafes and hotels must stop serving meals
by 11 o'clock. Theatres are presenting the most sullen plays. Rumours
spread like prairie fires. One day Hindenburg is dead. Two days later
he is alive again.

But the Kaiser has studied this war psychology. He and his ministers
know that one thing keeps the German people fighting--their hope of
ultimate victory; their belief that they have won already. The Kaiser
knows, too, that if the public mind is stimulated from day to day by
new victories, by reports of many prisoners, of new territory gained,
of enemy ships torpedoed, or by promises of reforms after the war, the
public will continue fighting.

So the Kaiser gambles from day to day with his people's nerves. For
two years he has done this, and for two years he has been supported by
a 12,000,000-man-power army and a larger army of workers and women at
home. The Kaiser believes he can gamble for a long time yet with his
people.

Just as it is impossible for a physician to say how long his patient
can be stimulated without breaking down, so is it impossible for an
observer in Germany to say how long it will be before the break-up
comes in Germany.

Many times during the war Germany has been on the verge of a collapse.
President Wilson's ultimatum after the sinking of the Sussex in the
English Channel brought about one crisis. Von Falkenhayn's defeat at
Verdun caused another. The Somme battle brought on a third. General
Brusiloff's offensive against the Austrians upset conditions throughout
the Central Powers. Rumania's declaration of war made another crisis.
But Germany passed all of these successfully.

The ability of the German Government to convince the people that Wilson
was unneutral and wanted war caused them to accept Germany's note in
the _Sussex_ case. The defeat at Verdun was explained as a tactical
success. The Somme battles, with their terrible losses, failed to
bring a break-up because the Allies stopped attacking at the critical
moment.

Von Hindenburg as chief of the General Staff of Central Europe remedied
the mistakes of the Austrians during Brusiloff's attacks by
reorganising the Dual Monarchy's army. The crisis which Rumania's
entrance on the Allies' side brought in Germany and Hungary was
forgotten after von Mackensen took Bucharest.

In each of these instances it will be noticed that the crisis was
successfully passed by "stimulation." The German mind was made to
believe what the Kaiser willed.

But what about the future? Is there a bottomless well of stimulation
in Germany?

Before these questions can be answered others must be asked: Why don't
the German people think for themselves? Will they ever think for
themselves?

An incident which occurred in Berlin last December illustrates the fact
that the people are beginning to think. After the Allies replied to
President Wilson's peace note the Kaiser issued an appeal to the German
people. One morning it was printed on the first pages of all
newspapers in boldface type. When I arrived at my office the janitor
handed me the morning papers and, pointing to the Kaiser's letter, said:

"I see the Kaiser has written US another letter. You know he never
wrote to US in peace time."

There are evidences, too, that others are beginning to think. The
Russian revolution is going to cause many Socialists to discuss the
future of Germany. They have discussed it before, but always behind
closed doors and with lowered voices. I attended one night a secret
meeting of three Socialist leaders of the Reichstag, an editor of a
Berlin paper and several business men. What they said of the Kaiser
that night would, if it were published, send every man to the military
firing squad. But these men didn't dare speak that way in public at
that time. Perhaps the Russian revolt will give them more courage.

But the Government is not asleep to these changes. The Kaiser believes
he can continue juggling public opinion, but he knows that from now on
it will be more difficult. But he will not stop. He will always hold
forth the vision of victory as the reward for German faithfulness.
Today, for instance, in the United States we hear very little about the
German submarine warfare. It is the policy of the Allies not to
publish all losses immediately; first because the enemy must not be
given any important information if possible, and, secondly, because,
losses have a bad effect upon any people.

But the German people do not read what we do. Their newspapers are
printing daily the ship losses of the Entente. Submarines are
returning and making reports. These reports are published and in a way
to give the people the impression that the submarine war is a success.
We get the opposite impression here, but we are not in a position
better to judge than the Germans, because we don't hear everything.

The important question, however, is: What are the German people being
told about submarine warfare?

Judging from past events, the Kaiser and his Navy are undoubtedly
magnifying every sinking for the purpose of stimulating the people into
believing that the victory they seek is getting nearer. The Government
knows that the public favours ruthless torpedoing of all ships bound
for the enemy, so the Government is safe in concluding that the public
can be stimulated for some months more by reports of submarine victory.

Military operations in the West are probably not arousing the
discussion in Berlin that the plans against Russia are. The Government
will see to it that the press points regularly to the possibilities of
a separate peace with Russia, or to the possibility of a Hindenburg
advance against England and France.

The people have childlike faith in von Hindenburg. If Paul von
Hindenburg says a retreat is a victory the people will take his
judgment. But all German leaders know that the time is coming when
they will have to show the German people a victory or take the
consequences themselves.

Hence it would not be surprising if, after present military operations
are concluded, either by an offensive against Russia or by an attack on
the Western line, the Chancellor again made peace proposals. The
Socialists will force the Chancellor to do it sooner or later. They
are the real power behind the throne, although they have not enough
spunk to try to oust the Kaiser and tell the people to do their own
thinking.

A big Allied military victory would, of course, change everything.
Defeat of the German army would mean defeat of von Hindenburg, the
German god. It would put an end to the Kaiser's juggling with his
people's nerves. But few people in Germany expect an Entente victory
this year, and they believe that if the Allies don't win this year they
never will win.

Germany is stronger militarily now than she has been and Germany will
be able for many months to keep many Entente armies occupied. Before
the year is passed the Entente may need American troops as badly as
France needed English assistance last year. General von Falkenhayn,
former chief of the German General Staff, told me about the same thing
last December, in Rumania.

"In war," he remarked, "nothing is certain except that everything is
uncertain, but one thing I know is certain: We will win the war."

_America's entrance, however, will have the decisive effect_. The
Allies, especially the French, appreciate this. As a high French
official remarked one day when Ambassador Gerard's party was in Paris:

"There have been two great moments in the war for France. The first
was when England declared war to support us. The second was the
breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany."

The Germans don't believe this. As General von Stein, Prussian
Minister of War, said, Germany doesn't fear the United States. He said
that, of course, for its effect upon the German people. The people
must be made to believe this or they will not be able to hate America
in true German fashion.

America's participation, however, will upset Hindenburg's war plans.
American intervention can put a stop to the Kaiser's juggling with his
people's minds by helping the Allies defeat Germany. Only a big
military defeat will shake the confidence of the Germans in the Kaiser,
Hindenburg and their organised might. The people are beginning to
think now, but they will do a great deal more thinking if they are
beaten.

So the answer to the question: "How long can Germany hold out?" is
really answered by saying that Germany can keep on until she is
decisively defeated militarily.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEACE DRIVE OF DECEMBER 12TH

I

Disturbed by internal political dissension and tormented by lack of
food the German ship of state was sailing troubled waters by November,
1916. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech to the Reichstag on
September 28th satisfied no one. After he had spoken the only thing
people could recall were his words:

"The mighty tasks which await us in all the domains of public, social,
economic, and political life need all the strength of the people for
their fulfilment. It is a necessity of state which will triumph over
all obstacles to utilise to the utmost those forces which have been
forged in the fire and which clamour for work and creation. _A free
path for all who are capable--that must be our watch-word_. If we
carry it out freely, without prejudice, then our empire goes to a
healthy future."

The press interpreted this as meaning that the Chancellor might some
day change his mind about the advisability of a ruthless submarine
warfare. Early in November when it appeared that the Allies would not
succeed in breaking through at the Somme peace forces were again
mobilised. But when various neutral countries sounded Germany as to
possible terms they discovered that Germany was the self-appointed
"victor" and would consider only a peace which recognised Germany as
the dominant power in Europe. The confidence of the army in the
victory was so great that the following article was printed in all the
German newspapers:

"FAITH IN VICTORY"

"Great Headquarters sends us the following:

"Since the beginning of the war, when enemies arose on all sides and
millions of troops proceeded from all directions--since then more than
two long years have brought no more eventful days than those of the
present. The unity of the front--our enemies have prepared it for a
long time past with great care and proclaimed it in loud tones. Again
and again our unexpected attacks have disturbed this boldly thought out
plan in its development, destroying its force, but now at last
something has been accomplished that realises at least part of the
intentions of our enemies and all their strength is being concentrated
for a simultaneous attack. The victory which was withheld from them on
all the theatres of war is to be accomplished by an elaborate attack
against the defensive walls of our best blood. The masses of iron
supplied them by half the world are poured on our gallant troops day
and night with the object of weakening their will and then the mass
attacks of white, yellow, brown and black come on.

"The world never experienced anything so monstrous and never have
armies kept up a resistance such as ours.

"Our enemies combine the hunger and lie campaign with that of arms,
both aimed at the head and heart of our home. The hunger campaign they
will lose as the troublesome work of just an equal administration and
distribution of the necessities of life is almost complete. And a
promising harvest has ripened on our broad fields. From the first day
of the war, we alone of all the belligerent nations published the army
reports of all of our enemies in full, as our confidence in the
constancy of those at home is unlimited. But our enemies have taken
advantage of this confidence and several times a day they send out war
reports to the world; the English since the beginning of their
offensive send a despatch every two hours. Each of these publications
is two or three times as long as our daily report and all written in a
style which has nothing in common with military brevity and simplicity.
This is no longer the language of the soldier. They are mere fantastic
hymns of victory and their parade of names and of conquered villages
and woods and stormed positions, and the number of captured guns, and
tens of thousands of prisoners is a mockery of the truth.

"Why is all this done? Is it only intended to restore the wearying
confidence of their own armies and people and the tottering faith of
their allies? Is it only intended to blind the eagerly observing eye
of the neutrals? No, this flood of telegrams is intended to pass
through the channels which we ourselves have opened to our enemy, and
to dash against the heart of the German people, undermining and washing
away our steadfastness.

"But this despicable game will not succeed. In the same manner as our
gallant troops in the field defy superior numbers, so the German people
at home will defy the enemies' legions of lies, and remember that the
German army reports cannot tell them and the world at large everything
at present, but they never publish a word the truth of which could not
be minutely sifted. With proud confidence in the concise, but
absolutely reliable publications of our own army administration,
Germany will accept these legions of enemy reports at their own value,
as wicked concoctions, attempting to rob them of calm and confidence
which the soldier must feel supporting him, if he joyfully risks his
all for the protection of those at home. Thus our enemies' legions of
lies will break against the wall of our iron faith. Our warriors defy
the iron and fire--those at home will also defy the floods of printed
paper and remain unruffled. The nation and army alike are one in their
will and faith in victory."

[Illustration: THE POPE TO PRESIDENT WILSON----"HOW CAN MY PEACE ANGEL
FLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHEN YOU ALWAYS PUT SHELLS IN HER POCKETS?"]

This is a typical example of the kind of inspired stories which are
printed in the German newspapers from time to time to keep up the
confidence of the people. This was particularly needed last fall
because the people were depressed and melancholy over the losses at the
Somme, and because there was so much criticism and dissatisfaction over
the Chancellor's attitude towards the submarine warfare and peace.
People, too, were suffering agonies in their homes because of the
inferior quality of the food,--the lack of necessary fats and sugar
which normal people need for regular nourishment. The Socialists, who
are in closer touch with the people than any others, increased their
demands for peace while the National Liberals and the Conservatives,
who wanted a war of exhaustion against Great Britain, increased their
agitation for the submarine warfare. The Chancellor was between two
tormentors. Either he had to attempt to make peace to satisfy the
Socialists and the people, or he had to give in to the demands for
submarine warfare as outlined by the National Liberals. One day
Scheidemann went to the Chancellor's palace, after he had visited all
the big centres of Germany, and said to von Bethmann-Hollweg:

"Unless you try to make peace at once the people will revolt and I
shall lead the revolution!"

At the same time the industrial leaders of the Rhine Valley and the
Army and Navy were serving notice on the Government that there could
not possibly be a German victory unless every weapon in Germany's
possession, which included of course the submarine, was used against
Germany's so-called chief foe--England.

Confronted by graver troubles within Germany than those from the
outside, the Chancellor went to Great Headquarters to report to the
Kaiser and to discuss with von Hindenburg and Ludendorf what should be
done to unite the German nation.

While the Army had been successful in Roumania and had given the people
renewed confidence, this was not great enough to carry the people
through another hard winter.

While Germany had made promises to the United States in May that no
ships would be sunk without warning, the submarines were not adhering
very closely to the written instructions. The whole world was aroused
over Germany's repeated disregard of the rules and practice of sea
warfare. President Wilson through Ambassador Gerard had sent nine
inquiries to the Foreign Office asking for a report from Germany on the
sinking of various ships not only contrary to international law but
contrary to Germany's pledges. In an attempt to ward off many of the
neutral indictments of Germany's sea warfare the official North German
Gazette published an explanation containing the following:

"The activity of our submarines in the Atlantic Ocean and White Sea has
led the press of the entire world to producing articles as to the
waging of cruiser warfare by means of submarines. In both cases it can
be accurately stated that there is no question of submarine warfare
here, but of cruiser warfare waged with the support of submarines and
the details reported hitherto as to the activities of our submarines do
not admit of any other explanation, in spite of the endeavours of the
British press to twist and misrepresent facts. It is also strictly
correct to state that the cruiser warfare which is being waged by means
of submarines is in strict compliance with the German prize regulations
which correspond to the International Rules laid down and agreed to in
the Declaration of London which are not being any more complied with by
England. The accusations and charges brought forward by the British
press and propaganda campaign in connection with ships sunk, can be
shown as futile, as our position is both militarily and from the
standpoint of international law irreproachable. We do not sink neutral
ships per se, as was recently declared in a proclamation, but the
ammunition transports and other contraband wares conducive to the
prolongation of the war, and the rights of defensive measures as
regards this cannot be denied Germany any more than any other country.

"Based on this idea, it is clearly obvious that the real loss of the
destruction of tonnage must be attributed to the supplies sent to
England and not to the attitude displayed by Germany which has but
recourse to purely defensive measures. If the attitude displayed by
England towards neutrals during the course of this war be considered,
the manner in which it forced compulsory supplies of contraband goods,
etc., it can be further recognised that England is responsible for the
losses in ships; as it is owing to England's attitude that the cause is
to be found. . . .

"Although England has hit and crippled legitimate trade to such an
extent, Germany does not wish to act in the same manner, but simply to
stop the shipments of contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war.
England evidently is being hard hit by our defensive submarine measures
and is therefore doing all in her power to incite public opinion
against the German methods of warfare and confuse opinion in neutral
countries. . . .

"Therefore it must again be recalled that it is:

"England, which has crippled neutral trade!

"England, which has rendered the freedom of the seas impossible!

"England, which has extended the risk of contraband wares in excess of
international agreements, and now raises a cry when the same weapons
are used against herself.

"England, which has compelled the neutrals to supply these shipments of
contraband goods calculated to lengthen the war!

"As the neutrals quietly acquiesced when there was a question of
abandoning trade with the Central Powers they have remedies in hand for
the losses of ships which affect them so deeply. They need only
consider the fact that the German submarines on the high seas are able
to prevent war services to the enemy in the shipments of contraband
goods, in a manner that is both militarily and from the standpoint of
international law, irreproachable. If they agree to desist from the
shipment of contraband goods and cease yielding to British pressure
then they will not have to complain of losses in ships and can retain
the same for peaceful aims."

This was aimed especially at America. Naval critics did not permit the
opportunity to pass to call to the attention of the Government that
Germany's promises in the _Sussex_ case were only conditional and that,
therefore, they could be broken at any time. The Chancellor was in a
most difficult situation; so was von Hindenburg and the Kaiser. On
December 10th it was announced that the Reichstag would be called to a
special session on the twelfth and that the Chancellor would discuss
the international situation as it was affected by the Roumanian
campaign.

The meeting of December 12th was the best attended and most impressive
one of the Reichstag since August 4th, 1914. Before the Chancellor
left his palace he called the representatives of the neutral nations
and handed them Germany's peace proposal. The same day Germany sent to
every part of the globe through her wireless stations, Germany's note
to the Allies and the Chancellor's address.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16