Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman

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It is the great hour in which we dare not celebrate our first
Declaration of Independence, because the time has come when we must
proclaim a new one over the corpse of that which has perished.

Berlin, July 4th, 1915.

AN ANTI-AMERICAN PROPAGANDA DOCUMENT

* * * * * * * *

The League of Truth, however, was but one branch of the intricate
propaganda system. While it was financed almost entirely by
German-Americans living in Germany who retained their American
passports to keep themselves, or their children, out of the army, all
publications for this bureau were approved by the Foreign Office
censors. Germans, connected with the organisation, were under
direction of the General Staff or Navy.

In order to have the propaganda really successful some seeds of
discontent had to be sown in the United States, in South America and
Mexico as well as in Spain and other European neutral countries. For
this outside propaganda, money and an organisation were needed. The
Krupp ammunition interests supplied the money and the Foreign Office
the organisation.

For nearly two years the American press regularly printed despatches
from the Overseas News Agency. Some believed they were "official."
This was only half true. The Krupps had been financing this news
association. The government had given its support and the two wireless
towers at Sayville, Long Island, and Tuckerton, N. J., were used as
"footholds" on American soil. These stations were just as much a part
of the Krupp works as the factories at Essen or the shipyards of Kiel.
They were to disseminate the Krupp-fed, Krupp-owned, Krupp-controlled
news, of the Overseas News Agency.

When the Overseas despatches first reached the United States the
newspapers printed them in a spirit of fairness. They gave the other
side, and in the beginning they were more or less accurate. But when
international relations between the two countries became critical the
news began to be distorted in Berlin. At each crisis, as at the time
of the sinking of the _Arabic_, the _Ancona_, the _Sussex_ and other
ships, the German censorship prevented the American correspondents from
sending the news as they gathered it in Germany and substituted "news"
which the Krupp interests and the Imperial Foreign Office desired the
American people to believe. December, 1916, when the German General
Staff began to plan for an unrestricted submarine warfare, especial use
was made of the "Overseas News Agency" to work up sentiment here
against President Wilson. Desperate efforts were made to keep the
United States from breaking diplomatic relations. In December and
January last records of the news despatches in the American newspapers
from Berlin show that the Overseas agency was more active than all
American correspondents in Berlin. Secretary of State Zimmermann,
Under-secretaries von dem Busche and von Stumm gave frequent interviews
to the so-called "representatives of the Overseas News Agency." It was
all part of a specific Krupp plan, supported by the Hamburg-American
and the North German Lloyd steamship companies, to divide opinion in
the United States so that President Wilson would not be supported if he
broke diplomatic relations.

Germany, as I have pointed out, has been conducting a two-faced
propaganda. While working in the United States through her agents and
reservists to create the impression that Germany was friendly, the
Government laboured to prepare the German people for war. The policy
was to make the American people believe Germany would never do anything
to bring the United States into the war, but to convince the German
public that America was not neutral and that President Wilson was
scheming against the German race. Germany was Janus-headed. Head
No. 1 said:

"America, you are a great nation. We want your friendship and
neutrality. We have close business and blood relations, and these
should not be broken. Germany is not the barbaric nation her enemies
picture her."

Head No. 2, turned toward the German people, said:

"Germans, President Wilson is anti-German. He wants to prevent us from
starting an unlimited submarine war. America has never been neutral,
because Washington permits the ammunition factories to supply the
Allies. These factories are killing your relatives. We have millions
of German-Americans who will support us. It will not be long until
Mexico will declare war on the United States, and our reservists will
fight for Mexico. Don't be afraid if Wilson breaks diplomatic
relations."

The German press invasion of America began at the beginning of the war.
Dr. Dernburg was the first envoy. He was sent to New York by the same
Foreign Office officials and the same Krupp interests which control the
Overseas agency. Having failed here, he returned to Berlin. There was
only one thing to save German propaganda in America. That was to
mobolise the Sayville and Tuckerton wireless stations, and Germany did
it immediately.

At the beginning of the war, when the British censors refused the
American correspondents in Germany the right of telegraphing to the
United States via England, the Berlin Government granted permission to
the United Press, The Associated Press and the _Chicago Daily News_ to
send wireless news via Sayville. At first this news was edited by the
correspondents of these associations and newspapers in Berlin. Later,
when the individual correspondents began to demand more space on the
wireless, the news sent jointly to these papers was cut down. This
unofficial league of American papers was called the "War-Union." The
news which this union sent was German, but it was written by trained
American writers. When the Government saw the value of this service to
the United States it began to send wireless news of its own. Then the
Krupp interests appeared, and the Overseas News Agency was organised.
At that moment the Krupp invasion of the United States began and
contributed 800,000 marks annually to this branch of propaganda alone.

Dr. Hammann, for ten years chief of the Berlin Foreign Office
propaganda department, was selected as president of the Overseas News
Agency. The Krupp interests, which had been subscribing 400,000 marks
annually to this agency, subscribed the same amount to the reorganised
company. Then, believing that another agency could be organised,
subscribed 400,000 marks more to the Transocean News Agency. Because
there was so much bitterness and rivalry between the officials of the
two concerns, the Government stepped in and informed the Overseas News
Agency that it could send only "political news," while the Trans-ocean
was authorised to send "economic and social news" via Sayville and
Tuckerton.

This news, however, was not solely for the United States. Krupp's eyes
were on Mexico and South America, so agents were appointed in
Washington and New York to send the Krupp-bred wireless news from New
York by cable to South America and Mexico. Obviously the same news
which was sent to the United States could not be telegraphed to Mexico
and South America, because Germany had a different policy toward these
countries. The United States was on record against an unlimited
submarine warfare. Mexico and South America were not. Brazil, which
has a big German population, was considered an un-annexed German
colony. News to Brazil, therefore, had to be coloured differently than
news to New York. Some of the colouring was done in Berlin; some in
New York by Krupp's agents here. As a result of Germany's anti-United
States propaganda in South America and Mexico, these countries did not
follow President Wilson when he broke diplomatic relations with Berlin.
While public sentiment might have been against Germany, it was, to a
certain degree, antagonistic to the United States.

Obviously, Germany had to have friends in this country to assist her,
or what was being done would be traced too directly to the German
Government. So Germany financed willing German-Americans in their
propaganda schemes. And because no German could cross the ocean except
with a falsified neutral passport, Germany had to depend upon
German-Americans with American passports to bring information over.
These German-Americans, co-operating with some of the Americans in
Berlin, kept informing the Foreign Office, the army and navy as well as
influential Reichstag members that the real power behind the government
over here was not the press and public opinion but the nine million
Americans who were directly or indirectly related to Germany. During
this time the Government felt so sure that it could rely upon the
so-called German-Americans that the Government considered them as a
German asset whenever there was a submarine crisis.

When Henry Morgenthau, former American Ambassador to Turkey, passed
through Berlin, en route to the United States, he conferred with
Zimmermann, who was then Under Secretary of State. During the course
of one of their conversations Zimmermann said the United States would
never go to war with Germany, "because the German-Americans would
revolt." That was one of Zimmermann's hobbies. Zimmermann told other
American officials and foreign correspondents that President Wilson
would not be able to bring the United States to the brink of war,
because the "German-Americans were too powerful."

But Zimmermann was not making these statements upon his own authority.
He was being kept minutely advised about conditions here through the
German spy system and by German-American envoys, who came to Berlin to
report on progress the German-Americans were making here in politics
and in Congress.

Zimmermann was so "dead sure" he was right in expecting a large portion
of Americans to be disloyal that one time during a conversation with
Ambassador Gerard he said that he believed Wilson was only bluffing in
his submarine notes. When Zimmermann was Under Secretary of State I
used to see him very often. His conversation would contain questions
like these:

"Well, how is your English President? Why doesn't your President do
something against England?"

Zimmermann was always in close touch with the work of Captains von
Papen and Boy-Ed when they were in this country. He was one of the
chief supports of the little group of intriguers in Berlin who directed
German propaganda here. Zimmermann was the man who kept Baron Mumm von
Schwarzenstein, former Ambassador to Tokyo, in the Foreign Office in
Berlin as chief of foreign propaganda and intrigue in America and
China. Mumm had been here as Minister Extra-ordinary several years ago
and knew how Germany's methods could be used to the best purpose,
namely, to divide American sentiment. Then, when Zimmermann succeeded
Jagow he ousted Mumm because Mumm had become unpopular with higher
Government authorities.

One day in Berlin, just before the recall of the former German military
and naval attaches in Washington, I asked Zimmermann whether Germany
sanctioned what these men had been doing. He replied that Germany
approved everything they had done "because they had done nothing more
than try to keep America out of the war; to prevent American goods
reaching the Allies and to persuade Germans and those of German descent
not to work in ammunition factories." The same week I overheard in a
Berlin cafe two reserve naval officers discuss plans for destroying
Allied ships sailing from American ports. One of these men was an
escaped officer of an interned liner at Newport News. He had escaped
to Germany by way of Italy. That afternoon when I saw Ambassador
Gerard I told him of the conversation of these two men, and also what
Zimmermann had said. The Ambassador had just received instructions
from Washington about Boy-Ed and von Papen.

Gerard was furious.

"Go tell Zimmermann," he said, "for God's sake to leave America alone.
If he keeps this up he'll drag us into the war. The United States
won't stand this sort of thing indefinitely."

That evening I went back to the Foreign Office and saw Zimmermann for a
few minutes. I asked him why it was that Germany, which was at peace
with the United States, was doing everything within her power to make
war.

"Why, Germany is not doing anything to make you go to war," he replied.
"Your President seems to want war. Germany is not responsible for what
the German-Americans are doing. They are your citizens, not ours.
Germany must not be held responsible for what those people do."

Had it not been for the fact that the American Government was fully
advised about Zimmermann's intrigues in the United States this remark
might be accepted on its face. The United States knew that Germany was
having direct negotiations with German-Americans in the United States.
Men came to Germany with letters of introduction from leading
German-Americans here, with the expressed purpose of trying to get
Germany to stop its propaganda here. What they did do was to assure
Germany that the German-Americans would never permit the United States
to be drawn into the war. Because of their high recommendations from
Germans here some of them had audiences with the Kaiser.

Germany had been supporting financially some Americans, as the State
Department has proof of checks which have been given to American
citizens for propaganda and spy work.

I know personally of one instance where General Director Heinicken, of
the North German-Lloyd, gave an American in Berlin $1,000 for his
reports on American conditions. The name cannot be mentioned because
there are no records to prove the transaction, although the man
receiving this money came to me and asked me to transmit $250 to his
mother through the United Press office. I refused.

When Zimmermann began to realise that Germany's threatening propaganda
in the United States and Germany's plots against American property were
not succeeding in frightening the United States away from war, he began
to look forward to the event of war. He saw, as most Germans did, that
it would be a long time before the United States could get forces to
Europe in a sufficient number to have a decisive effect upon the war.
He began to plan with the General Staff and the Navy to league Mexico
against America for two purposes. One, Germany figured that a war with
Mexico would keep the United States army and navy busy over here.
Further, Zimmermann often said to callers that if the United States
went to war with Mexico it would not be possible for American factories
to send so much ammunition and so many supplies to the Allies.

German eyes turned to Mexico. As soon as President Wilson recognised
Carranza as President, Germany followed with a formal recognition.
Zubaran Capmany, who had been Mexican representative in Washington, was
sent to Berlin as Carranza's Minister. Immediately upon his arrival
Zimmermann began negotiations with him. Reports of the negotiations
were sent to Washington. The State Department was warned that unless
the United States solved the "Mexican problem" immediately Germany
would prepare to attack us through Mexico. German reservists were
tipped off to be ready to go to Mexico upon a moment's notice. Count
von Bernstorff and the German Consuls in the United States were
instructed, and Bernstorff, who was acting as the general director of
German interests in North and South America, was told to inform the
German officials in the Latin-American countries. At the same time
German financial interests began to purchase banks, farms and mines in
Mexico.

CHAPTER V

THE DOWNFALL OF VON TIRPITZ AND VON FALKENHAYN

After the sinking of the _Arabic_ the German Foreign Office intimated
to the United States Government and to the American correspondents that
methods of submarine warfare would be altered and that ships would be
warned before they were torpedoed. But when the Navy heard that the
Foreign Office was inclined to listen to Mr. Wilson's protests it made
no attempt to conceal its opposition. Gottlieb von Jagow, the
Secretary of State, although he was an intimate friend of the Kaiser
and an officer in the German Army, was at heart a pacifist. Every time
an opportunity presented itself he tried to mobilise the peace forces
of the world to make peace. From time to time, the German financiers
and propaganda leaders in the United States, as well as influential
Germans in the neutral European countries, sent out peace "feelers."
Von Jagow realised that the sooner peace was made, the better it would
be for Germany and the easier it would be for the Foreign Office to
defeat the military party at home. He saw that the more victories the
army had and the more victories it could announce to the people the
more lustful the General Staff would be for a war of exhaustion. Army
leaders have always had more confidence in their ability to defeat the
world than the Foreign Office. The army looked at the map of Europe
and saw so many hundred thousand square miles of territory under
occupation. The Foreign Office saw Germany in its relation to the
world. Von Jagow knew that every new square mile of territory gained
was being paid for, not only by the cost of German blood, but by the
more terrible cost of public opinion and German influence abroad. But
Germany was under martial law and the Foreign Office had nothing to say
about military plans. The Foreign Office also had little to say about
naval warfare. The Navy was building submarines as fast as it could
and the number of ships lost encouraged the people to believe that the
more intensified the submarine war became, the quicker the war would
end in Germany's favour. So the Navy kept sinking ships and relying
upon the Foreign Office to make excuses and keep America out of the war.

The repeated violations of the pledges made by the Foreign Office to
the United States aroused American public opinion to white heat, and
justly so, because the people here did not understand that the real
submarine crisis was not between President Wilson and Berlin but
between Admiral von Tirpitz and Secretary von Jagow and their
followers. President Wilson was at the limit of his patience with
Germany and the German people, who were becoming impatient over the
long drawn out proceedings, began to accept the inspired thinking of
the Navy and to believe that Wilson was working for the defeat of
Germany by interfering with submarine activities.

On February 22nd, 1916, in one of my despatches I said: "The patient
attitude toward America displayed during the _Lusitania_ negotiations,
it is plain to-day, no longer exists because of the popular feeling
that America has already hindered so many of Germany's plans." At that
time it appeared to observers in Berlin that unless President Wilson
could show more patience than the German Government the next submarine
accident would bring about a break in relations. Commenting on this
despatch the _Indianapolis News_ the next day said:

"In this country the people feel that all the patience has been shown
by their government. We believe that history will sustain that view.
Almost ten months ago more than 100 American citizens were deliberately
done to death by the German Government, for it is understood that the
submarine commander acted under instructions, and that Germany refuses
to disavow on the ground that the murderous act was the act of the
German Government. Yet, after all this time, the _Lusitania_ case is
still unsettled. The administration has, with marvellous
self-restraint, recognised that public opinion in Germany was not
normal, and for that reason it has done everything in its power to
smooth the way to a settlement by making it as easy as possible for the
Imperial Government to meet our just demands. Indeed, the President
has gone so far as to expose himself to severe criticism at home. We
believe that he would have been sustained if he had, immediately after
the sinking of the _Lusitania_, broken off diplomatic relations.

"But he has stood out against public opinion in his own country, waited
ten months for an answer, and done everything that he could in honour
due to soften the feeling here. Yet just on the eve of a settlement
that would have been unsatisfactory to many of our people, Germany
announced the policy that we had condemned as illegal, and that plainly
is illegal. The trouble in Berlin is an utter inability to see
anything wrong in the attack on the _Lusitania_, or to appreciate the
sense of horror that was stirred in this country by it. The idea seems
to be that the policy of frightfulness could be extended to the high
seas without in any way shocking the American people. Nothing has come
from Berlin that indicates any feeling of guilt on the part of the
German people or their Government.

"In the United States, on the contrary, the act is regarded as one of
the blackest crimes of history. And yet, in spite of that feeling, we
have waited patiently for ten months in the hope that the German
Government would do justice, and clear its name of reproach. Yet now
we are told that it is Germany that has shown a 'patient attitude,' the
implication or insinuation being that our long suffering administration
has been unreasonable and impatient. That will not be the verdict of
history, as it is not the verdict of our own people. We have made
every allowance for the conditions existing in Germany, and have
resolutely refused to take advantage of her distress. We doubt whether
there is any other government in the world that would have shown the
patience and moderation, under like provocation, that have been shown
by the American Government in these _Lusitania_ negotiations."

I sent the editorial to von Jagow, who returned it the next day with
the brief comment on one of his calling cards: "With many thanks."

About this time Count Reventlow and the other naval writers began to
refer to everything President Wilson did as a "bluff." When Col. E. M.
House came to Berlin early in 1916, he tried to impress the officials
with the fact that Mr. Wilson was not only not bluffing, but that the
American people would support him in whatever he did in dealing with
the German Government. Mr. Gerard tried too to impress the Foreign
Office but because he could only deal with that branch of the
Government, he could not change the Navy's impression, which was that
Wilson would never take a definite stand against Germany. On the 8th
of February, the _London Times_ printed the following despatch which I
had sent to the United States:

"Mr. Gerard has been accused of not being forceful enough in dealing
with the Berlin Foreign Office. In Berlin he has been criticised for
just the opposite. It has been stated frequently that he was too
aggressive. The Ambassador's position was that he must carry out Mr.
Wilson's ideas. So he tried for days and weeks to impress officials
with the seriousness of the situation. At the critical point in the
negotiations various unofficial diplomats began to arrive and they
seriously interfered with negotiations. One of these was a politician
who through his credentials from Mr. Bryan met many high officials, and
informed them that President Wilson was writing his notes for 'home
consumption.' Mr. Gerard, however, appealed to Washington to know what
was meant by the moves of this American with authority from Mr. Bryan.
This was the beginning of the reason for Secretary Bryan's resigning.

"Secretary Bryan had informed also former Ambassador Dumba that the
United States would never take any position against Germany even though
it was hinted so in the _Lusitania_ note. Dumba telegraphed this to
Vienna and Berlin was informed immediately. Because of Mr. Gerard's
personal friendship and personal association with Secretary of State
von Jagow and Under Secretary of State Zimmermann, he was acquainted
with Secretary Bryan's move. He telegraphed to President Wilson and
the result was the resignation of Mr. Bryan."

In December, the _Ancona_ was torpedoed and it was officially explained
that the act was that of an Austrian submarine commander. Wilson's
note to Vienna brought about a near rupture between Austria-Hungary and
Germany because Austria and Hungary at that time were much opposed to
Germany's submarine methods. Although the submarines operating in the
Mediterranean were flying the Austrian flag, they were German
submarines, and members of the crews were German. Throughout the life
of the Emperor Franz Josef the Dual Monarchy was ruled, not from
Vienna, but from Budapest by Count Stefan Tisza, the Hungarian Premier.
I was in Budapest at the time and one evening saw Count Tisza at his
palace, which stands on the rocky cliff opposite the main part of
Budapest, and which overlooks the valley of the Danube for many miles.
Tisza, as well as all Hungarians, is pro-American before he is
pro-German.

"To think of trouble between Austria-Hungary and the United States is
sheer nonsense," he said in his quiet but forceful manner. "I must
confess, however, that we were greatly surprised to get the American
note. It is far from our intention to get into any quarrel with
America. Perhaps I should not say quarrel, because I know it would not
be that, but of course matters do not depend upon us entirely. There
is no reason for any trouble over the _Ancona_ question. It must be
settled satisfactorily," he said emphatically, "not only from the
standpoint of the United States, but from our standpoint."

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