Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman

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To understand Germany's resentment over Mr. Wilson's interference with
the submarine warfare, three things must be taken into consideration.

1. The Allies' charge that all Germans are "Huns and Barbarians."

2. The battle of the Marne and the shipment of arms and ammunition from
the United States.

3. The intrigue and widening breach between the Army and Navy and the
Foreign Office.

I

One weapon the Allies used against Germany, which was more effective
than all others, was the press. When the English and French indicted
the Germans as "Barbarians and Huns," as "pirates," and "uncivilised"
Europeans, it cut the Germans to the quick; it affected men and women
so terribly that Germans feared these attacks more than they did the
combined military might of their enemies. This is readily understood
when one realises that before the war the thing the Germans prided
themselves on was their commerce and their civilisation,--their Kultur.
Before the war, the world was told by every German what the nation had
done for the poor; what strides the scientists had made in research
work and what progress the business men had made in extending their
commerce at the expense of competitors.

While some government officials foresaw the disaster which would come
to Germany if this national vanity was paraded before the whole world,
their advice and counsel were ignored. Consul General Kiliani, the
Chief German official in Australia before the war, told me he had
reported repeatedly to the Foreign Office that German business men were
injuring their own opportunities by bragging so much of what they had
done, and what they would do. He said if it continued the whole world
would be leagued against Germany; that public opinion would be so
strong against German goods that they would lose their markets.
Germany made the whole world fear her commercial might by this foolish
bragging.

So when the war broke out and Germans were attacked for being
uncivilised in Belgium, for breaking treaties and for disregarding the
opinion of the world, it was but natural that German vanity should
resent it. Germans feared nothing but God and public opinion. They
had such exalted faith in their army they believed they could gain by
Might what they had lost in prestige throughout the world. This is one
of the reasons the German people arose like one man when war was
declared. They wished and were ready to show the world that they were
the greatest people ever created.

II

The German explanation of why they lost the battle of the Marne is
interesting, not alone because of the explanation of the defeat, but
because it shows why the shipment of arms and ammunition from the
United States was such a poisonous pill to the army. Shortly after my
arrival in Berlin Dr. Alfred Zimmermann, then Under Secretary of State,
said the greatest scandal in Germany after the war would be the
investigation of the reasons for the shortage of ammunition in
September, 1914. He did not deny that Germany was prepared for a great
war. He must have known at the time what the Director of the Post and
Telegraph knew on the 2nd of August, 1914, when he wrote Announcement
No. 3. The German Army must have known the same thing and if it had
prepared for war, as every German admits it had, then preparations were
made to fight nine nations. But there was one thing which Germany
failed to take into consideration, Zimmermann said, and that was the
shipment of supplies from the United States. Then, he added, there
were two reasons why the battle of the Marne was lost: one, because
there was not sufficient ammunition; and, two, because the reserves
were needed to stop the Russian invasion of East Prussia. I asked him
whether Germany did not have enormous stores of ammunition on hand when
the war began. He said there was sufficient ammunition for a short
campaign, but that the Ministry of War had not mobilised sufficient
ammunition factories to keep up the supplies. He said this was the
reason for the downfall of General von Herringen, who was Minister of
War at the beginning of hostilities.

After General von Kluck was wounded and returned to his villa in
Wilmersdorf, a suburb of Berlin, I took a walk with him in his garden
and discussed the Marne. He confirmed what Zimmermann stated about the
shortage of ammunition and added that he had to give up his reserves to
General von Hindenburg, who had been ordered by the Kaiser to drive the
Russians from East Prussia.

III

At the very beginning of the war, although no intimations were
permitted to reach the outside world, there was a bitter controversy
between the Foreign Office, as headed by the Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg; the Navy Department, headed by Grand Admiral von
Tirpitz, and General von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff. The
Chancellor delayed mobilisation of the German Army three days. For
this he never has and never will be forgiven by the military
authorities. During those stirring days of July and August, when
General von Moltke, von Tirpitz, von Falkenhayn, Krupps and the Rhine
Valley Industrial leaders were clamouring for war and for an invasion
of Belgium, the Kaiser was being urged by the Chancellor and the
Foreign Office to heed the proposals of Sir Edward Grey for a Peace
Conference. But the Kaiser, who was more of a soldier than a
statesman, sided with his military friends. The war was on, not only
between Germany and the Entente, but between the Foreign Office and the
Army and Navy. This internal fight which began in July, 1914, became
Germany's bitterest struggle and from time to time the odds went from
one side to another. The Army accused the diplomats of blundering in
starting the war. The Foreign Office replied that it was the lust for
power and victory which poisoned the military leaders which caused the
war. Belgium was invaded against the counsel of the Foreign Office.
But when the Chancellor was confronted with the actual invasion and the
violation of the treaty, he was compelled by force of circumstance, by
his position and responsibility to the Kaiser to make his famous speech
in the Reichstag in which he declared: "Emergency knows no law."

But when the allied fleet swept German ships from the high seas and
isolated a nation which had considered its international commerce one
of its greatest assets, considerable animosity developed between the
Army and Navy. The Army accused the Navy of stagnation. Von Tirpitz,
who had based his whole naval policy upon a great navy, especially upon
battleship and cruiser units, was confronted by his military friends
with the charge that he was not prepared. As early as 1908 von Tirpitz
had opposed the construction of submarines. Speaking in the Reichstag
when naval appropriations were debated, he said Germany should rely
upon a battleship fleet and not upon submarines. But when he saw his
great inactive Navy in German waters, he switched to the submarine idea
of a blockade of England. In February, 1915, he announced his
submarine blockade of England with the consent of the Kaiser, but
without the approval of the Foreign Office.

By this time the cry, "Gott strafe England," had become the most
popular battle shout in Germany. The von Tirpitz blockade announcement
made this battlecry real. It made him the national hero. The German
press, which at that time was under three different censors, turned its
entire support over night to the von Tirpitz plan. The Navy
Department, which even then was not only anti-British but
anti-American, wanted to sink every ship on the high seas. When the
United States lodged its protests on February 12th the German Navy
wanted to ignore it. The Foreign Office was inclined to listen to
President Wilson's arguments. Even the people, while they were
enthusiastic for a submarine war, did not want to estrange America if
they could prevent it. The von Tirpitz press bureau, which knew that
public opposition to its plan could be overcome by raising the cry that
America was not neutral in aiding the Allies with supplies, launched an
anti-American campaign. It came to a climax one night when Ambassador
Gerard was attending a theatre party. As he entered the box he was
recognised by a group of Germans who shouted insulting remarks because
he spoke English. Then some one else remarked that America was not
neutral by shipping arms and ammunition.

The Foreign Office apologised the next day but the Navy did not. And,
instead of listening to the advice of Secretary of State von Jagow, the
Navy sent columns of inspired articles to the newspapers attacking
President Wilson and telling the German people that the United States
had joined the Entente in spirit if not in action.

CHAPTER III

THE GULF BETWEEN KIEL AND BERLIN

At the beginning of the war, even the Socialist Party in the Reichstag
voted the Government credits. The press and the people unanimously
supported the Government because there was a very terrorising fear that
Russia was about to invade Germany and that England and France were
leagued together to crush the Fatherland. Until the question of the
submarine warfare came up, the division of opinion which had already
developed between the Army and Navy clique and the Foreign Office was
not general among the people. Although the army had not taken Paris, a
great part of Belgium and eight provinces of Northern France were
occupied and the Russians had been driven from East Prussia. The
German people believed they were successful. The army was satisfied
with what it had done and had great plans for the future. Food and
economic conditions had changed very little as compared to the changes
which were to take place before 1917. Supplies were flowing into
Germany from all neutral European countries. Even England and Russia
were selling goods to Germany indirectly through neutral countries.
Considerable English merchandise, as well as American products, came in
by way of Holland because English business men were making money by the
transaction and because the English Government had not yet discovered
leaks in the blockade. Two-thirds of the butter supply in Berlin was
coming from Russia. Denmark was sending copper. Norway was sending
fish and valuable oils. Sweden was sending horses and cattle. Italy
was sending fruit. Spanish sardines and olives were reaching German
merchants. There was no reason to be dissatisfied with the way the war
was going. And, besides, the German people hated their enemies so that
the leaders could count upon continued support for almost an indefinite
period. The cry of "Hun and Barbarian" was answered with the battle
cry "Gott strafe England."

The latter part of April on my first trip to the front I dined at Great
Headquarters (Grosse Haupt Quartier) in Charleville, France, with Major
Nicolai, Chief of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff.
The next day, in company with other correspondents, we were guests of
General von Moehl and his staff at Peronne. From Peronne we went to
the Somme front to St. Quentin, to Namur and Brussels. The soldiers
were enthusiastic and happy. There was plenty of food and considerable
optimism. But the confidence in victory was never so great as it was
immediately after the sinking of the _Lusitania_. That marked the
crisis in the future trend of the war.

Up to this time the people had heard very little about the fight
between the Navy and the Foreign Office. But gradually rumours spread.
While there was previously no outlet for public opinion, the
_Lusitania_ issue was debated more extensively and with more vigour
than the White Books which were published to explain the causes of the
war.

With the universal feeling of self confidence, it was but natural that
the people should side with the Navy in demanding an unrestricted
submarine warfare. When Admiral von Bachmann gave the order to First
Naval Lieutenant Otto Steinbrink to sink the Lusitania, he knew the
Navy was ready to defy the United States or any other country which
might object. He knew, too, that von Tirpitz was very close to the
Kaiser and could count upon the Kaiser's support in whatever he did.
The Navy believed the torpedoing of the Lusitania would so frighten and
terrorise the world that neutral shipping would become timid and enemy
peoples would be impressed by Germany's might on the seas. Ambassador
von Bernstorff had been ordered by the Foreign Office to put notices in
the American papers warning Americans off these ships. The Chancellor
and Secretary von Jagow knew there was no way to stop the Admiralty,
and they wanted to avoid, if possible, the loss of American lives.

The storm of indignation which encircled the globe when reports were
printed that over a thousand people lost their lives on the Lusitania,
found a sympathetic echo in the Berlin Foreign Office. "Another navy
blunder," the officials said--confidentially. Foreign Office officials
tried to conceal their distress because the officials knew the only
thing they could do now was to make preparation for an apology and try
to excuse in the best possible way what the navy had done. On the 17th
of May like a thunderbolt from a clear sky came President Wilson's
first Lusitania note.

"Recalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the
Imperial German Government in matters of international life,
particularly with regard to the freedom of the seas; having learned to
recognise German views and German influence in the field of
international obligations as always engaged upon the side of justice
and humanity;" the note read, "and having understood the instructions
of the Imperial German Government to its naval commanders to be upon
the same plane of human action as those prescribed by the naval codes
of other nations, the government of the United States is loath to
believe--it cannot now bring itself to believe--that these acts so
absolutely contrary to the rules and practices and spirit of modern
warfare could have the countenance or sanction of that great
government. . . . Manifestly submarines cannot be used against
merchantmen as the last few weeks have shown without an inevitable
violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. American
citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and
in travelling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the
high seas, and exercise those rights in what should be a well justified
confidence that their lives will not be endangered by acts done in
clear violation of universally acknowledged international obligations
and certainly in the confidence that their own government will sustain
them in the exercise of their rights."

And then the note which Mr. Gerard handed von Jagow concluded with
these words:

"It (The United States) confidently expects therefore that the Imperial
German Government will disavow the acts of which the United States
complains, that they will make reparation as far as reparation is
possible for injuries which are without measure, and that they will
take immediate steps to prevent the recurrence of anything so obviously
subversive of the principles of warfare, for which the Imperial German
Government in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. The
Government and people of the United States look to the Imperial German
Government for just, prompt and enlightened action in this vital
matter. . . . Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in the
case of neutral ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy
international obligations if no loss of life results, cannot justify or
excuse a practice, the natural necessary effect of which is to subject
neutral nations or neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks. The
Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United
States to omit any word, or any act, necessary to the performance of
its sacred duty of maintaining the rights of the United States and its
citizens, and of safeguarding their free exercise and enjoyment."

Never in history had a neutral nation indicted another as the United
States did Germany in its first _Lusitania_ note without immediately
going to war. Because the Foreign Office feared the reaction it might
have upon the people, the newspapers were not permitted to publish the
text until the press bureaus of the Navy and the Foreign Office had
mobilised the editorial writers and planned a publicity campaign to
follow the note's publication. But the Navy and Foreign Office could
not agree on what should be done. The Navy wanted to ignore Wilson.
Naval officers laughed at President Wilson's impertinence and, when the
Foreign Office sent to the Admiralty for all data in possession of the
Navy Department regarding the sinking of the _Lusitania_ the Navy
refused to acknowledge the request.

During this time I was in constant touch with the Foreign Office and
the American Embassy. Frequently I went to the Navy Department but was
always told they had nothing to say. When it appeared, however, that
there might he a break in diplomatic relations over the Lusitania the
Kaiser called the Chancellor to Great Headquarters for a conference.
Meanwhile Germany delayed her reply to the American note because the
Navy and Foreign Office were still at loggerheads. On the 31st of May
von Jagow permitted me to quote him in an interview saying:

"America can hardly expect us to give up any means at our disposal to
fight our enemy. It is a principle with us to defend ourselves in
every possible way. I am sure that Americans will be reasonable enough
to believe that our two countries cannot discuss the _Lusitania_ matter
_until both have the same basis of facts_."

The American people were demanding an answer from Germany and because
the two branches of the Government could not agree on what should be
said von Jagow had to do something to gain time. Germany, therefore,
submitted in her reply of the 28th of May certain facts about the
_Lusitania_ for the consideration of the American Government saying
that Germany reserved final statements of its position with regard "to
the demands made in connection with the sinking of the _Lusitania_
until a reply was received from the American Government." After the
note was despatched the chasm between the Navy and Foreign Office was
wider than ever. Ambassador Gerard, who went to the Foreign Office
daily, to try to convince the officials that they were antagonising the
whole world by their attitude on the _Lusitania_ question, returned to
the Embassy one day after a conference with Zimmermann and began to
prepare a scrap book of cartoons and clippings from American
newspapers. Two secretaries were put to work pasting the comments,
interviews, editorials and cartoons reflecting American opinion in the
scrap book. Although the German Foreign Office had a big press
department its efforts were devoted more to furnishing the outside
world with German views than with collecting outside opinions for the
information of the German Government. Believing that this information
would be of immeasurable benefit to the German diplomats in sounding
the depths of public sentiment in America, Gerard delivered the book to
von Jagow personally.

In the meantime numerous conferences were held at Great Headquarters.
Financiers, business men and diplomats who wanted to keep peace with
America sided with the Foreign Office. Every anti-American influence
in the Central Powers joined forces with the Navy. The _Lusitania_
note was printed and the public discussion which resulted was greater
than that which followed the first declarations of war in August, 1914.
The people, who before had accepted everything their Government said,
began to think for themselves. One heard almost as much criticism as
praise of the _Lusitania_ incident. For the first time the quarrel,
which had been nourished between the Foreign Office and the Admiralty,
became nation-wide and forces throughout Germany lined up with one side
or the other. But the Navy Department was the cleverer of the two.
The press bureau sent out inspired stories that the submarines were
causing England a loss of a million dollars a week. They said that
every week the Admiralty was launching two U-boats. It was stated that
reliable reports to Admiral von Tirpitz proved the high toll taken by
the submarines in two weeks had struck terror to the hearts of English
ship-owners. The newspapers printed under great headlines: "Toll of
Our Tireless U-Boats," the names and tonnage of ships lost. The press
bureau pointed to the rise in food prices in Great Britain and France.
The public was made to feel a personal pride in submarine exploits.
And at the same time the Navy editorial writers brought up the old
issue of American arms and ammunition to further embitter the people.

Thus the first note which President Wilson wrote in the _Lusitania_
case not only brought the quarrel between the Navy and Foreign Office
to a climax but it gave the German people the first opportunity they
had had seriously to discuss questions of policy and right.

In the Rhine Valley, where the ammunition interests dominated every
phase of life, the Navy found its staunchest supporters. In
educational circles, in shipping centres, such as Hamburg and Bremen,
in the financial districts of Frankfort and Berlin, the Foreign Office
received its support. Press and Reichstag were divided. Supporting
the Foreign Office were the _Lokal Anzeiger_, the _Berliner Tageblatt_,
the _Cologne Gazette_, the _Frankforter Zeitung_, the _Hamburger
Fremdemblatt_, and the _Vorwaerts_.

The Navy had the support of Count Reventlow, Naval Critic of the
_Deutsche Tageszeitung_, the _Taeglische Rundscha_, the _Vossische
Zeitung_, the _Morgen Post_, the _B. Z. Am Mittag_, the _Muenchener
Neueste Nachrichten_, the _Rheinische Westfaelische Zeitung_, and the
leading Catholic organ, the _Koelnische Volks-Zeitung_.

Government officials were also divided. Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg led the party which demanded an agreement with the
United States. He was supported by von Jagow, Zimmermann, Dr. Karl
Helfferich, Secretary of the Treasury; Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister;
Dr. Siegfried Heckscher, Vice Chairman of the Reichstag Committee on
Foreign Relations; and Philip Scheidemann, leader of the majority of
the Socialists in the Reichstag.

The opposition was led by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. He was supported
by General von Falkenhayn, Field Marshal von Mackensen and all army
generals; Admirals von Pohl and von Bachmann; Major Bassermann, leader
of the National Liberal Party in the Reichstag; Dr. Gustav Stressemann,
member of the Reichstag and Director of the North German Lloyd
Steamship Company; and von Heydebrand, the so-called "Uncrowned King of
Prussia," because of his control of the Prussian Diet.

With these forces against each other the internal fight continued more
bitter than ever. President Wilson kept insisting upon definite
promises from Germany but the Admiralty still had the upper hand.
There was nothing for the Foreign Office to do except to make the best
possible excuses and depend upon Wilson's patience to give them time to
get into the saddle. The Navy Department, however, was so confident
that it had the Kaiser's support in everything it did, that one of the
submarines was instructed to sink the _Arabic_.

President Wilson's note in the _Arabic_ case again brought the
submarine dispute within Germany to a head. Conferences were again
held at Great Headquarters. The Chancellor, von Jagow, Helfferich, von
Tirpitz and other leaders were summoned by the Kaiser. On the 28th of
August I succeeded in sending by courier to The Hague the following
despatch:

"With the support of the Kaiser, the German Chancellor, Dr. von
Bethmann-Hollweg, is expected to win the fight he is now making for a
modification of Germany's submarine warfare that will forever settle
the difficulties with America over the sinking of the _Lusitania_ and
the _Arabic_. Both the Chancellor and von Jagow are most anxious to
end at once and for all time the controversies with Washington desiring
America's friendship." (Published in the Chicago _Tribune_, August
29th, 1915.)

"The Marine Department, headed by von Tirpitz, creator of the submarine
policy, will oppose any disavowal of the action of German's submarines.
But the Kaiser is expected to approve the steps the Chancellor and
Foreign Secretary contemplate taking, swinging the balance in favour of
von Bethmann-Hollweg's contention that ships in the future must be
warned before they are torpedoed."

One day I went to the Foreign Office and told one of the officials I
believed that if the American people knew what a difficult time the
Foreign Office was having in trying to win out over the Admiralty that
public opinion in the United States might be mobilised to help the
Foreign Office against the Admiralty. I took with me a brief despatch
which I asked him to pass. He censored it with the understanding that
I would never disclose his name in case the despatch was read in
Germany.

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