Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman

C >> Carl W. Ackerman >> Germany, The Next Republic?

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16

"This explanation of the great decision is an absurd mistake, but the
pacifists have had some excuses for making it. They have seen a great
democratic nation gradually forced into war, in spite of the manifest
indifference or reluctance of the majority of its population; and they
have rightly attributed the successful pressure to the ability of a
small but influential minority to impose its will on the rest of the
country. But the numerically insignificant class whose influence has
been successfully exerted in favour of American participation does not
consist of the bankers and the capitalists. Neither will they be the
chief beneficiaries of American participation. The bankers and the
capitalists have favoured war, but they have favoured it without
realising the extent to which it would injure their own interests, and
their support has been one of the most formidable political obstacles
to American participation. The effective and decisive work on behalf
of war has been accomplished by an entirely different class--a class
which must be comprehensively but loosely described as the
'intellectuals.'

"The American nation is entering this war under the influence of a
moral verdict reached, after the utmost deliberation by the more
thoughtful members of the community. They gradually came to a decision
that the attack made by Germany on the international order was
sufficiently flagrant and dangerous to justify this country in
abandoning its cherished isolation and in using its resources to bring
about German defeat. But these thoughtful people were always a small
minority. They were able to impose their will upon a reluctant or
indifferent majority partly because the increasingly offensive nature
of German military and diplomatic policy made plausible opposition to
American participation very difficult, but still more because of the
overwhelming preponderance of pro-Ally conviction in the intellectual
life of the country. If the several important professional and social
groups could have voted separately on the question of war and peace,
the list of college professors would probably have yielded the largest
majority in favour of war, except perhaps that contained in the Social
Register. A fighting anti-German spirit was more general among
physicians, lawyers and clergymen than it was among business
men--except those with Wall Street and banking connections. Finally,
it was not less general among writers on magazines and in the
newspapers. They popularised what the college professors had been
thinking. Owing to this consensus of influences opposition to pro-Ally
orthodoxy became intellectually somewhat disreputable, and when a final
decision had to be made this factor counted with unprecedented and
overwhelming force. College professors headed by a President who had
himself been a college professor contributed more effectively to the
decision in favour of war than did the farmers, the business men or the
politicians.

"When one considers the obstacles to American entrance into the war,
the more remarkable and unprecedented does the final decision become.
Every other belligerent had something immediate and tangible to gain by
participating and to lose by not participating. Either they were
invaded or were threatened with invasion. Either they dreaded the loss
of prestige or territory or coveted some kind or degree of national
aggrandisement. Even Australia and Canada, who had little or nothing
to gain from fighting, could not have refused to fight without severing
their connection with the British Empire, and behaving in a manner
which would have been considered treacherous by their fellow Britons.
But the American people were not forced into the war either by fears or
hopes or previously recognised obligations. On the contrary, the
ponderable and tangible realities of the immediate situation counselled
neutrality. They were revolted by the hideous brutality of the war and
its colossal waste. Participation must be purchased with a similarly
colossal diversion of American energy from constructive to destructive
work, the imposition of a similarly heavy burden upon the future
production of American labour. It implied the voluntary surrender of
many of those advantages which had tempted our ancestors to cross the
Atlantic and settle in the New World. As against these certain costs
there were no equally tangible compensations. The legal rights of
American citizens were, it is true, being violated, and the structure
of international law with which American security was traditionally
associated was being shivered, but the nation had weathered a similar
storm during the Napoleonic Wars and at that time participation in the
conflict had been wholly unprofitable. By spending a small portion of
the money which will have to be spent in helping the Allies to beat
Germany, upon preparations exclusively for defence, the American nation
could have protected for the time being the inviolability of its own
territory and its necessary communications with the Panama Canal. Many
considerations of national egotism counselled such a policy. But
although the Hearst newspapers argued most persuasively on behalf of
this course it did not prevail. The American nation allowed itself to
be captured by those upon whom the more remote and less tangible
reasons for participation acted with compelling authority. For the
first time in history a wholly independent nation has entered a great
and costly war under the influence of ideas rather than immediate
interests and without any expectation of gains, except those which can
be shared with all liberal and inoffensive nations.

"The United States might have blundered into the war at any time during
the past two years, but to have entered, as it is now doing, at the
right time and in the clear interest of a purely international
programme required the exercise of an intellectualised and imaginative
leadership. And in supplying the country with this leadership Mr.
Wilson was interpreting the ideas of thoughtful Americans who wished
their country to be fighting on the side of international right, but
not until the righteousness of the Allied cause was unequivocally
established. It has taken some time to reach this assurance. The war
originated in conflicting national ambitions among European Powers for
privileged economic and political positions in Africa and Asia, and if
it had continued to be a war of this kind there never could have been a
question of American intervention. Germany, however, had been dreaming
of a more glorious goal than Bagdad and a mightier heritage than that
of Turkey. She betrayed her dream by attacking France through Belgium
and by threatening the foundations of European order. The crucifying
of Belgium established a strong presumption against Germany, but the
case was not complete. There still remained the dubious origin of the
war. There still remained a doubt whether the defeat of German
militarism might not mean a dangerous triumph of Russian autocracy.
Above all there remained a more serious doubt whether the United States
in aiding the Allies to beat Germany might not be contributing merely
to the establishment of a new and equally unstable and demoralising
Balance of Power in Europe. It was well, consequently, to wait and see
whether the development of the war would not do away with some of the
ambiguities and misgivings, while at the same time to avoid doing
anything to embarrass the Allies. The waiting policy has served.
Germany was driven by the logic of her original aggression to threaten
the security of all neutrals connected with the rest of the world by
maritime communications. The Russian autocracy was overthrown, because
it betrayed its furtive kinship with the German autocracy. Finally,
President Wilson used the waiting period for the education of American
public opinion. His campaign speeches prophesied the abandonment of
American isolation in the interest of a League of Peace. His note of
last December to the belligerents brought out the sinister secrecy of
German peace terms and the comparative frankness of that of the Allies.
His address to the Senate clearly enunciated the only programme on
behalf of which America could intervene in European affairs. Never was
there a purer and more successful example of Fabian political strategy,
for Fabianism consists not merely in waiting but in preparing during
the meantime for the successful application of a plan to a confused and
dangerous situation.

"What Mr. Wilson did was to apply patience and brains to a complicated
and difficult but developing political situation. He was distinguished
from his morally indignant pro-Allies fellow countrymen, who a few
months ago were abusing him for seeking to make a specifically American
contribution to the issues of the war, just as Lincoln was
distinguished from the abolitionists, not so much by difference in
purposes as by greater political wisdom and intelligence. It is
because of his Fabianism, because he insisted upon waiting until he had
established a clear connection between American intervention and an
attempt to create a community of nations, that he can command and
secure for American intervention the full allegiance of the American
national conscience. His achievement is a great personal triumph, but
it is more than that. It is an illustration and a prophecy of the part
which intelligence and in general the 'intellectual' class have an
opportunity of playing in shaping American policy and in moulding
American life. The intimate association between action and ideas,
characteristic of American political practice at its best, has been
vindicated once more. The association was started at the foundation of
the Republic and was embodied in the work of the Fathers, but
particularly in that of Hamilton. It was carried on during the period
of the Civil War and was embodied chiefly in the patient and
penetrating intelligence which Abraham Lincoln brought to his task. It
has just been established in the region of foreign policy by Mr.
Wilson's discriminating effort to keep the United States out of the war
until it could go in as the instrument of an exclusively international
programme and with a fair prospect of getting its programme accepted.
In holding to this policy Mr. Wilson was interpreting with fidelity and
imagination the ideas and the aspirations of the more thoughtful
Americans. His success should give them increasing confidence in the
contribution which they as men of intelligence are capable of making to
the fulfilment of the better American national purposes."

During 1915 and 1916 our diplomatic relations with Germany have been
expressed in one series of notes after another, and the burden of
affairs has been as much on the shoulders of Ambassador Gerard as on
those of any other one American, for he has been the official who has
had to transmit, interpret and fight for our policies in Berlin. Mr.
Gerard had a difficult task because he, like President Wilson, was
constantly heckled and ridiculed by those pro-German Americans who were
more interested in discrediting the Administration than in maintaining
peace. Of all the problems with which the Ambassador had to contend,
the German-American issue was the greatest, and those who believed that
it was centred in the United States are mistaken, for the capital of
German-America was _Berlin_.

"I have had a great deal of trouble in Germany from the American
correspondents when they went there," said Ambassador Gerard in an
address to the American Newspapers Publishers Association in New York
on April 26th.

"Most of them became super-Ambassadors and proceeded to inform the
German Government that they must not believe me--that they must not
believe the President--they must not believe the American people--but
believe these people, and to a great extent this war is due to the fact
that these pro-German Americans, a certain number of them, misinformed
the German Government as to the sentiments of this country."

James W. Gerard's diplomatic career in Germany was based upon
bluntness, frankness and a kind of "news instinct" which caused him to
regard his position as that of a reporter for the United States
Government.

Berlin thought him the most unusual Ambassador it had ever known. It
never knew how to take him. He did not behave as other diplomats did.
When he went to the Foreign Office it was always on business. He did
not flatter and praise, bow and chat or speak to Excellencies in the
third person as European representatives usually do. Gerard began at
the beginning of the war a policy of keeping the United States fully
informed regarding Germany. He used to report daily the political
developments and the press comment, and the keen understanding which he
had of German methods was proved by his many forecasts of important
developments. Last September he predicted, in a message to the State
Department, ruthless submarine warfare before Spring unless peace was
made. He notified Washington last October to watch for German intrigue
in Mexico and said that unless we solved the problem there we might
have trouble throughout the war from Germans south of the Rio Grande.

[Illustration: AMBASSADOR GERARD ARRIVING IN PARIS]

During the submarine controversies, when reports reached Berlin that
the United States was divided and would not support President Wilson in
his submarine policy, Ambassador Gerard did everything he could to give
the opposite impression. He tried his best to keep Germany from
driving the United States into the war. That he did not succeed was
not the fault of _his_ efforts. Germany was desperate and willing to
disregard all nations and all international obligations in an attempt
to win the war with U-boats.

Last Summer, during one of the crises over the sinking of a passenger
liner without warning, Mr. Gerard asked the Chancellor for an audience
with the Kaiser. Von Bethmann-Hollweg said he would see if it could be
arranged. The Ambassador waited two weeks. Nothing was done. From
his friends in Berlin he learned that the Navy was opposed to such a
conference and would not give its consent. Mr. Gerard went to Herr von
Jagow who was then Secretary of State and again asked for an audience.
He waited another week. Nothing happened and Mr. Gerard wrote the
following note to the Chancellor:

"Your Excellency,

"Three weeks ago I asked for an audience with His Majesty the Kaiser.

"A week ago I repeated the request.

"Please do not trouble yourself further.

"Respectfully,

"JAMES W. GERARD."

The Ambassador called the Embassy messenger and sent the note to the
Chancellor's palace. Three hours later he was told that von
Bethmann-Hollweg had gone to Great Headquarters to arrange for the
meeting.

Sometimes in dealing with the Foreign Office the Ambassador used the
same rough-shod methods which made the Big Stick effective during the
Roosevelt Administration. At one time, Alexander Cochran, of New York,
acted as special courier from the Embassy in London to Berlin. At the
frontier he was arrested and imprisoned. The Ambassador heard of it,
went to the Foreign Office and demanded Cochran's immediate release.
The Ambassador had obtained Mr. Cochran's passports, and showed them to
the Secretary of State. When Herr von Jagow asked permission to retain
one of the passports so the matter could be investigated, the
Ambassador said:

"All right, but first let me tear Lansing's signature off the bottom,
or some one may use the passport for other purposes."

The Ambassador was not willing to take chances after it was learned and
proved by the State Department that Germany was using American
passports for spy purposes.

In one day alone, last fall, the American Embassy sent 92 notes to the
Foreign Office, some authorised by Washington and some unauthorised,
protesting against unlawful treatment of Americans, asking for reforms
in prison camps, transmitting money and letters about German affairs in
Entente countries, and other matters which were under discussion
between Berlin and Washington. At one time an American woman
instructor in Roberts' College was arrested at Warnemuende and kept for
weeks from communicating with the Ambassador. When he heard of it he
went to the Foreign Office daily, demanding her release, which he
finally secured.

Mr. Gerard's work in bettering conditions in prison camps, especially
at Ruhleben, will be long remembered. When conditions were at their
worst he went out daily to keep himself informed, and then daily went
to the Foreign Office or wrote to the Ministry of War in an effort to
get better accommodations for the men. One day he discovered eleven
prominent English civilians, former respected residents in Berlin,
living in a box stall similar to one which his riding horse had
occupied in peace times. This so aroused the Ambassador that he
volunteered to furnish funds for the construction of a new barracks in
case the Government was not willing to do it. But the Foreign Office
and the War Ministry and other officials shifted authority so often
that it was impossible to get changes made. The Ambassador decided to
have his reports published in a drastic effort to gain relief for the
prisoners. The State Department granted the necessary authority and
his descriptions of Ruhleben were published in the United States and
England, arousing such a world-wide storm of indignation that the
German Government changed the prison conditions and made Ruhleben fit
for men for the first time since the beginning of the war.

This activity of the Ambassador aroused a great deal of bitterness and
the Government decided to try to have him recalled. The press
censorship instigated various newspapers to attack the Ambassador so
that Germany might be justified in asking for his recall, but the
attack failed for the simple reason that there was no evidence against
the Ambassador except that he had been too vigorous in insisting upon
livable prison camp conditions.

* * * * * * * *

I have pointed out in previous chapters some of the things which
President Wilson's notes accomplished in Germany during the war.
Suppose the Kaiser were to grant certain reforms, would this destroy
the possibilities of a free Germany, a democratic nation--a German
Republic!

The German people were given an opportunity to debate and think about
international issues while we maintained relations with Berlin, but as
I pointed out, the Kaiser and his associates are masters of German
psychology and during the next few months they may temporarily undo
what we accomplished during two years. Americans must remember that at
the present time all the leading men of Germany are preaching to the
people the gospel of submarine success, and the anti-American campaign
there is being conducted unhindered and unchallenged. The United
States and the Allies have pledged their national honour and existence
to defeat and discredit the Imperial German Government and nothing but
unfaltering determination, no matter what the Kaiser does, will bring
success. Unless he is defeated, the Kaiser will not follow the Czar's
example.

In May of this year the German Government believed it was winning the
war. Berlin believed it would decisively defeat our Allies before
Fall. But even if the people of Germany again compel their Government
to propose peace and the Kaiser announces that he is in favour of such
drastic reforms as making his Ministry responsible to the Reichstag,
this (though it might please the German people) cannot, must not,
satisfy us. Only a firm refusal of the Allies will accomplish what we
have set out to do--overthrow the present rulers and dictators of
Germany. This must include not only the Kaiser but Field Marshal von
Hindenburg and the generals in control of the army, the Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg, who did not keep his promises to the United States
and the naval leaders who have been intriguing and fighting for war
with America for over two years. Only a decisive defeat of Germany
will make Germany a republic, and the task is stupendous enough to
challenge the best combined efforts of the United States and all the
Allies.

Prophecy is a dangerous pastime but it would not be fair to conclude
this book without pointing out some of the possibilities which can
develop from the policy which President Wilson pursued in dealing with
Germany before diplomatic relations were broken.

The chief effect of Mr. Wilson's policy is not going to be felt during
this war, but in the future. At the beginning of his administration he
emphasised the fact that in a democracy public opinion was a bigger
factor than armies and navies. If all Europe emerges from this war as
democratic as seems possible now one can see that Mr. Wilson has
already laid the foundation for future international relations between
free people and republican forms of governments. This war has defeated
itself. It is doubtful whether there ever will be another world war
because the opinion of all civilised people is mobilised against war.
After one has seen what war is like, one is against not only war itself
but the things which bring about war. This great war was made possible
because Europe has been expecting and preparing for it ever since 1870
and because the governments of Europe did not take either the people or
their neighbours into their confidence. President Wilson tried to show
while he was president that the people should be fully informed
regarding all steps taken by the Government. In England where the
press has had such a tussle to keep from being curbed by an autocratic
censorship the world has learned new lessons in publicity. The old
policy of keeping from the public unpleasant information has been
thrown overboard in Great Britain because it was found that it harmed
the very foundations of democracy.

[Illustration: A POST-CARD FROM GENERAL VON KLUCK.]

International relations in the future will, to a great extent, be
moulded along the lines of Mr. Wilson's policies during this war.
Diplomacy will be based upon a full discussion of all international
issues. The object of diplomacy will be to reach an understanding to
_prevent_ wars, not to _avoid_ them at the eleventh hour. Just as
enlightened society tries to _prevent_ murder so will civilised nations
in the future try to prevent wars.

Mr. Wilson expressed his faith in this new development in international
affairs by saying that "the opinion of the world is the mistress of the
world."

The important concern to-day is: How can this world opinion be moulded
into a world power?

Opinion cannot be codified like law because it is often the vanguard of
legislation. Public opinion is the reaction of a thousand and one
incidents upon the public consciousness. In the world to-day the most
important influence in the development of opinion is the daily press.
By a judicious interpretation of affairs the President of the United
States frequently may direct public opinion in certain channels while
his representatives to foreign governments, especially when there is
opportunity, as there is to-day, may help spread our ideas abroad.

World political leaders, if one may judge from events so far, foresee a
new era in international affairs. Instead of a nation's foreign
policies being secret, instead of unpublished alliances and iron-bound
treaties, there may be the proclaiming of a nation's international
intentions, exactly as a political party in the United States pledges
its intentions in a political campaign. Parties in Europe may demand a
statement of the foreign intentions of their governments. If there was
this candidness between the governments and their citizens there would
he more frankness between the nations and their neighbours. Public
opinion would then be the decisive force. International steps of all
nations would then be decided upon only after the public was thoroughly
acquainted with their every phase. A fully informed nation would be
considered safer and more peace-secure than a nation whose opinion was
based upon coloured official reports, "Ems" telegrams of 1870 and 1914
variety, and eleventh-hour appeals to passion, fear and God.

The opinion of the world may then be a stronger international force
than large individual armies and navies. The opinion of the world may
be such a force that every nation will respect and fear it. The
opinion of the world may be the mistress of the world and publicity
will be the new driving force in diplomacy to give opinion world power.

Germany's defeat will be the greatest event in history because it will
establish world democracy upon a firm foundation and because Germany
itself will emerge democratic. The Chancellor has frequently stated
that the Germany which would come out of this war would be nothing like
the Germany which went into the war and the Kaiser has already promised
a "people's kingdom of Hohenzollern." The Kaiser's government will be
reformed because world opinion insists upon it. If the German people
do not yet see this, they will be outlawed until they are free. They
will see it eventually, and when that day comes, peace will dawn in
Europe.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16