Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman

C >> Carl W. Ackerman >> Germany, The Next Republic?

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On page 31 Admiral Hollweg speaks of the fact that at the beginning of
the war many Germans, especially those in banking and business circles,
felt that Germany was so indispensable to England in peace time that
England would not conduct a war to "knock out" Germany. But Hollweg
says the situation has now changed.

On pages 122 to 126 he justifies the ruthless submarine warfare in the
following way:

"It is known that England and her allies declared at the beginning of
the war that they would adhere to the Declaration of London. It is
just as well known that England and the Allies changed this declaration
through the Orders in Council and other lawless statements of authority
until the declaration was unrecognisable and worthless--especially the
spirit and purpose of the agreement were flatly pushed aside until
practically nothing more remains of the marine laws as codified in
1909. The following collection of flagrant breaches of international
law will show who first broke marine laws during the war."

"Ten gross violations of marine law in war time by England.

"1. Violation of Article IV of the Maritime Declaration of April 16th,
1855. Blockading of neutral harbours in violation of international law.

"2. Violation of Article II of the same declarations by the
confiscation of enemy property aboard neutral ships. See Order in
Council, March 11th, 1915.

"3. Declaration of the North Sea as a war zone. British Admiralty
Declaration, November 3, 1914.

"4. England regarded food as contraband since the beginning of the war.
The starvation war. England confiscated neutral food en route to
neutral states whenever there was a possibility that it would reach the
enemy. This violated the recognised fundamental principles of the
freedom of the seas.

"5. Attempt to prevent all communications between Germany and neutral
countries through the violation of international law and the seizing of
mail.

"6. Imprisonment of German reservists aboard neutral ships.

"7. a. Violation of Article I of The Hague Convention by the
confiscation of the German hospital ship _Ophelia_. b. Murdering of
submarine crew upon command of British auxiliary cruiser _Baralong_.
c. Violation of Article XXIX, No. 1, of London Declaration by
preventing American Red Cross from sending supplies to the German Red
Cross.

"8. a. Destruction of German cruisers _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_ in
Spanish territorial waters by English cruiser _Highflyer_. b.
Destruction of German cruiser _Dresden_ in Chinese waters by British
cruiser _Glasgow_. c. Attack of British warships on German ship
_Paklas_ in Norwegian waters.

"9. England armed her merchant ships for attack.

"10. Use of neutral flags and signs by British merchantmen in violation
of Articles II and III of the Paris Declaration."

On page 134, after discussing the question of whether the English
blockade has been effective and arguing that England by seizing neutral
ships with food on the supposition that the food was going to Germany,
he says:

"We may conclude from these facts that we Germans can now consider
ourselves freed from the uncomfortable conditions of the London
Declaration and may conduct the war as our own interests prescribe. We
have already partially done this in as much as we followed the English
example of extending the lists of war contraband. This has been
inconvenient for the neutrals affected and they have protested against
it. We may, however, consider that they will henceforth respect our
proposals just as they have in the past accepted English interests.
England demanded from them that they assist her because England was
fighting for the future of neutrals and of justice. We will take this
principle also as basis for what we do and even await thereby that we
will compel England to grant us the kind of peace which can lay new
foundations for sea warfare and that for the future the military acts
of belligerents against neutrals will not be carried to the extremes
they have been for centuries because of England's superior sea power.
This new era of civilised warfare we bring under the term 'freedom of
the seas.'"

Hollweg's next justification of the unlimited submarine warfare is that
Secretary of State Lansing in a note to Count von Bernstorff at first
said merchant ships could not be armed and then changed his mind.

On page 160 Hollweg says: "And now in discussing the question of the
legal position of the submarine as a warship I cite here the statements
of the German authority on international law, Professor Dr. Niemeyer,
who said: 'There can be absolutely no question but that the submarine
is permitted. It is a means of war similar to every other one. The
frightfulness of the weapon was never a ground of condemnation. This
is a war in which everything is permitted, which is not forbidden.'"

On page 175 in the chapter entitled "The Submarine War and Victory" the
author says:

"Every great deed carries with it a certain amount of risk. After the
refusal of our peace proposal we have only the choice of victory with
the use of all of our strength and power, or, the submission to the
destructive conditions of our opponents."

He adds that his statements shall prove to the reader that Germany can
continue the hard relentless battle with the greatest possibility and
confidence of a final victory which will break the destructive
tendencies of the Entente and guarantee a peace which Germany needs for
her future existence.

On page 193 he declares: "All food prices in England have increased on
the average 80% in price, they are for example considerably higher in
England than in Germany. A world wide crop failure in Canada and
Argentine made the importation of food for England more difficult.

"England earns in this war as opposed to other wars, nothing. Part of
her industrial workers are under arms, the others are working in making
war munitions for her own use, not, however, for the export of valuable
wares."

Admiral Hollweg has a clever theory that the German fleet has played a
prominent role in the war, although most of the time it has been
hugging the coasts of the Fatherland. He declares that the fleet has
had a "distance effect" upon the Allies' control of the high seas. On
page 197 he says:

"What I mean in extreme by 'fernwirkung' [distance effect] I will show
here by an example. The English and French attack on Constantinople
failed. It can at least be doubted whether at that time when the
connection between Germany and Turkey was not established a strong
English naval unit would have brought the attack success. The
necessity of not withdrawing the English battleships from the North Sea
prevented England from using a more powerful unit at Constantinople.
To this extent the German battle fleet was not without influence in the
victory for the defender of Constantinople. That is 'distance effect.'"

On page 187 Hollweg declares: "England not only does not make money
to-day by war but she is losing. The universal military service which
she was forced to introduce in order to hold the other Allies by the
tongue draws from her industry and thereby her commerce, 3,500,000
workmen. Coal exportation has decreased. During the eleven months
from January to November, 1916, 4,500,000 tons less coal was exported
than in 1915. In order to produce enough coal for England herself the
nation was compelled by the munitions obligation law to put miners to
work."

On page 223 the author declares:

"That is, therefore, the great and important role which the submarines
in this war are playing. They are serving also to pave the way in the
future for the 'freedom of the seas.'"

He adds that the submarines will cut the thread which holds the English
Damocles' sword over weak sea powers and that for eternity the
"gruesome hands" of English despotism will be driven from the seas.

[Illustration: CHART SHOWING TONNAGE OF SHIPS SUNK BY GERMAN SUBMARINES
FROM REAR ADMIRAL HOLLWEG'S BOOK]

Germany's submarine warfare which was introduced in February, 1915,
began by sinking less than 50,000 tons of ships per month. By
November, 1915, the amount of tonnage destroyed per month was close to
200,000 tons. By January, 1916, the tonnage of ships destroyed by
submarines had fallen to under 100,000 tons. In April, 1916, as Grand
Admiral von Tirpitz' followers made one more effort to make the
submarine warfare successful, nearly 275,000 tons were being destroyed
a month. But after the sinking of the _Sussex_ and the growing
possibilities of war with the United States the submarine warfare was
again held back and in July less than 125,000 tons of shipping were
destroyed.

At this time, however, the submarine campaign itself underwent a
change. Previously most of the ships destroyed were sunk off the coast
of England, France or in the Mediterranean. During the year and a half
of the submarine campaign the Allies' method of catching and destroying
submarines became so effective it was too costly to maintain submarine
warfare in belligerent waters. The German Navy had tried all kinds of
schemes but none was very successful. After the sinking of the
_Ancona_ the Admiralty planned for two submarines to work together, but
this was not as successful as it might have been. During May, June and
July the submarine warfare was practically given up as the losses of
ships during those months will show. There was a steep decline from a
quarter of a million tons in April to less than 140,000 tons in May,
about 125,000 tons in June and not much more than 100,000 tons in July.

During these three months the Navy was being bitterly criticised for
its inactivity. But as the events six months later will show the
German navy simply used these months to prepare for a much stronger
submarine campaign which was to begin in August. By this time it was
decided, however, not to risk a submarine campaign off the Allied
coasts but to operate in the Atlantic, off the coasts of Spain and
Norway. This method of submarine warfare proved very successful and by
November, 1916, Germany was sinking over 425,000 tons of ships per
month.

During this swell in the success of the submarine campaign the U-53 was
despatched across the Atlantic to operate off the United States coasts.

U-53 was sent here for two purposes: First, it was to demonstrate to
the American people that, in event of war, submarines could work terror
off the Atlantic coast. Second, it was to show the naval authorities
whether their plans for an attack on American shipping would be
practical. U-53 failed to terrorise the United States, but it proved
to the Admiralty that excursions to American waters were feasible.

On February 1, when the Kaiser defied the United States by threatening
all neutral shipping in European waters, Germany had four hundred
undersea boats completed or in course of construction. This included
big U-boats, like the U-53, with a cruising radius of five thousand
miles, and the smaller craft, with fifteen-day radius, for use against
England, as well as supply ships and mine layers. But not all these
were ready for use against the Allies and the United States at that
time. About one hundred were waiting for trained crews or were being
completed in German shipyards.

It was often said in Berlin that the greatest loss when a submarine
failed to return was the crew. It required more time to train the men
than to build the submarine. According to Germany's new method of
construction, a submarine can be built in fifteen days. Parts are
stamped out in the factories and assembled at the wharves. But it
takes from sixty to ninety days to educate the men and get them
accustomed to the seasick motion of the U-boats. Besides, it requires
experienced officers to train the new men.

To meet this demand Germany began months ago to train men who could man
the newest submarines. So a school was established--a School of
Submarine Murder--and for many months the man who torpedoed the
_Lusitania_ was made chief of the staff of educators. It was a new
task for German kultur.

For the German people the lessons of the _Lusitania_ have been exactly
opposite those normal people would learn. The horror of non-combatants
going down on a passenger liner, sunk without warning, was nothing to
be compared to the heroism of aiming the torpedo and running away.
Sixty-eight million Germans think their submarine officers and crews
are the greatest of the great.

When the Berlin Foreign Office announced, after the sinking of the
_Sussex_, that the ruthless torpedoing of ships would be stopped the
German statesmen meant this method would be discontinued until there
were sufficient submarines to defy the United States. At once the
German navy, which has always been anti-American, began building
submarines night and day. Every one in the Government knew the time
would come when Germany would have to break its _Sussex_ pledge.

The German navy early realised the need for trained men, so it
recalled, temporarily, for educational work the man who sank the
_Lusitania_.

"But, who sank the _Lusitania_?" you ask.

"The torpedo which sank the _Lusitania_ and killed over one hundred
Americans and hundreds of other noncombatants was fired by Oberleutnant
zur See (First Naval Lieutenant) Otto Steinbrink, commander of one of
the largest German submarines."

"Was he punished?" you ask.

"Kaiser Wilhelm decorated him with the highest military order, the Pour
le Merite!"

"Where is Steinbrink now?"

"On December 8, 1916, the German Admiralty announced that he had just
returned from a special trip, having torpedoed and mined twenty-two
ships on one voyage."

"What had he been doing?"

"For several months last summer he trained officers and crews in this
branch of warfare, which gained him international notoriety."

It is said that Steinbrink has trained more naval men than any other
submarine commander. If this be true, is there any wonder that Germany
should be prepared to conduct a ruthless submarine warfare throughout
the world? Is it surprising that American ships should be sunk,
American citizens murdered and the United States Government defied when
the German navy has been employing the man who murdered the passengers
of the _Lusitania_ as the chief instructor of submarine murderers?

The Krupp interests have played a leading role in the war, not only by
manufacturing billions of shells and cannon, and by financing
propaganda in the United States, but by building submarines. At the
Krupp wharves at Kiel some of the best undersea craft are launched.
Other shipyards at Bremen, Hamburg and Danzig have been mobilised for
this work, too. Just a few weeks before diplomatic relations were
broken a group of American doctors, who were investigating prison camp
conditions, went to Danzig. Here they learned that the twelve wharves
there were building between 45 and 50 submarines annually. These were
the smaller type for use in the English Channel. At Hamburg the
Hamburg-American Line wharves were mobilised for submarine construction
also. At the time diplomatic relations were severed observers in
Germany estimated that 250 submarines were being launched annually and
that preparations were being made greatly to increase this number.

Submarine warfare is a very exact and difficult science. Besides the
skilled captain, competent first officers, wireless operators and
artillerymen, engineers are needed. Each man, too, must be a "seadog."
Some of the smaller submarines toss like tubs when they reach the ocean
and only toughened seamen can stand the "wear and tear." Hence the
weeks and months which are necessary to put the men in order before
they leave home for their first excursion in sea murder.

But Germany has learned a great deal during two years of hit-and-miss
submarine campaigns. When von Tirpitz began, in 1915, he ordered his
men to work off the coasts of England. Then so many submarines were
lost it became a dangerous and expensive military operation. The
Allies began to use great steel nets, both as traps and as protection
to warships. The German navy learned this within a very short time,
and the military engineers were ordered to perfect a torpedo which
would go through a steel net. The first invention was a torpedo with
knives on the nose. When the nose hit the net there was a minor
explosion. The knives were sent through the net, permitting the
torpedo to continue on its way. Then the Allies doubled the nets, and
two sets of knives were attached to the German torpedoes. But
gradually the Allies employed nets as traps. These were anchored or
dragged by fishing boats. Some submarines have gotten inside, been
juggled around, but have escaped. More, perhaps, have been lost this
way.

Then, when merchant ships began to carry armament, the periscopes were
shot away, so the navy invented a so-called "finger-periscope," a thin
rod pipe with a mirror at one end. This rod could he shoved out from
the top of the submarine and used for observation purposes in case the
big periscope was destroyed. From time to time there were other
inventions. As the submarine fleet grew the means of communicating
with each other while submerged at sea were perfected. Copper plates
were fastened fore and aft on the outside of submarines, and it was
made possible for wireless messages to be sent through the water at a
distance of fifty miles.

A submarine cannot aim at a ship without some object as a sight. So
one submarine often acted as a "sight" for the submarine firing the
torpedo. Submarines, which at first were unarmed, were later fitted
with armour plate and cannon were mounted on deck. The biggest
submarines now carry 6-inch guns.

Like all methods of ruthless warfare the submarine campaign can be and
will be for a time successful. Germany's submarine warfare today is
much more successful than the average person realises. By December,
1916, for instance, the submarines were sinking a half million tons of
ships a month. In January, 1917, over 600,000 tons were destroyed. On
February nearly 800,000 tons were lost. The destruction of ships means
a corresponding destruction of cargoes, of many hundreds of thousands
of tons. When Germany decided the latter part of January to begin a
ruthless campaign German authorities calculated they could sink an
average of 600,000 tons per month and that in nine months nearly
6,000,000 tons of shipping could be sent to the bottom of the
ocean,--then the Allies would be robbed of the millions of tons of
goods which these ships could carry.

In any military campaign one of the biggest problems is the
transportation of troops and supplies. Germany during this war has had
to depend upon her railroads; the Allies have depended upon ships.
Germany looked at her own military situation and saw that if the Allies
could destroy as many railroad cars as Germany expected to sink ships,
Germany would be broken up and unable to continue the war. Germany
believed ships were to the Allies what railroad carriages are to
Germany.

The General Staff looked at the situation from other angles. During
the winter there was a tremendous coal shortage in France and Italy.
There had been coal riots in Paris and Rome. The Italian Government
was so in need of coal that it had to confiscate even private supplies.
The Grand Hotel in Rome, for instance, had to give up 300 tons which it
had in its coal bins. In 1915 France had been importing 2,000,000 tons
of coal a month across the Channel from England. Because of the
ordinary loss of tonnage the French coal imports dropped 400,000 tons
per month. Germany calculated that if she could decrease England's
coal exports 400,000 tons a month by an ordinary submarine campaign
that she could double it by a ruthless campaign.

Germany was looking forward to the Allied offensive which was expected
this Spring. Germany knew that the Allies would need troops and
ammunition. She knew that to manufacture ammunition and war supplies
coal was needed. Germany calculated that if the coal importations to
France could be cut down a million tons a month France would not be
able to manufacture the necessary ammunition for an offensive lasting
several months.

Germany knew that England and France were importing thousands of tons
of war supplies and food from the United States. Judging from the
German newspapers which I read at this time every one in Germany had
the impression that the food situation in England and France was almost
as bad as in Germany. Even Ambassador Gerard had somewhat the same
impression. When he left Germany for Switzerland on his way to Spain,
he took two cases of eggs which he had purchased in Denmark. One night
at a reception in Berne, one of the American women in the Gerard party
asked the French Ambassador whether France really had enough food! If
the Americans coming from Germany had the impression that the Allies
were sorely in need of supplies one can see how general the impression
must have been throughout Germany.

When I was in Paris I was surprised to see so much food and to see such
a variety. Paris appeared to be as normal in this respect as
Copenhagen or Rotterdam. But I was told by American women who were
keeping house there that it was becoming more and more difficult to get
food.

After Congress declared war it became evident for the first time that
the Allies really did need war supplies and food from the United States
more than they needed anything else. London and Paris officials
publicly stated that this was the kind of aid the Allies really needed.
It became evident, too, that the Allies not only needed the food but
that they needed ships to carry supplies across the Atlantic. One of
the first things President Wilson did was to approve plans for the
construction of a fleet of 3,000 wooden ships practically to bridge the
Atlantic.

During the first three months of 1917 submarine warfare was a success
in that it so decreased the ship tonnage and the importations of the
Allies that they needed American co-operation and assistance. _So the
United States really enters the war at the critical and decisive
stage_. Germany believes she can continue to sink ships faster than
they can be built, but Germany did not calculate upon a fleet of wooden
bottom vessels being built in the United States to make up for the
losses. Germany did not expect the United States to enter the war with
all the vigour and energy of the American people. Germany calculated
upon internal troubles, upon opposition to the war and upon the
pacifists to have America make as many mistakes as England did during
the first two years of the war. But the United States has learned and
profited by careful observation in Europe. Just as England's
declaration of war on Germany in support of Belgium and France was a
surprise to Germany; just as the shipment of war supplies by American
firms to the Allies astonished Germany, so will the construction of
3,000 wooden vessels upset the calculations of the German General Staff.

While American financial assistance will be a great help to the Allies
that will not affect the German calculations because when the Kaiser
and his Generals decided on the 27th of January to damn all neutrals,
German financiers were not consulted.

Neither did the German General Staff count upon the Russian Revolution
going against them. Germany had expected a revolution there, but
Germany bet upon the Czar and the Czar's German wife. As Lieutenant
Colonel von Haeften, Chief Military Censor in Berlin, told the
correspondents, Germany calculated upon the internal troubles in Russia
aiding her. But the Allies and the people won the Russian Revolution.
Germany's hopes that the Czar might again return to power or that the
people might overthrow their present democratic leaders will come to
naught now that America has declared war and thrown her tremendous and
unlimited moral influence behind the Allies and with the Russian people.

Rear Admiral Hollweg's calculations that 24,253,615 tons of shipping
remained for the world freight transmission at the beginning of 1917,
did not take into consideration confiscation by the United States of
nearly 2,500,000 tons of German and Austrian shipping in American
ports. He did not expect the United States to build 3,000 new ships in
1917. He did not expect the United States to purchase the ships under
construction in American wharves for neutral European countries.

The German submarine campaign, like all other German "successes," will
be temporary. Every time the General Staff has counted upon "ultimate
victory" it has failed to take into consideration the determination of
the enemy. Germany believed that the world could be "knocked out" by
big blows. Germany thought when she destroyed and invaded Belgium and
northern France that these two countries would not be able to "come
back." Germany thought when she took Warsaw and a great part of
western Russia that Russia would not he able to continue the war.
Germany figured that after the invasion of Roumania and Servia that
these two countries would not need to be considered seriously in the
future. Germany believed that her submarine campaign would be
successful before the United States could come to the aid of the
Allies. German hope of "ultimate victory" has been postponed ever
since September, 1914, when von Kluck failed to take Paris. And
Germany's hopes for an "ultimate victory" this summer before the United
States can get into the war will be postponed so long that Germany will
make peace not on her own terms but upon the terms which the United
States of Democracy of the Whole World will dictate.

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