Germany, The Next Republic? by Carl W. Ackerman

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The world was astonished and surprised at the German move but no one
knew whether it was to be taken seriously. Great Britain instructed
her embassies and legations in neutral countries to attempt to find out
whether the Chancellor really desired to make peace or whether his
statements were to be interpreted as something to quiet internal
troubles.

During the days of discussion which followed I was in close touch with
the Foreign Office, the American Embassy and the General Staff. The
first intimation I received that Germany did not expect the peace plan
to succeed was on December 14th at a meeting of the neutral
correspondents with Lieut. Col. von Haeften. When von Hindenburg
became Chief of the General Staff he reorganised the press department
in Berlin and sent von Haeften from his personal staff to Berlin to
direct the press propaganda. As a student of public opinion abroad von
Haeften was a genius and was extremely frank and honest with the
correspondents.

"We have proposed peace to our enemies," he said to the correspondents,
"because we feel that we have been victorious and because we believe
that no matter how long the war continues the Allies will not be able
to defeat us. It will be interesting to see what effect our proposal
has upon Russia. Reports which we have received, coming from
unquestionable sources, state that internal conditions in Russia are
desperate; that food is scarce; that the transportation system is so
demoralised and that it will be at least eight months before Russia can
do anything in a military way. Russia wants peace and needs peace and
we shall see now whether she has enough influence upon England to
compel England to make peace. We are prepared to go on with the war if
the Allies refuse our proposals. If we do we shall not give an inch
without making the Allies pay such a dear cost that they will not be
able to continue."

The Foreign Office was not optimistic over the possibilities of
success; officials realised that the new Lloyd-George Cabinet meant a
stronger war policy by Great Britain, but they thought the peace
proposals might shake the British confidence in the new government and
cause the overthrow of Lloyd-George and the return of Asquith and
Viscount Edward Grey.

From all appearances in Berlin it was evident to every neutral diplomat
with whom I talked that while Germany was proclaiming to the whole
world her desire for peace she had in mind only the most drastic peace
terms as far as Belgium, certain sections of northern France, Poland
and the Balkans were concerned. Neutrals observed that Germany was so
exalted over the Roumanian victory and the possibilities of that
campaign solving the food problem that she was not only ready to defy
the Allies but the neutral world unless the world was ready to bow to a
German victory. There were some people in Germany who realised that
the sooner she made peace the better peace terms she could get but the
Government was not of this opinion. The Allies, as was expected,
defiantly refused the Prussian olive branch which had been extended
like everything else from Germany with a string tied to it. For the
purposes of the Kaiser and his Government the Allies' reply was exactly
what they wanted.

The German Government was in this position: If the Allies accepted
Germany's proposal it would enable the Government to unite all factions
in Germany by making a peace which would satisfy the political parties
as well as the people. If the Allies refused, the German Government
calculated that the refusal would be so bitter that it would unite the
German people political organisations and enable the Government to
continue the war in any way it saw fit.

Nothing which had happened during the year so solidified the German
nation as the Allies' replies to Berlin and to President Wilson. It
proved to the German people that their Government was waging a
defensive war because the Allies demanded annexation, compensation and
guarantees, all of which meant a change in the map of Europe from what
it was at the beginning of the war. The interests which had been
demanding a submarine warfare saw their opportunity had come. They
knew that as a result of the Allies' notes the public would sanction an
unrestricted sea warfare against the whole world if that was necessary.

From December 12th until after Christmas, discussions of peace filled
the German newspapers. By January 1st all possibilities of peace had
disappeared. The Government and the public realised that the war would
go on and that preparations would have to be made at once for the
biggest campaign in the history of the world in 1917.

Throughout the peace discussions one thing was evident to all
Americans. Opposition to American intervention in any peace discussion
was so great that the United States would not be able to take any
leading part without being faced by the animosity of a great section of
Germany. When it was stated in the press that Joseph O. Grew, the
American Charge d'Affaires, had received the German note and
transmitted it to his Government, public indignation was so great that
the Government had to inform all of the German newspapers to explain
that Germany had not asked the United States to make peace; that
Germany had in fact not asked any neutrals to make peace but had only
handed these neutrals the German note in order to get it officially
before the Allies. At this time the defiant attitude of the whole
nation was well expressed in an editorial in the _Morgen Post_ saying:
"If Germany's hand is refused her fist will soon be felt with increased
force."

II

The Conferences at Pless

As early as September, 1916, Ambassador Gerard reported to the State
Department that the forces demanding an unrestricted submarine campaign
were gaining such strength in Germany that the Government would not be
able to maintain its position very long. Gerard saw that not only the
political difficulties but the scarcity of food and the anti-American
campaign of hate were making such headway that unless peace were made
there would be nothing to prevent a rupture with the United States.
The latter part of December when Gerard returned from the United States
after conferences with President Wilson he began to study the submarine
situation.

He saw that only the most desperate resistance on the part of the
Chancellor would be able to stem the tide of hate and keep America out
of the war. On January 7th the American Chamber of Commerce and Trade
in Berlin gave a dinner to Ambassador Gerard and invited the
Chancellor, Dr. Helfferich, Dr. Solf, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Zimmermann, prominent German bankers and business men, leading editors
and all others who a few months before during the _Sussex_ crisis had
combined in maintaining friendly relations. At this banquet Gerard
made the statement, "As long as such men as Generals von Hindenburg and
Ludendorf, as long as Admirals von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von
Mueller headed the Navy Department, and the Chancellor von
Bethmann-Hollweg directed the political affairs there would be no
trouble with the United States." Gerard was severely criticised abroad
not only for this statement but for a further remark "That the
relations between Germany and the United States had never been better
than they were to-day." Gerard saw before he had been in Berlin a week
that Germany was desperate, that conditions were getting worse and that
with no possibilities of peace Germany would probably renew the von
Tirpitz submarine warfare. He chose desperate means himself at this
banquet to appeal to the democratic forces in Germany to side with the
Chancellor when the question of a ruthless submarine warfare again came
up.

The German Government, however, had planned its moves months in
advance. Just as every great offensive on the battlefields is planned,
even to the finest details, six months before operations begin, so are
the big moves on the political chessboard of Europe.

There are very few men in public life in Germany who have the courage
of their convictions to resign if their policies are overruled. Von
Jagow, who was Secretary of State from the beginning of the war until
December, 1916, was one of these "few." Because von Jagow had to sign
all of the foolish, explanatory and excusing notes which the German
Government sent to the United States he was considered abroad as being
weak and incapable. But when he realised early in November that the
Government was determined to renew the submarine warfare unless peace
was made von Jagow was the only man in German public life who would not
remain an official of the Government and bring about a break with
America. Zimmermann, however, was a different type of official.
Zimmermann, like the Chancellor, is ambitious, bigoted, cold-blooded
and an intriguer of the first calibre. As long as he was Under
Secretary of State he fought von Jagow and tried repeatedly to oust
him. So it was not surprising to Americans when they heard that
Zimmermann had succeeded von Jagow.

The Gerard banquet, however, came too late. The die was cast. But the
world was not to learn of it for some weeks.

On the 27th of January, the Kaiser's birthday, the Chancellor, Field
Marshal von Hindenburg, First Quartermaster General Ludendorf, Admirals
von Capelle, von Holtzendorff and von Mueller and Secretary of State
Zimmermann were invited to Great Headquarters to attend the Kaiser's
birthday dinner.

Ever since von Hindenburg has been Chief of the General Staff the Grand
Chief Headquarters of the German Army have been located at Pless, on
the estate of the Prince of Pless in Silicia. Previously, the Kaiser
had had his headquarters here, because it was said and popularly
believed that His Majesty was in love with the beautiful Princess of
Pless, an Englishwoman by birth. When von Hindenburg took his
headquarters to the big castle there, the Princess was exiled and sent
to Parkenkirchen, one of the winter resorts of Bavaria.

On previous birthdays of the Emperor and when questions of great moment
were debated the civilian ministers of the Kaiser were always invited.
But on the Kaiser's birthday in 1917 only the military leaders were
asked. Dr. Helfferich, Minister of Colonies Solf, German bankers and
business men as well as German shippers were not consulted. Germany
was becoming so desperate that she was willing to defy not only her
enemies and neutral countries but her own financiers and business men.
Previously, when the submarine issue was debated the Kaiser wanted to
know what effect such a warfare would have upon German economic and
industrial life. But this time he did not care. He wanted to know the
naval and military arguments.

In August, 1914, when the Chancellor and a very small group of people
were appealing to His Majesty not to go to war, the Kaiser sided with
General von Moltke and Admiral von Tirpitz. During the various
submarine crises with the United States it appeared that the Kaiser was
changing--that he was willing and ready to side with the forces of
democracy in his own country. President Wilson and Ambassador Gerard
thought that after the downfall of von Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn the
Kaiser would join hands with the reform forces. But in 1917 when the
final decision came the Kaiser cast his lot with his generals against
the United States and against democracy in Germany. The Chancellor,
who had impressed neutral observers as being a real leader of democracy
in Germany, sided with the Kaiser. Thus by one stroke the democratic
movement which was under way in Germany received a rude slap. The man
the people had looked upon as a friend became an enemy.

III

The Break in Diplomatic Relations

On January 30th the German Government announced its blockade of all
Allied coasts and stated that all shipping within these waters, except
on special lanes, would be sunk without notice. Germany challenged the
whole world to stay off of the ocean. President Wilson broke
diplomatic relations immediately and ordered Ambassador Gerard to
return home. Gerard called at the Foreign Office for his passports and
said that he desired to leave at once. Zimmermann informed him that as
soon as the arrangements for a train could be made he could leave.
Zimmermann asked the Ambassador to submit a list of persons he desired
to accompany him. The Ambassador's list was submitted the next day.
The Foreign Office sent it to the General Staff, but nearly a week
passed before Gerard was told he could depart and then he was
instructed that the American consuls could not accompany him, but would
have to take a special train leaving Munich a week or two later.
American correspondents, who expressed a desire to accompany the
Ambassador, were refused permission. In the meantime reports arrived
that the United States had confiscated the German ships and Count
Montgelas, Chief of the American division of the Foreign Office,
informed Gerard the American correspondents would be held as hostages
if America did this. Gerard replied that he would not leave until the
correspondents and all other Americans were permitted to leave over any
route they selected. Practically all of the correspondents had handed
in their passports to the Foreign Office, but not until four hours
before the special train departed for Switzerland were the passports
returned. When Gerard asked the Foreign Office whether his passports
were good to the United States the Foreign Office was silent and
neither would the General Staff guarantee the correspondents a safe
conduct through the German submarine zone. So the only thing the
Ambassador could do was to select a route via Switzerland, France and
Spain, to Cuba and the United States.

The train which left Berlin on the night of February 10th carried the
happiest group of Americans which had been in Europe since the war
began. Practically no one slept. When the Swiss border was reached
the Stars and Stripes were hung from the car windows and Americans
breathed again in a free land. They felt like prisoners escaping from
a penitentiary. Most of them had been under surveillance or suspicion
for months. Nearly every one had had personal experiences which proved
to them that the German people were like the Government--there was no
respect for public sentiment or moral obligation. Some of the women
had upon previous occasions, when they crossed the German frontier,
submitted to the most inhuman indignities, but they remained in Germany
because their husbands were connected in some way with United States
government or semi-public service work. They were delighted to escape
the land where everything is "verboten" except hatred and militarism.
The second day after Gerard's arrival in Berne, American Minister
Stoval gave a reception to the Ambassador and invited the Allied
diplomats. From that evening on until he sailed from Coruna, Spain,
the Ambassador felt that he was among friends. When the Americans
accompanying the Ambassador asked the French authorities in Switzerland
for permission to enter France the French replied:

"Of course you can go through France. You are exiles and France
welcomes you."

After the Americans arrived in Paris they said they were not considered
exiles but guests.

* * * * * * * *

On the Kaiser's birthday services were held in all Protestant churches
in Germany. The clergy was mobilised to encourage the people. On
January 29th I sent the following despatch, after attending the
impressive services in the Berlin Cathedral:

"Where one year ago Dr. Dryander, the quiet white-haired man who is
court preacher, pleaded for an hour for peace in the services marking
the Kaiser's birthday, this year his sermon was a fiery defence of
Germany's cause and a militant plea for Germany to steel herself for
the decisive battle every one believes is coming.

"In this changed spirit he reflected the sentiment of the German
people. His sermon of Saturday has evoked the deepest approval
everywhere.

"'We know,' be said, 'that before us is the decisive battle which can
be fought through only with the greatest sacrifices. But in all cases
of the past God has helped us, and God will fight for us to-day,
through our leaders and our soldiers. We neither willed nor wanted
this war--neither the Kaiser nor the people. We hoped for peace as the
Kaiser extended his peace proposal, but with unheard of frivolity and
insults our enemies slapped the back of the Kaiser's extended hand of
peace.

"'To such enemies there is only one voice--that of the cannon. We
continue the war with a clear conscience and with trust in God that he
will bring us victory. God cannot--he will not--permit the German
people to go down.'"

"GOD WILL NOT PERMIT THE GERMAN PEOPLE TO GO DOWN"

* * * * * * * *

CHAPTER IX

THE BERNHARDI OF THE SEAS

After the break in diplomatic relations the slogan of German Militarism
became:

"Win or lose, we must end the war."

To many observers it seemed to be insanity coupled with desperation
which caused the Kaiser to defy the United States. There was no doubt
that Germany was desperate, economically, morally and militarily.
While war had led German armies far into enemy territory, it had
destroyed German influence throughout the world; it had lost Germany's
colonies and Pacific possessions and it had turned the opinion of the
world against Germany. But during the time Germany was trying to
impress the United States with its sincerity after the _Sussex_
incident the German Navy was building submarines. It was not building
these ships to be used in cruiser warfare. It was building them for
the future, when submarine war would be launched on a big scale,
perhaps on a bigger scale than it had ever before been conducted.

After the new blockade of the Allied Coast was proclaimed, effective
Feb. 1, 1917, some explanation had to be made to convince the public
that the submarine war would be successful and would bring the victory
which the people had been promised. The public was never informed
directly what the arguments were which convinced the Kaiser that he
could win the war by using submarines. But on the 9th of February
there appeared a small book written by Rear Admiral Hollweg entitled:
"Unser Recht auf den Ubootkrieg." (Our Right in Submarine Warfare.)
The manuscript of this book was concluded on the 15th of January, which
shows that the data which it contained and the information and
arguments presented were those which the Admiralty placed before the
Kaiser on his birthday. The points which Rear Admiral Hollweg makes in
his book are:

1. America's unfriendly neutrality justifies a disregard of the United
States;

2. The loss of merchant ships is bringing about a crisis in the
military and economic conditions of the Allies;

3. England, as the heart of the Entente, must be harmed before peace
can be made;

4. Submarines can and must end the war.

This book is for the German people a naval text book as General von
Bernhardi's book, "Germany and the Next War," was a military text book.
Bernhardi's task was to school Germany into the belief in the
unbeatableness of the German army. Hollweg's book is to teach the
German people what their submarines will accomplish and to steal the
people for the plans her military leaders will propose and carry
through on this basis.

The keynote of Hollweg's arguments is taken from the words of the
German song: "Der Gott der Eisen wachsen Liesz," written by Ernst
Moritz Arndt. Hollweg quotes this sentence on page 23:

"Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken, als ein Schrecken ohne Ende."

("Rather an end with Terror than Terror without End.")

In the chapter on "The Submarine War and Victory" the writer presents
the following table:

Status of merchant ships in 1914:

Sunk or
Captured Percentage

England (Exclusive of
colonies) .......... 19,256,766 2,977,820 15.5
France .............. 2,319,438 376,360 16.2
Russia .............. 1,053,818 146,168 13.8
Italy ............... 1,668,296 314,290 18.8
Belgium ............. 352,124 32,971 9.3
Japan ............... 1,708,386 37,391 0.22

(Figures for Dec. 1916 estimated)
The World Tonnage at beginning of war was.... 49,089,553
Added 1914-16 by new construction............ 2,000,000
----------
51,089,553

Of this not useable are:

Tonnage Germany ... 5,459,296
Austria ... 1,055,719
Turkey ... 133,158

In Germany and Turkey
held enemy
shipping .......... 200,000

Ships in U. S. A... 2,352,764

Locked in Baltic and
Black Sea ......... 700,000

Destroyed enemy
tonnage ........... 3,885,000
----------
Total 13,785,937

Destroyed neutral
tonnage (estimated) 900,000
----------
14,685,937

Requisitioned by
enemy countries for
war purposes,
transports, etc.

England ....... 9,000,000
France ........ 1,400,000
Italy ......... 1,100,000
Russia ........ 400,000
Belgium ....... 250,000
----------
12,150,000
----------
26,835,937
----------
Remaining for world freight transmission still
useable at the beginning of 1917............ 24,253,615 tons

To the Entente argument that Germany has not considered the speedy
construction of merchant ships during war time the author replies by
citing Lloyd's List of December 29, 1916, which gave the following
tonnage as having been completed in British wharves:

1913 .......... 1,977,000 tons
1914 .......... 1,722,000 tons
1915 .......... 649,000 tons
1916 .......... 582,000 tons

"These figures demonstrate that England, which is the leader of the
world as a freight carrier is being harmed the most." Admiral Hollweg
cites these figures to show that ship construction has decreased in
England and that England cannot make good ship losses by new
construction.

On page 17 Rear Admiral Hollweg says:

"We are conducting to-day a war against enemy merchant vessels
different from the methods of former wars only in part by ordinary
warships. The chief method is by submarines based upon the
fundamentals of international law as dictated by German prize court
regulations. The German prize regulations were at the beginning of the
war based upon the fundamental principles of the London Declaration and
respected the modern endeavours of all civilised states to decrease the
terrors of war. These regulations of sea laws were written to decrease
the effects of the unavoidable consequences of sea warfare upon
non-combatants and neutrals. As far as there have been changes in the
regulations of the London Declaration during the war, especially as far
as changes in the contraband list have been extended, we Germans have
religiously followed the principle set by the English of, 'an eye for
an eye and a tooth for a tooth.'"

On page 19 he states:

"Americans would under no circumstances, not even to-day, if they were
faced by a superior sea power in war, refuse to follow this method of
warfare by the ruthless use of pirate ships. May our submarine
campaign be an example for them! The clever cruiser journey of U-53
off the Atlantic Coast gave them clearly to understand what this method
was. Legally they cannot complain of this warfare. The other neutrals
cannot complain either against such sea warfare because they have ever
since the Middle Ages recognised the English method of sea warfare."

[Illustration: The New Weather Cape]

In the chapter entitled "The Opponent," on page 27 the author says:

"Before there is a discussion of our legal right to the submarine
warfare a brief review of the general policies of our opponents during
the war will be given. This account shall serve the purpose of
fortifying the living feeling within us of our natural right and of our
duty to use all weapons ruthlessly.

"If we did not know before the publication of the Entente Note [The
Allies' peace reply to Germany] what we were up against, now we know.
The mask fell. Now we have confirmation of the intentions to rob and
conquer us which, caused the individual entente nations to league
together and conduct the war. The neutrals will now see the situation
more clearly. For us it is war, literally to be or not to be a German
nation. Never did such an appeal [The Entente Note] find such a
fruitful echo in German hearts. . . ."

* * * * *

"I begin with England, our worst enemy."

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