Origin of the Anglo Boer War Revealed (2nd ed.) by C. H. Thomas

C >> C. H. Thomas >> Origin of the Anglo Boer War Revealed (2nd ed.)

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10

Dundee Secret Dossier

The greatest stir was made upon the discovery of secret documents left
behind by the British military at the hurried evacuation of Dundee
(Natal).

It was made public that those documents contained all the details of a
plan of invading the Orange Free State, and that it furnished most
incontestable proofs of British designs as early as 1896 against the
independence of both Republics. It was promised to publish those
details, but this has not yet been done. It appears, however, that no
incriminating details exist. Nevertheless, the matter has been made to
serve calumniating reports on a considerable scale in the pro-Boer Press
abroad, declaring that those documents conveyed absolute proofs of
England's perfidious intentions of attacking the Orange Free State
unawares, whilst all the time professing friendly relations and
undertaking to respect the complete integrity of the Republican status
of both States. What actually has transpired is that the whole thing was
a mare's nest, simply and nothing more than military information under
cover marked "secret," giving topographical and other details upon the
Orange Free State--a proceeding which is carried out by all military
authorities of any pretensions to prudent activity in the information
department, and no more construable into actual hostile intentions than
are other geographical surveys for general instructions or for school
use.

The incident again shows the absence of tangible grounds for accusations
against England when a foolish invention as the one cited must do duty
for such, and to rekindle race hatred.

The interest and the manipulation devoted to that fabrication by the
pro-Boer Press have, however, scored another success to Bond propaganda
in fixing the belief with Boer partisans, of England's really
predetermined designs to annex both Republics. Every Boer has since been
more than ever so persuaded, the conviction fanning the fervour of
patriotism and stimulating his eagerness to resist the would-be
ravishers of his country.

Considering, on the other hand, that the English Government had known
much about the Afrikaner Bond menace, it is singular that precautionary
measures had halted with that bare effort of making military
observations. The only way to account for this apparent lethargic
inaction is the assumption that a persevering patience and friendly
attitude was expected in time to effectually dissipate all trouble in
South Africa, and that a display of anxiety or of force would have
frustrated such peaceable tactics. In refutation of the aspersion
against England, it may be sufficient to point to the fact that during
those very years (1896-7) both Republics were in a condition of complete
helplessness through the rinderpest scourge which was then raging. If
any hostile designs had in reality existed they could have been carried
out with utmost ease then, as that scourge presented no obstacle to
England. But it was the programme of peace which was pursued as
undeviatingly then as since, with a constancy which refused to be
foiled.

Pamphlet entitled _A Hundred Years of Injustice_

A mass of so-called proof against England of her guilt in provoking the
present war and justifying the Boer attitude was presented to the public
in South Africa and abroad in November last in the shape of a voluminous
pamphlet entitled _A Hundred Years of Injustice_ (published both in
English and Dutch, and later even translated into French). That
production covers Boer history and its troubles with England up to 1881.
It then travels over the diplomatic appeals of the Transvaal delegation,
which resulted in the renewed convention of 1884. Then it wades through
all the mire of academic squabble _re_ suzerainty, etc. After exhausting
the Jameson episode with bitter invective, and seeking applause for the
Transvaal Government for its professed desire to conciliate and to
propitiate England by the offer of a seven years' franchise, the reader
is, in conclusion, 'treated to a literary display of pyrotechnic
denunciations and prophetic burdens against wicked Albion, with appeals
to divine justice for righting the cause of an innocent nation so foully
driven to a war of pure self-defence.

Lest he be taken unawares the reader of that pamphlet would do well to
note the significant fact in connection with those preferred accusations
and aspersions that not a single act construable to the prejudice of
England is adduced dating after the Anglo-Transvaal peace of 1881, that
peace which had been mutually understood to close up all by-gones. But
the recriminations all revert to previous history, nothing having
occurred since 1881 to form real grounds for accusations. There had, on
the contrary, been an exhibition of unwearied friendly endeavours on the
part of Great Britain to maintain loyal peace with an ever-shifty and
truculent Government, and to induce it to desist from scandalous
intrigue against imperial interests in South Africa, and to adopt a more
rational attitude towards Uitlanders, which in itself would have
precluded troubles like that of the Johannesburg revolt and the Jameson
raid.

AN OLD FREE STATER'S ADMONITION

The doctrines of the Afrikaner Bond coterie have been so assiduously and
deeply instilled into the Boer mind that demonstrations are utterly
futile in shaking the national conviction of the divinely approved
justice of his cause. The first occasion when I saw this illustrated,
and also the people's unreasoning adherence to their leaders' opinions,
happened about ten years ago at burgher meetings which had been convened
to discuss the then projected law for restraining Uitlanders from
admission to Transvaal franchise and other political topics.

An old Free State burgher was led then and subsequently to express his
views upon the subject in about the following strain: "It is our duty to
guard our nation against being swamped out or supplanted by strangers;
they are in great force already, and their number will constantly
increase, yet what attracts them, as you know, is our gold. That will
give out eventually, when the majority will again depart. Those
strangers, who then elect to remain with us, might be admitted to full
burgher rights. In the meantime it behoves us to reserve the full
franchise, nor will many aspire to it if they are only treated well as
strangers should be, as we should wish to be treated if we were in their
place. This is what they expect from us, and it can well be done without
giving full franchise, which they indeed do not need and will then not
claim. They will be content if their own interests are not hampered or
interfered with, and will be satisfied with such rights and privileges
as are reasonably due to guests, and we may say welcome guests (for it
is plain that the land is also largely benefited by their presence). In
other respects let us support law and order to suppress evil, which they
desire as well as we do.

"Does the Bible not say, 'The Lord loveth the stranger?' so also then
must we; and again, 'Thou shalt not devise mischief against the stranger
who dwelleth in peace with thee.' We are reputed as a God-fearing
people. Is it not well that we should take great care to act in
accordance? But I have observed with shame that instead of love and
peace a spirit of hatred and strife has been allowed to gain upon us.
Let us strive to expel that evil, lest we fall under God's displeasure
and forfeit His favour. We cannot afford to lose that."

At this stage the speaker was interrupted by violent remarks about
England's incurable perfidy and the like, when he added, prolonging his
speech more than he had probably intended: "Yes, we may not trust
England, but what we must do is to trust in God. Did God not pull us
through all along? was it not He who provided the peace of 1881 which
restored our independence? And can that gracious Lord, if we only let
Him act, not also protect us against any wiles and dangers if such
should occur in the future? As yet none such have arisen. The Lord was
with us in our battles for liberty; He was equally present and prompted
the sense and conditions of that very convention of 1881, which the
people were subsequently dissatisfied with and in their own wisdom
sacrificed for that of 1884. It is just possible that that presumptuous
act of wanting to improve upon the Lord's work will result in trouble
and prove to our sorrow that we have simply tampered and tinkered with a
good thing and spoilt it to our hurt.

"'Thou shalt not provoke thy children to wrath lest they be discouraged
and be tempted to do evil,' applies specially also to the duties of
Governments. Our rulers need wisdom in this direction, and will be
responsible if our strangers are subjected to unfair laws. The older
people here will call to mind, when the old voortrekkers were obliged to
go hundreds of miles, as far as Pietermaritzburg, for their supplies,
that we prayed for shopkeepers in our land so that we might be spared
those long journeys. What was done soon after we had attracted strangers
to establish businesses with us? We were seduced to deliberately attempt
their ruin by starting those _nationale Boerenwinkels_ (national Boer
stores), supported by our own capital, but governed by Hollanders who
eventually squandered our money. Was that dealing fairly by confiding
strangers? Later on, again in response to our prayers, we got railways;
skilled men and much capital from foreign countries, first to prospect
for gold and then to develop and exploit the mines. Their labour and
hard-earned money were risked when the return was still problematic.
Shall we begrudge them their successes now, seeing that our whole land
is equally enriched at the same time, and but for them and their
enterprise the gold would still be lying uselessly hidden in the depths
of the ground? There are now, in 1890, over 100,000 such strangers in
the land, and probably over 200 millions capital invested. Shall they be
treated in a manner to justify the accusation that they were inveigled
into our land with the object of despoiling them afterwards after the
style of 'Come into my parlour, says the spider to the fly'? These
people count upon our honest friendship, especially the many English
among them who ground that confidence upon the honourable peace accorded
us in 1881. Shall we deceive them? May we hate them for old questions
which that peace was intended to bury for ever? Think of the Lord's
dealings with our people--poor, wandering, and despised at first. He had
blessings in store for the tried voortrekkers and their children. 'The
beggar was raised from the dunghill [_asch-hoop, i.e._, ash-heap, was
the word he used] to sit with princes'--'a table laid for us in the
sight of our enemies.' All this is literally fulfilled. Our President
and others representing us have been to Europe and sat with princes, and
we have a country full of riches enough to make any enemy to rage with
jealousy at the sight. Who else but the devil is that enemy? It is he
who persecuted our Dutch and Huguenot ancestors for their faith, and is
pursuing us since. It is he and his army that rage the most at our
unexampled blessings. It is he who wants us to forfeit them all and the
Lord's favour as well. It emanates from the evil one that so many among
us are seduced into wicked political plans to subvert authority
installed by God, to incite our brethren to sedition in the Colonies,
wanting to dispossess the English. For the Queen's Government there is
as much from God as are the authorities over us here and in the Orange
Free State.

"God saith by Solomon (Prov. xxiv. 21-22): 'My son, fear thou the Lord
and the king; and meddle not with them that are given to change: for
their calamity shall rise suddenly; and who knoweth the destruction of
them both?'" and he finally warned them of the risk they incurred, after
having been advanced and blessed in an unexampled way, of being flung
back to their previous ignoble position upon the ash heap. There are
plenty of respectable Boers in whose ears those expressions still
tingle.

The man, who is no speaker, was, nevertheless, apt to grow warm and
impressive, drawn out probably by interruptions and opposing views. The
speeches terminated on one occasion by one of the party saying in
violent Bond fashion: "The English hired the Zulus to massacre our
people. They robbed us of Natal, and drove us from the Colonies. There
can be no peace with them until we have our own. God helps them who help
themselves. Whoever takes their part is against us and against every
true Afrikaner."

_MODUS VIVENDI_ SUGGESTED BY OLD FREE STATER

As is known, the conference between Sir Alfred Milner and President
Krueger, assisted by President Steyn, took place at Bloemfontein during
the first days of June last (1899), and resulted in the refusal to a
demand of a five years' franchise made on behalf of the Transvaal
Uitlanders, which refusal was some time later modified by enacting a law
admitting them to full burgher rights after a probation of seven years,
but coupled with restrictive forms and conditions which made that
measure unacceptable. Some time before that conference the old Free
Stater already mentioned obtained several prolonged interviews with the
hon. State Secretary Reitz, at Pretoria, with the object of dissuading
the Transvaal Government from conferring with Sir Alfred Milner while as
yet no sufficient friendly _rapprochement_ had been reached and no
advance had been made as to mutually approved bases upon which to
confer. He strongly deprecated the idea of granting "full" burgher
rights to Uitlanders, but held that their needs and wishes could be met
by allowing their interests to be amply represented without impinging
upon the special privileges which should be reserved for the burgher
status proper. He was finally invited by Mr. Reitz to submit his scheme
in writing, with the promise that it should receive careful
consideration. That old Free Stater complied, and supplied President
Krueger with a duplicate separately as well. The scheme ran in substance
as follows:

"_Modus vivendi_"

The population of the Transvaal to be divided into two classes, pending
the continued presence of the large floating portion consisting of
Uitlanders who derive their subsistence from the mining industries,
viz.:--

1st Class.--The fixed or burgher estate.

2nd Class.--The floating or alien estate or Guests.

The 1st Volksraad to be elected by burghers only, and to represent the
highest legislative and administrative powers.

The 2nd Volksraad to be elected by Uitlanders and burghers, and to be
vested with all such reasonable legislative powers as will cover the
domestic, industrial, and vocative interests of both burghers and
guests.

The Uitlander franchise shall be limited to representation in the 2nd
Volksraad, and be extended under usual fair conditions of eligibility to
all white persons after two years' residence, retrospectively reckoned.

Aliens may be admitted to full burgher rights and vote for 1st
Volksraad, President, and Commandant-General, after five years'
residence, if approved of by two-thirds of the burghers of his ward,
possesses landed property to the value of L1,000, and has not been
convicted here or elsewhere of any degrading crime.

Members of both Volksraads and for public service shall be eligible
without respect of creed.

The exploitation of mines shall be subject to a tax of 25 per cent.,
reckoned upon the yearly net profits, such revenue to be applied at the
discretion of the 1st Volksraad solely for the benefit of the burgher
estate--schools, hospitals, universities, pensions, by means of
permanent endowments.

The Government of the Transvaal undertakes:--

1. There shall be no identification or co-operation permitted, on the
part of any of the Transvaal people, with the association known as the
Afrikaner Bond, or any such-like political complot.

2. The recognition of British paramountcy over South Africa, including
the Transvaal, in so far as it does not clash with the intentions and
provisions set forth in the conventions of 1881 and 1884, and does not
extend to interference with or curtailment of complete internal
autonomy.

3. Renunciation of indemnity claim _re_ Jameson incursion.

4. To regulate the question of coloured British subjects resident in the
Transvaal upon a genial basis, irrespective of the Bloemfontein
arbitration award upon that subject.

5. Poll and war taxes shall be abolished.

6. Dual rights equal with the Dutch language shall be accorded to the
English language, similarly as is done in the Cape Colony for Dutch.

7. The railways and dynamite factory to be expropriated as soon as
possible--the loans required thereto to be amortized within twenty
years, and pending those expropriations the freights upon coal and
oversea goods shall be reduced 10 per cent, and the price of explosives
20s. per case, these reductions to be met from the revenue accruing to
the burgher estate from the tax upon mining profits.

8. To join a general Customs union upon equitable conditions.

9. Restore the High Court to independent power in terms of constitution.

The sequel has shown that Bond counsels prevailed over the suggestions
of that old Free Stater. As to the seven years' franchise offered under
the pretence and colour of meeting Sir Alfred Milner's demand, it had
clearly been intended to serve as a decoy and stop-gap pending the
contemplated war of conquest, and to mask Bond duplicity while further
preparations were to be completed in diplomacy abroad and in the
seditious conspiracy in the Colonies. Natal was at that time swarming
with Boer emissaries, and Transvaal artillery officers with Hollander
engineers in disguise were seen inspecting Laing's Nek tunnel and other
strategic points in that colony.

Not knowing at the time that State Secretary Reitz was an inveterate
Bondman, that old Free State patriot had roundly denounced to him the
wickedness of Bond aims, and added the remark that the establishment of
a united Boer Republic apart from British supremacy in South Africa was
a deceptive dream. England has a mission in Africa--that of the Boers
can only be subordinate to it. It would need the aid of a powerful
maritime combination to supplant England. The case of America does not
present an analogy; there England only was actually interested, but here
various other nations were concerned in their respective huge
investments. They would have a voice in the business. Armed intervention
would lead to a big European war and extreme misery to entire
Africa--just what the devil wants, but not the investor. Indiscriminate
franchise will cause the loss of national independence, and so might
ultimately cosmopolize and obliterate their distinctive nationality, but
so would also a war with England, with the total sacrifice of their
independence into the bargain. Let the Government rather prove to
England its sincere friendship and agree to deal well by the Uitlanders,
treating them as privileged guests, then the unhappy strain in relations
will cease. Above all, renounce that wicked Afrikaner Bond with its
motto of conquest. The demand for franchise is England's device of
self-protection against Bond designs. England will desist from that
demand if we renounce the Bond and prove our friendship.

That old Free Stater had moreover expressed his most earnest conviction
that a _modus vivendi_ upon the lines suggested would find ready
consideration as an alternative to the five years' franchise demand,
and that the British Government would hail with the utmost satisfaction
and relief any tentative towards a sound _rapprochement_ based upon the
contentment of the Boer people within the areas of their Republics and
which would terminate Bond aspirations for Boer supremacy in South
Africa. Had he been permitted, the old Free Stater would gladly have
called upon the British agent at Pretoria, Mr. Conyngham Greene, and
felt confident that the _modus vivendi_ would lead finally to a complete
cessation of British interference and to best relations and prosperous
conditions for all instead. He also cautioned the Government at
Pretoria, giving chapter and verse, against counting upon "the arm of
man." They would find they had trusted on reeds--it would be so in
regard to any foreign help, and even in regard to men of their own
nation in the Cape Colony.

During one of the interviews Mr. Reitz had remarked that he had a
special theory in regard to the situation; but it varied from that of
the President, who, in reality, was King, and whose will overcame all
opposition.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN'S POLICY TO AVERT WAR

Seeing that twenty years of patient, loyal endeavours and friendly
conciliatory proceedings following upon the rehabilitation of the
Transvaal independence had utterly failed in advancing the object of
uniting the English and Boer races, and that instead the existing gulf
was ever widening through the spread of those fell Afrikaner Bond
doctrines, it had become imperative, on the part of British statesmen,
to employ special efforts to overcome the serious menace hanging over
South Africa. The critical situation designedly brought about by the
action of the Transvaal Government and by the influence of the Bond
party indicated the remedy. A liberal franchise in favour of the
Uitlanders would at one stroke correct that evil, and counteract the
other impending danger as well. With a large accession of legitimized
voters working in accord with England's desire for peace and progress,
that good influence would be potent, first to shackle Bond action and
ultimately to reduce it to Colonial limits. The Transvaal would then no
longer be the giant ally, the arsenal, and the treasury of the Afrikaner
Bond, and that organisation would then be checkmated into impotence for
evil.

The success of such a remedial and defensive measure would naturally
depend upon the adequacy of the franchise aimed at. Mr. Chamberlain and
his colleagues were not a little sanguine in expecting that a five
years' qualification for voting and a representation equal to one-fifth
of the total number of seats in the Legislature would be effective for
all that which was needed; nor could it be averred that the Transvaal
burghers would be swamped out thereby.

The Bond chiefs did not fail to at once penetrate the object when the
demand for a five years' franchise was made, and in vain did Sir Alfred
display that firm attitude and exhaust his arguments at the historic
Bloemfontein conference. He had pointed out to President Krueger in a
rudimentary fashion which was no doubt convincing enough--that it was
incompatible with professions of concord and desire for peace while
persisting in excluding from representation a large majority of the
population accustomed to and expecting liberal treatment, and which,
moreover, held four-fifths of the wealth invested in the State. There
could be no other result than a dangerous tension and alienation from
the Government, instead of the peaceful co-operation so essential to
security and progress. In these days of advanced ideas of personal and
political liberty people will resist domination by a minority. They want
to be consulted, and to have at least the opportunity of making their
wishes known by means of representation. The right of petitioning could
not meet that need, and in fact implied the recognition of an inferior
status so repugnant to any one's sensibility. When people are ignored
they resent even light impositions and taxes, but if allowed a voice
will cheerfully submit to heavy burdens, because they then become, in a
manner, self-imposed. Representation is the panacea against popular
disaffection and for assuring governmental stability. To concede to
Uitlanders one-fifth of the seats in the Legislature could not operate
to the prejudice of burgher interests, but less would not meet the case.

It was, however, not President Krueger alone who had to decide--it
affected the Bond as a whole. The diplomatic contest so far proved just
the thing to ripen conditions for the meditated Bond _coup d'etat_. An
alternative offer of a seven years' franchise was interposed as a mere
ruse. Never for a moment did the Afrikaner Bond leaders waver or quail
in the face of resolute firmness, display of force, or even of moral
pressure and notes of advice from imposing quarters, as Mr. Chamberlain
had at first still fondly hoped. To the Bond it had all resolved itself
to a mere question of time, of choosing the most opportune moment when
to assume the aggressive. British attitude had only hastened the issue.
Mr. Jan Hofmeyer had indeed been sent for from the Cape so as to assure
that section of the Bond of Transvaal firmness, but he found no sign of
flinching or of renouncing the common object laboured for so long and
then so near fruition. The only difficulty was that British action had
hastened the issue somewhat too fast. Hence the repeated hurried visits
of the Bond leaders--Jan Hofmeyer, Abraham Fisher, and others--the
frequent caucus meetings of the Executive in consultation with those
delegates, the secret midnight sessions of the combined Volksraads and
Executive, the prolonged telegraphic conferences between the two
Presidents, and the final resulting word of "ready" which preceded the
fatal war ultimatum. The Gordian knot had been in evidence many years
ago; it is now recognised with regret that England had deferred action
for cutting it much too long.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10