Maxims And Opinions Of Field Marshal His Grace The Duke Of Wellington, Selected From His Writings And Speeches During A Public Life Of More Than Half A Century by Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington

A >> Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington >> Maxims And Opinions Of Field Marshal His Grace The Duke Of Wellington, Selected From His Writings And Speeches During A Public Life Of More Than Half A Century

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_Oct. 11, 1811._

_A General Re-action against Buonaparte predicted._

I have, however, long considered it probable, that even _we_ should
witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and
disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has
occurred in Spain and Portugal; and that _we_ should be actors and
advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the
measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.

Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to
understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the
sword they must not return it, till they shall have completely
accomplished their object. They must be prepared, and must be forced, to
make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and
order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the
authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be
prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and
to risk all in a contest, which it should be clearly understood before
it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.

The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to
raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army:
above all, to form a government of such strength, as that army and
people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon
which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which
should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to
avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in
print; but I have never known it to produce any thing but confusion. In
France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through
the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe,
and in establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever
existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in _vivas_
and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the
attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged,
ever since, as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the officers and the
indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.

I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing
to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if
possible, a good government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall
enforce upon them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and
let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures
to raise it.

I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a
match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any
country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are
necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring
specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities
only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can
and ought to assist with money, as well as in other modes, every effort
of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort,
ought to be by the people of the resisting country.

_Dec. 10, 1811._

* * * * *

_The French System of Predatory War._

In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the
recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they
called a _levee en masse_; and put every man, animal, and article, in
their own country, in requisition for the service of the armies. This
system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies
throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation, among whom
such a system was established, should have been anxious to carry on the
war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and
afforded the means of success; and with the war, they carried, wherever
they went, the system of requisition; not, however, before they had, by
these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the
sources of national prosperity at home.

Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence, at least,
the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have
been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides
subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes; in other instances,
besides these articles, they have received pay; and from Austria and
Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides
all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in
money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought
to be added the plunder acquired by the generals, officers, and troops;
and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest
evil that ever fell on the civilised world.

The capital and industry of France having been destroyed by the
revolution, it is obvious that the government cannot raise a revenue
from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must
be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new government,
particularly in the newly-conquered or ceded states; and to defend the
widely-extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and
inclination must lead them to attack it. The French government,
therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for
their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource; and
that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French
revolution has entailed upon the present generation.

_Jan. 31, 1812._

* * * * *

I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the
Peninsula.

_May 3, 1812._

* * * * *

It is very difficult to manage the defence of the kingdom of Portugal,
the whole country being frontier.

_June 11, 1812._

_How to establish National Credit._

When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other
words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its
government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed
expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by
performing their engagements in respect to their debts.

_June 25. 1812._

* * * * *

_The Spaniards cry "Viva!" but don't act._

I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards,
notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry _viva!_ and are
very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most
incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have ever known;
the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of
military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own
country.

_August 18, 1812._

* * * * *

_Imbecility of the Spanish Leaders._

It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have
produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the
country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking, and
talking of any other subject but Spain.

_November 1, 1812._

_Evils of uncontrolled popular Legislatures._

The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be
certain that legislative assemblies could on all occasions act according
to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those
checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems.
Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are
swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they
are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it unfortunately happens too
frequently, that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most
popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and
powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the
public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain,
there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting
the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.

_January 29, 1813._

* * * * *

_Ingratitude of the Portuguese to the British Army._

I must say, that the British army, which I have the honour to command,
have met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and
authorities in Portugal for their services; and that everything that
could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress
the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any
accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the
last of Portugal.

_July 20, 1813._

* * * * *

Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns,
is the characteristic of all Spaniards.

_July 12, 1813._

* * * * *

Sound sense is better than abilities.

_August 8, 1813._

* * * * *

_Basis of military operations against the United States from the side of
Canada._

Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by a naval
superiority on the lakes. But even if we had that superiority, I should
doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at
which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America,
very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in
proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are
impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted
use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport,
which such a country can rarely supply.

I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed
augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed,
would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army
would be large.[7]

[Footnote 7: The letter from the Duke the above is taken was written in
reply to an application by the home government for his opinion. We
frequently find the Duke applied to for his opinion on political matters
at home, while serving in the Peninsula.]

_February 22, 1814._

* * * * *

_The Morale of an Army important to Discipline._

No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the
enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder, and those officers alone can
expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the
troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their
attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their
cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.

_March 5, 1814._

* * * * *

English officers are very strictly instructed, and those who mean to
serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless
they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness
very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the
circumstances exist under which an order is given.

_April 16, 1814._

* * * * *

_French Feelings about the Slave Trade._

You (Mr. Wilberforce) judge most correctly regarding the state of the
public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information,
but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible
to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual,
viz., the daily press. Nobody reads anything but the newspapers; but it
is impossible to get anything inserted in any French newspaper in Paris
in favour of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished
in England, from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English
newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view,
either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to
exasperate against us still more the people of this country; and
therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily
press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers
here.

* * * * *

I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in
this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the king and his
government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But as long
as our press teems with writings drawn with a view of irritating persons
here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to
have upon this question, and which we really possess.

_Letter to Mr. Wilberforce, October 8, 1814._

* * * * *

The real power in Spain is in the clergy.

_October 20, 1814._

* * * * *

Les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquees, ne vont pas
bien.

_Letter to Doumouriex, November 3, 1814._

FRANCE.

_Effects of Buonaparte's Government of France._

Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mecontentement general, et la pauvrete
universelle. Cette malheureuse revolution et ces suites ont ruine le
pays, de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis,
leurs institutions empechent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et
puissante. Tous doivent donc necessairement viser a remplir des emplois
publics, non, comme autrefois, pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour
avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.

Buonaparte laissa une armee de million d'hommes en France, outres les
officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le roi ne peut pas en
maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employees sont mecontens. Buonaparte
gouvernait directement la moitie de l'Europe, et indirectement presque
l'autre moitie. Pour des causes a present bien develloppees et connues,
il employait une quantite infinie de personnes dans ses administrations;
et tous ceux employes, ou dans les administrations exterieures, civiles,
ou dans les administrations militaires des armees, sont renvoyes, et
beaucoup des ceux employes dans les administrations interieures; a cette
classe nombreuse ajouter la quantite d'emigres, et de personnes rentres,
tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de
pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la classe
de la societe, non employee a la main d'oeuvre ou a labourer la terre,
sont en etat d'indigence, et, par consequence, mecontens. Si vous
considerez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte verite, vous y verrez la
cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armee les officiers, sourtout,
sont mecontens. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles a detailler
ici, mais ce mecontentement pourra ce vaincre en adoptant des mesures
sages pour ameliorer l'esprit.

_Letter to Doumouriex, November 26, 1814._

* * * * *

_Re-establishment of the Bourbons necessary to the Peace of Europe._

I have frequently told your highness, and every day's experience shews
me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in
the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The
establishment of any other government, whether in the person of----, or
in a regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual,
or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military
establishments, to the ruin of all the governments of Europe, till it
shall suit the convenience of the French government to commence a
contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we
are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty,
that those who are now on our side will then be against us, and you will
again find yourself surrounded by enemies. I am convinced that the
penetration of your highness will have shewn you the danger of all these
schemes to the interests of the emperor, and that you will defeat them
all by adhering to that line of conduct (in which you will find us
likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the
legitimate government, from which alone can Europe expect any genuine
peace.

_May 20, 1815._

* * * * *

_Effects of Waterloo._

I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his
death-blow: from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are
deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The
infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their
horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing
for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can
still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th
corps d'armee, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps,
which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as
the others, and probably some troops from La Vendee, I am still of
opinion that he can make no head against us--qu'il n'a qu'a se pendre.

_June 23, 1815._

* * * * *

Some of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing; but
I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the
service, at great expense; or I must send them home, and part with the
few British soldiers I have.

I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this; and I only
hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early determination
some way or other.

_June 25, 1815._

* * * * *

_Waterloo described to a Soldier._

Notre Bataille du 18 a ete une de geans; et notre succes a ete complet,
comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise assez pour que je n'en aie plus,
parceque je suis desole de la perte de mes anciens amis et comrades.

Mon voisin et collaborateur (Bluecher) est en bonne sante quoique un peu
souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blesse sous lui dans la
bataille du 16.

_Letter to Doumouriex, June 26, 1815._

* * * * *

_If Buonaparte is to be put to Death, he will not be his Executioneer._

General----has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's passing
to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no
authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me,
believing that I will save his life.---- wishes to kill him; but I have
told him I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed
of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I
advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that
he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to
become executioners, and that I was determined that, if the sovereigns
wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which
should not be me.

_June 26, 1815._

* * * * *

_The "Pounding Match."_

You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a
pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did
not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in
columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was
that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an
enormous quantity of artillery.

I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French
cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the
British infantry behave so well.

_Letter to Marshal Beresford, July 9, 1815._

* * * * *

_Blucher's Vandalism averted._

To Marshal Prince Blucher.--Several reports have been brought to me
during the evening and night, and some from the government, in
consequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one of the
bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to
destroy.

As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the
town, and as the sovereigns when they were here before, left all these
bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay
the destruction of the bridge, at least till they should arrive; or, at
all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow
morning.

_July 8, 1815._

* * * * *

The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king
and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not
merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character
of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely
because the bridge is considered as a monument of the battle of Jena,
notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of
the bridge. Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to suggest
that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to
the commissioners on behalf of the part of the army, during the
negociation of the convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c.,
should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.

All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the
destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall
arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the
bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.

_July 9, 1815._[8]

[Footnote 8: The Duke rarely writes or speaks twice, when once will do.
On this occasion he was anxious; and--successful.]

* * * * *

_Summary Justice._

To the Sous-Prefet de Pontoise.--J'ai ordonne qu'on vous fasse
prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoye une requisition a Pontoise pour des
vivres, vous avez repondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on
envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre.

Vous vous etes mis dans les cas des militaires, et je vous fais
prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.

Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adherens ont traite les
habitans des pays ou ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller;
mais, comme vous vous etes constitue guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier
de guerre.

_July 13, 1815._

* * * * *

_Characteristic Letter to Marshal Beresford_.

The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been
for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the allies the
most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the
infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own
government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their
rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got
their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.

As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend you to resign, and come
away immediately. It is impossible for the British government to
maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so
trifling as it is, if the Portuguese government are to refuse to give
the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them
to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified to
yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the
prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the
matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British government must and
will recall the British officers.

_August 7, 1815._

* * * * *

SPEECHES IN PARLIAMENT.

_Praise of Lord Hastings and the Indian Army._

He professed his entire concurrence in the tribute of approbation
bestowed on the Marquis of Hastings, for his conduct of the late war in
India. There could not remain a doubt in the minds of those acquainted
with the facts, but that the wisdom of the plan on which it was
commenced, and the vigour of its execution, merited the highest praise.
The noble Duke said, he was pleased that an opportunity, like the
present, had occurred to do justice to the services and gallantry of our
troops in India, which were often neglected or disallowed. No troops in
the world performed their duty better, or observed a more steady
discipline. They had evinced their good qualities in all their late
transactions, whether acting in great masses or small detachments. In
all situations they had nobly performed their duty.

_House of Lords, March 9, 1819._

_Impossibility of granting Catholic Emancipation._

The whole question turned upon the degree of security which could be
given to the Protestant religion as by law established in Ireland. To
consider this, it was necessary to consider how the reformation had been
established in Ireland. It was not necessary for him to recall to their
lordships remembrance that the unreformed religion had been established
in Ireland at the point of the sword, and by means of confiscations. All
this was repeated at the revolution, and was fresh in the recollection
of the people of Ireland. Keeping in view that the Irish Roman Catholic
church, under all oppressions, continued in the same state--the pope
having the same influence over the clergy, the clergy the same power
over the people; in this state of things, he would ask, whether it was
possible that Roman Catholics could be safely admitted to hold seats in
parliament? The influence of the priesthood over the people was fostered
by the remembrance of the events to which he had alluded; and the idea
of unmerited and mutual suffering; and no doubt could be entertained,
from their present feelings, that if the Roman Catholics were admitted
to the enjoyment of political power, their first exertion would be to
restore their religion to its original supremacy; and to recover the
possessions and property of which they had been stripped by the
reformation. It was, however, said, that securities were offered on the
part of the Roman Catholics.

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