Maxims And Opinions Of Field Marshal His Grace The Duke Of Wellington, Selected From His Writings And Speeches During A Public Life Of More Than Half A Century by Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington

A >> Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington >> Maxims And Opinions Of Field Marshal His Grace The Duke Of Wellington, Selected From His Writings And Speeches During A Public Life Of More Than Half A Century

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In respect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I am surprised that
any man in the character of a British officer should not have given the
Rajah to understand that the offer would be considered as an insult; and
that he should not have forbidden its renewal, than that he should have
encouraged it, and even offered to receive a quarter of the sum proposed
to be given him for prompt payment. I can attribute your conduct on this
occasion, to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate indiscretion, and
to a desire to benefit yourself, which got the better of your prudence.
I desire, however, that you will refrain from the subject with the Rajah
of Kittoor at all, and that if he should renew it, you will inform him,
that I and all British officers consider such offers as insults on the
part of them by whom made.

_Letter to an officer in India, January 20, 1803._

_Principle of Warfare in India._

We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it
with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long
defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys that are scattered over
the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in
distress.

_Dispatch, Aug. 17, 1803._

* * * * *

_How to avoid Party Spirit in the Army._

It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter;
this must be put an end to. And there is only one mode of effecting
this, and that is for the commanding officer to be of no side excepting
that of the public; to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve
the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service; the
consequence will be that the service will go on, all parties will join
in forwarding it, and in respecting him; there will be an end to their
petty disputes about trifles; and the commanding officer will be at the
head of an army instead of a party.

_Letter to an officer, Sept. 16, 1803._

* * * * *

_The power of the Sword necessary in India._

It is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the native
princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In
this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword;
and it follows that if these political agents have no authority over the
military, they have no power whatever.

The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the
residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be
argued if that is the case, the military commanding officer ought to be
the resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say,
that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive
government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the
hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from
all reflection and reasoning upon the subject is, that the British
government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to
apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other
governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

_Dispatch, Oct. 13, 1803._

* * * * *

_Reason for the ambiguity of Treaties._

It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find
in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties
concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war,
and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims
arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring
forward on all occasions.

_Dispatch, Jan. 7, 1804._

_Foundation of British Power in India in 1803._

The British government has been left by the late Mahratta war in a most
glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India,
the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators by treaty of
the disputes of all. The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their
power is settled upon more permanent foundations, than any before known
in India; all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the
institutions and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is
likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of
tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel
the happiness and security which they enjoy.

_Dispatch, Jan. 16, 1804._

* * * * *

_British "Moderation" in India._

I declare that, when I view the treaty of peace,[2] and its
consequences, I am afraid it will be imagined that the moderation of the
British government in India has a strong resemblance to the ambition of
other governments.

[Footnote 2: After the Mahratta war.]

_Jan. 29, 1804._

* * * * *

_Contrast between European and Asiatic Policy._

European governments were, till very lately, guided by certain rules and
systems of policy so accurately defined and generally known, that it was
scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest
and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the corps
diplomatique, in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state.
The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge, and hardly know of, such
rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary; the objects of their
policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the
effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong; on the
contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them
taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance, they
should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine
their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so
long as it is attended with success; the first reverse dissolves it;
and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the
apprehension of which originally caused it. The company's government in
India, the other contracting party to their alliance, is one bound by
all the rules and systems of European policy. The company's power in
India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation; and although I do
not admit that it depends upon its reputation, as distinguished from its
real force, as appears to be contended by some, I may say that it is
particularly desirable for a government, so constituted as the
company's, never to enter upon any particular object, the probable
result of which should not be greatly in favour of success.

Besides this, the company's government in India is bound by acts of
parliament not to undertake wars of aggression, not to make any but
defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other
contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the
company actually threatened with hostilities.

The company's government in India is also connected with his majesty's
government, and, as an Asiatic power, is liable to be involved in wars
with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever his
majesty shall be at war with those powers.

The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers,
proves that no permanent system can be adopted which will preserve the
weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in
their relative situations, and the whole in peace; excepting there
should be one power, which, either by the superiority of its strength,
its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate, and be able
to protect all.

_1804._

* * * * *

It is necessary for a man who fills a public situation, and who has
great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private
considerations, whether on his own account or that of other persons.

_March 2, 1804._

* * * * *

When war is concluded, all animosity should be forgotten.

_March 12, 1804._

_The British character for good faith must be preserved in India._

I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every portion of India, ten times over, in
order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the
advantages and honour we gained by the late war and the peace: and we
must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained
principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this
country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the
negociations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.

_Dispatch, March 17, 1804._

* * * * *

_Civil Government in India must follow immediately on Military
Conquest._

I rather think that you and the Governor-General agree in opinion on the
subject of the affairs of Malabar. He says, "examine and report the
state of the province before you commence your military operations;
define the evils, and propose a system of government which shall afford
a remedy, towards the establishment of which system military operations
may be directed."

It would be useless to commence military operations upon any great
scale, unless the civil officers should be prepared to take possession
of the country, and to re-establish the civil government as the troops
shall conquer it. If the civil government were not re-established in
this manner, the rebels would rise again as soon as the troops would
pass through the districts; and the effect of the operations of a large
body of troops would be much the same as that of a small body. But if
the civil government is to be re-established in this manner, it would be
better to establish that system which is found to be good, and is to be
permanent, than that which is known to be had, and which is intended
should not last. Supposing that the bad system were first introduced, it
must be followed afterwards by the good one; and, supposing that the bad
system did not produce a rebellion of itself (which I acknowledge I do
not think it would, as rebellion in Malabar is to be traced to causes
entirely independent of all systems of civil government, excepting as
they are connected with a strong or weak military force), the change
from the bad to the good system would produce a degree of convulsion,
and, possibly, momentary weakness, which it is always desirable to
avoid. It is particularly desirable to avoid it in this instance, as it
will not be difficult, by an examination of all that has passed in
Malabar, to fix upon the general principles according to which that
province ought to be governed, and to form a system accordingly, in the
time which must elapse before the troops can he employed in settling the
province.

_March 20, 1804._

* * * * *

_Principle of Relief to the Poor._

The principle, of the mode in which I propose to relieve the distresses
of the inhabitants, is not to give grain or money in charity.

Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided into two classes:
those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter class may be
included old persons, children, and the sick women; who, from their
former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labour, and are
weakened by the effects of famine.

The former, viz., those of both sexes who can work, ought to be employed
by the public; and in the course of this letter I shall point out the
work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in what
manner paid. The latter, viz., those who cannot work, ought to be taken
into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at the
expense of the public.

According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for
all; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be
incurred, and, above all, it will be certain, that no able-bodied person
will apply for relief, unless he should be unwilling to work for his
subsistence, that none will apply who are able to work, and who are not
real objects of charity; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the
purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by the labour,
or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.

_Dispatch, April 11, 1804._

* * * * *

_Tactics to be pursued against Predatory Troops_.

I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description
of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press
him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity,
and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means
doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it
is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps
will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of
operation is to oblige him to move constantly, and with great celerity.
When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the
country, and he does comparatively but little mischief; at all events
the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the
horsemen become dissatisfied, and they perceive that their situation is
hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; the freebooter ends by
having with him only a few adherents, and he is reduced to such a state
as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which
are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a
freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity,
will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most
formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village
people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and
will not allow a man to enter their villages; because their villages
being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare
not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is
the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains
excepting to separate, and even this resource is attended by risk, as
the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

_Dispatch, May 27, 1804._

* * * * *

_Importance of Secresy in Public Affairs_.

There is nothing more certain than that of one hundred affairs
ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to
the public interests; but the misfortune is that where the public
business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept a
secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult
to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is
an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which
description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it
out; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business
ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public
view. For this reason secresy is always best; and those who have been
long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of
never making known public business of any description that it is not
necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secresy
becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk
of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret
or not, as they may think proper.

Remember that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery; in
fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions,
in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

_Dispatch, June 28, 1804._

* * * * *

In all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in
proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps.

_Dispatch, Sept. 12, 1804._

* * * * *

_Neglect of his Services in India._

In regard to staying longer (in the Deccan), the question is exactly
whether the court of directors, or the king's ministers, have any claim
upon me, strong enough to induce me to do anything so disagreeable to my
feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain, for a great
length of time, in this country. I have served the company in important
situations for many years, and have never received anything but injury
from the court of directors, although I am a singular instance of an
officer who has served under all governments, and in communication with
all the political residents, and many civil authorities; and there is
not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of
disapprobation of any of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a
symptom of ill-temper from any one of the political or civil authorities
in communication with whom I have acted. The king's ministers have as
little claim upon me as the court of directors. I am not very ambitious,
and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my
expectations that military services in India would be considered in the
scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the
world. But I might have expected to be placed on the staff in India; and
yet if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General
Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well
known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

_Jan. 4, 1805._

* * * * *

I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes
are concerned.

_Feb. 3, 1805._

* * * * *

_Advice to a Native Ruler in India._

Let the prosperity of the country be your great object; protect the
ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether invested with authority or
not, to oppress them with impunity. Do justice to every man.

_March 2, 1805._

* * * * *

Without distinction of religion every man ought to be called upon to do
service to the state, wherever he is particularly qualified to do that
service.

_House of Commons, May 11, 1808._

_Control of the Navy and Army._

The navy is the characteristic and constitutional force of Britain, and
may therefore be governed by regulations of the legislature; but the
army is a new force, arising out of the extraordinary exigencies of
modern times, and from every consideration of expediency and necessity,
must be left under the control of the crown.

_House of Commons, June 3, 1808._

* * * * *

_The Law-breaker always Wrong._

It frequently happens that the people who do commit outrages and
disturbances have some reason to complain; but he who breaks the law
must be considered in the wrong, whatever may have been, the nature of
the provocation which he has received.[3]

[Footnote 3: This remark, though it applies generally, was made with
respect to Ireland.]

_Ibid, July 7, 1808._

* * * * *

THE PENINSULA.

_The Battle of Vimeiro._

The action of Vimeiro is the only one I have ever been in (1808), in
which everything passed as was directed, and no mistake was made by any
of the officers charged with its conduct.

_Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1806._

* * * * *

_Distinction between Civil and Military Responsibility._

There is a great distinction of duty between military and civil inferior
situations. If, in a civil officer, the inferior differs materially from
the superior, he ought to resign, but in military appointments, it is
the duty of the inferior officer to assist his commander in the mode in
which that commander may deem his services most advantageous.

_Defence of his conduct with regard to the Convention of Cintra. House
of Commons, Feb. 21, 1809._

* * * * *

_Rapidity of the French Retreats accounted for._

It is obvious, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments,
and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it
to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to
its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress;[4] it
must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with
any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same
sacrifice.

[Footnote 4: Alluding to the rapidity of the French retreat.]

_Dispatch, May 18, 1809._

* * * * *

I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither
success nor failure.[5]

[Footnote 5: Referring to their habits of plunder.]

_Dispatch, May 31, 1809._

* * * * *

_Inefficiency of Spanish Officers._

Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army, and it is
extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this
nation has by the measures which it has adopted in the last two years,
so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military
profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be
so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I
cannot say they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception
of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature.

_Dispatch, Aug. 1809._

* * * * *

_Terrorism and Force, not Enthusiasm, enabled the French Revolutionary
Armies to conquer._

People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French
through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which
have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined,
it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was
the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the
system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance
in the same system of applying every individual and every description of
property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered
Europe.

_Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1809._

_The Spaniards and Portuguese want the true spirit of Soldiers._

We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish
armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits
and spirit of soldiers--the habits of command on one side, and of
obedience on the other--mutual confidence between officers and men; and
above all, a determination in superiors to obey the spirit of the orders
they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell
the true cause if they do not.

_Dispatch, Sept. 8, 1809._

* * * * *

_Importance of good understanding between Negotiating Parties._

Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is
done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other, but
when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds
for them; when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no
accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought
to be spent in action.

_Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1809._

* * * * *

_Popular Assemblies unmanageable._

I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular assembly;
even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and in three days,
would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the
example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules
and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of
which render safe, and successfully direct, its proceedings.

_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._

* * * * *

_Distracted State of Spain._

I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's situation, I should leave the
English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could;
and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short space
of time Spain must fall into the hands of France. At the same time I
must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a
situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of
common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government,
intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their
powers could he used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with
all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an assembly, will
have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the
country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower class in
our favour, and against France; the remark being perfectly well founded,
that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us any where in Spain
excepting by the government.

But in order to enjoy common safety under such an assembly as the
Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal
government ought to be well defined, and to be, if possible, a part of
the constitution of the assembly. Great care should also be taken in
their formation to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the
place of their sitting; but still with all these precautions I should
prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a regent, to the
Cortes.

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