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Maxims And Opinions Of Field Marshal His Grace The Duke Of Wellington, Selected From His Writings And Speeches During A Public Life Of More Than Half A Century by Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington

A >> Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington >> Maxims And Opinions Of Field Marshal His Grace The Duke Of Wellington, Selected From His Writings And Speeches During A Public Life Of More Than Half A Century




I certainly have a very strong feeling on the subject of all these
railways to be traversed by the aid of steam. I sincerely wish that all
these projects could prove successful; but, in proportion as they may be
successful, in the same proportion is it desirable that there should not
be a perpetual monopoly established in the country. Under these
circumstances, I have a strong feeling that it is desirable to insert in
all these bills some clause, to enable the government or the parliament
to revise the enactments contained in them at some future specific
period. I conceive that, by carrying these measures into execution, a
very great injustice is often done to many landed proprietors in the
country; and they are forced either to submit to great inconvenience, or
to contend against that inconvenience by incurring a very large expense,
both in this and the other house of parliament. If some measure of the
description to which I allude be not adopted, and if these railroads are
to become monopolies in the hands of present or of future proprietors,
we shall hereafter be only able to get the better of such monopolies by
forming fresh lines of road, to the farther detriment of the interests
of the landed proprietors, and at a great increase of expense and
inconvenience. These circumstances have most forcibly struck my mind. I
have had the subject under consideration for some days; I have conversed
with others respecting it; and it appears to me that some plan ought to
be devised in order to bring these railroads under the supervision of
parliament at some future period. I therefore am anxious that the
further proceedings in all these bills[18] should be suspended for a
short time, in order that I may propose some clause, or introduce some
measure, to meet the object to which I have referred. I think it is a
subject the consideration of which ought not to fall on any individual.
It is, I conceive, a matter which the government should take into its
especial consideration. I am, however, perfectly ready to share with the
government the responsibility of proposing such a measure to the house.

[Footnote 18: Some railway bills before the Home of Lords.]

_June_ 3,1836.

* * * * *

_Moderation of the Opposition in the House of Lords towards the
Melbourne Government_.

From my own experience, I must take the liberty of observing, that I
consider the conduct pursued by noble lords on this side of the house,
throughout the present session, to have been marked with the utmost
moderation. For myself, I think I am correct in stating, that since the
address to the throne in answer to the king's speech, with the exception
only of one occasion, when I requested the noble viscount to postpone
the Corporations (Ireland) Bill till after the Easter holidays, I never
entered the house till after Easter. Since that period, I have certainly
taken part in the proceedings that have been going forward in the house,
and I have felt it my duty to oppose some of the measures of government;
but I think I shall be borne out when I say that I have accompanied the
vote which I have given with observations expressed in terms of great
moderation. I have acted on all occasions to the best of my opinion, and
in a way which I thought most calculated to be beneficial to the
country. The noble viscount has been pleased to taunt us for not having
addressed the king with a view to obtain his and his colleagues' removal
from the situations which they hold. If the noble viscount would look at
the manner in which they were appointed to office, if he would look at
the whole history for the last twelve months I think he would find
sufficient reason for our not having adopted that course of proceeding.
The noble viscount knows very well upon what ground he stands, and
knowing that, it would have been just as well in him if he had avoided
his taunts against us for not having asked the king to remove him from
office. I would take the liberty to recommend the noble viscount to
consider himself not as the minister of a democratic body in another
place, but as the minister of a sovereign in a limited monarchy, in a
country, great in point of extent, great in its possessions, and in the
various interests which it comprises; and that considering these
circumstances, he should, in future, concert such measures as he has
reason to think may pass with the approval and suit the general
interests of all,--meet the good will of all,--and not of one
particular party in one particular place only. If the noble viscount
will but follow that course for some little time, he will find no
difficulty in conducting the business of government in this house, but
will find every facility afforded him in forwarding measures of the
above description. I would beg the noble lord to recollect one fact, in
regard to the church of England, whether in England or Ireland. Let him
recollect that the avowed policy followed by this country during the
last three hundred years, has been to retain inviolable the church
establishment. We are called here to consult particularly for the good
of the church; and if the noble viscount brings forward any measures
relating to that subject, let him recollect that all measures of such a
kind must be discussed by us with that particular object in view. This
is not only the old feeling of this house of three hundred years'
standing, but it is that on which we acted no longer than eight or nine
years ago, when we had occasion to review the safeguards and general
landmarks whereby the church establishment of this country was defended.

_August_ 18, 1836.

_The Quadruple Treaty. Effects of our Intervention in Spain_.

It is well known to your lordships that I was one of those who objected
to the treaty called the "Quadruple Treaty." It is perfectly true that I
was afterwards instrumental in carrying it into effect; because it was
my duty, in the situation in which I was placed at that time, to carry
into effect those treaties which his majesty had entered into, whether I
had originally approved of them or not. I cannot, therefore, now,
disapprove of the due execution of the quadruple treaty by others; nor
will I refuse my assent to the proposition that the measures which his
majesty has adopted in execution of the treaty are satisfactory as far
as we have any knowledge of them. If any measures should have been
adopted, not already provided for in the treaty, it will be our duty to
consider them calmly and dispassionately. Much discussion has taken
place in other countries with respect to the course pursued by other
members of this alliance, in the execution of this treaty. I must say,
that so far as I am enabled to form a judgment of the treaty, (and I
know nothing more than what appears on the face of the treaty itself) it
seems to me that it has been fairly executed by all the parties who
subscribed it. When I had the honour of serving his majesty in 1834, I
was called upon to state whether the treaty in question would be carried
into execution. I then stated what I understood was the meaning and
scope of the treaty;--viz. that there should be no armed intervention in
the internal affairs of Spain, which should tend to affect the
independence of that country. That was my sense of the treaty at the
time--it is my sense of the treaty at the present moment--it was so
understood by the other parties to the treaty. It was the understanding
of all parties that there should he no military intervention in the
internal affairs of Spain. This was the understanding of the treaty, and
in the month of November, 1834, this explanation was communicated and
was satisfactory to the Spanish government.

I consider that the attempt by his majesty's government, aided even by
the strongest power in Europe, to force upon Spain any form of
government, must fail. Those who should make the attempt must take upon
themselves not only the expenses of their own army in a most expensive
contest, but those of the civil and military government of Spain; and
they must hold their position in Spain, and defray their expenses till
the new government should be settled and submitted to, and tranquillity
established in the country. I should like to see how the Commons House
of Parliament, or the Chamber of Deputies, would treat a proposition
that should call upon them to agree to a vote of money for any such
operation, for the purpose of forcibly imposing a liberal government on
Spain, or on any other country. I contend my lords, that this scheme is
absolutely impracticable. His majesty's ministers may rely on it, that
they have undertaken that which they never can perform; and that the
sooner they place themselves on the footing on which they ought strictly
to stand with reference to the quadruple alliance, the sooner will the
pacification of Spain, which we must all of us anxiously wish for, be
accomplished. I feel, for one, the strongest objection to anything like
interference with the internal affairs of the Peninsula. I object to it,
not only on account of the vast expense it must inevitably entail upon
this country, but still more so on account of the injury which it
inflicts on the parties existing in that state. Of my own certain
knowledge I can state, that the individuals composing these parties in
Spain, have actually been ruined, their properties confiscated, their
fortunes sacrificed, by the course which his majesty's government have
pursued. Acting under the assurances of his majesty's government,
individuals have adopted a certain line of conduct. They followed his
majesty's government, as a party in the state. His majesty's government,
thus acting, is obliged to move forward with the democratic movement The
unfortunate persons I have alluded to have, in consequence, been
abandoned, their fortunes sacrificed, and their prospects blighted for
ever. Events like these, my lords, which affect the character as well as
the influence of the country, inclined me to be more adverse to such
interference than I should be on the mere score of expense. I do not
mean to oppose the address, but in taking this course, I beg to be
clearly understood as not holding myself bound to approve of the
employment of any force beyond that stipulated for by the quadruple
treaty, which treaty parliament has recognised.

_January_ 30,1837.

_The Poor Law Act has surpassed his expectation_.

My lords, I supported the bill while it was in this house; and having
given that support to the bill from being a witness to the evils, and
being apprehensive of the consequences likely to have attended the
former system, I conceive it to be my duty to come forward on this
occasion, and to state that this bill has surpassed any expectation
which I had formed of the benefits likely to result from it. The bill,
my lords, may require amendment in certain parts, and it appears that
his majesty's government have taken measures to ascertain what points in
the bill so require amendment. I, for one, am ready to pay the greatest
attention to the points which may be brought under the consideration of
this house. But I must say that I approve of the measure as far as it
has gone hitherto, and I have witnessed its operation. I do not talk of
what I have seen generally, I talk of the details of the management of
the bill, from having witnessed that management in different workhouses,
in different parts of the country in which I have resided; and I must
say that it has been practically beneficial, and particularly in cases
such as these. First of all, it has put the workman and his employer
upon a true and friendly footing of confidence. Then it has connected
the man of property, the man of the highest rank in his country, with
the lowest class, with the labouring class, by admitting such to the
board of Guardians. I can mention some noble lords, who are ornaments to
this house, and who constantly attend at the weekly meetings of the
guardians, being elected guardians by the parishes in the neighbourhood
in which they reside. No measure could be attended with better results,
and being convinced that it will effect still greater benefits,
sincerely thinking so, I should be ashamed if I did not step forward,
and at once avow my sentiments respecting it. I avow at once that I
supported the bill at the time his majesty's ministers proposed it--that
I do not repent of what I did on that occasion in so supporting it--but,
on the contrary, that I rejoice in the part I then took; and I now
congratulate his majesty's ministers on its success.

_April_ 7, 1837.

* * * * *

_The Universities--their Education System the admiration of the World._

The working of all these colleges and of the system on which they are
regulated, is for the benefit of the public; and in each and every
college the object is to carry into execution the will of the founder,
just as it would probably have been had he lived to this period. In
every case the great object of the governing authorities is, to benefit
the public by the education of the youth who resort to these
institutions. The noble viscount (Melbourne) could not help admitting
that these institutions have worked well, and that latterly a great
improvement has taken place in the system of education pursued under
their auspices. The noble viscount has also spoken of the great
improvement in the system of education pursued in the new university of
Durham, and in other new universities elsewhere. But, nevertheless, the
noble viscount could not help admitting that the old universities of
Oxford and Cambridge possess the merit of having established in England
an excellent system of education, which is, in point of fact, the envy
and admiration of the world.

_April_ 11, 1837.

* * * * *

_The Quadruple Treaty condemned_.

My lords, I must confess that I did not approve of the original
Quadruple Treaty. I considered it inconsistent with the ancient
principle and the policy and practice adopted in this country with
regard to Portugal, to avoid to interfere in the disputes between the
two princes of the House of Braganza, which had been the policy of this
country for many years. It sanctioned the introduction of Spanish troops
into Portugal, which measure was inconsistent with our defensive
relations with Portugal, and which had been objected to and prevented in
that very contest between the rival princes of the House of Braganza.
Yet it gave no fresh assistance to bring the contests in Portugal to a
conclusion, excepting the promise to give the aid of this country by the
employment of a naval force in co-operation with the Spanish and
Portuguese troops, which aid was not necessary. Another objection which
I entertained to the Quadruple Treaty was, that it mixed up France and
this country in the offers and promises made to Don Carlos and Don
Miguel, in the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty. These powers
became, in fact, guarantees for the performance of these engagements, as
well as for the performance of the engagements made under the same
articles of the treaty to the subjects of Portugal and Spain. It is
impossible to describe the inconvenience of such articles; they require
the interference of government in hundreds of little questions. I have
felt the inconvenience of those articles since their adoption; I stated
my objections to them at the time, and I have seen no reason, since, to
alter the opinions I then formed.

_April_ 21, 1837.

* * * * *

_Effects of the Additional Articles to the Quadruple Treaty._

By the first of the additional articles to the treaty, the King of the
French obliged himself to take such measures in those parts of his
dominions which adjoined to Spain, as might be calculated to prevent
succours of men, arms, and warlike stores being sent from France into
Spain; and the King of Great Britain engaged, under the second of the
said additional articles, to furnish such arms and warlike stores as her
majesty the Queen of Spain might require; and further to assist her
majesty with a naval force if necessary. The Duke of Braganza was to
give his best assistance to serve her majesty, that he might be called
upon to render. So that those additional articles were essentially
different from the terms and provisions of the original treaty, by which
the removal of the two princes from Portugal was effected. I do not mean
to say, that, in the preamble to that treaty, allusion is not made to
the affairs both of Spain and Portugal, but there still is a remarkable
difference between the words used in the treaty and the additional
articles; and moat particularly in relation to the part to be taken by
this country.

_April_ 21, 1837.

* * * * *

_The Legion and the Stock Exchange.--Impotency of our interference_.

I contend, as I have before contended in this house, that his majesty's
present ministers (Lord Melbourne's government) ought not to have
departed from the position which the previous administration had
established while they were in power. I will not pretend to say what
would have been the result of their following out that course, but this
I do say, that the course pursued by his lordship's government has not
benefited the military or the financial affairs of Spain, or promoted
the peace of that country or the general tranquillity of Europe, or
attained any of the political advantages which the noble viscount boasts
have been attained by his departure from that position which the
previous government had occupied and left to their successors. But, my
lords, it did unfortunately happen that certain parties in this country
had been connected with the Spanish finances; and it was important to
those parties that the red coats should make their appearance in Spain,
and that the name of "Great Britain," and of the British legion, should
be mixed up in the operations of the war. Money was raised in this
country to defray the expense of the equipment of the "Legion," as it
was called, of 10,000 or 12,000 men, and also of their pay, their food,
and maintenance, for a certain number of months; and the noble lords, in
order that this scheme might be carried into execution, gave their
consent to the order in council for the suspension of the Foreign
Enlistment Act. The corps gathered in this country, and went to Spain,
in the spring of the year 1835, nearly two years ago. Their first
operation upon their arrival at St. Sebastian, was a march over the very
same ground to the very spot which was the scene of the late disaster.
My lords, up to that moment, the Eliot convention, as it is most
honourably and justly called, had been carried into execution. It was on
that day departed from on both sides, and from that day to this, I
firmly believe, from all I have seen and read,--and I have read much on
the subject within the last few days--there has been no certainty in the
execution of that convention. Not only has there been no certainty in
the execution of that convention, but, notwithstanding the millions of
money that Spain has expended,--notwithstanding the blood which has been
shed and the number of lives that have been lost,--I will venture to
say, that the military affairs of the Queen of Spain are in a worse
condition now than they were in the month of May, 1835.

The whole of the policy of the British government, therefore; all the
operations of the British legion, backed by the British squadron; have
effected nothing more nor less towards putting an end to the war, and
giving peace to Spain and to Europe, than the removal of the blockade of
St. Sebastian from one point to another, so as not to come within the
liability of being affected by the 68-pounders of the British steamers,
under the command of Lord John Hay.

_April_ 21,1837.

* * * * *

_Uselessness of the operations of the Legion, and Lord John Hay's
Squadron, at St. Sebastian_.

If the noble lord supposes that the safety of St. Sebastian had been
more or less endangered by the blockade, I can assure him that he is
much mistaken; for, from what I know of that fortified town, which is
one of the first or second order in Europe, I can take upon myself to
say that the Carlists might have been left in their original position
without any danger whatever to the town, because they could not make an
attack upon such a fortress. In the whole course of the war they have
not, to my knowledge, taken by an attack any fortified post; or even any
open town of any magnitude, prepared for its defence. They could not
have distressed St. Sebastian for provisions, because its communication
with the sea could not be prevented. I say, it could not be prevented,
even if the whole British fleet were blockading it, instead of being
there to relieve it. The amount of inconvenience felt in the town from
the Carlist force being in the neighbourhood, was neither more nor less
than the unpleasantness of ladies and gentlemen, residing there, being
prevented taking their evening walks in the neighbourhood. This is the
whole amount of the inconvenience from which the town was relieved. This
was the whole amount of the service rendered.

_April_ 21,1837.

_Strictures on General Evans_.

My lords, I will go a little further. I will say, that I firmly believe
that the connexion between the legion and the fleet has been injurious
to the military operations of the queen of Spain's generals. That is my
decided opinion, founded upon my knowledge of the nature of the country,
and of the position of both parties. My lords, there is one point to
which I refer; that is, the want of communication between the Queen of
Spain's generals, which can be relied upon. If corps of the size of
those now employed are not actually joined, there must be a certain
communication between them; for, without communication there can be no
co-operation; and any attempt at co-operation would, in my opinion, in
all probability, lead to disasters such as have recently taken place at
Hernani. How are these troops situated? General Evans's troops are at
St. Sebastian; General Saarsfield is at the other side of the Borunda,
at Pampeluna; and Espartero, with his army, is at Bilboa. It is
impossible that there can be any communication between these three,
except by the French frontier, and by sea from Socoa, or by the Ebro. An
arrangement is made for an attack, and a day named. What was the
consequence? General Evans made an attack, but General Saarsfield, at
Pampeluna, does not attack; there is a frost or snow, or rain, or some
physical impediment which prevents a movement on the part of Saarsfield.
General Evans cannot be informed in time, and the enemy has opportunity
and leisure to throw his whole force upon General Evans; who, even if
the troops had behaved well, would have been compelled to retire. The
position, therefore, of the legion at St. Sebastian, in order to
co-operate with the British squadron, that there might be something like
British co-operation, was not an operation of war, it was one of
stock-jobbing. My lords, it is a matter of much surprise to me, that
General Evans, who, having acquired the confidence of his majesty's
government, and that of the Queen of Spain, I presume must be an able
man--it is, certainly, a surprising circumstance, that having had
experience of the difficulties of carrying on communication in that
country, and having met with a check in the month of January, 1836, for
want of communication, he should not have felt the danger of his
position, and should have omitted to put himself in communication to a
certainty with corps in whose co-operation he was to act, instead of
keeping himself at a distance, in order that he might carry on
operations in concert with his majesty's fleet.

_April_ 21,1837.

* * * * *

_Undisciplined state of the Legion_.

The noble lord has stated that he will not recall the marines. I would
beg to remind your lordships, and the noble viscount in particular, of
this fact--that the marines are properly the garrisons of his majesty's
ships, and that upon no pretence ought they to be moved from a fair and
safe communication with the ships to which they belong. The noble lord
states, that he is responsible, and that he will take upon himself the
responsibility. I have commanded his majesty's armies, and have incurred
as many risks, and faced more difficulties than, I hope, the noble lord
will ever have to encounter. I have been engaged in hostilities of this
description, where co-operation was carried on upon the coast; and
though I certainly would do as much for the service, and I believe I may
say, have done as much for the service, as the noble lord, yet I would
not venture, and have never ventured, to put any corps whatever in
co-operation with the Spaniards, or in any situation whatever in which
the detached troops could not communicate with the corps from which they
were detached; and, above all, upon the sea-coast, where the troops
detached could not hold communication with the ships. The first order to
each of these detachments was, to keep the communication with their
ships. The loss of 400 or 500 marines may not materially involve the
honour of this country, but the lives of the men ought not to be
endangered, as they must be, if care be not taken that they should have
a communication with a point of safety, without some very extraordinary
cause. We hear of the operations of the marines with the Austrians. But
the Spanish troops, and particularly the British legion, are not the
Austrians. I cannot consider this corps of General Evans to be in a
state of discipline and subordination, such as a body of troops ought to
be in, with which his majesty's marine forces ought to be connected.
They have suffered very considerably; their losses have been great, and
have affected their subordination, their good order and discipline,
particularly in the presence of an enemy. A disaster or panic may occur
among the best troops; but among such, order can be re-established. It
does not appear that these are in the state in which they ought to be,
to render it safe to co-operate with them. No efforts of their officers
can, in such cases, have any effect upon them.

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