The Government Class Book by Andrew W. Young

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Sec.5. But of the officers of these departments of the government, only the
members of one branch of the law-making power were elected by the
people. The other branch was composed of a small number of men, called a
council; but they were appointed by the king and subject to his control,
as was also the governor, who had the power of an absolute negative or
veto to any proposed law. And laws after having received the assent of
the governor, must be sent to England and approved by the king, before
they could go into effect.

Sec.6. Hence we see that the colonists had no security for the passage of
such laws as they wanted. And the consequence was, that they were often
denied good and wholesome laws, by the refusal of the king to sanction
them. Not only so; many laws enacted by parliament were very unjust and
oppressive. The object of these laws was to secure to Great Britain
alone the trade of the colonies. One law declared that no goods should
be imported by the colonists but in English vessels; if brought in
other vessels, both the goods and vessels were to be forfeited to the
British government.

Sec.7. Another law required such articles as England wanted, to be
transported to that country and other countries belonging to Great
Britain. The colonists were permitted to ship to foreign markets such
products only as English merchants did not want. They were prohibited
from selling abroad any wool, yarn, or woolen manufactured goods. This
was done to keep the markets open for British wool and manufactures.
Another law declared that no iron wares of any kind should be
manufactured here. Thus was it attempted to suppress manufactures in the
colonies.

Sec.8. Hence we see that it was the policy of the British government to
compel the colonists to buy of England all the goods they wanted which
they did not themselves produce, and to sell to England the surplus
productions of the colonies. For this purpose, heavy duties were laid
upon goods imported into the colonies from other countries than Great
Britain and her possessions. These duties were taxes levied upon goods
brought into the colonies from abroad, and were collected by officers
here from the persons importing the goods.

Sec.9. The following facts will explain to the young reader more clearly
the nature and effects of these duties: The colonists traded with the
West India islands, some of which belonged to Great Britain, some to
France, and some to Spain. To secure the whole trade, the British
government imposed high duties upon the molasses, sugar and other
articles imported into the colonies from the French and Spanish islands.
The people of the colonies could therefore avoid the payment of these
duties only by importing the above mentioned goods from the British
islands.

Sec.10. Not satisfied with these acts, parliament claimed the right to tax
the colonies, "in all cases whatsoever;" and an act was passed
accordingly, laying duties upon all tea, glass, paper, &c., imported
into the colonies; and the money thus collected was put into the British
treasury. The colonists petitioned the king and parliament to repeal
these obnoxious laws; but their petitions were denied. Having given up
all hope of relief, congress, which was a body of delegates from the
several colonies, declared the colonies to be free and independent
states, no longer subject to the government of Great Britain. This
declaration was maintained by a war which lasted about seven years, when
Great Britain gave up the contest, and acknowledged the independence of
the states; and the _revolution_ was accomplished.

Chapter XXVII.

Nature of the Union under the Confederation.

Sec.1. As early as the year 1774, the colonies united in the plan of a
congress, to be composed of delegates chosen in all the colonies, for
the purpose of consulting on the common good and of adopting measures of
resistance to the claims of the British government. The first great
continental congress met on the 4th of September, 1774. Another congress
assembled in May, 1775. This congress adopted sundry measures having
reference to war, and finally made the declaration of independence, July
4th, 1776. The continental congress, the members of which were chosen by
the state legislatures, conducted the affairs of the nation until near
the close of the war.

Sec.2. With a view to a permanent union of the colonies under a general
government, the congress, in November, 1777, agreed upon a frame of
government, contained in certain articles, called, "Articles of
Confederation and perpetual Union between the States." These articles
were to go into effect when they should have received the assent of all
the states. But as the consent of the last state (Maryland) was not
obtained until March, 1781, they went into operation only about two
years before the close of the war.

Sec.3. As a plan of national government, the confederation was soon found
to be very defective. The union formed under it was a very imperfect
one. Having been framed in time of war, it had respect to the operations
of war rather than to a state of peace. Although it answered some good
purpose in carrying on the war, it was not well adapted oven to the
condition of the country then existing. Its defects appeared almost as
soon as it went into effect; and after the return of peace, it was found
that the union, instead of being strengthened and perpetuated by it,
could be preserved only by a radical change in the system of government.

Sec.4. The leading defect of the confederation was its weakness. Congress
could do little more than to recommend measures. As it could not
legislate directly upon persons, its measures were to be carried into
effect by the states; but the states were not in all cases willing, and
some of them did at times refuse to do so, and congress could not compel
them. It belonged to congress to determine the number of troops and the
sums of money necessary to carry on the war, and to call on each state
to raise its share; but congress could not enforce its demands. It
borrowed money in its own name, but it had not the means of paying it.
It had no power to lay and collect taxes; this power was reserved to the
states.

Sec.5. Hence we see that congress was dependent for every thing upon the
good will of thirteen independent states. It is a wonder that a
government of such inherent weakness should bring the war to a
successful issue. It was a sense of danger from abroad, rather than any
power in the government, that induced a sufficient compliance with the
ordinances of congress to achieve the independence of the states.

Sec.6. On the restoration of peace, new difficulties arose. We have already
spoken of the want of power in congress to lay and collect taxes for
war purposes. Money was now wanted to discharge the public debt, and to
pay the current expenses of the government; yet congress had no power to
raise it, either by a _direct tax_ upon the persons or property of the
citizens, or _indirectly_ by duties on goods imported, as at present
under the constitution. The power to lay and collect duties was with the
states; but it was of little use so long as each state could impose such
duties as it chose. The states being unable to agree upon a uniform rate
of duties, the goods would be imported into states which levied the
lowest duties. It was expedient, if it had been possible, to borrow more
money on the credit of the union, as the heavy debt contracted during
the war remained unpaid, and congress had no means of paying it.

Sec.7. But the inability to raise money was not the only difficulty that
attended the want of power by congress to lay duties. This power was
necessary also to regulate the foreign trade. We have already remarked,
that it was the policy of Great Britain before the revolution to secure
in the colonies a market for her manufactures. (Chap. XXVI.) Not only
so; she had by her navigation acts, for more than a hundred years,
imposed heavy duties upon foreign vessels coming into her ports, in
order to secure the carrying trade to her own shipping. In addition to
this, she also levied high duties upon the produce of the states sent to
pay for the goods we were obliged to buy of her, our own people not
having as yet the means, nor having had time, to establish
manufactories, and to manufacture for themselves.

Sec.8. Another of the numerous troubles which arose from this imperfect
union was the want of peace and harmony between the states. Laws were
enacted in some states with a view to their own interests, which
operated injuriously upon other states. This induced the latter states
to retaliate, by passing laws partial to themselves and injurious to the
former. The states soon became disaffected toward each other; and their
mutual jealousies and rivalries and animosities at length became so
great as to cause fears that some of the states would become involved
in war among themselves, and that the union would be broken up.

Sec.9. In the hope of remedying the difficulty last mentioned, an attempt
was made to procure the insertion, into the articles of confederation,
of a provision giving to congress the power to regulate trade; but the
attempt failed. In January, 1786, the legislature of Virginia proposed a
convention of commissioners from all the states, to take into
consideration the situation and trade of the United States, and the
necessity of a uniform system of commercial regulations.

Sec.10. A meeting was accordingly held at Annapolis, in September, 1786;
but as commissioners from only five states attended, viz., New York, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, the commissioners deemed
it unadvisable to proceed to business relating to an object in which all
the states were concerned; but they united in a report to the several
states and to congress, in which they recommended the calling of a
general convention of delegates from all the states, to meet in
Philadelphia on the 2d Monday of May, 1787, with a view not only to the
regulation of commerce, but to such other amendments of the articles of
confederation as were necessary to render them "adequate to the
exigencies of the union."

Sec.11. In pursuance of this recommendation, congress, in February, 1787,
passed a resolution for assembling a convention. All the states, except
Rhode Island, appointed delegates, who met pursuant to appointment; and
framed the present constitution of the United States. They also
recommended it to be laid by congress before the several states, to be
by them considered and ratified in conventions of representatives of the
people. Conventions were accordingly called for this purpose in all the
states, except Rhode Island, and the constitution was ratified by all of
them in which conventions had been called, except North Carolina.

Sec.12. The constitution was to go into effect if ratified by nine states.
The ninth state, New Hampshire, sent its ratification to congress in
July, 1788; and measures were taken by congress to put the new
constitution into operation. Ratifications were received from North
Carolina and Rhode Island the year after the organization of the new
government.

Chapter XXVIII.

Nature of the Union under the Constitution.

Sec.1. Having given, in the preceding chapter, a sketch of the union under
the confederation, we shall next show the nature of the union under the
present constitution, commencing with a brief comparison of the leading
features of the two systems of government.

Sec.2. The former union was a mere confederacy. A _confederacy_ is a
league, a federal compact. The word _federal_ is from the Latin _fadus_,
a league, or alliance. Hence a confederacy is a combination or union of
two or more parties, whether persons or states, for their mutual benefit
and assistance. And let it be here particularly noted, that this union
was a union of states, _as states_. The articles of confederation were
framed by congress, whose members were appointed by the state
legislatures, and, when framed, were submitted to the state legislatures
for ratification.

Sec.3. On the other hand, the union under the constitution is a union, not
of the states, as such, but of the _people of the states_. Thus it is
expressed in the preamble to the constitution: "We, the people of the
United States, in order to form a more perfect union, ... do ordain and
establish this constitution for the United States of America." And the
constitution was submitted for ratification, not to the state
legislatures, but to conventions whose members were elected by the
people for that purpose.

Sec.4. The states under the confederation were independent, not only of
each other, but of the general government. True, they agreed, for their
common defense and mutual welfare, to do certain things; and certain
other things they agreed not to do, but delegated to congress the power
to do them; but, as we have seen, congress had not the power to compel
the states to obey its requisitions. By the constitution, the states
have given up a greater portion of their sovereignty to the general
government, which has power, in certain cases, to control the state
governments, and to enforce its laws upon them and upon individuals.

Sec.5. Again, under the confederation, as in confederacies generally, the
states were equal. They were entitled to an equal number of delegates in
the congress, in which they voted by states, each state having one vote;
that is, if a majority of the delegates of a state voted in favor of or
against a proposed measure, the vote of the state was so counted; and a
proposition having in its favor a majority of the states, was carried.
Every state was entitled to seven delegates; but there must be at least
two delegates present and voting, in order to give a state vote; and if
an equal number of the delegates of a state voted for and against a
proposition, the state was said to be divided, and to have no vote.

Sec.6. Under the constitution there are two branches of congress, in one of
which the number of representatives of each state is in proportion to
its population; in the other, (the senate,) the states are equally
represented, on the principle of the confederation, though by two
senators only. But the vote in both is taken, not by states as under the
confederation, but _per capita_, that is, by the head or poll, the vote
of each member counting one.

Sec.7. The articles of confederation were framed by congress, the members
of which were appointed by the state legislatures; and the articles,
when framed, were submitted for ratification to the state legislatures.
The constitution was framed by a convention of delegates from the
states appointed for that purpose; and was ratified, not by the state
legislatures, but by state conventions whose members were elected by the
people of the several states.

Sec.8. The former union, as has been remarked, was a mere Confederacy,
composed of independent states, and united simply for purposes of
defense and their mutual safety. In most respects they had no more
political connection than so many different nations. The people of a
state were not, properly speaking, citizens of the United States, but
only citizens of the state in which they lived. But by the constitution,
the people of the states were incorporated into a nation; and a citizen
of a state is also a citizen of the United States. The government of the
confederation, although sometimes called the national government, was
not really such, nor was it generally so regarded, as appears from the
proceedings of the convention that framed the constitution.

Sec.9. Among the earliest proceedings of the convention was the offering of
a resolution, declaring that "a national government ought to be formed,
consisting of legislative, judiciary, and executive." This resolution
was strongly opposed by a large portion of the delegates, because it
proposed to establish a _national_ government. They were in favor of
continuing the confederation with a slight enlargement of the powers of
congress, so as to give that body the power to lay and collect taxes,
and to regulate commerce. But the friends of a national government
prevailed; and we have now a complete government, consisting of the
three departments, legislative, executive, and judicial.

Sec.10. Under the confederation, there was no executive to execute the
ordinances of congress; nor a national judiciary, the state courts being
used for all judicial purposes. There was only a legislature; and that
consisted of a single body, called the congress, appointed by the state
legislatures, and having scarcely power enough to entitle it to the name
of legislature.

Sec.11. But, although the present government, with these three departments
of power, and controlling, in matters of general concern, the action of
the state governments and of individuals, is properly a national
government; yet it is not wholly such, but partly national and partly
federal; some of the federal features of the confederation having been
retained in the constitution, as will appear on a further examination of
this instrument. Hence the union is still called, with propriety, the
_federal union_, and the government the _federal government_.

Chapter XXIX.

Legislative Department. House of Representatives.

Sec.1. The first article of the constitution describes the manner in which
the legislature is formed, and prescribes its principal powers. It
declares, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house
of representatives." Members of the old congress were appointed by the
state legislatures for one year, and might be recalled by them at any
time. Representatives are now chosen for two years. It was thought that
a single session was too short a term for men in general to acquire the
knowledge and experience necessary to a right performance of the
responsible duties of a representative. Besides, measures are often left
unfinished at the close of a session; and those who have once examined
their merits and demerits, can dispose of them more promptly than new
members.

Sec.2. The same clause declares that "the electors in each state shall have
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of
the state legislature." The qualifications of electors were various in
the different states. (Chap. VI, Sec.8.) In some of them, owners of
property, or tax-payers, in others, freeholders only, were voters. In
some, only the latter voted for the higher officers; in a few, suffrage
was almost universal. It was presumed that no state would object to its
own rule for electing the popular branch of its legislature. It is
proper that a representative should be chosen directly by those whose
wants he is to make known, and whose rights he is to guard.

Sec.3. A representative must, at the time of his election, "have attained
the age of twenty-five years; and have been seven years a citizen of the
United States;" and he must "be an inhabitant of the state in which he
is chosen." Few young men, on attaining the age of majority, have the
knowledge, or experience, or wisdom, which is requisite to qualify them
for the responsible duties of a representative. Nor is it to be presumed
that an alien, at the earliest period at which he may become a
naturalized citizen, would be sufficiently familiar with our
institutions and the wants of our people to be a competent
representative.

Sec.4. The next clause prescribes the rule of apportionment.
"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
states, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined
by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,
three-fifths of all other persons." To the younger class of readers,
this part of the clause needs explanation.

Sec.5. The convention found it very difficult to agree upon a rule of
apportionment. In the first place, the states, as will be recollected,
were entitled to an equal number of delegates in the old congress; and
each state had one vote. But as each member of the house of
representatives was to have a vote, the small states opposed a
representation according to numbers, while the large states as
strenuously insisted upon it.

Sec.6. In the next place, the slaveholding states claimed a representation
according to numbers including slaves; the non-slaveholding states
insisted on a representation according to the number of free persons. It
may here be observed, that slavery then existed in all the states except
Massachusetts; but as the slaves were so few in the northern states, in
which slavery has been since abolished, the latter are generally spoken
of as if they were at that time non-slaveholding states. The controversy
on this point rose so high, and the parties were for a long time so
unyielding, that fears were entertained of a sudden dissolution of the
convention.

Sec.7. It became evident that the question could be settled only by
compromise. The northern states consented that in ascertaining the
number of persons to be taken as the basis of apportionment,
three-fifths of the slaves should be added to the number of free
persons. And as these states had opposed the computation of any slaves
in fixing a rule of apportionment, on the ground that slaves are
property, and that no property in these states entitled its owners to
representation, the southern states consented, on their part, that
_direct taxes_ should be apportioned on the same basis as
representatives.

Sec.8. To illustrate this rule by an example: Suppose a state to contain
600,000 free persons, and 500,000 slaves. Adding three-fifths of the
number of slaves, (300,000) to the number of free persons, gives 900,000
as the number of the representative population: and the state would be
entitled to _three_ representatives for every _two_ that a state would
have which contained 600,000 free inhabitants and no slaves. So in
apportioning taxes according to population, the state in the case we
have supposed, would have to raise _three_ dollars for every _two_ that
it would raise if no slaves were counted.

Sec.9. But the advantages of this arrangement are more unequal than may at
first sight appear, or than was anticipated by the framers of the
constitution. The benefits are chiefly on the side of the slaveholding
states. In the first place, two-fifths of a large class of property in
these states is exempt from taxation, while _all_ the property in the
free states is liable to taxation. Of this the framers were aware. But
they did not foresee the fact, that the laying of direct taxes would be
unnecessary, and that the slave states would consequently escape
taxation for their slaves. Only three direct taxes have been laid; and
it is not probable that another will become necessary; the treasury
being supplied from other sources, chiefly by duties on imports.

Sec.10. Now, although nothing is gained by the slave states, nor is
anything lost by the free states, by the exemption of the two-fifths of
the slaves from taxation, since direct taxes are unnecessary; there is a
great gain to the slave states, which have between thirty and forty
representatives for what their laws hold to be "property to all intents
and purposes whatsoever," for which the free states have nothing in
return.

Sec.11. The constitution does not limit the house to any definite number of
representatives; it only declares that the number shall not exceed one
for every 30,000 inhabitants. It requires an enumeration of the
inhabitants every ten years; and the next congress thereafter determines
the ratio of representation and the number of representatives, and
apportions them among the states. The word _ratio_ signifies rate, or
proportion. It here means the number or portion of the inhabitants
entitled to a representative.

Sec.12. But as a representative for every 30,000 inhabitants, after the
population became very numerous, would have made the house too large to
transact business with due dispatch, and would have unnecessarily
increased the public expense, the ratio of representation has from time
to time been increased. But to whatever number the ratio may be raised,
the constitution expressly declares, that "each state shall have at
least one representative." Neither Delaware nor Florida had, in 1850, a
population equal to the present ratio; and without the above
constitutional provision, these states would have been deprived of a
representation in the house, unless congress had adopted a smaller
ratio.

Sec.13. It will be seen by reference to the constitution, that the number
of representatives was for the time fixed at sixty-five. After the first
census, taken in 1790, the ratio was fixed at 33,000, which gave the
house 106 members. After the census of 1800, the same ratio was
adopted, and the number of members was 142.

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