Stephen A. Douglas by Allen Johnson

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While Douglas was in Ohio, he was saddened by the intelligence that
Senator Broderick of California, his loyal friend and staunch
supporter in the Lecompton fight, had fallen a victim to the animosity
of the Southern faction in his State. The Washington _Constitution_
might explain his death as an affair of honor--he was shot in a
duel--but intelligent men knew that Broderick's assailant had desired
to rid Southern "chivalry" of a hated political opponent.[809] A month
later, on the night of October 16th, John Brown of Kansas fame
marshalled his little band of eighteen men and descended upon the
United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry. What did these events
portend?

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 775: Weiss, Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker, II,
p. 243.]

[Footnote 776: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 355.]

[Footnote 777: Memphis _Avalanche_, November 30, 1858, quoted by
Chicago _Times_, December 8, 1858.]

[Footnote 778: New Orleans _Delta_, December 8, 1858, quoted by
Chicago _Times_, December 19, 1858.]

[Footnote 779: Rhodes, History of United States, II, p. 355.]

[Footnote 780: See reported conversation of Douglas with the editor of
the Chicago _Press and Tribune_, Hollister, Life of Colfax, p. 123.]

[Footnote 781: Letcher to Crittenden; Coleman. Life of John J.
Crittenden, II, p. 171; Hollister, Colfax, p. 124.]

[Footnote 782: New Orleans _Delta_, December 8, 1858.]

[Footnote 783: _Globe_, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1243.]

[Footnote 784: _Globe_, 35 Cong., 2: Sess., p. 1245.]

[Footnote 785: _Ibid._, pp. 1247-1248.]

[Footnote 786: _Globe_, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1259.]

[Footnote 787: _Ibid._, p. 1258.]

[Footnote 788: _Globe_, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1256.]

[Footnote 789: _Ibid._, p. 1243.]

[Footnote 790: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 371.]

[Footnote 791: _Ibid._, pp. 369-370.]

[Footnote 792: Letter to J.B. Dorr, June 22, 1859; Flint, Douglas, pp.
168-169.]

[Footnote 793: Letter to J.L. Peyton, August 2, 1859; Sheahan,
Douglas, pp. 465-466.]

[Footnote 794: Speech at Columbus, Ohio, September, 1859; see Debates,
p. 250.]

[Footnote 795: On his return to Washington after the debates, Douglas
said to Wilson, "He [Lincoln] is an able and honest man, one of the
ablest of the nation. I have been in Congress sixteen years, and there
is not a man in the Senate I would not rather encounter in debate."
Wilson, Slave Power in America, II, p. 577.]

[Footnote 796: It does not seem likely that Douglas hoped to reach the
people of the South through _Harper's Magazine_, as it never had a
large circulation south of Mason and Dixon's line. See Smith, Parties
and Slavery, p. 292.]

[Footnote 797: _Harper's Magazine_, XIX, p. 527.]

[Footnote 798: Compare the quotation in _Harper's_, p. 531, with the
opinion of the Court, U.S. Supreme Court Reports, 19 How., p. 720. The
clause beginning "And if the Constitution recognizes" is taken from
its own paragraph and put in the middle of the following paragraph.]

[Footnote 799: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2152. This statement was
confirmed by Reverdy Johnson, who was one of the lawyers that argued
the case. See the speech of Reverdy Johnson, June 7, 1860.]

[Footnote 800: Rhodes, History of the United States, II., p. 374.]

[Footnote 801: Washington _Constitution_, September 10, 1859. The
article was afterward published in a collection of his essays and
speeches.]

[Footnote 802: Flint, Douglas, p. 181.]

[Footnote 803: One of the most interesting commentaries on Black's
argument is his defense of the people of Utah, many years later,
against the Anti-Polygamy Laws, when he used Douglas's argument
without the slightest qualms. See Essays and Speeches, pp. 603, 604,
609.]

[Footnote 804: Flint, Douglas, pp. 172-181 gives extracts from these
pamphlets.]

[Footnote 805: Rhodes History of United States, II, p. 381.]

[Footnote 806: _Ibid._, p. 382.]

[Footnote 807: New York _Times_, September 9, 1859.]

[Footnote 808: _Ibid._, September 9, 1859.]

[Footnote 809: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, pp.
374-379.]

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1860

Deeds of violence are the inevitable precursors of an approaching war.
They are so many expressions of that estrangement which is at the root
of all sectional conflicts. The raid of John Brown upon Harper's
Ferry, like his earlier lawless acts in Kansas, was less the crime of
an individual than the manifestation of a deep social unrest.
Occurring on the eve of a momentous presidential election, it threw
doubts upon the finality of any appeal to the ballot. The antagonism
between North and South was such as to make an appeal to arms seem a
probable last resort. The political question of the year 1860 was
whether the law-abiding habit of the American people and the
traditional mode of effecting changes in governmental policy, would be
strong enough to withstand the primitive instinct to decide the
question of right by an appeal to might. To actors in the drama the
question assumed this simple, concrete form: could the national
Democratic party maintain its integrity and achieve another victory
over parties which were distinctly sectional?

The passions aroused by the Harper's Ferry episode had no time to cool
before Congress met. They were again inflamed by the indorsement of
Helper's "Impending Crisis" by influential Republicans. As the author
was a poor white of North Carolina who hated slavery and desired to
prove that the institution was inimical to the interests of his
class, the book was regarded by slave-holders as an incendiary
publication, conceived in the same spirit as John Brown's raid. The
contest for the Speakership of the House turned upon the attitude of
candidates toward this book. At the North "The Impending Crisis" had
great vogue, passing through many editions. All events seemed to
conspire to prevent sobriety of judgment and moderation in speech.

From a legislative point of view, this exciting session of Congress
was barren of results. The paramount consideration was the approaching
party conventions. What principles and policies would control the
action of the Democratic convention at Charleston, depended very
largely upon who should control the great body of delegates. Early in
January various State conventions in the Northwest expressed their
choice. Illinois took the lead with a series of resolutions which rang
clear and true on all the cardinal points of the Douglas creed.[810]
Within the next sixty days every State in the greater Northwest had
chosen delegates to the national Democratic convention, pledged to
support the nomination of Stephen A. Douglas.[811] It was with the
knowledge, then, that he spoke for the Democracy of the Northwest that
Douglas took issue with those Southern senators who plumed themselves
on their party orthodoxy.

In a debate which was precipitated by a resolution of Senator Pugh,
the old sores were rent open. Senator Davis of Mississippi was
particularly irritating in his allusions to the Freeport, and other
recent, heresies of the Senator from Illinois. In the give and take
which followed, Douglas was beset behind and before. But his fighting
blood was up and he promised to return blow for blow, with interest.
Let every man make his assault, and when all were through, he would
"fire into the lump."[812] "I am not seeking a nomination," he
declared, "I am willing to take one provided I can assume it on
principles that I believe to be sound; but in the event of your making
a platform that I could not conscientiously execute in good faith if I
were elected, I will not stand upon it and be a candidate." For his
part he would like to know "who it is that has the right to say who is
in the party and who not?" He believed that he was backed by
two-thirds of the Democracy of the United States. Did one-third of the
Democratic party propose to read out the remaining two-thirds? "I have
no grievances, but I have no concessions. I have no abandonment of
position or principle; no recantation to make to any man or body of
men on earth."[813]

Some days later Douglas made it equally clear that he had no
recantation to make for the sake of Republican support. Speaking of
the need of some measure by which the States might be protected
against acts of violence like the Harper's Ferry affair, he roundly
denounced that outrage as "the natural, logical, inevitable result of
the doctrines and teachings of the Republican party, as explained and
enforced in their platform, their partisan presses, their pamphlets
and books, and especially in the speeches of their leaders in and out
of Congress."[814] True, they disavowed the _act_ of John Brown, but
they should also repudiate and denounce the doctrines and teachings
which produced the act. Fraternal peace was possible only upon "that
good old golden principle which teaches all men to mind their own
business and let their neighbors' alone." When men so act, the Union
can endure forever as the fathers made it, composed of free and slave
States.[815] "Then the senator is really indifferent to slavery, as he
is reported to have said?" queried Fessenden. "Sir," replied Douglas,
"I hold the doctrine that a statesman will adapt his laws to the
wants, conditions, and interests of the people to be governed by them.
Slavery may be very essential in one climate and totally useless in
another. If I were a citizen of Louisiana I would vote for retaining
and maintaining slavery, because I believe the good of the people
would require it. As a citizen of Illinois I am utterly opposed to it,
because our interests would not be promoted by it."[816]

The lines upon which the Charleston convention would divide, were
sharply drawn by a series of resolutions presented to the Senate by
Jefferson Davis. They were intended to serve as an ultimatum, and they
were so understood by Northern Democrats. They were deliberately
wrought out in conference as the final expression of Southern
conviction. In explicit language the right of either Congress or a
territorial legislature to impair the constitutional right of property
in slaves, was denied. In case of unfriendly legislation, it was
declared to be the duty of Congress to provide adequate protection to
slave property. Popular sovereignty was completely discarded by the
assertion that the people of a Territory might pass upon the question
of slavery only when they formed a State constitution.[817]

As the delegates to the Democratic convention began to gather in the
latter part of April, the center of political interest shifted from
Washington to Charleston. Here the battle between the factions was to
be fought out, but without the presence of the real leaders. The
advantages of organization were with the Douglas men. The delegations
from the Northwest were devoted, heart and soul, to their chief. As
they passed through the capital on their journey to the South, they
gathered around him with noisy demonstrations of affection; and when
they continued on their way, they were more determined than ever to
secure his nomination.[818] From the South, too, every Douglas man who
was likely to carry weight in his community, was brought to Charleston
to labor among the Ultras of his section.[819] The Douglas
headquarters in Hibernian Hall bore witness to the business-like way
in which his candidacy was being promoted. Not the least striking
feature within the committee rooms was the ample supply of Sheahan's
_Life of Stephen A. Douglas_, fresh from the press.[820]

Recognized leader of the Douglas forces was Colonel Richardson of
Illinois, a veteran in convention warfare, seasoned by years of
congressional service and by long practice in managing men.[821] It
was he who had led the Douglas cohorts in the Cincinnati convention.
The memory of that defeat still rankled, and he was not disposed to
yield to like contingencies. Indeed, the spirit of the delegates from
the Northwest,--and they seemed likely to carry the other Northern
delegates with them,--was offensively aggressive; and their
demonstrations of enthusiasm assumed a minatory aspect, as they
learned of the presence of Slidell, Bigler, and Bright, and witnessed
the efforts of the administration to defeat the hero of the Lecompton
fight.[822]

Those who observed the proceedings of the convention could not rid
themselves of the impression that opposing parties were wrestling for
control, so bitter and menacing was the interchange of opinion. It was
matter of common report that the Southern delegations would withdraw
if Douglas were nominated.[823] Equally ominous was the rumor that
Richardson was authorized to withdraw the name of Douglas, if the
platform adopted should advocate the protection of slavery in the
Territories.[824] The temper of the convention was such as to preclude
an amicable agreement, even if Douglas withdrew.

The advantages of compact organization and conscious purpose were
apparent in the first days of the convention. At every point the
Douglas men forced the fighting. On the second day, it was voted that
where a delegation had not been instructed by a State convention how
to give its vote, the individual delegates might vote as they pleased.
This rule would work to the obvious advantage of Douglas.[825] On the
third day, the convention refused to admit the contesting delegations
from New York and Illinois, represented by Fernando Wood and Isaac
Cook respectively.[826]

Meantime the committee on resolutions, composed of one delegate from
each State, was in the throes of platform-making. Both factions had
agreed to frame a platform before naming a candidate. But here, as in
the convention, the possibility of amiable discussion and mutual
concession was precluded. The Southern delegates voted in caucus to
hold to the Davis resolutions; the Northern, with equal stubbornness,
clung to the well-known principles of Douglas. On the fifth day of the
convention, April 27th, the committee presented a majority report and
two minority reports. The first was essentially an epitome of the
Davis resolutions; the second reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, at
the same time pledging the party to abide by the decisions of the
Supreme Court on those questions of constitutional law which should
affect the rights of property in the States or Territories; and the
third report simply reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform without
additional resolutions.[827] The defense of the main minority report
fell to Payne of Ohio. In a much more conciliatory spirit than Douglas
men had hitherto shown, he assured the Southern members of the
convention that every man who had signed the report felt that "upon
the result of our deliberations and the action of this convention, in
all human probability, depended the fate of the Democratic party and
the destiny of the Union." The North was devoted to the principle of
popular sovereignty, but "we ask nothing for the people of the
territories but what the Constitution allows them."[828] The argument
of Payne was cogent and commended itself warmly to Northern delegates;
but it struck Southern ears as a tiresome reiteration of arguments
drawn from premises which they could not admit.

It was Yancey of Alabama, chief among fire-eaters, who, in the
afternoon of the same day, warmed the cockles of the Southern heart.
Gifted with all the graces of Southern orators, he made an eloquent
plea for Southern rights. Protection was what the South demanded:
protection in their constitutional rights and in their sacred rights
of property. The proposition contained in the minority report would
ruin the South. "You acknowledged that slavery did not exist by the
law of nature or by the law of God--that it only existed by State law;
that it was wrong, but that you were not to blame. That was your
position, and it was wrong. If you had taken the position directly
that slavery was right, and therefore ought to be ... you would have
triumphed, and anti-slavery would now have been dead in your midst....
I say it in no disrespect, but it is a logical argument that your
admission that slavery is wrong has been the cause of all this
discord."[829]

These words brought Senator Pugh to his feet. Wrought to a dangerous
pitch of excitement, he thanked God that a bold and honest man from
the South had at last spoken, and had told the whole of the Southern
demands. The South demanded now nothing less than that Northern
Democrats should declare slavery to be right. "Gentlemen of the
South," he exclaimed, "you mistake us--you mistake us--we will not do
it."[830] The convention adjourned before Pugh had finished; but in
the evening he told the Southern delegates plainly that Northern
Democrats were not children at the bidding of the South. If the
gentlemen from the South could stay only on the terms they proposed,
they must go. For once the hall was awed into quiet, for Senator Pugh
stood close to Douglas and the fate of the party hung in the
balance.[831]

Sunday intervened, but the situation remained unchanged. Gloom settled
down upon the further deliberations of the convention. On Monday, the
minority report (the Douglas platform) was adopted by a vote of 165 to
138. Thereupon the chairman of the Alabama delegation protested and
announced the formal withdrawal of his State from the convention. The
crisis had arrived. Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida,
Texas, and Arkansas followed in succession, with valedictories which
seemed directed less to the convention than to the Union. Indeed, more
than one face blanched at the probable significance of this secession.
Southerners of the Yancey following, however, were jubilant and had
much to say about an independent Southern Republic.[832]

On the following day, what Yancey scornfully dubbed the "Rump
Convention," proceeded to ballot, having first voted that two-thirds
of the full vote of the convention should be necessary to nominate. On
the first ballot, Douglas received 145-1/2, Hunter of Virginia 42,
Guthrie of Kentucky 35-1/2; and the remaining thirty were divided
among several candidates. As 202 votes were necessary for a choice,
the hopelessness of the outlook was apparent to all. Nevertheless, the
balloting continued, the vote of Douglas increasing on four ballots to
152-1/2. After the thirty-sixth ballot, he failed to command more than
151-1/2. In all, fifty-seven ballots were taken.[833] On the tenth day
of the convention, it was voted to adjourn to meet at Baltimore, on
the 18th of June.

The followers of Douglas left Charleston with wrath in their hearts.
Chagrin and disappointment alternated with bitterness and resentment
toward their Southern brethren. Moreover, contact with the South, so
far from having lessened their latent distrust of its culture and
institutions, had widened the gulf between the sections. Such speeches
as that of Goulden of Georgia, who had boldly advocated the re-opening
of the African slave-trade, saying coarsely that "the African
slave-trade man is the Union man--the Christian man," caused a certain
ethical revolt in the feelings of men, hitherto not particularly
susceptible to moral appeals on the slavery question.[834] Added to
all these cumulative grievances was the uncomfortable probability,
that the next President was about to be nominated in the Republican
convention at Chicago.

What were the feelings of the individual who had been such a divisive
force in the Charleston convention? The country was not long left in
doubt. Douglas was quite ready to comment upon the outcome; and it
needed only the bitter arraignment of his theories by Davis, to bring
him armed _cap-a-pie_ into the arena.

Aided by his friend Pugh, who read long extracts from letters and
speeches, Douglas made a systematic review of Democratic principles
and policy since 1848. His object, of course, was to demonstrate his
own consistency, and at the same time to convict his critics of
apostasy from the party creed. There was, inevitably, much tiresome
repetition in all this. It was when he directed his remarks to the
issues at Charleston that Douglas warmed to his subject. He refused to
recognize the right of a caucus of the Senate or of the House, to
prescribe new tests, to draft party platforms. That was a task
reserved, under our political system, for national conventions, made
up of delegates chosen by the people. Tried by the standard of the
only Democratic organization competent to pronounce upon questions of
party faith, he was no longer a heretic, no longer an outlaw from the
Democratic party, no longer a rebel against the Democratic
organization. "The party decided at Charleston also, by a majority of
the whole electoral college, that I was the choice of the Democratic
party of America for the Presidency of the United States, giving me a
majority of fifty votes over all other candidates combined; and yet my
Democracy is questioned!" "But," he added, and there is no reason to
doubt his sincerity, "my friends who know me best know that I have no
personal desire or wish for the nomination;... know that my name never
would have been presented at Charleston, except for the attempt to
proscribe me as a heretic, too unsound to be the chairman of a
committee in this body, where I have held a seat for so many years
without a suspicion resting on my political fidelity. I was forced to
allow my name to go there in self-defense; and I will now say that
had any gentleman, friend or foe, received a majority of that
convention over me, the lightning would have carried a message
withdrawing my name from the convention."[835]

Douglas was ready to acquit his colleagues in the Senate of a purpose
to dissolve the Union, but he did not hesitate to assert that such
principles as Yancey had advocated at Charleston would lead "directly
and inevitably" to a dissolution of the Union. Why was the South so
eager to repudiate the principle of non-intervention? By it they had
converted New Mexico into slave Territory; by it, in all probability,
they would extend slavery into the northern States of Mexico, when
that region should be acquired. "Why," he asked, "are you not
satisfied with these practical results? The only difference of opinion
is on the judicial question, about which we agreed to differ--which we
never did decide; because, under the Constitution, no tribunal on
earth but the Supreme Court could decide it." To commit the Democratic
party to intervention was to make the party sectional and to invite
never-ceasing conflict. "Intervention, North or South, means disunion;
non-intervention promises peace, fraternity, and perpetuity to the
Union, and to all our cherished institutions."[836]

The challenge contained in these words was not permitted to pass
unanswered. Davis replied with offensive references to the "swelling
manner" and "egregious vanity" of the Senator from Illinois. He
resented such dictation.[837] On the following day, May 17th, an
exciting passage-at-arms occurred between these representatives of
the Northwest and the Southwest. Douglas repeated his belief that
disunion was the prompting motive which broke up the Charleston
convention. Davis resented the insinuation, with fervent protestations
of affection for the Union of the States. It was the Senator from
Illinois, who, in his pursuit of power, had prevented unanimity, by
trying to plant his theory upon the party. The South would have no
more to do with the "rickety, double-construed platform" of 1856. "The
fact is," said Davis, "I have a declining respect for platforms. I
would sooner have an honest man on any sort of a rickety platform you
could construct, than to have a man I did not trust on the best
platform which could be made. A good platform and an honest man on it
is what we want."[838] Douglas reminded his opponent sharply that the
bolters at Charleston seceded, not on the candidate, but on the
platform. "If the platform is not a matter of much consequence, why
press that question to the disruption of the party? Why did you not
tell us in the beginning of this debate that the whole fight was
against the man, and not upon the platform?"[839]

In the interval between the Charleston and the Baltimore conventions,
the Davis resolutions were pressed to a vote in the Senate, with the
purpose of shaping party opinion. They passed by votes which gave a
deceptive appearance of Democratic unanimity. Only Senator Pugh parted
company with his Democratic colleagues on the crucial resolution; yet
he represented the popular opinion at the North.[840] The futility of
these resolutions, so far as practical results were concerned, was
demonstrated by the adoption of Clingman's resolution, that the
existing condition of the Territories did not require the intervention
of Congress for the protection of property in slaves.[841] In other
words, the South was insisting upon rights which were barren of
practical significance. Slave-holders were insisting upon the right to
carry their slaves where local conditions were unfavorable, and where
therefore they had no intention of going.[842]

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