Stephen A. Douglas by Allen Johnson

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[Footnote 450: Speech before the Illinois Legislature, October 23,
1849; see Illinois _State Register_, November 8, 1849.]

[Footnote 451: The Southern Whigs were ready to support the Dixon
Amendment, according to Clingman, Speeches and Writings, p. 335.]

[Footnote 452: See remarks of Douglas, January 24th, _Globe_, 33
Cong., 1 Sess., p. 240.]

[Footnote 453: Letter of Dixon to Foote, September 30, 1858, in Flint,
Douglas, pp. 138-141.]

[Footnote 454: Dixon, True History of the Repeal of the Missouri
Compromise.]

[Footnote 455: Parker, Secret History of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, in
the _National Quarterly Review_, July, 1880.]

[Footnote 456: Parker, Secret History of the Kansas-Nebraska Act; also
Foote, Casket of Reminiscences, p. 93; also Cox, Three Decades of
Federal Legislation, p. 49.]

[Footnote 457: _Ibid._ Dixon's account of his interview with Douglas
is too melodramatic to be taken literally, but no doubt it reveals
Douglas's agitation.]

[Footnote 458: This was Greeley's interpretation, _Tribune_, June 1,
1861.]

[Footnote 459: Jefferson Davis to Mrs. Dixon, September 27, 1879, in
Dixon, True History of the Repeal of the Missouri Compromise, pp. 457
ff.]

[Footnote 460: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 221.]

[Footnote 461: Transactions of the Nebraska Historical Society, Vol.
II, p. 90.]

[Footnote 462: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 382.]

[Footnote 463: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 239-240.]

[Footnote 464: Washington _Union_, January 24, 1854.]

[Footnote 465: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 282.]

[Footnote 466: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 281-282.]

[Footnote 467: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 278-279.]

[Footnote 468: See remarks of Senator Bell of Tennessee, May 24, 1854,
in _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 939-940; also see statement
of Benjamin in _Globe_, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1093.]

[Footnote 469: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App. pp. 414-415; p. 943.]

[Footnote 470: _Globe_, 34 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1093. This statement by
Senator Benjamin was corroborated by Douglas and by Hunter of
Virginia, during the debates, see _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p.
224. See also the letter of A.H. Stephens, May 9, 1860, in _Globe_, 36
Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 315-316.]

[Footnote 471: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 343-344.]

[Footnote 472: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 344.]

[Footnote 473: _Ibid._, p. 344.]

[Footnote 474: _Ibid._, p. 353.]

[Footnote 475: MS. Letter, Douglas to Lanphier, February 13, 1854.]

[Footnote 476: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 232.]

[Footnote 477: _Ibid._, pp. 279-280.]

[Footnote 478: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 391.]

[Footnote 479: _Ibid._, pp. 287-288.]

[Footnote 480: _Ibid._, p. 296.]

[Footnote 481: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 296-297.]

[Footnote 482: _Ibid._, p. 297.]

[Footnote 483: _Ibid._, p. 298.]

[Footnote 484: _Ibid._, p. 298.]

[Footnote 485: See remarks of Bell; _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App.,
pp. 414-415; and also later, _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p.
937.]

[Footnote 486: See remarks of Atchison, _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess.,
App., p. 302.]

[Footnote 487: _Ibid._, p. 298.]

[Footnote 488: _Ibid._, p. 302.]

[Footnote 489: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 325.]

[Footnote 490: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 332.]

[Footnote 491: _Ibid._, p. 332.]

[Footnote 492: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 337.]

[Footnote 493: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 338.]

[Footnote 494: _Ibid._, p. 338.]

[Footnote 495: Cutts, Treatise on Constitutional and Party Questions,
pp. 122-123.]

[Footnote 496: That the President believed with Douglas that the
benefits of the Act would inure to freedom, is vouched for by
ex-Senator Clemens of Alabama. See Illinois _State Register_, April 6,
1854.]

[Footnote 497: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 618, 621.]

[Footnote 498: _Ibid._, App., p. 654.]

[Footnote 499: _Ibid._, App., pp. 657-661.]

[Footnote 500: _Globe_, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 661.]

[Footnote 501: Speech at Wooster, Ohio, 1859, Philadelphia _Press_,
September 26, 1859.]

[Footnote 502: Rhodes, History of the United States, I, p. 496.]

[Footnote 503: Cutts, Constitutional and Party Questions, p. 98.]

[Footnote 504: "I speak to the people of Chicago on Friday next,
September 1, on Nebraska. They threaten a mob but I have no fears. All
will be right.... Come up if you can and bring our friends with you."
MS. Letter, Douglas to Lanphier, August 25, 1854.]

[Footnote 505: Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinois, p. 640.]

[Footnote 506: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 271-273. Cutts, Constitutional
and Party Questions, pp. 98-101. New York _Times_, September 6,
1854.]

CHAPTER XII

BLACK REPUBLICANISM

The passing of the Whig party after its defeat in the election of
1852, must be counted among the most momentous facts in our political
history. Whatever were its errors, whatever its shortcomings, it was
at least a national organization, with a membership that embraced
anti-slavery Northerners and slave-holding Southerners, Easterners and
Westerners. As events proved, there was no national organization to
take its place. One of the two political ties had snapped that had
held together North and South. The Democratic party alone could lay
claim to a national organization and membership.

Party has been an important factor in maintaining national unity. The
dangers to the Union from rapid territorial expansion have not always
been realized. The attachment of new Western communities to the Union
has too often been taken as a matter of course. Even when the danger
of separation was small, the isolation and provincialism of the new
West was a real menace to national welfare. Social institutions did
their part in integrating East and West; but the politically
integrating force was supplied by party. Through their membership in
national party organizations, the most remote Western pioneers were
energized to think and act on national issues.[507] In much the same
way, the great party organizations retarded the growth of
sectionalism at the South. The very fact that party ties held long
after social institutions had been broken asunder, proves their
superior cohesion and nationalizing power. The inertia of parties
during the prolonged slavery controversy was an element of strength.
Because these formal organizations did not lend themselves readily to
radical policies, they provided a frame-work, within which adjustments
of differences were effected without danger to the Union. Had
Abolitionists of the radical type taken possession of the organization
of either party, can it be doubted that the Union would have been
imperiled much earlier than it was, and very probably when it could
not have withstood the shock?

No one who views history calmly will maintain, that it would have been
well for either the radical or the conservative to have been dominant
permanently. If the radical were always able to give application to
his passing, restless humors, society would lose its coherence. If the
conservative always had his way, civilization would stagnate. It was a
fortunate circumstance that neither the Whig nor the Democratic party
was composed wholly either of radicals or conservatives. Party action
was thus a resultant. If it was neither so radical as the most radical
could desire, nor so conservative as the ultra-conservative wished, at
least it safeguarded the Union and secured the political achievements
of the past. Moreover, the two great party organizations had done much
to assimilate the foreign elements injected into our population. No
doubt the politician who cultivated "the Irish vote" or "the German
vote," was obeying no higher law than his own interests; but his
activities did much to promote that fusion of heterogeneous elements
which has been one of the most extraordinary phenomena of American
society. With the disappearance of the Whig party, one of the two
great agencies in the disciplining and educating of the immigrant was
lost.

For a time the Native American party seemed likely to take the place
of the moribund Whig party. Many Whigs whose loyalty had grown cold
but who would not go over to the enemy, took refuge in the new party.
But Native Americanism had no enduring strength. Its tenets and its
methods were in flat contradiction to true American precedents.
Greeley was right when he said of the new party, "It would seem as
devoid of the elements of persistence as an anti-cholera or an
anti-potato-rot party would be." By its avowed hostility to Catholics
and foreigners, by its insistence upon America for Americans, and by
its secrecy, it forfeited all real claims to succeed the Whig party as
a national organization.

After the downfall of the Whig party, then, the Democratic party stood
alone as a truly national party, preserving the integrity of its
national organization and the bulk of its legitimate members. But the
events of President Pierce's administration threatened to be its
undoing. If the Kansas-Nebraska bill served to unite outwardly the
Northern and Southern wings of the party, it served also to
crystallize those anti-slavery elements which had hitherto been held
in solution. An anti-Nebraska coalition was the outcome. Out of this
opposition sprang eventually the Republican party, which was,
therefore, in its inception, national neither in its organization nor
in its membership.

For "Know-Nothingism," as Native Americanism was derisively called,
Douglas had exhibited the liveliest antipathy. Shortly after the
triumph of the Know-Nothings in the municipal elections of
Philadelphia, he was called upon to give the Independence Day address
in the historic Independence Square.[508] With an audacity rarely
equalled, he seized the occasion to defend the great principle of
self-government as incorporated in the Nebraska bill, just become law,
and to beard Know-Nothingism in its den. Under guise of defending
national institutions and American principles, he turned his oration
into what was virtually the first campaign speech of the year in
behalf of Democracy. Never before were the advantages of a party name
so apparent. Under his skillful touch the cause of popular government,
democracy, religious and civil liberty, became confounded with the
cause of Democracy, the only party of the nation which stood opposed
to "the allied forces of Abolitionism, Whigism, Nativeism, and
religious intolerance, under whatever name or on whatever field they
may present themselves."[509]

There can be no doubt that Douglas voiced his inmost feeling, when he
declared that "to proscribe a man in this country on account of his
birthplace or religious faith is revolting to our sense of justice and
right."[510] In his defense of religious toleration he rose to heights
of real eloquence.

Douglas paid dearly for this assault upon Know-Nothingism. The order
had organized lodges also in the Northwest, and when Douglas returned
to his own constituency after the adjournment of Congress, he found
the enemy in possession of his own redoubts. With some show of reason,
he afterward attributed the demonstration against him in Chicago to
the machinations of the Know-Nothings. His experience with the mob
left no manner of doubt in his mind that Know-Nothingism, and not
hostility to his Kansas-Nebraska policy, was responsible for his
failure to command a hearing.[511]

But Douglas was mistaken, or he deceived himself, when he sought in
the same fashion to explain away the opposition which he encountered
as he traveled through the northern counties of the State. Malcontents
from both parties, but chiefly anti-slavery Whigs, Free-Soilers, and
Abolitionists, were drawing together in common hostility to the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise. Mass conventions were summoned,
irrespective of party, in various counties; and they gave no uncertain
expression to their hatred of slavery and the slave-power. These were
the counties most largely peopled by the New England immigrants.
Anti-Nebraska platforms were adopted; and fusion candidates put in
nomination for State and congressional office. In the central and
southern counties, the fusion was somewhat less complete; but finally
an anti-Nebraska State convention was held at Springfield, which
nominated a candidate for State Treasurer, the only State officer to
be elected.[512] For the first time in many years, the overthrow of
the Democratic party seemed imminent.

However much Douglas may have misjudged the causes for this fusion
movement at the outset, he was not long blind as to its implications.
On every hand there were symptoms of disaffection. Personal friends
turned their backs upon him; lifelong associates refused to follow his
lead; even the rank and file of his followers seemed infected with the
prevailing epidemic of distrust. With the instinct of a born leader of
men, Douglas saw that the salvation of himself and his party lay in
action. The _elan_ of his forces must be excited by the signal to ride
down the enemy. Sounding the charge, he plunged into the thick of the
fray. For two months, he raided the country of the enemy in northern
Illinois, and dashed from point to point in the central counties where
his loyal friends were hard pressed.[513] It was from first to last a
tempestuous conflict that exactly suited the impetuous, dashing
qualities of "the Little Giant."

In the Sixth Congressional District, Douglas found his friend Harris
fighting desperately with his back against the wall. His opponent,
Yates, was a candidate for re-election, with the full support of
anti-Nebraska men like Trumbull and Lincoln, whom the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska bill had again drawn into politics. While the State
Fair was in progress at Springfield, both candidates strained every
nerve to win votes. Douglas was summoned to address the goodly body of
Democratic yeomen, who were keenly alive to the political, as well as
to the bucolic, opportunities which the capital afforded at this
interesting season. Douglas spoke to a large gathering in the State
House on October 3d. Next day the Fusionists put forward Lincoln to
answer him; and when Lincoln had spoken for nearly four hours, Douglas
again took the stand and held his audience for an hour and a half
longer.[514] Those were days when the staying powers of speakers were
equalled only by the patience of their hearers.

Like those earlier encounters, whose details have passed into the haze
of tradition, this lacks a trustworthy chronicler. It would seem,
however, as though the dash and daring of Douglas failed to bear down
the cool, persistent opposition of his antagonist. Douglas should have
known that the hazards in his course were reared by his own hand.
Whatever other barriers blocked his way, Nebraska-ism was the most
formidable; but this he would not concede.

A curious story has connected itself with this chance encounter of the
rivals. Alarmed at the effectiveness of Lincoln's attack, so runs the
legend, Douglas begged him not to enter the campaign, promising that
he likewise would be silent thereafter. Aside from the palpable
improbability of this "Peoria truce," it should be noted that Lincoln
accepted an invitation to speak at Lacon next day, without so much as
referring to this agreement, while Douglas continued his campaign with
unremitting energy.[515] If Douglas exhibited fear of an adversary at
this time, it is the only instance in his career.

The outcome of the elections gave the Democrats food for thought. Five
out of nine congressional districts had chosen anti-Nebraska or Fusion
candidates; the other four returned Democrats to Congress by reduced
pluralities.[516] To be sure, the Democrats had elected their
candidate for the State Treasury; but this was poor consolation, if
the legislature, as seemed probable, should pass from their control. A
successor to Senator Shields would be chosen by this body; and the
choice of an anti-Nebraska man would be as gall and wormwood to the
senior senator. In the country at large, such an outcome would surely
be interpreted as a vote of no confidence. In the light of these
events, Democrats were somewhat chastened in spirit, in spite of
apparent demonstrations of joy. Even Douglas felt called upon to
vindicate his course at the banquet given in his honor in Chicago,
November 9th. He was forced to admit--and for him it was an unwonted
admission--that "the heavens were partially overcast."

For the moment there was a disposition to drop Shields in favor of
some Democrat who was not so closely identified with the Nebraska
bill. Douglas viewed the situation with undisguised alarm. He urged
his friends, however, to stick to Shields. "The election of any other
man," he wrote truthfully, "would be deemed not only a defeat, but an
ungrateful desertion of him, when all the others who have voted with
him have been sustained."[517] It was just this fine spirit of loyalty
that made men his lifelong friends and steadfast followers through
thick and thin. "Our friends should stand by Shields," he continued,
"and throw the responsibility on the Whigs of beating him _because he
was born in Ireland_. The Nebraska fight is over, and Know-Nothingism
has taken its place as the chief issue in the future. If therefore
Shields shall be beaten it will [be] apparent to the people & to the
whole country that a gallant soldier, and a faithful public servant
has been stricken down because of the place of his birth." This was
certainly shrewd, and, measured by the tone of American public life,
not altogether reprehensible, politics. Douglas anticipated that the
Whigs would nominate Lincoln and "stick to him to the bitter end,"
while the Free-Soilers and anti-Nebraska Democrats would hold with
equal persistence to Bissell, in which case either Bissell would
ultimately get the Whig vote or there would be no election. Sounding
the trumpet call to battle, Douglas told his friends to nail Shields'
flag to the mast and never to haul it down. "We are sure to triumph in
the end on the great issue. Our policy and duty require us to stand
firm by the issues in the late election, and to make no bargains, no
alliances, no concessions to any of the _allied isms_."

When the legislature organized in January, the Democrats, to their
indescribable alarm, found the Fusion forces in control of both
houses. The election was postponed until February. Meantime Douglas
cautioned his trusty lieutenant in no event to leave Springfield for
even a day during the session.[518] On the first ballot for senator,
Shields received 41 votes; Lincoln 45; Trumbull, an anti-Nebraska
Democrat, 5; while three Democrats and five Fusionists scattered
their votes. On the seventh ballot, Shields fell out of the running,
his place being taken by Matteson. On the tenth ballot, Lincoln having
withdrawn, the Whig vote concentrated on Trumbull, who, with the aid
of his unyielding anti-Nebraska following, received the necessary 51
votes for an election. This result left many heart-burnings among both
Whigs and Democrats, for the former felt that Lincoln had been
unjustly sacrificed and the latter looked upon Trumbull as little
better than a renegade.[519]

The returns from the elections in other Northern States were equally
discouraging, from the Democratic point of view. Only seven out of
forty-two who had voted for the Kansas-Nebraska bill were re-elected.
In the next House, the Democrats would be in a minority of
seventy-five.[520] The anti-Nebraska leaders were not slow in claiming
a substantial victory. Indeed, their demonstrations of satisfaction
were so long and loud, when Congress reassembled for the short
session, that many Democrats found it difficult to accept defeat
good-naturedly. Douglas, for one, would not concede defeat, despite
the face of the returns. Men like Wade of Ohio, who enjoyed chaffing
their discomfited opponents, took every occasion to taunt the author
of the bill which had been the undoing of his party. Douglas met their
gibes by asking whether there was a single, anti-Nebraska candidate
from the free States who did not receive the Know-Nothing vote. For
every Nebraska man who had suffered defeat, two anti-Nebraska
candidates were defeated by the same causes. "The fact is, and the
gentleman knows it, that in the free States there has been an
alliance, I will not say whether holy or unholy, at the recent
elections. In that alliance they had a crucible into which they poured
Abolitionism, Maine liquor-lawism, and what there was left of Northern
Whigism, and then the Protestant feeling against the Catholic, and the
native feeling against the foreigner. All these elements were melted
down in that crucible, and the result was what was called the Fusion
party. That crucible ... was in every instance, a Know-Nothing
Lodge."[521]

There was, indeed, enough of confusion in some States to give color to
such assertions. Taken collectively, however, the elections indicated
unmistakably a widespread revulsion against the administration of
President Pierce; and it was folly to contend that the Kansas-Nebraska
bill had not been the prime cause of popular resentment. Douglas was
so constituted temperamentally that he both could not, and would not,
confront the situation fairly and squarely. This want of sensitiveness
to the force of ethical convictions stirring the masses, is the most
conspicuous and regrettable aspect of his statecraft. Personally
Douglas had a high sense of honor and duty; in private affairs he was
scrupulously honest; and if at times he was shifty in politics, he
played the game with quite as much fairness as those contemporary
politicians who boasted of the integrity of their motives. He
preferred to be frank; he meant to deal justly by all men. Even so, he
failed to understand the impelling power of those moral ideals which
border on the unattainable. For the transcendentalist in politics and
philanthropy, he had only contempt. The propulsive force of an idea in
his own mind depended wholly upon its appeal to his practical
judgment. His was the philosophy of the attainable. Results that were
approximately just and fair satisfied him. He was not disposed to
sacrifice immediate advantage to future gain. His Celtic temperament
made him think rapidly; and what imagination failed to supply, quick
wit made good.

When, then, under the pressure of conditions for which he was not
responsible, he yielded to the demand for a repeal of the Missouri
Compromise, he failed to foresee that revulsion of moral sentiment
that swept over the North. It was perfectly clear to his mind, that
historically the prohibition of slavery by Federal law had had far
less practical effect than the North believed. He was convinced that
nearly all, if not all, of the great West was dedicated to freedom by
a law which transcended any human enactment. Why, then, hold to a mere
form, when the substance could be otherwise secured? Why should
Northerner affront Southerner by imperious demands, when the same end
might be attained by a compromise which would not cost either dear?
Possibly he was not unwilling to let New Mexico become slave
Territory, if the greater Northwest should become free by the
operation of the same principle. Besides, there was the very tangible
advantage of holding his party together by a sensible agreement, for
the sake of which each faction yielded something.

Douglas was not blind to the palpable truth that the masses are swayed
more by sentiment than logic: indeed, he knew well enough how to run
through the gamut of popular emotions. What did escape him was the
almost religious depth of the anti-slavery sentiment in that very
stock from which he himself had sprung. It was not a sentiment that
could be bargained away. There was much in it of the inexorable
obstinacy of the Puritan faith. Verging close upon fanaticism at
times, it swept away considerations of time and place, and overwhelmed
appeals to expediency. Even where the anti-slavery spirit did not take
on this extreme form, those whom it possessed were reluctant to yield
one jot or tittle of the substantial gains which freedom had made.

It is probable that with the growing sectionalism, North and South
would soon have been at odds over the disposition of the greater
Northwest. Sooner or later, the South must have demanded the repeal of
the Missouri Compromise, or have sought large concessions elsewhere.
But it is safe to say that no one except Douglas could have been found
in 1854, who possessed the requisite parliamentary qualities, the
personal following, the influence in all sections,--and withal, the
audacity, to propose and carry through the policy associated with the
Kansas-Nebraska bill. The responsibility for this measure rested in a
peculiar sense upon his shoulders.

It was in the course of this post-election discussion of February 23d,
that Wade insinuated that mercenary motives were the key to Douglas's
conduct. "Have the people of Illinois forgotten that injunction of
more than heavenly wisdom, that 'Where a man's treasure is, there will
his heart be also'?" To this unwarranted charge, which was current in
Abolitionist circles, Douglas made a circumstantial denial. "I am not
the owner of a slave and never have been, nor have I ever received,
and appropriated to my own use, one dollar earned by slave-labor." For
the first time, he spoke of the will of Colonel Martin and of the
property which he had bequeathed to his daughter and to her children.
With very genuine emotion, which touched even his enemies, he added,
"God forbid that I should be understood by anyone as being willing to
cast from me any responsibility that now does, or has ever attached to
any member of my family. So long as life shall last--and I shall
cherish with religious veneration the memories and virtues of the
sainted mother of my children--so long as my heart shall be filled
with parental solicitude for the happiness of those motherless
infants, I implore my enemies who so ruthlessly invade the domestic
sanctuary, to do me the favor to believe, that I have no wish, no
aspiration, to be considered purer or better than she, who was, or
they, who are, slaveholders."[522]

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