Stephen A. Douglas by Allen Johnson
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Allen Johnson >> Stephen A. Douglas
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Two features of this speech commended it to Democrats: its
recognition of the finality of the compromise, and its insistence upon
the necessity of banishing the slavery question from politics. "The
Democratic party," he asseverated, "is as good a Union party as I
want, and I wish to preserve its principles and its organization, and
to triumph upon its old issues. I desire no new tests--no
interpolations into the old creed."[379] For his part, he was resolved
never to speak again upon the slavery question in the halls of
Congress.
But this was after all a negative programme. Could a campaign be
successfully fought without other weapons than the well-worn
blunderbusses in the Democratic arsenal? This was a do-nothing policy,
difficult to reconcile with the enthusiastic liberalism which Young
America was supposed to cherish. Yet Douglas gauged the situation
accurately. The bulk of the party wished a return to power more than
anything else. To this end, they were willing to toot for old issues
and preserve the old party alignment. For four years, the Democratic
office-hunters had not tasted of the loaves and fishes within the gift
of the executive. They expected liberality in conduct, if not
liberalism in creed, from their next President. Douglas shared this
political hunger. He had always been a believer in rotation in office,
and an exponent of that unhappy, American practice of using public
office as the spoil of party victory. In this very session, he put
himself on record against permanence in office for the clerks of the
Senate, holding that such positions should fall vacant at stated
intervals.[380]
But had Douglas no policy peculiarly his own, to qualify him for the
leadership of his party? Distrustful Whigs accused him of being
willing to offer Cuba for the support of the South.[381] Indeed, he
made no secret of his desire to acquire the Pearl of the Antilles.
Still, this was not the sort of issue which it was well to drag into a
presidential campaign. Like all the other aspirants for the
presidency, Douglas made what capital he could out of the visit of
Kossuth and the question of intervention in behalf of Hungary. When
the matter fell under discussion in the Senate, Douglas formulated
what he considered should be the policy of the government:
"I hold that the principle laid down by Governor Kossuth as the basis
of his action--that each State has a right to dispose of her own
destiny, and regulate her internal affairs in her own way, without the
intervention of any foreign power--is an axiom in the laws of nations
which every State ought to recognize and respect.... It is equally
clear to my mind, that any violation of this principle by one nation,
intervening for the purpose of destroying the liberties of another, is
such an infraction of the international code as would authorize any
State to interpose, which should conceive that it had sufficient
interest in the question to become the vindicator of the laws of
nations."[382]
Cass had said much the same thing, but with less virility. Douglas
scored on his rival in this speech: first, when he declared with a bit
of Chauvinism, "I do not deem it material whether the reception of
Governor Kossuth give offence to the crowned heads of Europe,
provided it does not violate the law of nations, and give just _cause_
of offence"; and again, scorning the suggestion of an alliance with
England, "The peculiar position of our country requires that we should
have an _American policy_ in our foreign relations, based upon the
principles of our own government, and adapted to the spirit of the
age."[383] There was a stalwart conviction in these utterances which
gave promise of confident, masterful leadership. These are qualities
which the people of this great democracy have always prized, but
rarely discovered, in their Presidents.
It was at this moment in the canvass that the promoters of Douglas's
candidacy made a false move. Taking advantage of the popular
demonstration over Kossuth and the momentary diversion of public
attention from the slavery question to foreign politics, they sought to
thrust Douglas upon the Democratic party as the exponent of a
progressive foreign policy. They presumed to speak in behalf of "Young
America," as against "Old Fogyism." Seizing upon the _Democratic
Review_ as their organ, these progressives launched their boom by a
sensational article in the January number, entitled "Eighteen-Fifty-Two
and the Presidency." Beginning with an arraignment of "Webster's
un-American foreign policy, the writer,--or writers,--called upon
honest men to put an end to this "Quaker policy." "The time has come
for strong, sturdy, clear-headed and honest men to act; and the
Republic must have them, should it be compelled, as the colonies were
in 1776, to drag the hero of the time out of a hole in a wild forest,
[_sic_] whether in Virginia or the illimitable West." To inaugurate
such an era, the presidential chair must be filled by a man, not of the
last generation, but of this. He must not be "trammeled with ideas
belonging to an anterior era, or a man of merely local fame and local
affections, but a statesman who can bring young blood, young ideas, and
young hearts to the councils of the Republic. He must not be a mere
general, a mere lawyer, a mere wire-puller. "Your beaten horse, whether
he ran for a previous presidential cup as first or second," will not
do. He must be 'a tried civilian, not a second and third rate general.'
"Withal, a practical statesman, not to be discomfited in argument, or
led wild by theory, but one who has already, in the councils and
tribunals of the nation, reared his front to the dismay of the shallow
conservative, to the exposure of the humanitarian incendiary, and the
discomfiture of the antiquated rhetorician."
If anyone was so dense as not to recognize the portrait here painted,
he had only to turn to an article entitled "Intervention," to find the
name of the hero who was to usher in the new era. The author of this
paper finds his sentiments so nearly identical with those of Stephen
A. Douglas, that he resorts to copious extracts from his speech
delivered in the Senate on the welcome of Kossuth, "entertaining no
doubt that the American people, the _democracy_ of the country will
endorse these doctrines by an overwhelming majority." Still another
article in this formidable broadside from the editors of the
_Democratic Review_, deprecated Foote's efforts to thrust the slavery
issue again upon Congress, and expressed the pious wish that Southern
delegates might join with Northern in the Baltimore convention, to
nominate a candidate who would in future "evince the most profound
ignorance as to the topographical bearing of that line of discord
known as 'Mason and Dixon's.'"
If all this was really the work of Douglas's friends,--and it is more
than likely,--he had reason to pray to be delivered from them. At best
the whole manoeuvre was clumsily planned and wretchedly executed; it
probably did him irreparable harm. His strength was not sufficient to
confront all his rivals; yet the almost inevitable consequence of the
odious comparisons in the _Review_ was combinations against him. The
leading article gave mortal offense in quarters where he stood most in
need of support.[384] Douglas was quick to detect the blunder and
appreciate its dangers to his prospects. His friends now began
sedulously to spread the report that the article was a ruse of the
enemy, for the especial purpose of spoiling his chances at Baltimore.
It was alleged that proof sheets had been found in the possession of a
gentleman in Washington, who was known to be hostile to Douglas.[385]
Few believed this story: the explanation was too far-fetched.
Nevertheless, one of Douglas's intimates subsequently declared, on the
floor of the House, that the Judge was not responsible for anything
that appeared in the _Review_, that he had no interest in or control
over the magazine, and that he knew nothing about the January number
until he saw it in print.[386]
In spite of this untoward incident, Douglas made a formidable
showing.[387] He was himself well pleased at the outlook. He wrote to
a friend, "Prospects look well and are improving every day. If two or
three western States will speak out in my favor the battle is over.
Can anything be done in Iowa and Missouri? That is very important. If
some one could go to Iowa, I think the convention in that State would
instruct for me. In regard to our own State, I will say a word. Other
States are appointing a large number of delegates to the convention,
... ought not our State to do the same thing so as to ensure the
attendance of most of our leading politicians at Baltimore?... This
large number would exert a great moral influence on the other
delegates."[388]
Among the States which had led off in his favor was California; and it
was a representative of California who first sounded the charge for
Douglas's cohorts in the House. In any other place and at any other
time, Marshall's exordium would have overshot the mark. Indeed, in
indorsing the attack of the _Review_ on the old fogies in the party,
he tore open wounds which it were best to let heal; but gauged by the
prevailing standard of taste in politics, the speech was acceptable.
It so far commended itself to the editors of the much-abused _Review_
that it appeared in the April number, under the caption "The Progress
of Democracy vs. Old Fogy Retrograder."
To clear-headed outsiders, there was something factitious in this
parade of enthusiasm for Douglas. "What most surprises one," wrote
the correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, "is that these
Congressmen, with beards and without; that verdant, flippant, smart
detachment of Young America that has got into the House, propose to
make a candidate for the Baltimore convention without consulting their
masters, the people. With a few lively fellows in Congress and the aid
of the _Democratic Review_, they fancy themselves equal to the
achievement of a small job like this."[389] As the first of June
approached, the older, experienced politicians grew confident that
none of the prominent candidates could command a two-thirds vote in
the convention. Some had foreseen this months beforehand and had been
casting about for a compromise candidate. Their choice fell eventually
upon General Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. Friends were active in
his behalf as early as April, and by June they had hatched their plot.
It was not their plan to present his name to the convention at the
outset, but to wait until the three prominent candidates (Cass,
Douglas, and Buchanan) were disposed of. He was then to be put forward
as an available, compromise candidate.[390]
Was Douglas cognizant of the situation? While his supporters did not
abate their noisy demonstrations, there is some ground to believe that
he did not share their optimistic spirit. At all events, in spite of
his earlier injunctions, only eleven delegates from Illinois attended
the convention, while Pennsylvania sent fifty-five, Tennessee
twenty-seven, and Indiana thirty-nine. Had Douglas sent home the
intimation that the game was up? The first ballot told the story of
his defeat. Common rumor had predicted that a large part of the
Northwest would support him. Only fifteen of his twenty votes came
from that quarter, and eleven of these were cast by Illinois. It was
said that the Indiana delegates would divert their strength to him,
when they had cast one ballot for General Lane; but Indiana cast no
votes for Douglas. Although his total vote rose to ninety-two and on
the thirty-first ballot he received the highest vote of any of the
candidates, there was never a moment when there was the slightest
prospect of his winning the prize.[391]
On the thirty-fifth ballot occurred a diversion. Virginia cast fifteen
votes for Franklin Pierce. The schemers had launched their project.
But it was not until the forty-ninth ballot that they started the
avalanche. Pierce then received all but six votes. Two Ohio delegates
clung to Douglas to the bitter end. With the frank manliness which
made men forget his less admirable qualities, Douglas dictated this
dispatch to the convention: "I congratulate the Democratic party upon
the nomination, and Illinois will give Franklin Pierce a larger
majority than any other State in the Union,"--a promise which he was
not able to redeem.
If Douglas had been disposed to work out his political prospects by
mathematical computation, he would have arrived at some interesting
conclusions from the balloting in the convention. Indeed, very
probably he drew some deductions in his own intuitive way, without any
adventitious aid. Of the three rivals, Cass received the most widely
distributed vote, although Douglas received votes from as many States.
While they drew votes from twenty-one States, Buchanan received votes
from only fifteen. Cass and Douglas obtained their highest percentages
of votes from the West; Buchanan found his strongest support in the
South. Douglas and Cass received least support in the Middle States;
Buchanan had no votes from the West. But while Cass had, on his
highest total, thirty per centum of the whole vote of the Middle
States, Douglas was relatively weak in the Middle States rather than
in the South. On the basis of these figures, it is impossible to
justify the statement that he could expect nothing in future from New
England and Pennsylvania, but would look to the South for support for
the presidency.[392] On the contrary, one would say that his strong
New England following would act as an equipoise, preventing too great
a dip toward the Southern end of the scales. Besides, Douglas's hold
on his own constituents and the West was contingent upon the favor of
the strong New England element in the Northwest. If this convention
taught Douglas anything, it must have convinced him that narrow,
sectional policies and undue favor to the South would never land him
in the White House. To win the prize which he frankly coveted, he must
grow in the national confidence, and not merely in the favor of a
single section, however powerful.[393]
Pledges aside, Douglas was bound to give vigorous aid to the party
candidates. His term as senator was about to expire. His own fortunes
were inseparably connected with those of his party in Illinois. The
Washington _Union_ printed a list of his campaign engagements,
remarking with evident satisfaction that Judge Douglas was "in the
field with his armor on." His itinerary reached from Virginia to
Arkansas, and from New York to the interior counties of his own State.
Stray items from a speech in Richmond suggest the tenuous quality of
these campaign utterances. It was quite clear to his mind that General
Scott's acceptance of the Whig nomination could not have been written
by that manly soldier, but by _Politician_ Scott under the control of
_General_ Seward. Was it wise to convert a good general into a bad
president? Could it be true that Scott had promised the entire
patronage of his administration to the Whigs? Why, "there had never
been a Democratic administration in this Union that did not retain at
least one-third of their political opponents in office!"[394] And yet,
when Pierce had been elected, Douglas could say publicly, without so
much as a blush, that Democrats must now have the offices. "For every
Whig removed there should be a competent Democrat put in his place ...
The best men should be selected, and everybody knows that the best men
voted for Pierce and King."[395]
The outcome of the elections in Illinois was gratifying save in one
particular. In consequence of the redistricting of the State, the
Whigs had increased the number of their representatives in Congress.
But the re-election of Douglas was assured.[396] His hold upon his
constituency was unshaken. With right good will he participated in the
Democratic celebration at Washington. As an influential personage in
Democratic councils he was called upon to sketch in broad lines what
he deemed to be sound Democratic policy; but only a casual reference
to Cuba redeemed his speech from the commonplace. "Whenever the people
of Cuba show themselves worthy of freedom by asserting and maintaining
independence, and apply for annexation, they ought to be annexed;
whenever Spain is ready to sell Cuba, with the consent of its
inhabitants, we ought to accept it on fair terms; and if Spain should
transfer Cuba to England or any other European power, we should take
and hold Cuba anyhow."[397]
Ambition and a buoyant optimism seemed likely to make Douglas more
than ever a power in Democratic politics, when a personal bereavement
changed the current of his life. His young wife whom he adored, the
mother of his two boys, died shortly after the new year. For the
moment he was overwhelmed; and when he again took his place in the
Senate, his colleagues remarked in him a bitterness and acerbity of
temper which was not wonted. One hostage that he had given to Fortune
had been taken away, and a certain recklessness took possession of
him. He grew careless in his personal habits, slovenly in his dress,
disregardful of his associates, and if possible more vehemently
partisan in his public utterances.
It was particularly regrettable that, while Douglas was passing
through this domestic tragedy, he should have been drawn into a
controversy relating to British claims in Central America. It was
rumored that Great Britain, in apparent violation of the terms of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, had taken possession of certain islands in the
Bay of Honduras and erected them into the colony of "the Bay Islands."
On the heels of this rumor came news that aroused widespread
indignation. A British man-of-war had fired upon an American steamer,
which had refused to pay port dues on entering the harbor of Greytown.
Over this city, strategically located at the mouth of the San Juan
River, Great Britain exercised an ill-disguised control as part of the
Mosquito protectorate.
In the midst of the excited debate which immediately followed in
Congress, Cass astonished everybody by producing the memorandum which
Bulwer had given Clayton just before the signing of the treaty.[398]
In this remarkable note, the British ambassador stated that his
government did not wish to be understood as renouncing its existing
claims to Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras and "its dependencies."
And Clayton seemed to have admitted the force of this reservation. For
his part, Cass made haste to say, he wished the Senate distinctly to
understand that when he had voted for the treaty, he believed Great
Britain was thereby prevented from establishing any such dependency.
His object--and he had supposed it to be the object of the treaty--was
to sweep away all British claims to Central America.
Behind this imbroglio lay an intricate diplomatic history which can
be here only briefly recapitulated. The interest of the United States
in the Central American States dated from the discovery of gold in
California. The value of the control of the means of transportation
across the isthmus at Nicaragua became increasingly clear, as the gold
seekers sought that route to the Pacific coast. In the latter days of
his administration, President Polk had sent one Elijah Hise to
cultivate friendly relations with the Central American States and to
offset the paramount influence of Great Britain in that region. Great
Britain was already in possession of the colony of Belize and was
exercising an ill-defined protectorate over the Mosquito Indians on
the eastern coast of Nicaragua. In his ardor to serve American
interests, Hise exceeded his instructions and secured a treaty with
Nicaragua, which gave to the United States exclusive privileges over
the route of the proposed canal, on condition that the sovereignty of
Nicaragua were guaranteed. The incoming Whig administration would have
nothing to do with the Hise _entente_, preferring to dispatch its own
agent to Central America. Though Squier succeeded in negotiating a
more acceptable treaty, the new Secretary of State, Clayton, was
disposed to come to an understanding with Great Britain. The outcome
of these prolonged negotiations was the famous Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
by which both countries agreed to further the construction of a ship
canal across the isthmus through Nicaragua, and to guarantee its
neutrality. Other countries were invited to join in securing the
neutrality of this and other regions where canals might be
constructed. Both Great Britain and the United States explicitly
renounced any "dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito
coast or any part of Central America."[399]
The opposition would have been something less than human, if they had
not seized upon the occasion to discredit the outgoing administration.
Cass had already introduced a resolution reaffirming the terms of the
famous Monroe message respecting European colonization in America, and
thus furnishing the pretext for partisan attacks upon Secretary of
State Clayton. But Cass unwittingly exposed his own head to a sidelong
blow from his Democratic rival from Illinois, who affected the role of
Young America once more.
It is impossible to convey in cold print the biting sarcasm, the
vindictive bitterness, and the reckless disregard of justice, with
which Douglas spoke on February 14th. He sneered at this new
profession of the Monroe Doctrine. Why keep repeating this talk about
a policy which the United States has almost invariably repudiated in
fact? Witness the Oregon treaty! "With an avowed policy, of thirty
years' standing that no future European colonization is to be
permitted in America--affirmed when there was no opportunity for
enforcing it, and abandoned whenever a case was presented for carrying
it into practical effect--is it now proposed to beat another retreat
under cover of terrible threats of awful consequences when the offense
shall be repeated? '_Henceforth_' no 'future' European colony is to be
planted in America '_with our consent!_' It is gratifying to learn
that the United States are never going to 'consent' to the
repudiation of the Monroe doctrine again. No more Clayton and Bulwer
treaties; no more British 'alliances' in Central America, New Granada,
or Mexico; no more resolutions of oblivion to protect 'existing
rights!' Let England tremble, and Europe take warning, if the offense
is repeated. 'Should the attempt be made,' says the resolution, 'it
will leave the United States _free to adopt_ such measures as an
independent nation may justly adopt in defense of its rights and
honor.' Are not the United States now _free_ to adopt such measures as
an independent nation may _justly adopt_ in defense of its _rights and
honor_? Have we not given the notice? Is not thirty years sufficient
notice?"[400]
He taunted Clayton with having suppressed the Hise treaty, which
secured exclusive privileges for the United States over the canal
route, in order to form a partnership with England and other
monarchical powers of Europe. "Exclusive privileges" were sacrificed
to lay the foundation of an alliance by which European intervention in
American affairs was recognized as a right!
It was generally known that Douglas had opposed the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty;[401] but the particular ground of his opposition had been only
surmised. Deeming the injunction of secrecy removed, he now
emphatically registered his protest against the whole policy of
pledging the faith of the Republic, not to do what in the future our
interests, duty, and even safety, might compel us to do. The time
might come when the United States would wish to possess some portion
of Central America. Moreover, the agreement not to fortify any part of
that region was not reciprocal, so long as Great Britain held Jamaica
and commanded the entrance to the canal. He had always regarded the
terms of the British protectorate over the Mosquito coast as
equivocal; but the insuperable objection to the treaty was the
European partnership to which the United States was pledged. The two
parties not only contracted to extend their protection to any other
practicable communications across the isthmus, whether by canal or
railway, but invited all other powers to become parties to these
provisions. What was the purport of this agreement, if it did not
recognize the right of European powers to intervene in American
affairs; what then became of the vaunted Monroe Doctrine?
To the undiplomatic mind of Douglas, our proper course was as clear as
day. Insist upon the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Bay Islands!
"If we act with becoming discretion and firmness, I have no
apprehension that the enforcement of our rights will lead to
hostilities." And then let the United States free itself from
entangling alliances by annulling the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.[402]
Surely this was simplicity itself.
The return of Clayton to the Senate, in the special session of March,
brought the accused before his accusers. An acrimonious debate
followed, in the course of which Douglas was forced to state his own
position more explicitly. He took his stand upon the Hise treaty. Had
the exclusive control of the canal been given into our hands, and the
canal thrown open to the commerce of all nations upon our own terms,
we would have had a right which would have been ample security for
every nation under heaven to keep peace with the United States. "We
could have fortified that canal at each end, and in time of war could
have closed it against our enemies." But, suggested Clayton, European
powers would never have consented to such exclusive control. "Well,
Sir," said Douglas, "I do not know that they would have consented: but
of one thing I am certain I would never have asked their
consent."[403] And such was the temper of Young America that this
sledge hammer diplomacy was heartily admired.
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