Rebuilding Britain by Alfred Hopkinson

A >> Alfred Hopkinson >> Rebuilding Britain

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With a good map you may safely have Mr. Worldly Wiseman's company to the
village of Morality, and visit the "judicious gentleman named Legality"
and "his charming son Civility"--yet find a straight road thence to the
Celestial City without deviating to the "great town" of Carnal Policy.
An apology perhaps is due in the twentieth century for using the
language of an earlier day; but everyone naturally thinks in the
language in which he was brought up, and education is now no doubt
sufficiently general to make allusion recognisable and translation easy.
There are still some survivals from a past generation who prefer even
the "minor prophets" as literature to the most "up-to-date" modern
utterances, though they have long ago relinquished the idea that there
is the slightest personal merit in doing so. Even when the older
language was half forgotten there were within our memory some who would
use it if they could, and perhaps did so when they felt strongly, as a
Scotsman in strange lands may, when deeply moved, revert to what
convention insists on calling his "native doric."

The question may fairly be put to all who are dealing with proposals for
reconstruction: "Is the aim you have in view definitely and clearly to
promote the general benefit?" Most would no doubt be able quite honestly
to answer, "Yes, that is my desire"; but we must go a step farther, "Are
you willing to make that object paramount? If it were proved that in
order to provide decent housing for a number of workers your dividends
would be reduced, are you prepared still to urge that the required
accommodation shall be provided? If the removal or the imposition of a
particular tariff will benefit the community as a whole, are you
prepared to vote for such a change, though owing to it the business in
which you are personally interested may make less profit?" There are
some men whose conduct shows that an answer could be given by them in
the affirmative. When the great majority can so answer with truth, we
need have no fear that the rebuilding of Britain, even if mistakes are
made, will be on sound foundations.

To sum up: in considering each proposal we must first examine the spirit
and the aim. Try the spirit, test the aims put before us by every means
in our power; venture to measure them by the moral canons of the great
thinkers and seers which have stood the test of time. Adopt the rules to
which the acts of those who have benefited mankind have conformed or
which have received the consent of the best--the "golden" rule, hard
though it be to apply rightly and thoroughly, or Kant's principle that
each act of the individual (or community) is to be tested by the
standard whether or no it can be made of universal application, whether
it can command approval if taken as a guide for their actions by other
men or other nations as well as our own. Goodwill and Charity, to be
strong and true, must begin at home, but for their full fruition require
a field which has no bounds.

That man's the best Cosmopolite
Who loves his native country best.

Part II

PEACE

_A.--INTERNATIONAL PEACE_

CHAPTER II

LEAGUE OF NATIONS--THE NEED

_Unless a nation, like an individual, have some purpose,
some ideal, some motive which lies outside of and beyond
self-interest and self-aggrandisement, war must continue
on the face of this earth until the day when the last and
strongest man shall look out upon a world that has been
depopulated in its pursuit of a false ideal._--NICHOLAS
MURRAY BUTLER.

Paramount in importance above everything else is the establishment and
maintenance of peace between nations. No remedies for disease, no rules
for healthy life will avail, if the arteries through which the
life-blood is pouring away remain open still or are only temporarily
closed and liable after a brief interval to burst out anew. The vitality
of the nation would be gone beyond recovery if another generation of its
best manhood were to be sacrificed and its materiall resources again
squandered to meet the necessities of a great war.

Every day that the War lasts forces on us more clearly the fact that
Science, not only natural science--physics and chemistry--but also the
scientific organisation of the State as an instrument of war, has so
developed the means of destruction as either to blot out humanity or to
leave the greater part of mankind in abject and bitter slavery to the
powers that can wield most effectively the instruments of death and of
torture, if war between the leading nations breaks out again after an
interval of seeming peace. How warfare has changed within living memory!
Five-and-twenty years ago the highest authority on naval construction
spoke with contempt of the submarine as a factor in war at sea. No one
then had solved the old world problem of aerial flight. Some of the most
distinguished men of science regarded the attempts which were then being
made as hopeless. It then seemed still to be a mere dream of poets.
Wireless telegraphy was only a matter of speculation, a thing which a
few only thought of as a possibility of the future. Man has indeed
plucked the fruit of the tree of knowledge for his own destruction. What
may be the result of another quarter of a century of like advancement of
the knowledge of the means of spreading "death throughout the world and
bitter woe"? It may not be, as Dr. Murray Butler says, that the
strongest man will remain alone in a depopulated world. The strongest
may succumb to the inventions for destruction and the survivors may be a
few of those maimed or weakened by disease whom the storm has passed
over as too obscure, of too little importance even for the messengers of
Death to remember and to relieve from their misery. This is not
rhetorical exaggeration. The weapons of offence regularly win in their
race with the weapons of defence. Fortresses that took years to
construct are shattered in a day. The ironclad is sunk by the torpedo.
How very little margin lay between this country and starvation through
action of submarines! Suppose the enemy had possessed five times as many
submarines from the first, would our defensive measures have prevailed?
How small an extension in the enemy's power in the air would have
enabled him in a single night to leave London a mass of ruins, its whole
population which had not fled dying in torment from poisonous gases!
Another five-and-twenty years of advance in scientific knowledge equal
to that of the last five-and-twenty years may easily make such a result
possible.

But some man--one of those who never look beyond the next year and their
own street, and expects always to carry on business as usual--will say
that the nations will be exhausted and tired of war, and this War will
be the last. Dare any country trust to that unless a new spirit is
infused into the nations and definite steps are taken to prevent war?
Did those who had the best means of knowledge--the Government of the
day--imagine that such a war as this would break out suddenly? If they
did, they would be guilty of a crime almost unparalleled in leaving us
so unprepared and fiddling with such questions--"Welsh Disestablishment"
and the like--as occupied their time and attention and excited the
political controversies of the months and years immediately preceding
the War.

Assume even that no new war does break out again actually, dare any
nation neglect to keep up its naval and military armaments on a scale
far greater than before? How is the burden to be met when every penny
that can be raised as revenue will be needed to meet the charge on our
gigantic debt and the necessary claims for carrying on Government, to
say nothing of improving the conditions of life? We cannot, nor can
other nations, go on using up capital and borrowing indefinitely. The
choice is between assured peace and certain ruin, even if no war
actually occurs. How can peace be assured? It would be well for some of
those with the requisite historical knowledge and insight to trace
carefully the causes which have led to war in the past, to attempt a
diagnosis of the disease which has again and again devastated the world.
A vain classification might perhaps be made into religious wars,
dynastic wars, trade wars; but is there not one element common almost to
all, namely, the will to power, the desire and intention of some man or
set of men to impose their will on others, regardless of justice, which
forbids the exercise of force to prevent each thinking, speaking, acting
as he will, provided he does not injure the rights of others? It was the
assertion of a claim to dominate which led to the eighty years' war when
Spain tried to impose her yoke on the Netherlands, and blended with
desire for gain a crusade against the faiths which rejected the
supremacy of Rome. Was the Thirty years War a religious war or a
struggle between rulers to assert and extend their powers? Take any one
of the series of long wars, such as those of Louis XIV. or of Napoleon,
under what head of such a classification do they fall? Does not the
common element above mentioned apply to all of them?

The urgency of taking definite steps to secure peace has been recognised
already, much thought has been devoted to it, and schemes even in some
detail have been suggested for dealing with it. The idea of a League of
Nations to secure peace is occupying the attention of many of the wisest
minds and of the statesmen who hold the most responsible positions. It
is meeting with strong popular support, at all events in Britain and in
the United States. France and Italy are examining the proposal. It is
well, however, where attractive phrases are used and schemes proposed,
to subject them carefully to the double test: how far they cover the
ground and meet the real difficulties; and, secondly, how they would
work out in practice in the circumstances which are likely to arise. We
want to look at the question as a whole, to see exactly what we have to
aim at, sometimes to reiterate what seem almost useless truisms. The
obvious is too often overlooked. First we need to recognise the actual
facts, then let the right spirit grow up and become general, and after
that attempt to plan the best machinery and test its probable effect and
efficiency by seeing how it would be expected to work in various special
cases.

There are now in the world two fundamentally different ways of looking
at international relations. On the one hand, we have the assertions
expressed definitely in words by many Germans and acted upon
consistently without qualification by the German Government, that
justice is the interest of the stronger; that power and force may be,
and indeed ought to be, exerted by a State without any check on moral
grounds; that a strong nation must realise itself, develop and use its
strength without regard to the so-called rights of the weaker; that
"those should take who have the power, and those should keep who can."
To them Reason, Common Sense, even the Divine Law seem to say: "Assert
thyself; have the will to power." Where such a spirit exists there can
be no binding force in agreements, rules of international law are a
farce, but convenient perhaps at times for embarrassing the action of
opponents who wish to treat them with respect. The dictates of humanity
may be set aside at discretion. With that spirit argument is useless.
With those who are inspired by it there can be no compromise, no truce.
It must be met by force inspired by moral earnestness. In that struggle
the alternative for the world is victory or death. Every man who falls
fighting against such a foe dies a martyr, witnessing by his death that
so far as in him lies the embodied powers of evil shall not prevail.
Unless the Power which thus claims to dominate is defeated it is useless
to talk of peace. On the other hand, it is essential to recognise, and
keep ever before us, the spirit which is opposed to this claim for
domination, this denial of the existence of justice, and to renew in the
whole nation the spirit in which it entered into the War.

CHAPTER III

LEAGUE OF NATIONS--THE SCHEME

_If any peace after the War is to be permanent there must
be a settlement not only between territorial claims but
an arrangement with regard to the machinery by which
peace will be maintained in the future._

Perhaps the most convenient way to gain a more definite idea of what the
proposal for a League of Nations really means, to understand both its
advantages and the difficulties involved in it, may be to follow the
debate on the subject initiated by Lord Parmoor in the House of Lords in
March of 1918. It shows that the idea of a League of Nations to prevent
war is taking definite shape, and is not regarded by practical
men--statesmen with experience of the actual conduct of international
affairs, and lawyers who as members of the judicial committee of the
Privy Council have had to devote their attention to questions of
international law--as outside the range of practical politics. It shows
also that the idea will stand the test of discussion and calm criticism.

Lord Lansdowne--to whom, whatever may be thought of some recent
utterances, the country owes a debt of gratitude too little recognised,
especially for his conduct of foreign affairs at a most difficult period
during the Boer War--stated his opinion that "in a league pronouncing a
sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away
from its obligations you would have a material guarantee for the
maintenance of peace." He pointed out how "the existence of such a
league might perhaps have prevented the War in July of 1914, as it was
impossible in that time of clamour and confusion when one suggestion
after another made by those who, like Sir Edward Grey, were working for
peace was rejected, to put forward a definite proposal for dealing with
the dispute in a manner provided for by previous agreement." Lord
Parker, whose authority carries the greatest weight with jurists
everywhere, having the true lawyer's instinct for putting vague
proposals into definite shape, actually presented a draft of heads of
agreement for the establishment of a League.[1] These heads would, to
say the least, form the basis for discussion leading to practical
results. One or two of his proposed clauses may be quoted as expressing
in definite language the fundamental principles which must be the basis
of any such League. The first may appear perhaps only a "pious opinion."
It is really very much more. Assent to it means the complete repudiation
of the ideas which have guided German policy--the ideas which made world
war inevitable, and which will inevitably lead to war in the future
unless they are abandoned. Any nation which assents to the clause tells
the world that it expressly rejects those ideas and agrees that its
action shall be guided by principles diametrically opposed to them.
Assent to a declaration of the kind suggested would certainly affect the
spirit in which international questions are approached in future, and
probably the resulting action also. It runs:

"The League to recognise that war from whatever cause is a danger to our
common civilisation, and that international disputes ought to be settled
on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms." The last
clause dealing with the admission of new members of the League is the
complement of this. There is to be power "to admit a nation as a member
of the League, if satisfied in each case that the nation bona fide
accepts the principle on which the League is founded, and bona fide
intends that international disputes shall thereafter be settled by
peaceful means." It is contemplated, and rightly contemplated, that
there should be a possibility for the Central Empires to join the League
sooner or later, but it can only be on terms of their rulers at the time
saying expressly, "We abjure in the sight of the world and of our own
people those principles of action which German rulers and leaders of
thought have been inculcating for two generations." The choice for
Germany would be either to stand excommunicated from the brotherhood of
nations for ever, or to say plainly, "I declare what my professors and
schoolmasters have for half a century had to teach to be false; the
doctrines of Treitschke and of his disciple von Bernhardi are anathema;
it is infamous to adopt the statement of the German writer that 'It is
of no importance to me whether an action is just or unjust,' or that 'If
I am powerful enough to perform any deed, then I am justified in doing
it.' I renounce such leaders and teachers and all their words and works,
so that I will not follow or be led by them." It may be urged that the
recantation might not be sincere, but it would discredit the authority
of those who attempt to revive the damnable doctrines.[2]

The great difficulty, of course, arises as to the means of enforcing the
agreement against war, of finding some proper and effective sanction to
secure its observance. It may be well to note that throughout this
discussion the word sanction is used in the strict legal sense, meaning
some definite penalty or punishment to be inflicted on a wrong-doer. It
is the existence of such a "sanction" which is the clearest way of
enforcing obedience, and gives a rule of conduct the force of law.

Two definite proposals are made in Lord Parker's scheme. (1) "If an act
of war be committed against any member of the League, the Council is to
notify it, and thereupon every member should (_a_) break off diplomatic
relations with the nation guilty of such act; (_b_) prohibit and take
effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between itself and the
guilty party; (_c_) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the
guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its
territories."

A very similar suggestion, though not quite so definite, was made by the
present writer in an article on "Sanction in International Law," which
appeared in the Italian Journal "Scientia" in 1916. "The nations might
agree that any belligerent which wilfully violates or invades neutral
territory shall be treated as a moral leper. Without actually going to
war they should cease to have dealings with the invader, forbid all
intercourse of their subjects with the country which violates the
neutral territory."

For the sake of brevity this may be called the "economic boycott," but
it is really very much more than simply economic pressure. It is a
common habit in political discussions to confuse very different things,
to which the same name is given, and the term "economic boycott" is
being used to cover three proposals of very different character. (_a_)
It may mean a permanent exclusion of Germany from the markets of the
world to punish its people for supporting the crimes of its rulers and
incidentally to secure for ourselves a valuable extension of trade by
reason of the exclusion of a rival. (_b_) It may mean a temporary
measure to insure that agreed terms of peace are observed by those who
disregard "mere scraps of paper," to act as a guarantee that restitution
shall be made for wrongs done, to check the revival and extension of the
enemy's armaments, to make the German people feel the disadvantages and
loss caused by their action, and the desirability of joining with
others in repudiating war as a means of settling disputes or asserting
national claims. (_c_) It may mean a sanction for breach of the
stipulations contained in the agreement on which the League of Nations
is founded, i.e., a punishment to be inflicted on anyone who infringes
the agreement he has made--a means of insuring performance of its terms.
It is in this last sense that it is used in the present discussion.

(2) The second sanction proposed in the scheme is of a still more
serious character. The clause to embody it runs as follows:

"Certain members of the League specified in a schedule and to consist of
the chief military and naval powers, should agree, if required to do so
by a resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty
nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty
nation shall have accepted terms which shall be approved by the League."

This proposal might more effectually prevent wrong-doing, but, even if
carefully guarded as Lord Parker proposes, appears open to serious
objections. There seems grave reason to fear that while intended to
prevent war, it might really be the cause of disputes, and possibly of
war of the most deadly kind. Such a stipulation might cast a terrible
burden on a strong naval power like Great Britain, and have most
disastrous consequences. We are bound to maintain a strong navy to keep
open communication between the different parts of the Empire and also to
protect our food supplies. Without sea power Britain could in a few
months be starved into submission to any terms in case of war, but to
maintain a large navy to be at the beck and call of a Council
representing all the nations who cared to join the proposed League would
be intolerable. Suppose, for example, the United States demanded
satisfaction for some outrage on American subjects, or suppose American
subjects were threatened with massacre in some unsettled country such as
Mexico, and in order to obtain satisfaction or to protect its subjects
sent some warships to a Mexican port and landed an armed force, not with
any object of aggression, but to prevent irreparable injuries. Suppose
Great Britain was of opinion that the American demand was amply
justified, but that a majority of representatives of the League, or
even, as Lord Parker's scheme suggests, a majority of the powers named
in the Schedule, took a contrary view and called on Great Britain to
fulfil the agreement to use her naval force and commence and prosecute
to the bitter end a war against the United States because its Government
had acted at once instead of waiting while the representatives of a
score of other nations were discussing whether any action was
permissible. Would not the alternative between breaking the engagement
and undertaking a bitter and ruinous war against a powerful and friendly
nation put us in an intolerable position? Half a dozen States in the
League might for one reason or another wish to resist the claim of the
United States for redress. Names of States which might possibly so
combine could be given, but it is better to refrain. It is not
inconceivable that German penetration and intrigue at some future time
might promote a combination of the kind. All sorts of influences might
be brought to bear on certain of the States and on their
representatives. Dynastic claims might even affect them.

Unless it be with some country which she can trust and whose Government
and its aims she can thoroughly rely upon, and then only for some
limited and specific purpose, Great Britain, or any other naval or
military power, ought not to bind itself to go to war and employ its
forces. We must be free to reduce those forces or to refrain from
employing them in making war. An engagement which might in
circumstances, the real character of which no one can foresee at
present, compel us to undertake a war at the bidding of others is a
thing to which we ought never to consent. Engagements to make war are
not a safe way of promoting peace. They may possibly be justified where
there is some clearly specified object, some defined case in which
nations ally themselves to prevent some particular wrong, such, for
example, as guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Even for a single
specific agreement of this kind a very strong case is required, but that
is a totally different thing from agreeing to provide a kind of world
police to enforce and execute the orders of a Council of heterogeneous
States under conditions the nature of which no one can predict now. We
cannot tell beforehand with any certainty what will be the real
character of the proposed League Council, nor what motives may inspire
its members at some future time, nor whom the majority of them will in
fact represent. It does not necessarily follow that there can be no
sanction of any kind to enforce the rules of International Law or the
decisions of a League of Nations to prevent a breach of international
peace, no penalty attaching to those who disregard those rules or are
guilty of breaking that peace. As already stated, the economic boycott,
every member of the League agreeing to treat an aggressor as an outlaw,
and without actually going to war ceasing to have any dealings with him,
and forbidding all intercourse of its subjects with the peace-breaker,
is likely to be really effective. Lord Shaw, whose interest in the
subject is no new thing, and who has devoted long and careful
consideration to it, later in the debate gave the weight of his
authority as to the efficacy of such measures. "Let it," he said, "be
known once and for all that from the moment a nation becomes a traitor
to the League it becomes, _ipso facto_, an economic outlaw, then the
motive both for being included within and for remaining within the
League will be increased a hundredfold, and wholly for the benefit of
mankind."

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