'Of Genius', in The Occasional Paper, and Preface to The Creation by Aaron Hill
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Aaron Hill >> \'Of Genius\', in The Occasional Paper, and Preface to The Creation
Series Four
_Men, Manners and Critics_
No. 2
Anonymous, "Of Genius", in _The Occasional Paper_,
Volume III, Number 10 (1719)
and
Aaron Hill, Preface to _The Creation_ (1720)
With an Introduction by
Gretchen Graf Pahl
The Augustan Reprint Society
March, 1949
_Price: One Dollar_
_GENERAL EDITORS_
RICHARD C. BOYS, _University of Michigan_
EDWARD NILES HOOKER, _University of California, Los Angeles_
H.T. SWEDENBERG, JR., _University of California, Los Angeles_
_ASSISTANT EDITOR_
W. EARL BRITTON, _University of Michigan_
_ADVISORY EDITORS_
EMMETT L. AVERY, _State College of Washington_
BENJAMIN BOYCE, _University of Nebraska_
LOUIS I. BREDVOLD, _University of Michigan_
CLEANTH BROOKS, _Yale University_
JAMES L. CLIFFORD, _Columbia University_
ARTHUR FRIEDMAN, _University of Chicago_
SAMUEL H. MONK, _University of Minnesota_
ERNEST MOSSNER, _University of Texas_
JAMES SUTHERLAND, _Queen Mary College, London_
Lithoprinted from copy supplied by author
by
Edwards Brothers, Inc.
Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A.
[Transcriber's Note: Some of the latin footnotes and the errata were
difficult or impossible to read. These are annotated.]
INTRODUCTION
The anonymous essay "Of Genius," which appeared in the
_Occasional Paper_ of 1719, still considers "genius" largely a
matter of aptitude or talent, and applies the term to the
"mechanick" as well as the fine arts. The work is, in fact,
essentially a pamphlet on education. The author's main concern is
training, and study, and conscious endeavor. Naturally enough,
his highest praise--even where poetry is in question--is reserved
for those solid Augustan virtues of "judgment" and "good sense."
And yet the pamphlet reveals some of the tangled roots from which
the later concept of the "original" or "primitive" genius grew.
For here are two prerequisites of that later, more extravagant
concept. One is the author's positive delight in the infinite
differences of human temperaments and talents--a delight from
which might spring the preference for original or unique works of
art. The other is his conviction that there is something
necessary and foreordained about those differences: a conviction
essential to faith in the artist who is apparently at the mercy
of a genius beyond his own control. The importance of this latter
belief was long ago indicated in Paul Kaufman's "Heralds of
Original Genius."
While his tone is perhaps more exuberant than that of most of his
immediate contemporaries, there is nothing particularly new in
our author's interest in those aspects of human nature which
render a man different from his fellows. It is true that the main
stress of neoclassical thought had rested on the fundamental
likeness of all men in all ages, and had sought an ideal and
universal norm in morals, conduct, and art. But there had always
been counter currents making for a recognition of the inescapable
differences among various races and individuals. Such deviations
were often merely tolerated, but toward the close of the
seventeenth century more and more voices had praised human
diversity. England, in particular, began to take notice of the
number of "originals" abounding in the land.
At least as old as the delight in human differences was the
belief in the foreordained nature of at least those differences
resulting in specific vocational aptitudes. This is the
conviction that each man has at birth--innately and inevitably--a
peculiar "bent" for some particular contribution to human
society. Environment is not ignored by the man who wrote "Of
Genius," for he insists that each man's bent may be greatly
developed by favorable circumstances and proper education, and,
conversely, that it may be entirely frustrated by unpropitious
circumstances or wilful neglect. But in no way can a man's inborn
talent for one thing be converted to a talent for anything else.
In the works of many Augustan writers, too, it is easy to see how
the enthusiasm for individualism, later to become one of the
hallmarks of romanticism, actually sprang from an earlier faith
in a God-directed universe of law and order. There is a kind of
universal law of supply and demand, and the argument is simply
that each link in the human chain, like those in the animate and
inanimate worlds above and below it, is predestined to a specific
function for the better ordering of the whole. Lewis Maidwell,
for instance, still employs the medieval and Renaissance analogy
of the correspondence between the human body and the social
organism (_An Essay upon the Necessity and Excellency of
Education_):
Upon Consideration we find this Difference of Tempers to
arise from Providence, and the Law of the Creation, and to
be most Evident in al Irrational, and Inanimat Beings ... One
Man is no more design'd for Al Arts, than Al Arts for
One Man. We are born Confaederats, mutually to help One
another, therefor appropriated in the Body Politic, to
this, or that Busyness, as our Members are in the Natural
to perform their separat Offices.
This same comparison between the body politic and the body human
occurs in the essay of 1719, and even the author's chief analogy
drawn from musical harmony bears with it some of the flavor of an
older system of universal correspondences. His comparison of the
force of genius to the pull of gravity, however, evokes a newer
picture. Yet it is a picture no less orderly and one from which
the preordained function of each individual could be just as
logically derived. And his rhapsodic praise of the infinite
diversity of human temperaments is based on that favorite
comparison with natural scenery and that familiar canon of
neoclassical esthetics: ordered variety within unity, whether it
be in nature or in art.
The author of the pamphlet of 1719 introduces another refinement
on the idea of an inborn bent or genius. A man is born not only
with a peculiar aptitude for the vocation of writing, but with a
peculiar aptitude for a particular _style_ of writing. Some such
aptitude had presumably resulted in that individuality of style,
that particular "character," which 17th-century Biblical critics
were busily searching out in each of the writers of Scripture.
Individuality or originality in the form or plan of a work of
art, however, was quite another thing, and praise of it far more
rare. Yet there had always been protests against the imposition
of a universal classical standard, and our author's insistence
that some few geniuses have the right to discard the "Rules of
Art" and all such "Leading-strings" follows a well-worn path of
reasoning. His scientific analogy, drawn from those natural
philosophers who had cast off the yoke of Aristotle and all
"other Mens Light," is one which had appeared at least as early
as 1661 in Robert Boyle's _Considerations Touching the Style of
Holy Scripture_. It had been reiterated by Dryden and several
others who refused to recognize an _ipse dixit_ in letters any
more than in science.
It must be noted, however, that this rejection of authority for a
few rare individuals in no way constitutes a rejection of reason
or conscious art. The genius has the right to cast off the
fetters only after he has well studied them. Only in one instance
does our author waver toward another conception. This is when he
pauses to echo Rowe's preface to Shakespeare and Addison's famous
_Spectator_ no. 160. Then indeed he boasts that England has had
many "Originals" who, "without the help of Learning, by the meer
Force of natural Ability, have produc'd Works which were the
Delight of their own Times, and have been the Wonder of
Posterity." But when he doubts whether learning would have helped
or "spoiled" them, it is hard to escape the conclusion that he is
still poised on the horns of the typical neoclassical antithesis:
that supposed enmity between reason, which was generally thought
to create the form of the poem, and the emotions and imagination,
which were considered largely responsible for its style.
Only when the admiration for such emotional and imaginative
qualities should outweigh the desire for symmetrical form; when
"primitive" literature should be preferred to Virgil and Horace;
and when this preference should be joined with a belief in the
diversity and fatality of literary bents--only then could the
concept of original genius burst into full bloom.
In Aaron Hill's preface to the paraphrase of Genesis, published
in 1720, we find no preoccupation with the fatality of
temperament and style. But we do find a rising discontent with
the emptiness and restraint of much contemporary verse, and a
very real preference for a more meaningful and a more emotional
and imaginative poetry. We find, in fact, a genuine appreciation
for the poetry of the Old Testament--a poetry which Biblical
scholars like Le Clerc were already viewing as the product of
untrained primitives.
Hill was not alone in his admiration for Biblical style, for the
praise of the "unclassical" poetry of the Bible, which had begun
in the Renaissance, had swelled rather than diminished during the
neoclassical age. By the second decade of the 18th century such
Augustans as Dennis, Gildon, and Pope were crying up its
beauties. Not all agreed, of course, on just what those beauties
were. And still less did they agree on the extent to which
contemporary poetry should imitate them.
One thing upon which almost all would have agreed, however, was
the adoption of the historical point of view in the approach to
Hebrew poetry. Yet many of Hill's predecessors had stopped short
with the historical justification. Blackmore, for instance, had
condemned as bigots and sectarians all those who denied that the
Hebrew way was as great as the classical. He had pronounced it a
mere accident of fate that modern poetry of Western Europe was
modeled on that of Greece and Rome rather than on that of ancient
Israel. But he had been perfectly willing to accept that
fate--and to remodel the form and style of the book of Job on
what he considered the pattern of the classical epic.
Hill is as far as most of his contemporaries from appreciating
such a literal translation as the King James Version. On the
other hand, he is one of a small group of critics who were
beginning to see that at least certain aspects of Biblical style
were of universal appeal; that they might be as effective
psychologically for the modern Englishman as for the ancient Jew.
And he sees in this collection of ancient Oriental literature a
corrective for some of the worst tendencies of a degenerate
contemporary poetry.
Hill's attack upon the current preoccupation with form and
polish, and his contempt for mere smoothness, for the padded
redundancy of Addison and the elaborate rhetoric of Trapp, are
all part of a campaign waged by a small group of critics to make
poetry once again a vehicle of the very highest truth. He
insists, too, that great thought cannot be contained within the
untroubled cadences of the heroic couplet. His own preference led
to the freer, though currently unfashionable, Pindaric, the
irregularity of which seemed justified by Biblical example, for
despite a century and a half of study and speculation the secret
of Biblical verse had not been solved and to most critics even
the Psalms appeared devoid of any pattern. Indeed, Cowley had
declared that in their freedom of structure and abruptness of
transition the odes of Pindar were like nothing so much as the
poetry of Israel.
In addition, Hill would have the modern poet profit by another
quality of Biblical style: its magic combination of a
"magnificent Plainness" with the "Spirit of Imagery." This is the
Hebrew virtue of concrete suggestiveness, so highly prized by
20th-century critics and so alien to the generalized abstractions
and the explicit clarity of much 18th-century poetry.
In consonance with those who believed poetry best communicated
truth because it appealed to man's senses and emotions as well as
to his logical faculty, Hill praises those "pictur'd Meanings of
Poetry" which "enflame a Reader's Will, and bind down his
Attention." Yet his analysis of Trapp's metaphorical expansions
of Biblical imagery reveals that Hill does not like detailed
descriptions or long-drawn-out comparisons. Instead, he admires
the Hebrew ability to spring the imagination with a few vividly
concrete details. Prior to Hill one can find, in a few
paraphrasers and critics like Denham and Lamy, signs of an
appreciation of the concrete suggestiveness of the Bible, but
most of the hundreds of paraphrasers had felt it desirable to
expand Biblical images to beautify and clarify them. Hill was
apparently the first to prove the esthetic loss in such a
practice by an analysis of particular paraphrastic expansions.
Despite his theory, however, Hill's own paraphrase seems almost
as artificial and un-Biblical as those he condemns. He often
forgets the principles he preaches. But even in his preface there
is evident a blind spot that is a mark of his age. His false
ideas of decorum, admiration for Milton, and approval of Dennis's
interpretation of the sublime as the "vast" and the "terrible,"
all lead him to condemn the "low" or the familiar. And his own
efforts to "raise" both his language and his comparisons to suit
the "high" Biblical subject, result in personifications, compound
epithets, and a Miltonic vocabulary, by which the very simplicity
he himself found in the Bible is destroyed.
Another decade was to pass before John Husbands would demonstrate
a clear appreciation for the true simplicity of the Bible and
praise its "penmen" in terms close to those employed to describe
original genius.
Gretchen Graf Pahl
Pomona College
The essay "Of Genius," from the _Occasional Paper_ (1719), is
reproduced from a copy in the New York Public Library. The
typescript of Aaron Hill's preface is based on a copy in the
Henry E. Huntington Library. Both works are used with
permission.
THE
OCCASIONAL PAPER.
VOL. III. NUMB. X.
OF
GENIUS.
The Cartesian _Categories are contain'd in these two
Verses,_
Mens, mensura, quies, motus, positura, Figura, Sunt,
cum materia, cunctarum Exordia rerum.
_The Spiritual Nature_, Mens, _is at the head of All. It
ought to be look'd on here, as a Transcendent Nature,_
quae vagatur per omnes Categorias.
Bayle's Diction. _on the Heathen Doctrine of
many_ Genij. See _CAINITES_.
_LONDON_:
Printed for EM. MATTHEWS at the _Bible_
in _Pater-Noster-Row_; J. ROBERTS, in
_Warwick-Lane_; J. HARRISON, under the
_Royal Exchange_; and A. DODD, without
_Temple-Bar_. MDCCXIX.
OF
GENIUS.
It is a Matter of common Observation, that there is a vast
Variety in the Bent of Mens Minds. Some have a Taste of one Way
of Living, some of another; some have a Turn for one kind of
Employment, others for what is quite different. Whether this be
from the Constitution of the Mind itself, as some Soils are more
apt to produce some Plants and Herbs than others; or from the
Laws of Union between the Body and Mind, as some Climates are
more kindly to nurse particular Vegetables than others; or from
the immediate Impulse of that Power which governs the World, is
not so easy to determine.
We ascribe this to a difference of _Genius_ amongst Men. _Genius_
was a Deity worshipped by the Ancient Idolaters: Sometimes as the
God of _Nature_; sometimes as the God of a particular _City_ or
_Country_, or _Fountain_, or _Wood_, or the like; sometimes as
the Guardian and Director of a _single Person._
Exuitur, _Geniumq; meum_ prostratus adorat.
Propert. _l_. 4. _El._ 9 V. 43.
The Heathens had a Notion, that every Man upon his Birth was
given up to the[A] Conduct of some invisible Being, who was to
form his Mind, and govern and direct his Life. This _Being_ the
_Greeks_ called[B] [Greek: Daimon or Daimonion]; the _Latins,
Genius_. Some of them suppos'd a[D] Pair of _Genij_ were to
attend every _Man_ from his Birth; one Good, always putting him
on the Practice of Virtue; the other Bad, prompting him to a
vicious Behaviour; and according as their several Suggestions
were most attended to, the Man became either Virtuous or Vicious
in his Inclinations: And from this Influence, which the _Genius_
was suppos'd to have towards forming the Mind, the Word was by
degrees made to stand for the Inclination itself. Hence[E]
_indulgere Genio_ with the _Latins_ signifies, to give Scope to
Inclination, and more commonly to what is none of the best. On
the other Hand, [F]_Defraudare Genium_, signifies to deny Nature
what it craves.
[A] _Ferunt Theologi, in lucem editis Hominibus cunctis, Salva
firmitate fatali, bujusmodi quedam, velut actus vectura, numina
Sociari: Admodum tamen paucissimis visa, quos multiplices
auxere virtutes. Idque & Oracula & Autores docuerunt praclari_.
Ammian Marcel Lib. 21.
[B] [Greek: Hapanti Daimon andri symparistatai
Euthys genomeno mystagogos tou biou. Menan]
[C] Scit Genius Natale comes, qui temperat Astrum, Nature Deus
Humana. Horat. [Transcriber's Note: This footnote is not seen
in the text.]
[D] _Volunt unicuique Genium appositum Damonem benum & malum,
hoc est rationem qua ad meliora semper boriatur, & libidinem
qua ad pejora, hic est Larva & Genius malus, ille bonus Genius
& Lar._ Serv. in Virgil, Lib. 6. v. 743.
[E] _Indulge Genio: carpamus dulcia_. Pers. Sat. 5.
[F] _Suum defraudans Genium._ Terent. Phorm. Act 1.
But a _Genius_ in common Acceptation amongst _us_, doth not
barely answer to this Sense. The _Pondus Animae_ is to be taken
into its Meaning, as well as the bare Inclination; as Gravitation
in a Body (to which this bears great Resemblance) doth not barely
imply a determination of its Motion towards a certain Center, but
the _Vis_ or Force with which it is carried forward; and so the
_English_ Word _Genius_, answers to the same _Latin_ Word, and
_Ingenium_ together. [G]_Ingenium_ is the _Vis ingenita_, the
natural Force or Power with which every Being is indued; and
this, together with the particular Inclination of the Mind,
towards any Business, or Study, or Way of Life, is what we mean
by a _Genius_. Both are necessary to make a Man shine in any
Station or Employment. Nothing considerable can be done against
the Grain, or as the _Latins_ express it, _invita Minerva_, in
spite of Power and Inclination, "Forc'd Studies, says[H]
_Seneca_, will never answer: The Labour is in vain where Nature
recoils." Indeed, where the Inclination towards any Thing is
strong, Diligence and Application will in a great Measure supply
the Defect of natural Abilities: But then only is in a finish'd
_Genius_, when with a strong Inclination there is a due
Proportion of Force and Vigour in the Mind to pursue it.
[G] _Ingenium quasi intus genitum_.
[H] _Male respondent ingenia coacta; reluctante natura irritus
Labor est._
There is a vast Variety of these Inclinations among Mankind. Some
there are who have no bent to Business at all; but, if they could
indulge Inclination, would doze out Life in perpetual Sloth and
Inactivity: Others can't be altogether Idle, but incline only to
trifling and useless Employments, or such as are altogether out
of Character. Both these sorts of Men are properly good for
nothing: They just live, and help to[I] consume the Products of
the Earth, but answer no valuable End of Living, out of
Inclination I mean; Providence and good Government have sometimes
made them serviceable against it.
[I] _Fruges consumere nati_. Horat.
The better, and in Truth only valuable, Part of Mankind, have a
Turn for one sort of Business or other, but with great variety of
Taste. Some are addicted to deep Thought and Contemplation: Some
to the abstracted Speculations of Metaphysicks; some to the
evident Demonstrations of the Mathematicks; some to the History
of Nature, built upon true Narration, or accurate Observations
and Experiments: Some to the Invention of _Hypotheses_, to solve
the various _Phenomena_. Some affect the study of Languages,
Criticism, Oratory, Poetry, and such like Studies. Some have a
Taste for Musick, some for History and those Sciences which must
help to Accuracy in it: Some have Heads turned for Politicks, and
others for Wars. Some few there are of such quick and strong
Faculties, as to grasp at every thing, and who have made a very
eminent Figure in several Professions at once. We have known in
our Days the same Men learned in the Laws, acute Philosophers,
and deep Divines: We have known others at once eloquent Orators,
brave Soldiers, and finished Statesmen. But these Instances are
rare.
The more general Inclination among Men is to some Mechanical
Business. Of this there is most general Use for the Purposes of
Human Life, and it needs most Hands to carry it on. The bulk of
Mankind seem turned for some or other of these Employments, and
make them their Choice; and were not such a multiplicity of Hands
engaged in them, great part of the Conveniencies of Human Life
would be wanting. But even the Multitude of these Employments
leaves room for great variety of Inclinations, and for different
_Genij_, to display and exert themselves.
This is an admirable and wise Provision to answer every End and
Occasion of Mankind, for a sure and harmonious Concurrence of
Mens Actions to all the necessary and useful Affairs of the
World. When in very different Ways, but with equal Pleasure and
Application, they contribute to the Order and Service of the
whole. Mr. _Dryden_ has given an Hint, how we may form a
beautiful and pleasing Idea of this from the Powers of Musick,
that arise from the Variety and artful Composition of Sounds.
_From Harmony, from Heavenly Harmony,
This Universal Frame began.
From Harmony to Harmony,
Thro' all the Compass of the Notes it ran,
The Diapasm closing full in Man._
There seems to be a wonderful Likeness in the natural Make of
Mens Minds to the various Tones and Measures of Sounds; and in
their Inclinations and most pleasing Tastes to the several Styles
and Manners of Musick. Something there is in the Mind, of alike
Composition, that is easily touch'd by the kindred Harmony of
Musick,
_For Man may justly tuneful Strains admire,
His Soul is Musick, and his Breast a Lyre._
We have all the Materials of Musick in the Tones and Measure. For
the infinite Variety Composition admits of, can be nothing else,
but higher or lower Tones, stronger or softer Sounds, with a
slower or swifter Motion. The Artist, by an harmonious Mixture
of these, makes the Musick either strong and martial, brisk and
airy, grave and solemn, or soft and moving.
There seems to be in Man a Composition of natural Powers and
Capacities, not unlike to these. From hence I would take the
first Original of their distinguishing _Genij_. The Words by
which they are usually explain'd, have a manifest Allusion
hereto. Thus we say of some Men, they have a brisk and airy
_Genius_; of others, they have a strong and active _Genius_, a
quick and lively Spirit, a grave and solemn Temper, and the like.
The different readiness of Apprehension, strength of Judgment,
vivacity of Fancy and Imagination, with a more or less active
Disposition, and the several Mixtures of which these Powers are
capable, are sufficient to explain this. They may shew us how
some have a particular _Genius_ for Wit and Humour, others for
Thought and Speculation. Whence it is, some love a constant and
persevering Application to whatever they undertake; and others
are continually jumping from one Thing to another, without
finishing any thing at all.
But we do not only consider in Musick these Materials, as I may
call them, of which it is composed; but also the Style and
Manner. This diversifies the _Genius_ of the Composer, and
produces the most sensible and touching Difference. There is in
all Musick the natural difference of Tone and Measure. They are
to be found in the most vulgar Compositions of a Jig or an
Hornpipe. But it is a full Knowledge of the Force and Power of
Sounds, and a judicial Application of them to the several
Intentions of Musick, that forms the Style of a _Purcel_ or
_Corelli_. This is owing to successive Improvements. The Ear is
formed to an elegant Judgment by Degrees. What is harsh and
harmonious is discovered and corrected. By many Advantages, some
at last come to find out what, in the whole Compass of Sounds, is
most soft and touching, most brisk and enlivening, most lofty and
elevating. So that whatever the Artist intends, whether to set an
Air, or compose a _Te Deum_, he does either, with an equal
_Genius_, that is, with equal Propriety and Elegance. Thus long
ago,