The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future by A. T. Mahan
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A. T. Mahan >> The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future
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The aim of any discussion such as this should be to narrow down, by a
gradual elimination, the various factors to be considered, in order
that the decisive ones, remaining, may become conspicuously visible.
The trees being thus thinned out, the features of the strategic
landscape can appear. The primary processes in the present case have
been carried out before seeking the attention of the reader, to whom
the first approximations have been presented under three heads. First,
the two decisive centres, the mouth of the Mississippi and the
Isthmus. Second, the four principal routes, connecting these two
points with others, have been specified; these routes being, 1,
between the Isthmus and the Mississippi themselves; 2, from the
Isthmus to the North American coast, by the Windward Passage; 3, from
the Gulf of Mexico to the North American coast, by the Strait of
Florida; and, 4, from the Isthmus to Europe, by the Anegada Passage.
Third, the principal military positions throughout the region in
question have been laid down, and their individual and relative
importance indicated.
From the subsequent discussion it seems evident that, as
"communications" are so leading an element in strategy, the position
or positions which decisively affect the greatest number or extent of
the communications will be the most important, so far as situation
goes. Of the four principal lines named, three pass close to, and are
essentially controlled by, the islands of Cuba and Jamaica, namely,
from the Mississippi to the Isthmus by the Yucatan Channel, from the
Mississippi to the Atlantic coast of America by the Strait of Florida,
and from the Isthmus to the Atlantic coast by the Windward Passage.
The fourth route, which represents those from the Isthmus to Europe,
passes nearer to Jamaica than to Cuba; but those two islands exercise
over it more control than does any other one of the archipelago, for
the reason that any other can be avoided more easily, and by a wider
interval, than either Jamaica or Cuba.
Regarded as positions, therefore, these two islands are the real
rivals for control of the Caribbean and of the Gulf of Mexico; and it
may be added that the strategic centre of interest for both Gulf and
Caribbean is to be found in the Windward Passage, because it furnishes
the ultimate test of the relative power of the two islands to control
the Caribbean. For, as has been said before, and cannot be repeated
too often, it is not position only, nor chiefly, but mobile force,
that is decisive in war. In the combination of these two elements
rests the full statement of any case. The question of position has
been adjudged in favor of Cuba, for reasons which have been given. In
the case of a conflict between the powers holding the two islands, the
question of controlling the Windward Passage would be the test of
relative mobile strength; because that channel is the shortest and
best line of communications for Jamaica with the American coast, with
Halifax, and with Bermuda, and as such it must be kept open. If the
power of Jamaica is not great enough to hold the passage open by
force, she is thrown upon evasion--upon furtive measures--to maintain
essential supplies; for, if she cannot assert her strength so far in
that direction, she cannot, from her nearness, go beyond Cuba's reach
in any direction. Abandonment of the best road in this case means
isolation; and to that condition, if prolonged, there is but one
issue.
The final result, therefore, may be stated in this way: The advantages
of situation, strength, and resources are greatly and decisively in
favor of Cuba. To bring Jamaica to a condition of equality, or
superiority, is needed a mobile force capable of keeping the Windward
Passage continuously open, not only for a moment, nor for any
measurable time, but throughout the war. Under the present conditions
of political tenure, in case of a war involving only the two states
concerned, such a question could admit of no doubt; but in a war at
all general, involving several naval powers, the issue would be less
certain. In the war of 1778 the tenure, not of the Windward Passage
merely, but of Jamaica itself, was looked upon by a large party in
Great Britain as nearly hopeless; and it is true that only a happy
concurrence of blundering and bad luck on the part of its foes then
saved the island. It is conceivable that odds which have happened once
may happen again.
THE END.
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